Kasilag v. Rodriguez

G.R. No.
46623 December 7, 1939

MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and IGNACIO DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.
Luis M. Kasilag for petitioner.
Fortunato de Leon for respondents.
IMPERIAL, J.:
The respondents, children and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced the aforesaid
civil case to the end that they recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its
improvements granted by way of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio; that the petitioner pay them the
value of the fruits which he received from the land;.
The petitioner denied in his answer all the material allegations of the complaint and by way of special
defense alleged that he was in possession of the land and that he was receiving the fruits thereof by
virtue of a mortgage contract, entered into between him and the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio ; and
in counterclaim asked that should the respondents be declared to have a better right to the
possession of the land, that they be sentenced to pay him the value of all the improvements which
he introduced upon the land.
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Emiliana Ambrosio, and the petitioner entered into an agreement over the improvements on the lot.
"
However, Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interests as well as the tax on the
land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal
contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter
would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit
by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon. By virtue of this verbal contract,
the petitioner entered upon the possession of the land, gathered the products thereof, did not collect
the interest on the loan, introduced improvements upon the land and the tax declaration was
transferred in his name.We have seen that subsequent to the execution of the contract, Exhibit 1,
the parties entered into another verbal contract whereby the petitioner was authorized to take
possession of the land, to receive the fruits thereof and to introduce improvements thereon. The
possession by the petitioner and his receipt of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements
of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements because, as already stated, the
contract of antichresis is a lien and such is expressly prohibited by section 116 of Act No. 2874, as
amended. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner acted in bad faith in taking possession of the
land because he knew that the contract he made with Emiliana Ambrosio was an absolute deed of
sale and, further, that the latter could not sell the land because it is prohibited by section 116. it may
be stated that a person is deemed a possessor in bad faith when he knows that there is a flaw in his
title or in the manner of its acquisition, by which it is invalidated.
Borrowing the language of Article 433, the question to be answered is whether the petitioner should
be deemed a possessor in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the
manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated. It will be noted that ignorance of the flaw is the
keynote of the rule. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals we can neither deduce
nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition,
aside from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case, the question is whether
good faith may be premised upon ignorance of the laws.
According to this author, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith,
but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant
with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he
proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the
alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not
know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the
contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These
considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the
provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith. We do not
give much importance to the change of the tax declaration, which consisted in making the petitioner
appear as the owner of the land, because such an act may only be considered as a sequel to the
change of possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, to about which we have stated
that the petitioner's ignorance of the law is possible and excusable. We, therefore, hold that the
petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land and enjoying its fruits.
The petitioner being a possessor in good faith within the meaning of article 433 of the Civil Code and
having introduced the improvements upon the land as such, the provisions of article 361 of the same
Code are applicable; wherefore, the respondents are entitled to have the improvements and plants
upon indemnifying the petitioner the value thereof or the respondents may elect to compel the
petitioner to have the land by paying its market value to be fixed by the court of origin.
For all the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision is reversed, and we hereby adjudge: (1)
that the contract of mortgage of the improvements, set out in Exhibit 1, is valid and binding; (2) that
the contract of antichresis agreed upon verbally by the parties is a real incumbrance which burdens
the land and, as such, is a null and without effect; (3) that the petitioner is a possessor in good faith;
(4) that the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying
the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the
improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be filed by the court of origin,
upon hearing the parties; (5) that the respondents have a right to the possession of the land and to
enjoy the mortgaged improvements; and

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G.R. No.

46623 December 7, 1939

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