Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 1 of 27 PageID: 177

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TRACY MORGAN, ARDLEY FUQUA,

JR., JEFFREY MILLEA and KRISTA
MILLEA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
WAL-MART STORES, INC. and WALMART TRANSPORTATION, LLC,
Defendants.
___________________________________________/

PLAINTIFFS OPPOSITION TO KEVIN ROPERS MOTION TO

INTERVENE

Return Date: 12/15/14

Opposition Date: 12/1/14

David T. Sirotkin
Benedict P. Morelli
David S. Ratner
MORELLI ALTERS RATNER, LLP
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
777 Third Avenue, 31st Floor
New York, NY 10015
(212) 751-9800 Telephone
(212) 751-0046 Facsimile

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 2 of 27 PageID: 178

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preliminary Statement.1
I.

Mr. Ropers Request to Stay Discovery Should be Denied.3

1. Similarity of the Issues Between Civil and Criminal Case.4
2. Status of the Criminal Case7
3. Prejudice to Plaintiff...8
4. Burden on Defendant....11
5. The Interest of the Court...14
6. The Public Interest15

II.

Mr. Roper Should Not Be Permitted to Intervene in this Case..17

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) Intervention as of Right18
B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(b) Permissive Intervention...21

Conclusion.21

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 3 of 27 PageID: 179

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810
(1976)...12
Benjamin v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare of Pennsylvania, 432 F. App'x 94
(3d Cir. 2011)......18
Castellani v. City of Atl. City, No. CIV. 13-5848 RMB/AMD, 2014 WL
201955 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2014)...5-9,15
Colombo v. Bd. of Educ. for the Clifton Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A. 11-00785
CCCC, 2011 WL 5416058, (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2011).12
Cress v. City of Ventnor, No. CIV. 08-1873(NLH), 2009 WL 750193
(D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2009)....4,5,8,9,14,15
De Vita v. Sills, 422 F.2d 1172 (3d Cir.1970)...3
Forrest v. Corzine, 757 F. Supp. 2d 473 (D.N.J. 2010)3,5,14,15
Gold v. JohnsMansville Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068 (3d Cir.1983)..3
Golden Quality Ice Cream Co. v. Deerfield Specialty, 87 F.R.D. 53 (E.D. Pa.
1980)..4
Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1133 (3d. Cir. 1982)...21
In re Herley Indus. Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV A 06-2596, 2007 WL 1120246
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2007)..10
In re New Jersey Tax Sales Certificates Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 5512661.16
In re Par Pharmaceutical Inc., 133 F.R.D. 12, 13 (S.D.N.Y.1990)...7
Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Service, 157 F.3d 964 (3d Cir.1998).19
Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936).3

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 4 of 27 PageID: 180

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 419 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2005)20
Mountain Top Condo. Ass'n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361
(3d Cir. 1995)......19
NJ Affordable Homes Corp., No. 05-60442(DHS), 2007 WL 869577, (Bankr.
D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2007)7
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Malon S. Andrus, Inc., 486 F.Supp.
1118 (S.D.N.Y.1980)...11
Panthera Rail Car LLC v. Kasgro Rail Corp., No. CIV.A. 13-679, 2014 WL
1612646 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2014)......19
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Beckham-Easley, No. CIV.A. 01-5530, 2002
WL 31111766 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2002)..7,8,12,16
Sterling National Bank v. A1 Hotels International, Inc., 175 F. Supp 2d. 573
(2nd Cir.2001)..9,11
United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. Ass'n, 811 F.Supp. 802
(E.D.N.Y.1992).7
U.S. v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n. 27, 90 S.Ct. 763, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970).3
Walsh Sec., Inc. v. Cristo Prop. Mgmt., Ltd., 7 F. Supp. 2d 523 (D.N.J.
1998)..3,7,15
Statutes
NJCCJ 2C:11-5...2
NJCCJ 2C:12-1C(1)2
Rules
49 C.F.R. part 831...10
Fed. R. Civ. P 24.17

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 5 of 27 PageID: 181

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)....17,18,20,21

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(b)......17,21

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 6 of 27 PageID: 182

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
TRACY MORGAN, ARDLEY
Civil Action No. 14-cv-04388
FUQUA, JR., JEFFREY MILLEA and : (MAS) (LHG)
KRISTA MILLEA,
:
Plaintiffs,
:
Plaintiffs Opposition to Kevin
v.
Ropers Motion to Intervene
:
WAL-MART STORES, INC. and
:
WAL-MART TRANSPORTATION,
LLC,
:
Defendants.

Motion Date: December 15, 2014

Plaintiffs Tracy Morgan, Ardley Fuqua, Jr., Jeffrey Millea, and Krista
Millea (collectively, Plaintiffs) hereby submit this Opposition to Kevin
Ropers Motion to Intervene for the Purpose of Requesting a Stay of
Discovery.
Preliminary Statement
On June 7, 2014, Mr. Roper, while in the course of his employment as
a Wal-Mart truck driver, was involved in serious motor vehicle accident.
The accident occurred when the Peterbilt truck driven by Mr. Roper
slammed into the rear of the Mercedes Benz Sprinter limousine vehicle
occupied by Mr. Morgan, Mr. Fuqua, Jr., and Mr. Millea. The accident
occurred on a section of the New Jersey Turnpike in Cranbury, NJ where the
1

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 7 of 27 PageID: 183

speed limit was reduced from 55 miles-per-hour to 45 miles-per-hour

because of ongoing construction. The truck was traveling 65 miles-per-hour
at the time of the collision. Mr. Morgan, Mr. Fuqua, Jr., and Mr. Millea all
sustained serious personal injuries.
Mr. Roper was arrested and was criminally charged by the Middlesex
County Prosecutor for Death by Auto, NJCCJ 2C:11-5, and Assault by
Auto, NJCCJ 2C:12-1C(1). Mr. Roper has not been indicted.
On July 11, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the instant civil lawsuit against WalMart Stores, Inc., and Wal-Mart Transportation, LLC. Notably, Plaintiffs
did not name Mr. Roper as a defendant in the case.
Now, over four months after Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, Mr.
Roper seeks to intervene in this case. Mr. Ropers sole purpose for seeking
intervention is to request that discovery be stayed in its entirety. However,
as will be articulated more fully below, a stay of discovery is inappropriate
in this case. Accordingly, Mr. Roper should not be permitted to intervene
because no purpose would be served by permitting his intervention. This
Opposition will first address why a stay is inappropriate in this case, and
then address why Mr. Ropers request to intervene is inappropriate.

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 8 of 27 PageID: 184

I.

Mr. Ropers Request to Stay Discovery Should be Denied

The stay of a civil proceeding is an extraordinary remedy and is not

favored. Forrest v. Corzine, 757 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (D.N.J. 2010) (citing
Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153
(1936)). However, a court has the discretion to stay a case if the interests of
justice so require. Id., (citing U.S. v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n. 27, 90 S.Ct.
763, 25 L.Ed.2d 1 (1970)). A stay of a civil case where there are pending
criminal proceedings is not constitutionally required but may be warranted
in certain circumstances. Id., (citing U.S. v. Kordel, 397 US at 12; De Vita v.
Sills, 422 F.2d 1172, 1181 (3d Cir.1970)). Whether to stay a case calls for
the exercise of judgment which must weigh competing interests and
maintain an even balance. Id., (citing, Landis, 299 U.S. at 25455).
However, it is well settled that before a stay may be issued, the petitioner
must demonstrate a clear case of hardship or inequity, if there is even a
fair possibility that the stay would work damage on another party. Gold v.
JohnsMansville Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068, 107576 (3d Cir.1983) (citing
Landis, 299 U.S. at 255).
Courts in the Third Circuit, and specifically the District of New Jersey
have relied on weighing the six factors set forth in Walsh Sec., Inc. v. Cristo
Prop. Mgmt., Ltd., 7 F. Supp. 2d 523, 526 (D.N.J. 1998) in considering
3

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 9 of 27 PageID: 185

whether to stay a civil case when there are pending criminal proceedings.1
These factors are: (1) the extent to which the issues in the criminal and civil
case overlap; (2) the status of the case including whether the defendant has
been indicted; (3) the plaintiff's interest in proceeding expeditiously weighed
against the prejudice to plaintiff caused by a delay; (4) the private interests
of and burden on defendants; (5) the interests of the court; and (6) the public
interest. Id. at 52729. After applying the six Walsh Securities Factors to
the facts of this case and weighing the accordingly, it is clear that Mr.
Ropers request for a stay should be denied.
Walsh Securities Factors:
1. Similarity of the Issues Between Civil and Criminal Case
Under the first Walsh Securities factor, the court must examine the
extent to which the issues in the criminal and civil proceedings overlap.
Cress v. City of Ventnor, No. CIV. 08-1873(NLH), 2009 WL 750193, at *2
(D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2009). Although not conclusive, a court is less likely to

Mr. Roper mistakenly relies on the five factors set forth in Golden Quality
Ice Cream Co. v. Deerfield Specialty, 87 F.R.D. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1980) in
considering whether to grant a stay. Golden Quality Ice Cream is not the
seminal case on the issue, and conspicuously fails to consider the important
factor of whether or not the criminal defendant seeking to intervene in a civil
action has been indicted, as Mr. Roper has not yet been indicted.
4

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 10 of 27 PageID: 186

grant a stay if the issues in parallel civil and criminal proceedings do not
completely overlap. Id.
First, it is important to note that although there are criminal charges
pending against Kevin Roper, he is not a defendant in the instant civil case.
It has been uncommon for the Court to grant motions to intervene for the
purpose of staying civil cases when the motions were brought by somebody
other than a defendant in both the civil and criminal proceedings. Cress,
2009 WL 750193, (Motion for Stay of civil proceedings denied), Forrest v.
Corzine, 757 F. Supp. 2d 473, 479 (D.N.J. 2010) (Motion for Stay of civil
proceedings denied), Castellani v. City of Atl. City, No. CIV. 13-5848
RMB/AMD, 2014 WL 201955 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2014), (Motion for Stay of
civil proceedings denied).
Second, although there is overlap between the civil and criminal
proceedings, they do not overlap in all aspects. Cress, 2009 WL 750193, at
*2. Although both the Plaintiffs claims and the criminal charges arise out
of the motor vehicle accident, Plaintiffs claims are broader than just the
instant motor vehicle accident. Id. (Motion to Intervene for the Purpose of
Requesting a Stay of Discovery denied where Plaintiffs claims were much
broader than just the incident which gave rise to the criminal charges). The
criminal charges against Mr. Roper arise solely out of the accident, and
5

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 11 of 27 PageID: 187

pertain solely to his alleged reckless driving which caused the accident and
injuries to the Plaintiffs and other vehicle occupants. In contrast, Plaintiffs
punitive damages claims against Wal-Mart are broader because they pertain
to its reckless or intentional conduct in allowing its drivers to commute
unreasonable distances to work immediately before beginning their shifts
(i.e. over 700 miles for Mr. Roper), failing to properly maintain the
collision-avoidance systems in its trucks, and routinely permitting its drivers
to work shifts longer than permitted by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (F.M.S.C.A.) Regulations, thereby failing to take proper
measures to combat the serious danger of its drivers suffering from fatigue.
These allegations are unspecific to Mr. Ropers accident, but rather pertain
to Wal-Marts custom, practice, regulation, and maintenance of its entire
trucking fleet.
Third, even if the Court finds that the issues in the pending civil and
criminal proceedings overlap extensively here, it still must deny the
requested stay because the balance of the other Walsh Securities factors
weigh against the requested stay. Indeed, Courts in this Circuit have denied
motions for stays where the first Walsh Securities factor weighed in favor of
a stay, but the weight of the other factors did not. Castellani, 2014 WL

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 12 of 27 PageID: 188

201955, at *2; NJ Affordable Homes Corp., No. 05-60442(DHS), 2007 WL

869577, at *5 (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2007).
2. Status of the Criminal Case
As to the second Walsh Securities factor:
The strongest case for a stay of discovery in the civil case
occurs during a criminal prosecution after an indictment is
returned. The potential for self-incrimination is greatest during
this stage, and the potential harm to civil litigants arising from
delaying them is reduced due to the promise of a fairly quick
resolution of the criminal case under the Speedy Trial Act.
Walsh Securities, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 527. Conversely, because the risk of
self-incrimination is reduced at the pre-indictment stage, and because of the
uncertainty surrounding when, if ever, indictments will be issued, as well as
the effect of the delay on the civil trial, pre-indictment requests for a stay are
typically denied. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Beckham-Easley, No.
CIV.A. 01-5530, 2002 WL 31111766, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2002)
(citing, Walsh Securities, 7 F.Supp. at 527); See also, United States v.
Private Sanitation Indus. Ass'n, 811 F.Supp. 802, 805 (E.D.N.Y.1992)), See
also, In re Par Pharmaceutical Inc., 133 F.R.D. 12, 13 (S.D.N.Y.1990), See
also, In re NJ Affordable Homes Corp., 2007 WL 869577, at *6 (As noted
in Walsh, requests for a stay pre-indictment are generally denied,
specifically due to the indefinite delay on civil proceedings and the
decreased risk of self-incrimination).
7

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 13 of 27 PageID: 189

Here, Mr. Roper has not been indicted. Further, there is no indication
if he will be indicted, or when the final decision whether or not to indict him
will be made. Thus, staying the instant civil case would result in an
indefinite delay that would be extremely prejudicial to the Plaintiffs. See,
Cress, 2009 WL 750193 at *2, (Unlike when an indictment has been
returned, here there is less certainty that [the criminal defendants] criminal
trial will begin shortly. Thus, a stay would be indefinite, prejudicing
Plaintiffs.). Accordingly, the second Walsh Securities factor weighs
heavily in favor of denying Mr. Ropers request for a stay of the civil case.
3. Prejudice to Plaintiff
The third Walsh Securities factor is plaintiff's interests in proceeding
expeditiously weighed against the prejudice to plaintiff caused by a delay.
Castellani, 2014 WL 201955, at *2. Mr. Ropers Memorandum of Law
misconstrues Walsh Securities where it states, Prejudice to a party only
results when the passage of time allows memories to fade, witnesses to
relocate, or otherwise become unavailable. (Movants Memo of Law, pp. 8)
(emphasis added). It is true that the Court may insist that the Plaintiff
establish more prejudice than simply the right to pursue his case and
vindicate his claim expeditiously. State Farm, 2002 WL 31111766, at *3.
However, courts have noted, that it would be perverse if plaintiffs who
8

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 14 of 27 PageID: 190

claim to be the victims of criminal activity were to receive slower justice

than other plaintiffs because the behavior they allege is sufficiently
egregious to have attracted the attention of the criminal authorities. Id.,
(quoting, Sterling National Bank v. A1 Hotels International, Inc., 175 F.
Supp 2d. 573, 575 (2nd Cir.2001).
The Movants assertion that a stay would not prejudice the parties in
any way other than to necessitate a brief delay in the continuation of
discovery is completely unfounded. (Movants Memo of Law, pp. 8)
(emphasis added). In fact, because Mr. Roper has not been indicted, the
delay in the civil proceeding would be indefinite. Plaintiffs have an interest
in the expeditious resolution of their civil action. Cress, 2009 WL 750193,
at *3, Castellani, 2014 WL 201955, at *2. Additionally, Plaintiffs will suffer
financial hardship if they are unable to proceed expeditiously with their civil
suit as the injuries they sustained in this accident have left them unable to
work. Further, a delay of discovery creates the risk of witnesses memories
fading, witnesses becoming unavailable, documents becoming lost or
destroyed, or other evidence going missing.
Moreover, Plaintiffs would be prejudiced by a stay of the civil trial
because it appears that Wal-Mart is attempting to gain an unfair advantage.

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 15 of 27 PageID: 191

In re Herley Indus. Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV A 06-2596, 2007 WL 1120246,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2007) (citing attempt to gain an unfair advantage
from the stay as a factor courts may consider under the third Walsh
Securities factor). Since the Complaint was filed, Wal-Mart has sought to
delay the instant civil case. Initially, Wal-Mart attempted to delay by hiding
behind the ongoing National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB)
investigation, claiming it could not provide investigative information
pursuant to 49 C.F.R. part 831. This ploy enabled Wal-Mart to file an
Answer which failed to respond to nearly half of the allegations of the
Complaint. In doing so, Wal-Mart submitted form responses, rather than
legitimate responses to allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint such as On June
7, Kevin Roper was employed by Wal-Mart as a driver, Mr. Roper lived in
Jonesboro, GA, and Mr. Ropers job was based out of a Wal-Mart facility
in Smyrna, DE. Plaintiffs made efforts to resolve any issues which might
have hindered Wal-Mart from meaningfully participating in discovery as a
result of the ongoing NTSB investigation. Once it was clear that Wal-Mart
would no longer be able to use the NTSB as a delay tactic, the instant
Motion to Intervene for the Purposes of Requesting a Stay was filed in short

10

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 16 of 27 PageID: 192

order.2 Mr. Ropers request to stay discovery in the instant civil case in its
entirety is also suspect, when really a stay of his deposition is all Mr. Roper
would potentially need to protect his individual interest. Wal-Mart should
not be permitted to use Mr. Ropers criminal proceedings as a shield in a
civil suit. Sterling Nat. Bank v. A-1 Hotels Int'l, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 2d 573,
575 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v.
Malon S. Andrus, Inc., 486 F.Supp. 1118, 1119 (S.D.N.Y.1980) (That
defendant's conduct also resulted in a criminal charge against him should not
be availed of by him as a shield against a civil suit and prevent plaintiff from
expeditiously advancing its claim.) Based upon how this civil case has
transpired thus far, it is reasonable to believe that Wal-Mart is attempting to
gain an unfair advantage by using the instant Motion as a ploy to further
delay this trial, thereby prejudicing the Plaintiffs.
Accordingly, the third Walsh Securities factor weighs in favor of
denying Movants request to stay this civil case.
4. Burden on Defendant

Counsel for the Defendants submitted the Parties Proposed Joint

Discovery Plain to the Court via e-mail on November 14 at 1:08PM.
Plaintiffs received notice via ECF that the instant Motion to Intervene for
the Purpose of Requesting a Stay of Discovery was filed at 3:45PM on the
same day. This Motion mimicked language from the proposed Joint
Discovery Plan, even though the Proposed Joint Discovery Plan was not yet
public record.
2

11

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 17 of 27 PageID: 193

With respect to the fourth Walsh Securities factor, Defendant

experiences a significant burden when he must choose between waiving his
Fifth Amendment rights by defending himself in the civil lawsuit and
asserting the privilege and possibly losing the civil case. Colombo v. Bd. of
Educ. for the Clifton Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A. 11-00785 CCCC, 2011 WL
5416058, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 4, 2011) (citing State Farm, 2002 WL 3111176,
at *3. However, it is not unconstitutional to force a defendant to make the
choice between waiving his Fifth Amendment rights and losing the civil
case. Id., (citing Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 31819, 96 S.Ct.
1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976).
Here, Mr. Roper is not a party to the civil case, so he does not need to
choose between waiving his Fifth Amendment rights by defending himself
in the civil lawsuit and asserting the privilege and possibly losing the civil
case. Further, Plaintiffs have not made any claims against Roper, and
therefore have not alleged that he was driving recklessly. While the
outcome of any criminal action would have an effect on the civil case
against Wal-Mart since it is vicariously liable for its drivers conduct in the
course of their employment, the converse is not true since any verdict
obtained in the civil case would be inadmissible in Mr. Ropers criminal
case.
12

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 18 of 27 PageID: 194

A Scheduling Order has been entered in the instant civil case, and the
parties have until June 15, 2014 to complete fact discovery. Plaintiffs are
willing to accommodate Mr. Roper by waiting until the very end of the fact
discovery period to take his deposition. That provides nearly seven months
to see what transpires with regard to Mr. Ropers criminal proceedings, with
absolutely no prejudice to Mr. Roper. It is possible that a grand jury will not
indict Mr. Roper, at which point he will suffer no prejudice in testifying in
the instant civil case. If a grand jury does indict him, or no decision has
been made yet, the parties can revisit the issue at that point in time, when the
parties and the Court will have a better idea what the best course of action to
take is. However, staying discovery in its entirety at this juncture in the case
is a drastic measure that is extremely prejudicial to the plaintiffs, while
providing no practical benefit to Mr. Roper.
Movant argues that discovery will, without question, provide
information that would not otherwise be discoverable in the criminal matter
and provide examples of Mr. Ropers strategy in a defense of the criminal
matter. However, Movant makes these bald assertions without any factual
support or supporting case law.
Accordingly, the fourth Walsh Securities factor weighs in favor of
denying a stay of the instant civil case.
13

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 19 of 27 PageID: 195

5. The Interest of the Court

As to the fifth Walsh Securities factor, the Court has an interest in
judicial efficiency in terms of managing its caseload. See, Cress, 2009 WL
750193, at *3. In Cress, the Movant had not been indicted, thereby making
any stay indefinite. Thus, the fifth Walsh Securities factor weighed against
granting a stay. Id. See also, Forrest, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 478 ([Movants]
requested stay will last indefinitely since no one can accurately predict when
the ongoing police investigation and prosecution will end. The stay will
undoubtedly serve to delay the ultimate resolution of what is expected to be
a complex case. After plaintiff filed his lawsuit he had a right to expect an
expeditious resolution.) Similarly, here, Mr. Roper has not been indicted,
and any stay of the instant civil case would be indefinite.
Further, [t]he interests of justice demand that the case be managed to
protect all parties' rights and to assure a reasonably prompt resolution In
the absence of good cause or material prejudice to a party, plaintiff is
entitled to his discovery sooner rather than later. Forrest, 757 F. Supp. 2d
at 478. Here, Mr. Roper has not shown any good cause or material prejudice

14

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 20 of 27 PageID: 196

to him as to why Plaintiffs are not entitled to discovery sooner rather than
later.
Even if Mr. Roper could show good cause for why discovery should
be delayed, the Court would have no reason to stay discovery in its entirety.
Rather, the Court could take the significantly less drastic measure of merely
delaying Mr. Ropers deposition to prevent any potential prejudice to him.
Accordingly, the fifth Walsh, factor weighs heavily in favor of
denying Movants requested stay.
6. The Public Interest
The final Walsh Securities factor to consider is whether a civil case
involves a matter of significant public interest. Cress, 2009 WL 750193, at
*3. For example, [c]ourts have denied stays where the civil case, brought
by a government agency, was intended to protect the public by halting the
distribution of mislabeled drugs ..., or the dissemination of misleading
information to the investing public ... Id., (citing Walsh Securities, 7
F.Supp.2d at 529). Courts have also weighed this factor in favor of denying
a stay where the plaintiffs allegations raise an issue that is legitimately a
matter of public concern. Castellani, 2014 WL 201955, at *3 (allegations of
false arrest and excessive force against police officers), Forrest v. Corzine,
757 F. Supp. 2d at 479 (allegations of police misconduct), State Farm, 2002
15

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 21 of 27 PageID: 197

WL 31111766, at *4 (allegation of a fraudulent insurance claim), In re NJ

Affordable Homes Corp., 2007 WL 869577, at *7(allegations of a massive
fraudulent schemes), In re New Jersey Tax Sales Certificates Antitrust Litig.,
2014 WL 5512661, at *13 (allegations of unlawful conspiracy to restrain
trade).
This accident has sharpened the publics focus on the serious issue of
trucking accidents. The NTSB has engaged in a full investigation of this
accident, which is uncommon. The number of fatal large-truck crashes has
steadily increased in the U.S. According to the most recent statistics from
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, there were 3,921
deaths and approximately 104,000 people injured in crashes involving large
trucks in 2012. Wal-Mart has its own fleet of private trucks which comprises
one of the largest transportation operations around the globe. The fleet
consists of approximately 7,400 drivers, 80,000 associates in logistics, 6,121
tractors, 60,000 trailers, and 124 distribution centers. Wal-Mart drivers drive
over 713 million miles per year, making deliveries to 4,000 stores annually.
It is believed that Wal-Mart systematically engages in unsafe trucking
practices, including, but not limited to having its drivers commute
unreasonable distances to work immediately before their shifts and without
rest (i.e. 700-plus miles for Mr. Roper), failing to properly maintain
16

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 22 of 27 PageID: 198

collision-avoidance technology in its trucks, and routinely permitting its

drivers to work shifts longer than permitted by the F.M.S.C.A. Regulations.
Wal-Marts practices place drivers and passengers on Americas roadways
in great danger of suffering similar fates to the victims in this accident:
serious injury or death. Therefore, the public has a great interest discovery
in this case proceeding expeditiously so that Wal-Marts alleged trucking
practices will be uncovered and hopefully made safer going forward.
Accordingly, the sixth Walsh Securities factor weighs heavily in favor
of denying a stay.
A balancing of all of the Walsh Securities factors makes clear that Mr.
Ropers request to stay discovery in this case should be denied. Therefore,
there is no reason to review the merits of whether Mr. Roper should be
permitted to intervene, because his sole purpose for seeking intervention is
to request a stay of discovery.
II.

Mr. Roper Should Not Be Permitted to Intervene in this Case

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 24, Mr. Roper seeks to intervene in the

instant civil case for the limited purpose of staying discovery both as of
right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) and via permissive intervention under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(b). Mr. Roper should not be permitted to intervene
under either rule.
17

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 23 of 27 PageID: 199

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2) Intervention as of Right

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) requires that a Court grant
intervention to anyone who claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that disposing
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability
to protect its interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that
interest. A petitioner seeking to intervene of right must establish that: (1)
the application for intervention is timely; (2) the applicant has a sufficient
interest in the litigation; (3) the interest may be affected or impaired, as a
practical matter, by the disposition of the action; and (4) the interest is not
adequately represented by an existing party in the litigation. Benjamin v.
Dep't of Pub. Welfare of Pennsylvania, 432 F. App'x 94, 97 (3d Cir. 2011).
Each of these requirements must be met to intervene as of right. Mountain
Top Condo. Ass'n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 366
(3d Cir. 1995). The claimed interest in the litigation must be one that is
specific [to those seeking to intervene], is capable of definition, and will be
directly affected in a substantially concrete fashion by the relief sought. Id.,
(citing, Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Service, 157 F.3d 964, 972 (3d Cir.1998)).
It is not disputed that Mr. Ropers Motion to Intervene is timely.
However, Plaintiffs dispute the other three requirements for intervention as
18

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 24 of 27 PageID: 200

of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). An intervenor is required to

demonstrate an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action. Panthera Rail Car LLC v. Kasgro Rail Corp., No.
CIV.A. 13-679, 2014 WL 1612646, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2014)
(citing Mountain Top Condominium Ass'n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder,
Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir.1995). Mr. Roper has no sufficient interest in
the property or transaction that is the subject of this civil case. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Additionally, the outcome of this civil case has no bearing
on Mr. Roper as he is not a party, and it will not affect his criminal
proceedings should he be indicted. While any outcome in Mr. Ropers
criminal action would have an effect on the civil case against Wal-Mart
since it is vicariously liable for its drivers, the converse is not true since the
verdict in the civil case is inadmissible in the criminal case.
Mr. Roper, in his Motion, merely states that he seeks to protect his
constitutional, criminal procedural, and due process rights, without any
further support or explanation. (Movants Memo of Law, pp 4). If a movant
does not establish a sufficient interest to intervene, the Court must end its
analysis and not proceed to the impairment element. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Treesdale, Inc., 419 F.3d 216, 227 (3d Cir. 2005). Accordingly, as Mr.

19

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 25 of 27 PageID: 201

Roper has failed to show a sufficient interest to intervene in the civil case,
the Court should end its analysis here.
Should the Court find that Mr. Roper has a sufficient interest in the
civil case to intervene, he cannot show that his interest would be affected or
impaired, as a practical matter by the outcomes. Mr. Roper argues that his
Constitutional rights would be directly impaired depending upon the
ultimate outcomes of matters such as: requests for protective orders;
subpoenas; depositions; interrogatories; production of documents, things and
electronically stored information; stipulations between the parties; mental
and physical examinations; and objections by the parties to any and all
discovery. However, these assertions are completely speculative, and do not
warrant intervention.
Finally, should the Court determine that Mr. Ropers interest may be
impaired, it should find that his interest is adequately represented by an
existing party in the litigation, Wal-Mart, by whom he was employed at the
time of the accident. Further, Mr. Ropers purpose in intervening is solely to
stay discovery, and not to participate in discovery, so no purpose would be
served by permitting his intervention.
Accordingly, the Court should deny Mr. Ropers Motion to Intervene
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
20

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 26 of 27 PageID: 202

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(b) Permissive Intervention

A party may request intervention pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
24(b)(1)(b). The Court may grant intervention to anyone who has a claim or
defense that shares with the main action common questions of law of fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(b). Whether or not to grant permissive intervention
is within the discretion of the trial court. Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d
1133, 1135 (3d. Cir. 1982) (denying Motion to Intervene).
Here, Mr. Roper has not met his burden of demonstrating that he has a
claim or defense that shares with the main action common questions of law
or fact. Accordingly, permissive intervention for the purpose of requesting a
stay of discovery must be denied.
Conclusion
Mr. Roper is moving to intervene in this case for the sole, limited
purpose of seeking a stay of discovery. However, it is clear from a
balancing of the Walsh Securities factors that Mr. Ropers requested stay of
discovery should be denied. Thus, there would be no purpose to grant Mr.
Ropers Motion to Intervene for the Purpose of Requesting a Stay.
Additionally, Mr. Roper should not be permitted to intervene under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 24(a)(2) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (b)(1)(b). Accordingly, Plaintiffs

21

Case 3:14-cv-04388-MAS-LHG Document 18 Filed 12/01/14 Page 27 of 27 PageID: 203

respectfully request that this Court deny Mr. Ropers Motion to Intervene for
the Purpose of Requesting a Stay of Discovery.
Date: 12/1/14

Respectfully Submitted,
MORELLI ALTERS RATNER, LLP
By: _/s/ David T. Sirotkin
David T. Sirotkin
[email protected]
D.N.J. Bar I.D.: DS4863
Benedict P. Morelli
[email protected]
N.Y. Bar No.: 1060441
David S. Ratner
[email protected]
N.Y. Bar No.: 1011279
777 Third Avenue, 31st Floor
New York, New York 10022
Tel: (212) 751-9800
Fax: (212) 751-0046
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

22