Scientific Metaphysics

Nicholas Maxwell
Email [email protected]
Website www.nick.maxwell.demon.co.uk
1 - Intoduction
In this pape I a!ue that physics makes metaphysical pesuppositions concenin! the
physical compehensibility" the dynamic unity" of the uni#ese. I a!ue that i!ou
e$uies that these metaphysical pesuppositions be made explicit as an inte!al pat of
theoetical knowled!e in physics. %n account of what it means to asset of a theoy that it
is unified is de#eloped" which po#ides the means fo patially odein! dynamical
physical theoies with espect to thei de!ees of unity. &his in tun makes it possible to
assess the empiical fuitfulness of 'some( metaphysical theses" in tems of the extent to
which they play a ole in empiically po!essi#e scientific eseach po!ammes. % new
conception of physics is de#eloped which makes metaphysical theses an inte!al pat of
physics and which" at the same time" makes it possible to assess such theses in tems of
thei empiical fuitfulness. )iculaity ob*ections ae ebutted.
&wo comments. +ist" the conception of physics to be expounded and defended hee is
not entiely new" in that #esions ha#e been expounded elsewhee 'see especially
Maxwell" 1,,-. see also Maxwell" 1,/0. 1,/1" ch. 1. 1,-0" chs. 2 and ,. 1,,3. 1,,/.
1,,,. 4555. 4551" ch. 3 and appendix 3. 4554. 4550(. 6ee I !i#e adically impo#ed
a!uments fo a adically impo#ed #esion of the #iew. Second" my title 7Scientific
Metaphysics8 sounds like a contadiction in tems in #iew of 9oppe:s well-known
demacation citeion which ules that metaphysical theses" bein! unfalsifiable" ae not
scientific. ;ut 9oppe:s falsificationist conception of science" alon! with othes" will be
1
found to be defecti#e pecisely because of a failue to acknowled!e the ole that
metaphysical assumptions play in science. +uthemoe" as I ha#e indicated" a famewok
will be de#eloped which makes it possible to appaise 'untestable( metaphysical theses
empiically" in tems of thei 7empiical fuitfulness8" o fuitfulness fo empiically
successful theoy. +o physics to be i!oous" it will be a!ued" it is essential that
metaphysical theses ae acknowled!ed as key components of theoetical knowled!e in
physics" and ae appaised empiically in tems of thei 7empiical fuitfulness8. <nce the
conception of physics defended hee is accepted" the title entiely loses its ai of bein!
self-contadictoy.
4 = Intellectual >i!ou >e$uies that Metaphysical 9esuppositions be made Explicit
Many #iews about science deny that science makes a substantial" pesistent"
metaphysical 'i.e. untestable( assumption about the uni#ese. &his is tue" fo example" of
lo!ical positi#ism" inducti#ism" lo!ical empiicism" hypothetico-deducti#ism"
con#entionalism" constucti#e empiicism" pa!matism" ealism" induction-to-the-best-
explanationism" and the #iews of 9oppe" ?uhn and @akatos. %ll these #iews" di#ese as
they ae in othe espects" accept a thesis that may be called standad empiicism 'SE(A in
science" theoies ae accepted on the basis of empiical success and failue" and on the
basis of simplicity" unity o explanatoiness" but no substantial thesis about the world is
accepted permanently by science, as a part of scientific knowledge, independently of
empirical considerations.
1

&he followin! a!ument shows howe#e that SE is untenable.
Whene#e a fundamental physical theoy is accepted as a pat of theoetical scientific
knowled!e thee ae always endlessly many i#al theoies which fit the a#ailable
e#idence *ust as well as the accepted theoy. )onside" fo example" Newtonian theoy
4
'N&(. <ne i#al theoy assetsA e#eythin! occus as N& assets up till midni!ht toni!ht
when" abuptly" an in#ese cube law of !a#itation comes into opeation. % second i#al
assetsA e#eythin! occus as N& assets" except fo the case of any two solid !old
sphees" each ha#in! a mass of a thousand tons" mo#in! in othewise empty space up to a
mile apat" in which case the sphees attact each othe by means of an in#ese cube law
of !a#itation. &hee is no limit to the numbe of i#als to N& that can be concocted in
this way" each of which has all the pedicti#e success of N& as fa as obse#ed
phenomena ae concened but which makes diffeent pedictions fo some as yet
unobse#ed phenomena.
4
Such theoies can e#en be concocted which ae more
empiically successful than N&" by abitaily modifyin! N&" in *ust this entiely ad hoc
fashion" so that the theoies yield coect pedictions whee N& does not" as in the case of
the obit of Mecuy fo example 'which #ey sli!htly conflicts with N&(.
3
%nd $uite
!eneally" !i#en any accepted physical theoy" &" thee will always be endlessly many ad
hoc i#als which meet with all the empiical success of &" make untested pedictions that
diffe fom &" ae empiically successful whee & is ostensibly efuted" and successfully
pedict phenomena about which & is silent 'as a esult of independently testable and
cooboated hypotheses bein! added on(.
%s most physicists and philosophes of physics would accept" two citeia ae
employed in physics in decidin! what theoies to accept and e*ectA '1( empiical citeia"
and '4( citeia that ha#e to do with the simplicity" unity o explanatoy chaacte of the
theoies in $uestion. '4( is absolutely indispensable" to such an extent that thee ae
endlessly many theoies empiically moe successful than accepted theoies" all of which
ae i!noed because of thei lack of unity.
3
Now comes the cucial point. In pesistently acceptin! unifyin! theoies 'e#en thou!h
ostensibly efuted(" and excludin! infinitely many empiically moe successful"
unefuted" disunified o abeant i#al theoies" science in effect makes a bi! assumption
about the natue of the uni#ese" to the effect that it is such that no disunified theoy is
tue" howe#e empiically successful it may appea to be fo a time. +uthemoe" without
some such bi! assumption as this" the empiical method of science collapses. Science
would be downed in an infinite ocean of empiically successful disunified theoies.
0
If scientists only accepted theoies that postulate atoms" and pesistently e*ected
theoies that postulate diffeent basic physical entities" such as fields - e#en thou!h
many field theoies can easily be" and ha#e been" fomulated which ae e#en moe
empiically successful than the atomic theoies - the implications would suely be $uite
clea. Scientists would in effect be assumin! that the wold is made up of atoms" all othe
possibilities bein! uled out. &he atomic assumption would be built into the way the
scientific community accepts and e*ects theoies = built into the implicit methods of the
community" methods which includeA e*ect all theoies that postulate entities othe than
atoms" whate#e thei empiical success mi!ht be. &he scientific community would
accept the assumptionA the uni#ese is such that no non-atomic theoy is tue.
Bust the same holds fo a scientific community which e*ects all disunified o abeant
i#als to accepted theoies" e#en thou!h these i#als would be e#en moe empiically
successful if they wee consideed. Such a community in effect makes the assumptionA
the uni#ese is such that no disunified theoy is tue. @et us call this assumption
7physicalism8.
&hat physicalism is metaphysical can be shown as follows. 9hysicalism assets
0
7not &1 and not &4 and . . . and not &

8" whee &1" &4" . . . &

ae infinitely many
disunified i#als to accepted physical theoies. 9hysicalism cannot be empiically
#eified" because this would e$uie that all of &1" &4" . . . &
ae falsified" but as thee ae
infinitely many of these theoies" each e$uiin! a diffeent falsifyin! expeiment" this
cannot be done. E$ually" physicalism cannot be falsified" as this e$uies the #eification
of at least one of &1" o &4" . . .o &

" which cannot be done as physical theoies cannot be

#eified empiically. 6ence physicalism" bein! neithe #eifiable no falsifiable" is
metaphysical.
&hus in pesistently e*ectin! empiically moe successful but disunified i#als to
accepted physical theoies" science makes a pesistent metaphysical assumption about the
wold" namely physicalism. Standad empiicism 'SE(" and all the abo#e doctines that
include SE as a component" ae untenable.
@et us call the #iew that science pesupposes physicalism 7pesuppositionism8.
9esuppositionism is moe i!oous than all the abo#e #esions of SE entirely
independent of any justification for accepting physicalism as a part of scientific
knowledge 'that is in addition to the one !i#en abo#e(. In sayin! this I am appealin! to
the followin! wholly unconto#esial e$uiement fo i!ou.
9inciple of Intellectual >i!ou '9I>( In ode to be i!oous" it is necessay that
assumptions that ae substantial" influential and poblematic be made explicit - so that
they can be citiciCed" so that altenati#es may be de#eloped and assessed" with the aim of
impo#in! the assumptions.
2
%ll #esions of SE fail to satisfy 9I> in *ust the way in which pesuppositionism does
satisfy 9I>. 9esuppositionism makes the assumption of physicalism explicit 'and so
citiciCable and" we may hope" impo#able(" while all #esions of SE deny that science
2
does make any such assumption as physicalism. &hus" $uite independent of any claim to
sol#e the poblem of induction" pesuppositionism is moe i!oous" and thus moe
acceptable" than any of the abo#e #esions of SE. %nd this is the case even though
presuppositionism can provide no justification for accepting physicalism. It is indeed
abo#e all when we ha#e no eason whatsoe#e fo supposin! physicalism is tue that it
becomes all the moe impotant to implement 9I>" and make the pobably false
assumption of physicalism explicit" so that it can be citically assessed" so that
altenati#es can be consideed" in the hope that a thesis neae the tuth can be disco#eed.
3 = Dnity of 9hysical &heoy
We ha#e seen that physics only accepts theoies that ae unified" and this commits
physics to pesupposin! physicalism. ;ut what ou!ht physicalism to be intepeted to
asset" especially if physics is to comply with 9I>E In ode to answe this $uestion we
fist need to sol#e the poblem of what it means to asset of a physical theoy that it is
unified. &his is a poblem that has lon! esisted solution.
1
E#en Einstein '1,0," 43(
confessed that he did not know how to sol#e the poblem. In section 4 abo#e I indicated
ways in which theoies can be disunified. &he solution to the poblem of what it is fo a
theoy to be unified that I now outline extends and de#elops the abo#e emaks about
disunity.
% dynamical physical theoy is unified if and only if its content" what it assets" is the
same thou!hout the an!e of possible phenomena to which it applies. &his e$uiement
is" howe#e" open to bein! intepeted in the followin! ei!ht inceasin!ly stin!ent ways
'the fist two of which coespond to the two kinds of disunity indicated in section 4(. %
dynamical physical theoy" &" is disunified to de!ee N if and only ifA
1
'1( & di#ides spacetime up into N distinct e!ions" >1...>N" and assets that the laws
!o#enin! the e#olution of phenomena ae the same fo all spacetime e!ions within each
>-e!ion" but ae diffeent in diffeent >-e!ions.
'4( & postulates that" fo distinct an!es of physical #aiables 'othe than position and
time(" such as mass o elati#e #elocity" in distinct e!ions" >1"...>N of the space of all
possible phenomena" distinct dynamical laws obtain.
'3( In addition to postulatin! non-uni$ue physical entities 'such as paticles(" o entities
uni$ue but not spatially esticted 'such as fields(" & postulates" in an abitay fashion" N -
1 distinct" uni$ue" spatially localiCed ob*ects" each with its own distinct" uni$ue dynamic
popeties.
'0( & postulates physical entities inteactin! by means of N distinct foces" diffeent
foces affectin! diffeent entities" and bein! specified by diffeent foce laws. 'In this case
one would e$uie one foce to be uni#esal so that the uni#ese does not fall into distinct
pats that do not inteact with one anothe.(
'2( & postulates N diffeent kinds of physical entity"
/
diffein! with espect to some
dynamic popety" such as #alue of mass o cha!e" but othewise inteactin! by means of
the same foce.
'1( )onside a theoy" &" that postulates N distinct kinds of entity 'e.!. paticles o fields("
but these N entities can be e!aded as aisin! because & exhibits some symmety 'in the
way that the electic and ma!netic fields of classical electoma!netism can be e!aded as
aisin! because of the symmety of @oentC in#aiance" o the ei!ht !luons of
chomodynamics can be e!aded as aisin! as a esult of the local !au!e symmety of
SD'3((.
-
If the symmety !oup" F" is not a diect poduct of sub!oups" we can declae
that & is fully unified. if F is a diect poduct of sub!oups" & lacks full unity. and if the N
/
entities ae such that they cannot be e!aded as aisin! as a esult of some symmety of &"
with some !oup stuctue F" then & is disunified.
'/( If 'appaent( disunity of thee bein! N distinct kinds of paticle o distinct fields has
eme!ed as a esult of a seies of cosmic spontaneous symmety-beakin! e#ents" thee
bein! manifest unity befoe these occued" then the ele#ant theoy" &" is unified. If
cuent 'appaent( disunity has not eme!ed fom unity in this way" as a esult of
spontaneous symmety-beakin!" then the ele#ant theoy" &" is disunified.
,
'-( %ccodin! to F>" NewtonGs foce of !a#itation is meely an aspect of the cu#atue of
spacetime. %s a esult of a chan!e in ou ideas about the natue of spacetime" so that its
!eometic popeties become dynamic" a physical foce disappeas" o becomes unified
with spacetime. &his su!!ests the followin! e$uiement fo unityA spacetime on the one
hand" and physical paticles-and-foces on the othe" must be unified into a sin!le self-
inteactin! entity" D. If & postulates spacetime and physical Hpaticles-and-focesH as two
fundamentally distinct kinds of entity" then & is not unified in this espect.
+o unity" in each case" we e$uie N I 1. %s we !o fom '1( to '2(" the e$uiements
fo unity ae intended to be accumulati#eA each pesupposes that N I 1 fo pe#ious
e$uiements. %s fa as '1( and '/( ae concened" if thee ae N distinct kinds of entity
which ae not unified by a symmety" whethe boken o not" then the de!ee of disunity
is the same as that fo '0( and '2(" dependin! on whethe thee ae N distinct foces" o
one foce but N distinct kinds of entity between which the foce acts.
'-( intoduces" not a new kind of unity" but athe a new" moe se#ee way of countin!
diffeent kinds of entity. '1( to '/( taken to!ethe e$uie" fo unity" that thee is one kind
of self-inteactin! physical entity e#ol#in! in a distinct spacetime" the way this entity
e#ol#es bein! specified" of couse" by a consistent physical theoy. %ccodin! to '1( to
-
'/(" e#en thou!h thee ae" in a sense" two kinds of entity" matte 'o paticles-and-foces(
on the one hand" and spacetime on the othe" ne#etheless N I 1. %ccodin! to '-(" this
would yield N I 4. +o N I 1" '-( e$uies matte and spacetime to be unified into one
basic entity 'unified by means of a spontaneously boken symmety" pehaps(.
%s we !o fom '1( to '-(" then" e$uiements fo unity become inceasin!ly
demandin!" with '1( and '/( bein! at least as demandin! as '0( and '2(" as explained
abo#e.
15
It is impotant to appeciate" howe#e" that '1( to '-( ae all #esions of the same
basic idea that & is unified if and only if the content of & is the same thou!hout the an!e
of possible phenomena to which it applies. When & is disunified" '1( to '-( specify
different kinds of diffeence in the content of & in di#ese e!ions of the space" S" of all
possible phenomena to which & applies. <" e$ui#alently" '1( to '-( di#ide S into sub-
e!ions in diffeent ways" & ha#in! a diffeent content in each sub-e!ion. +o '1(" sub-
e!ions contain physical systems in diffeent locations in spacetime" the content of &
bein! diffeent in diffeent spacetime locations. +o '4(" sub-e!ions contain physical
systems with diffeent #alues of physical #aiables such as mass o elati#e #elocity. +o
'3(" sub-e!ions contain systems with diffeent dynamically uni$ue ob*ects. +o '0(" sub-
e!ions contain systems composed of physical entities inteactin! by means of diffeent
foces. +o '2(" sub-e!ions contain systems composed of entities with diffeent
dynamical popeties such as #alues of mass o cha!e. +o '1(" sub-e!ions contain
systems composed of diffeent entities which cannot be tansfomed into each othe by
means of symmety opeations. +o '/(" sub-e!ions contain systems composed of
diffeent entities which cannot be constued to diffe only because of the poduct of
spontaneous symmety beakin!. +o '-(" S contains one sub-system consistin! of empty
spacetime" and anothe consistin! space-time plus some physical entity" and the one
,
cannot be tansfomed into the othe by means of a symmety opeation. We ha#e hee
ei!ht facets of a sin!le conception of unity.
11
6owe#e" coespondin! to these ei!ht facets" '1( to '-(" thee ae ei!ht diffeent
metaphysical theses" ei!ht diffeent #esions of physicalism" any one of which mi!ht be
held to be the best choice of pesupposition fo physics. If & is the tue theoy of
e#eythin!"
14
then we ha#e ei!ht diffeent theses" each of the fom 7& is unified up to
sense 'n(8 whee n I 1" 4"... -. @et us call these ei!ht theses 7physicalism'n(8" whee
n I 1" 4" ... -. 'N I 1 unless I state othewise.( Stictly speakin!" thee ae not ei!ht" but
infinitely many diffeent #esions of physicalism" dependin! on the de!ee of disunity" N"
that is asseted fo any #alue of n I 1" . . . /. 'n I - is exceptional in this espect.( &he
diffeent #esions of physicalism can be specified to beA physicalism'n" N(" with
n I 1" J/ and N I 1" 4" J " o with n I - and N I 1" 4. % two-dimensional !id is
placed o#e an infinite set of metaphysical theses" distinct #esions of physicalism
coespondin! to distinct appopiate #alues of the coodinates 'n"N(" these theses bein!
odeed with espect to de!ees of unity.
0 = )onflictin! Kesideata fo %cceptability of Metaphysical &heses
9hysics must exclude empiically successful disunified theoies fom consideation if
theoetical knowled!e in physics is to be possible at all. In pesistently excludin! such
disunified theoies" physics theeby makes a pesistent metaphysical pesupposition" as
we saw in section 4. ;ut what ou!ht this pesupposition to beE Section 3 has e#ealed
that thee ae at least ei!ht candidates" namely physicalism'n( with n I 1" . . . - 'and"
potentially" many moe if N L 1 fo some n.( Which of these is the best choice if physics
is to comply with 9I>E
15
&his $uestion is paticulaly had to answe because conflictin! desideata aise when
it comes to considein! what metaphysical thesis physics should accept.
<n the one hand it is easonable to a!ue that that thesis should be accepted which can
be shown to be the most conduci#e to po!ess in theoetical physics so fa. In the next
section I will demonstate that this picks out the elati#ely specific and contentful thesis
of physicalism'-( with N I 1.
<n the othe hand" howe#e" it is easonable to a!ue that that thesis should be
accepted which has the least content which is *ust sufficient to exclude the empiically
successful disunified theoies that cuent methods of physics do exclude. We ha#e
almost no !ounds fo holdin! that any #esion of physicalism is tue" o is moe likely to
be tue than some othe #esion. Whate#e we choose" we ae #ey likely to choose a
thesis that is false. <u best bet" then" is to choose that thesis which has the least possible
content which suffices to exclude those disunified theoies that ae excluded fom
physics" since the less the content of a thesis = othe thin!s bein! e$ual = the moe likely
it is to be tue. %s we shall see in section 1 below" this leads to a choice $uite diffeent
fom physicalism'-(.
Which of these conflictin! lines of a!ument should be acceptedE
In answein! this $uestion" I poceed as follows. In section 2 I spell out the a!ument
fo holdin! that physicalism'-( is the most fuitful #esion of physicalism fo physics. In
section 1 I spell out the a!ument fo acceptin! the minimal #esion of physicalism. %nd
in section / I a!ue that a new conception of physics esol#es the conflict.
11
2 = Empiically +uitful Metaphysics
;efoe I plun!e into my a!ument fo acceptin! physicalism'-(" thee is a peliminay
$uestion I must answeA Why does the uni$ue fuitfulness of physicalism'-( fo physics"
supposin! it can be established" po#ide !ounds fo its acceptanceE
&he basic idea of 9I>" as it applies to physics" is that substantial" poblematic"
influential and implicit metaphysical assumptions need to be made explicit so that they
can be citically assessed" so that altenati#es can be de#eloped and consideed" in the
hope that assumptions moe conduci#e to po!ess can be de#eloped and accepted. In
othe wods" accodin! to 9I>" that assumption ou!ht to be accepted which seems to be
the most conduci#e to po!ess in theoetical physics.
It is impotant to appeciate *ust how pofoundly influential o#e the success o failue
of theoetical physics choice of metaphysical thesis" of the kind we ae considein!" is
likely to be. &his influence is execised in two ways. +ist" the metaphysical
pesupposition of a community of physicists influences = e#en detemines = the diection
in which physicists look in ode to de#elop new physical theoies. If physicists ae
con#inced that the uni#ese is made up of point-atoms which inteact by means of
centally-diected" i!id foces = as many wee fo much of the 1,
th
centuy = then
physicists will pesistently seek to de#elop theoies which postulate such entities.
9hysicists who belie#e that the basic stuff of the uni#ese is ene!y may be pompted to
de#elop theoies of a athe diffeent type. Secondly" and e#en moe impotant" the
metaphysical pesupposition of physics" implicit in non-empiical methods of physics"
influences = o co-detemines 'with e#idence( = what theoies ae accepted and e*ected.
&he success o failue of physics will be hi!hly dependent on whethe the non-empiical
methods adopted = and thus the coespondin! metaphysical theses pesupposed = ae" o
14
ae not" conduci#e to the selection of theoies capable of meetin! with empiical success.
%doptin! the methodolo!ical pinciple 7accept only theoies that postulate atoms8
amounts to pesupposin! that the uni#ese is made up of atomsA if it is" this
pesupposition and associated methodolo!ical pinciple may well lead to empiical
success. ;ut if the uni#ese is not made up of atoms" adoptin! this methodolo!ical
pinciple and pesupposin! the associated metaphysical thesis is likely to se#eely stifle
scientific po!ess.
In shot" physics must make some metaphysical pesupposition fo thee to be any
theoetical knowled!e in physics at all. Since the metaphysical theses in $uestion ae
about the ultimate natue of the uni#ese" the domain of ou i!noance" whate#e we
assume is almost bound to be false. %cceptin! a false assumption is likely to se#eely
stifle po!ess in the theoetical physics. It mattes enomously" fo the po!ess of
physics" that a !ood choice of metaphysical thesis is made. Bust about the only !ounds
we ha#e fo pefein! one thesis to anothe is that one seems to be moe conduci#e to
po!ess in theoetical physics than anothe. &hus we ou!ht to pefe that thesis which
seems to be the most conduci#e to po!ess in physics. &his is the choice physics needs
to make in ode to comply with the e$uiement of i!ou of 9I>.
6ee" now" ae the easons fo holdin! that physicalism'-( should be the pefeed
metaphysical thesis fo physics" la!ely because this thesis has po#ed to be moe fuitful
fo po!ess in physics than any i#al thesis.
+ist" it dese#es to be noted that what needs to be made explicit and accepted" if
physics is to comply with 9I>" is that thesis which is implicit in the cuent non-empiical
methods of physics = methods which detemine which theoies ae to be accepted and
e*ected on !ounds of simplicity" unity" explanatoiness. &hee can be no doubt that" as
13
fa as non-empiical consideations ae concened" the moe nealy a new fundamental
physical theoy satisfies all ei!ht of the abo#e e$uiements fo unity" with N I 1" the
moe acceptable it will be deemed to be. +uthemoe" failue of a theoy to satisfy
elements of these citeia is taken to be !ounds fo holdin! the theoy to be false e#en in
the absence of empiical difficulties. +o example" hi!h ene!y physics in the 1,15s kept
disco#ein! moe and moe diffeent hadons" and was *ud!ed to be in a state of cisis as
the numbe ose to o#e one hunded. %!ain" e#en thou!h the standad model 'the cuent
$uantum field theoy of fundamental paticles and foces( does not face seious empiical
poblems" it is ne#etheless e!aded by most physicists as unlikely to be coect *ust
because of its seious lack of unity. In adoptin! such non-empiical citeia fo
acceptability" physicists theeby implicitly assume that the best con*ectue as to whee the
tuth lies is in the diection of physicalism'-(. 9I> e$uies that this implicit assumption
= o con*ectue = be made explicit so that it can be citically assessed and" we may hope"
impo#ed. 9hysics with physicalism'-( explicitly acknowled!ed as a pat of con*ectual
knowled!e is moe i!oous than physics without this bein! acknowled!ed because
physics pusued in the fome way is able to sub*ect non-empiical methods to citical
appaisal as physicalism'-( is citically appaised" wheeas physics pusued in the latte
way cannot do this.
&he eally impotant point" howe#e" in decidin! what metaphysical assumption of
unity to accept" is that what needs to be consideed is not *ust cuent theoetical
knowled!e" o cuent methods" but the whole way theoetical physics has de#eloped
duin! the last 055" o possibly 4"555 yeas. &he cucial $uestion is thisA What
metaphysical thesis does the best *ustice to the way theoetical physics has de#eloped
duin! this peiod in the sense that successi#e theoies inceasin!ly successfully
10
exemplify and !i#e pecision to this metaphysical thesis in a way which no i#al thesis
doesE &he answe is physicalism'-(" as the followin! consideations indicate.
%ll ad#ances in theoy in physics since the scientific e#olution ha#e been ad#ances in
unification" in the sense of '1( to '-( abo#e. &hus Newtonian theoy 'N&( unifies
FalileoGs laws of teestial motion and ?epleGs laws of planetay motion 'and much else
besides(A this is unification in senses '1( to '3(. Maxwellian classical electodynamics"
')EM(" unifies electicity" ma!netism and li!ht 'plus adio" infa ed" ulta #iolet" M and
!amma ays(A this is unification in sense '0(. Special elati#ity 'S>( bin!s !eate unity
to )EM" in e#ealin! that the way one di#ides up the electoma!netic field into the
electic and ma!netic fields depends on oneGs efeence fameA this is unification in sense
'1(. S> is also a step towads unifyin! N& and )EM in that it tansfoms space and time
so as to make )EM satisfy a basic pinciple fundamental to N&" namely the 'esticted(
pinciple of elati#ity. S> also bin!s about a unification of matte and ene!y" #ia the
most famous e$uation of moden physics" E I mc
4
" and patially unifies space and time
into Minkowskian space-time. Feneal elati#ity 'F>( unifies space-time and
!a#itation" in that" accodin! to F>" !a#itation is no moe than an effect of the cu#atue
of space-time = a step towads unification in sense '-(. Nuantum theoy 'NM( and
atomic theoy unify a mass of phenomena ha#in! to do with the stuctue and popeties
of matte" and the way matte inteacts with li!htA this is unification in senses '0( and '2(.
Nuantum electodynamics unifies NM" )EM and S>. Nuantum electoweak theoy
unifies 'patially( electoma!netism and the weak foceA this is 'patial( unification in
sense '/(. Nuantum chomodynamics bin!s unity to hadon physics '#ia $uaks( and
bin!s unity to the ei!ht kinds of !luons of the ston! foceA this is unification in sense
'1(. &he standad model 'SM( unifies to a consideable extent all known phenomena
12
associated with fundamental paticles and the foces between them 'apat fom
!a#itation(A patial unification in senses '0( to '/(. &he theoy unifies to some extent its
two component $uantum field theoies in that both ae locally !au!e in#aiant 'the
symmety !oup bein! D'1(MSD'4(MSD'3((. %ll the cuent po!ammes to unify SM
and F> known to me" includin! stin! theoy o M-theoy"

seek to unify in senses '0( to
'-(.
13

In shot" all ad#ances in fundamental theoy since Falileo ha#e in#aiably bou!ht
!eate unity to theoetical physics in one o othe" o all" of senses '1( to '-(A all
successi#e theoies ha#e inceasin!ly successfully exemplified and !i#en pecision to
physicalism'-( to an extent which cannot be said of any i#al metaphysical thesis" at that
le#el of !eneality. &he whole way theoetical physics has de#eloped points towads
physicalism'-(" in othe wods" as the !oal towads which physics has de#eloped.
+uthemoe" what it means to say this is !i#en pecision by the account of theoetical
unity !i#en in section 3 abo#e.
In assessin! the elati#e fuitfulness of two i#al metaphysical theses" Ma and Mb" fo
some phase in the de#elopment of theoetical physics that in#ol#es the successi#e
acceptance of theoies &1" &4" ... &n" two consideations need to be bon in mind. +ist"
how potentially fuitful ae Ma and Mb" how specific o pecise" and thus how specific in
the !uidelines offeed fo the de#elopment of new theoiesE Second" how actually fuitful
ae Ma and Mb" in the sense of how successful o unsuccessful has the succession of
theoies" &1" &4" ... &n" been when e!aded as a eseach po!amme with Ma o Mb as its
key ideaE When both consideations ae taken into account" physicalism'-( comes out as
moe fuitful fo theoetical physics fom Newton to today than any i#al thesis 'at its
le#el of !eneality(. 9hysicalism'/( is not as specific as physicalism'-(" and thus not as
11
potentially fuitful" does not do *ustice to the way F> absobs the foce of !a#itation into
the natue of spacetime" and does not do *ustice to cuent eseach po!ammes which
seek to unify matte and spacetime. '%ll of physicalism'n(" n I 1" 4" J /" ae
scientifically fuitful to some extent" but deceasin!ly so as n !oes down fom / to 1J to
1" in #iew of the deceasin! specificity and content of these #esions of physicalism.(
Some philosophes of science hold that the successi#e e#olutions in theoetical
physics that ha#e taken place since Falileo o Newton make it $uite impossible to
constue science as steadily and po!essi#ely honin! in on some definite #iew of the
natual wold '?uhn" 1,/5. @audan" 1,-5(. If attention is esticted to standad
empiicism and physical theory" this may be the case. ;ut the moment some fom of
pesuppositionism is accepted" and one consides metaphysical theses implicit in the
methods of science" a #ey diffeent conclusion eme!es. All theoretical revolutions
since Galileo exemplify the one idea of unity in nature. +a fom obliteatin! the idea that
thee is a pesistent thesis about the natue of the uni#ese in physics" as ?uhn and
@audan suppose" all theoetical e#olutions" without exception" do exactly the opposite in
e#ealin! that theoetical physics daws e#e close to captuin! the idea that thee is an
undelyin! dynamic unity in natue" as specified by physicalism'-(.
&hee is a futhe point to be made in fa#ou of physicalism'-(. So fa" e#ey
theoetical ad#ance in physics has e#ealed that theoies accepted ealie ae false. &hus
Falileo:s laws of teestial motion and ?eple:s laws of planetay motion ae
contadicted by Newtonian theoy" in tun contadicted by special elati#ity" in tun
contadicted by !eneal elati#ity. &he whole of classical physics is contadicted by
$uantum theoy" in tun contadicted by $uantum field theoy. Science ad#ances fom
one false theoy to anothe. Oiewed fom a standad empiicist pespecti#e" this seems
1/
discoua!in! and has pompted the #iew that all futue theoies will be false as well" a
#iew which has been called 7the pessimistic induction8 'Newton-Smith" 1,-1" 10(.
Oiewed fom the pespecti#e of science pesupposin! physicalism'-(" howe#e" this mode
of ad#ance is wholly encoua!in!" since it is e$uied if physicalism'-( is tue. Fanted
physicalism'-(" the only way a dynamical theoy can be pecisely tue of any esticted
an!e of phenomena is if it is such as to be stai!htfowadly !enealiCable so as to be
tue of all phenomena. %ny physical theoy inheently esticted to a limited an!e of
phenomena" e#en thou!h containin! a wealth of tue appoximate pedictions about these
phenomena" must ne#etheless be stictly falseA only a theoy of e#eythin! can be a
candidate fo tuthP
Not only does the way physics has ad#anced fom one false theoy to the next accod
with physicalism'-(. &he conception of unity sketched in section 3 successfully accounts
fo anothe featue of the way theoetical physics has ad#anced. @et &1"&4"... &n stand fo
successi#e sta!es in the totality of fundamental theoy in physics. Each of &1"&4"... &n
contadicts physicalism'-(" in that each of &1 etc. assets that natue is disunified" wheeas
physicalism'-( assets that it is unified. &his mi!ht seem to make a nonsense of the idea
that &1"&4"... &n is mo#in! steadily and po!essi#ely towads some futue &nQ which is a
pecise" testable #esion of physicalism'-(. ;ut what section 3 shows is that" e#en thou!h
all of &1"&4"... &n ae incompatible with physicalism'-(" because disunified" ne#etheless a
pecise meanin! can be !i#en to the assetion that &Q1 is close to physicalism" o moe
unified" than &. &his is the case if &Q1 is 'a( of !eate empiical content than & 'since
these ae candidate theoies of e#eythin!(" o 'b( of a hi!he de!ee of unity than & in
ways specified in section 3. &hus the account of unity !i#en abo#e" in#ol#in!
physicalism'1 to -(" !i#es pecision to the idea that a succession of false theoies"
1-
&1 ... &n" all of which contadict physicalism'-(" ne#etheless can be constued as mo#in!
e#e close to the !oal of specifyin! physicalism'-( as a pecise" testable" physical theoy
of e#eythin!.
1 = Metaphysical Minimalism
I tun now to the a!ument desi!ned to show that that #esion of physicalism should
be accepted which is the weakest a#ailable which *ust suffices to exclude theoies moe
disunified than cuently accepted physical theoies = at pesent the standad model 'SM(
and !eneal elati#ity 'F>(. We may take this to be the ston!est #esion of physicalism
that is compatible with SM Q F>. &his" it may be a!ued" leads to physicalism'n 3(
bein! accepted. RIf only physicalism'n 4( wee accepted" empiically successful i#als
to SM plus F> could be concocted that ae compatible with physicalism'n 4( but
incompatible with physicalism'n 3(.S
&his #iew" howe#e" faces seious difficulties. +ist" it may be held that
physicalism'n 3( is not ston! enou!h. SM Q F> postulate fou diffeent foces" and
some 1, diffeent paticlesA the ston!est #esion of physicalism compatible with cuent
theoy isA 7physicalism'3( with N I 1" plus physicalism'0( with N 0" plus
physicalism'2( with N 1," o physicalism'n 1(8. ;ut it may be a!ued that this is still
not ston! enou!h because physics pesupposes that acceptable theoies ae at least
compatible with the clumsy #esion of physicalism *ust indicated when formulated in
current concepts of theoretical physics (or some extension of them)" and the italicised
e$uiement" #a!ue as it is" is ne#etheless enomously esticti#e. <n the othe hand" it
may be a!ued that physicalism'n 3( is too ston!" in that it i!noes that SM and F> ae
incompatible with one anothe" and can only be made compatible by estictin! the
1,
ene!ies to which SM applies in an ad hoc fashion. &hee ae doubts e#en about the
consistency of F>" in that it pedicts the existence of black holes and sin!ulaities which
#iolate the smoothness of space-time. %nd SM poses poblems too" in pat because SM is
based on $uantum theoy" and $uantum theoy does not apply to measuement" and thus
needs to call upon some othe theoy" in an ad hoc fashion" fo a teatment of
measuement. It is not clea that SM and F>" taken to!ethe o e#en indi#idually" ae
compatible with physicalism'4(" with N I 1.
&he attempt to identify that #esion of physicalism *ust contentful enou!h to exclude
those disunified theoies fom physics that need to be excluded has not come up with
anythin! definite o plausible.
/ = &he 6ieachical Oiew
Should physics accept physicalism'-( in line with the a!ument of section 2" and isk
committin! physics to a hi!hly specific and contentful #esion of physicalism all too
likely to be false" despite its fuitfulness fo physics up to the pesentE < should physics
accept some clumsy #esion of physicalism indicated in section 1" less contentful and
thus moe likely to be tue" but entiely lackin! in fuitful !uidelines fo the de#elopment
of new physical theoiesE
No #esion of pesuppositionism which esticts itself to adoptin! a sin!le 'if
composite( metaphysical thesis can esol#e the conflictin! desideata satisfactoily" that
ae hi!hli!hted in these two $uestions. ;ut this conflict is esol#ed if we adopt a #esion
of pesuppositionism which holds that we need to see physics as adoptin! a hierarchy of
theses" fom physicalism'-( nea the bottom of the hieachy to physicalism'1( at the topA
see dia!am 1. 9hysicalism'2-/( ae on the same le#el since they ae all but e$ui#alent to
one anothe. %s we descend the hieachy" fom le#el '1( to le#el '-(" theses become
45
@e#el '1( 9hysicalism'1(

@e#el '4( 9hysicalism'4(

@e#el '3( 9hysicalism'3(

@e#el '0( 9hysicalism'0(

@e#el '2-/( 9hysicalism'2-/(

@e#el '-( 9hysicalism'-(

@e#el ',( @a!an!ianism
@e#el '15( &otality of 9hysical &heoy

TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
@e#el '11( U E#idence U
41
U TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT U
Kia!am 1
inceasin!ly contentful and specific" inceasin!ly potentially fuitful fo futue po!ess in
theoetical physics" but also inceasin!ly likely to be false and in need of e#ision. %s we
mo#e fom '1( to '-(" the coespondin! methodolo!ical e$uiements fo unity" not
depicted in dia!am 1" become inceasin!ly demandin!" but also inceasin!ly speculati#e
and uncetain. &he totality of physical theoy" at any !i#en sta!e in the de#elopment of
physics 'except when a candidate unified theoy of e#eythin! has been poposed and
accepted( will only satisfy these methodolo!ical ules patially. a new theoy" in ode to
be an ad#ance fom the standpoint of unity" must lead to a new totality of theoy
satisfyin! the methodolo!ical ules bette than the pe#ious totality.
&his hieachical #iew has the followin! ad#anta!es o#e any #esion of
pesuppositionism which esticts itself to a sin!le 'possibly composite( thesis. +ist" the
hieachical #iew does *ustice to both appaently conflictin! desideata" indicated abo#e"
which cannot be done if a sin!le metaphysical assumption is made. &he hieachical
#iew includes both the uni$uely scientifically fuitful thesis of physicalism'-( and the
much less specific and poblematic theses of physicalism '1( o '4(. Second" the
hieachical #iew" as a esult of makin! explicit metaphysical theses implicitly
pesupposed in adoptin! methods associated with le#els '0( to '-(" facilitates citicism
and e#ision of these methods" which may well need to be done at some sta!e 'if the
coespondin! metaphysical theses ae false(. Such citicism and e#ision is not
facilitated if a sin!le thesis is pesupposed. &hid" the hieachical #iew assists e#ision
of the moe contentful and specific #esions of physicalism low down in the hieachy by
po#idin! a famewok of elati#ely unpoblematic assumptions and methods" at le#els
44
'1( to '3(" which place estictions on the way the moe specific" poblematic #esions of
physicalism may be e#ised" should the need to do so aise. If a succession of
inceasin!ly empiically successful theoies ae de#eloped" &1" &4" . . . " all of which clash
with physicalism'-(" but which accod inceasin!ly well with physicalism '/(" this mi!ht
be taken as !ounds fo e*ectin! o modifyin! physicalism'-(.
&he easons !i#en abo#e fo includin! the elati#ely specific" scientifically fuitful
metaphysical thesis of physicalism'-( in the hieachy of accepted theses ae easons also
fo acceptin! an e#en moe specific" scientifically fuitful metaphysical thesis" should one
be a#ailable. % !lance at the histoy of physics e#eals that a succession of much moe
specific metaphysical theses ha#e been accepted" o taken #ey seiously" fo a time" each
thesis bein! an attempt to captue aspects of physicalism. Ideas at this le#el includeA the
uni#ese is made up of i!id copuscles that inteact by contact. it is made up of point-
atoms that inteact at a distance by means of i!id" spheically-symmetical foces. it is
made up of a unified field. it is made up of a unified $uantum field. it is made up of
$uantum stin!s. &hese ideas tend to eflect the chaacte of eithe the cuent best
accepted physical theoy" o assumptions made by cuent effots to de#elop a new theoy.
&his is not sufficient to be scientifically fuitful in the way that physicalism '-( is. +o
this" we e$uie that the thesis in $uestion is such that all accepted fundamental physical
theoies since Newton can be e!aded as mo#in! steadily towads captuin! the thesis as
a testable physical theoy" in the manne indicated in section 3. <ne candidate fo such a
thesis is the followin!A
@a!an!ianismA the uni#ese is such that all phenomena e#ol#e in accodance with
6amiltonGs pinciple of least action" fomulated in tems of some unified @a!an!ian 'o
@a!an!ian density(" @. We e$uie" hee" that @ is not the sum of two o moe distinct
43
@a!an!ians" with distinct physical intepetations and symmeties" fo example one fo
the electoweak foce" one fo the ston! foce" and one fo !a#itation" as at pesent. @
must ha#e a sin!le physical intepetation" and its symmeties must ha#e an appopiate
!oup stuctue 'the !oup not bein! a poduct of sub-!oups(. We e$uie" in addition"
that cuent $uantum field theoies and !eneal elati#ity eme!e when appopiate limits
ae taken.
10
%ll accepted fundamental physical theoies" fom Newton on" can be !i#en a
@a!an!ian fomulation. +uthemoe" if we conside the totality of fundamental physical
theoy since Newton 'empiical laws bein! included if no theoy has been de#eloped(
then" as in the case of physicalism'-(" e#ey new accepted theoy has bou!ht the totality
of physical theoy neae to captuin! @a!an!ianism. &hus @a!an!ianism is at least as
scientifically fuitful as physicalism'-(. In fact it is more scientifically fuitful since it is
#ey much moe specific and contentful. &he easons fo acceptin! physicalism'-( ae
easons fo acceptin! @a!an!ianism too as the lowest thesis in the hieachy of
metaphysical theses" #ey much moe potentially scientifically fuitful than
physicalism'-(" but also moe speculati#e" moe likely to need e#isionA see dia!am 1.
It dese#es to be noted that somethin! like the hieachy of metaphysical theses"
constainin! acceptance of physical theoy fom abo#e" is to be found at the empiical
le#el" constainin! acceptance of theoy fom below. &hee ae" at the lowest le#el" the
esults of expeiments pefomed at specific times and places. &hen" abo#e these" thee
ae low-le#el expeimental laws" assetin! that each expeimental esult is a epeatable
effect. Next up" thee ae empiical laws such as 6ooke:s law" <hm:s law o the !as laws.
%bo#e these thee ae such physical laws as those of electostatics o of themodynamics.
%nd abo#e these thee ae theoies which ha#e been efuted" but which can be 7dei#ed8"
40
when appopiate limits ae taken" fom accepted fundamental theoy = as Newtonian
theoy can be 7dei#ed8 fom !eneal elati#ity. &his empiical hieachy" somewhat
infomal pehaps" exists in pat fo pecisely the same epistemolo!ical and
methodolo!ical easons I ha#e !i#en fo the hieachical odein! of metaphysical thesesA
so that elati#ely contentless and secue theses 'at the bottom of the hieachy( may be
distin!uished fom moe contentful and insecue theses 'futhe up the hieachy( to
facilitate pinpointin! what needs to be e#ised" and how" should the need fo e#ision
aise. &hat such a hieachy exists at the empiical le#el po#ides futhe suppot fo my
claim that we need to adopt such a hieachy at the metaphysical le#el.
- = %im-<iented Empiicism
&he hieachical #iew depicted in dia!am 1 may need to be e*ected in its entiety as
physics ad#ances. If we exclude fom consideation physicalism'n I 1" N I ( which
pemits anythin!" the hieachical #iew assumes that the uni#ese is at least patially
physically compehensible in the sense that phenomena occu in accodance with
physical laws which ae moe o less disunified" the taditional distinction between laws
and initial conditions bein! pesupposed. ;ut e#en thou!h the uni#ese is physically
compehensible" the taditional distinction between laws and initial conditions mi!ht not
be obse#ed. &he tue theoy of e#eythin! mi!ht be cosmolo!ical in chaacte" and
mi!ht specify uni$ue initial conditions fo the uni#ese. &his possibility" and othe
possibilities of this kind" could no doubt be accommodated within a modified #esion of
the abo#e hieachical #iew. ;ut thee ae othe possibilities" of philosophical inteest
e#en if of no inteest to physics as at pesent constituted" which cannot be so
accommodated. 9ehaps Fod is ultimately esponsible fo all natual phenomena" o
some kind of cosmic pupose o cosmic po!amme analo!ous to a compute po!amme
42
'as has been su!!ested(. In these cases the uni#ese would be compehensible but not
physically compehensible = e#en thou!h it mi!ht mimic a physically compehensible
uni#ese.
In ode to accommodate these" and othe such" possibilities we need to embed the
abo#e hieachical #iew in a boade #iew I shall call 7aim-oiented empiicism8 '%<E("
depicted in dia!am 4. %s #esions of %<E ha#e been expounded and defended in some
detail elsewhee 'see Maxwell" 1,,-. 1,,,. 4555. 4551" ch. 3 and appendix 3. 4554.
4550(" hee I !i#e only a bief exposition. @e#els '-( to '1( of %<E" dia!am 4" ae the
same as le#els '11( to ',( of the hieachical #iew" dia!am 1. @e#el '2( of %<E assets
that the uni#ese is physically compehensible" one o othe of physicalism'2--( bein!
tue = this le#el combinin! le#els '2( to '-( of dia!am 1. '&he uni#ese is physically
compehensible to a faily hi!h de!ee if physicalism'2( is tue" e#en if physicalism'-( is
false.( @e#el '0( of %<E assets that the uni#ese is comprehensible in some way o
othe" whethe physically o in some othe way. &his thesis assets that the uni#ese is
such that thee is something 'Fod" tibe of !ods" cosmic !oal" physical entity" cosmic
po!amme o whate#e(" which exists e#eywhee in an unchan!in! fom and which" in
some sense" detemines o is esponsible fo e#eythin! that chan!es 'all chan!e and
di#esity in the wold in pinciple bein! explicable and undestandable in tems of the
undelyin! unchan!in! something(. % uni#ese of this type dese#es to be called
HcompehensibleH because it is such that e#eythin! that occus" all chan!e and di#esity"
can in pinciple be explained and undestood as bein! the outcome of the opeations of
the one undelyin! something" pesent thou!hout all phenomena. @e#el '3( assets that
the uni#ese is patially o appoximately compehensible. &he possibility that the
uni#ese is patially compehensible physically is epesented by physicalism'n( with
41
@e#el '1( 9atial ?nowability PK

@e#el '4( Meta-?nowability MK

1
2
@e#el '3( 9atial PC 3 9hysicalism'1-0(
)ompehensibility 4

@e#el '0( )ompehensibility C

5
9hysical 6 9hysicalism'2--(
@e#el '2( )ompehensibility 7
8

@e#el '1( @a!an!ianism L
@e#el '/( F> Q SM T

TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT
4/
@e#el '-( U Evidence U
U TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT U
Kia!am 4
n I 1" 4" 3 o 0. @e#el '3( also includes the possibility that the uni#ese is patially
compehensible in some non-physical way. @e#el '4( assets that the uni#ese is such that
thee is some ationally disco#eable thesis about its natue 'elati#e to existin!
knowled!e( which" if accepted" makes it possible po!essi#ely to impo#e methods fo
the impo#ement of knowled!e. H>ationally disco#eableH" hee" means at least that the
thesis is not an abitay choice fom infinitely many analo!ous theses. &his thesis is to
be intepeted as assetin! that the uni#ese is not epistemolo!ically malicious" in the
sense that appaently impo#ed methods lead to appaent new knowled!e which tuns out"
subse$uently" to be illusoy" thee bein! no possibility of disco#ein! this befoe it is
e#ealed. '&his is claified in the next section.( @e#el '1( assets that the uni#ese is such
that we can continue to ac$uie knowled!e of ou local cicumstances" sufficient to make
life possible.
&he hieachical #iew" depicted in dia!am 1" is embedded in %<E" depicted in
dia!am 4" as a pope pat. %s one !oes up the hieachy of le#els of %<E" the theses
become inceasin!ly insubstantial" and thus inceasin!ly likely to be tue 'as fo the
hieachical #iew depicted in dia!am 1(. In fact" le#el 'MQ1( implies le#el 'M( fo
M I 2 to 1.
>easons fo acceptin! these theses ae simila to those !i#en fo acceptin! the
hieachy of theses of the #iew depicted in dia!am 1. &he le#el '0( thesis of
compehensibility of dia!am 4 is scientifically fuitful in the same way that
physicalism'-( is. Insofa as all accepted fundamental physical theoies since Newton
ha#e dawn po!essi#ely close to physicalism'-(" the same is tue of the le#el '0( thesis
4-
of compehensibility of dia!am 4" since physicalism'-( is a special case of this thesis.
&he totality of fundamental physical theoy" in !ettin! steadily close to exemplifyin!
physicalism'-(" !ets close to po#idin! an explanation 'in pinciple( of all phenomena =
thus !ettin! close to exemplifyin! the compehensibility thesis of dia!am 4. &he
compehensibility thesis is moe likely to be tue than physicalism'-( because it is not as
specific and contentful. on the othe hand" pecisely fo this eason" it is not as
scientifically fuitful as physicalism'-(. '<n the othe hand" physicalism'-( implies the
compehensibility thesis. if the fome is accepted" the latte is as well.( &he thesis at the
top of the hieachy" at le#el '1(" assets that the uni#ese is such that we can ac$uie some
knowled!e of ou local cicumstances. If this assumption is false" we will not be able to
ac$uie knowled!e whate#e we assume. We ae *ustified in acceptin! this assumption
pemanently as a pat of ou knowled!e" since acceptin! it can only help" and cannot
hinde" the ac$uisition of knowled!e whate#e the uni#ese is like. >easons fo acceptin!
the le#el '4( thesis will be discussed in the next section.
>emaks made about the #iew depicted in dia!am 1 apply also" when appopiately
modified" to the moe !eneal #iew of %<E depicted in dia!am 4. &he #iew depicted in
dia!am 1 has a moe diect ele#ance to theoetical physics. %<E would become
ele#ant if it eme!ed that the uni#ese diffes adically fom the way moden science
depicts it to be. %<E is moe ele#ant to the philosophy of physics. it is e$uied to sol#e
the poblem of induction 'Maxwell" 1,,-" ch. 2(" and to ebut ob*ections of ciculaity" as
we shall now see.
, - )iculaity 9oblem Sol#ed
<ne featue of the #iews depicted in dia!ams 1 and 4 may be deemed to be puCClin!A
both hold that when metaphysical thesis and physical theoy clash" physical theoy may
4,
be e#ised" but also metaphysical thesis may be e#ised. 6ow is such a two-way
influence possibleE In what follows I conside %<E" since this includes the fist
hieachical #iew as a pope pat.
&he fist point to note is that *ust such a two-way influence occus when theoy and
expeiment clash. In !eneal" if a theoy clashes with an expeiment that has been
sub*ected to expet citical scutiny and epeated" the theoy is e*ected. ;ut on occasions
it tuns out that it is the expeimental esult that is won!" not the theoy. In a somewhat
simila way" if a new theoy inceases the conflict between the totality of physical theoy
and the cuently accepted metaphysical thesis" at le#el '1( of dia!am 4" the new theoy
will be e*ected 'o not e#en consideed o fomulated(. <n occasions" howe#e" a new
theoy may be de#eloped which inceases the conflict between the totality of theoy and
the cuent thesis at le#el '1( but deceases the conflict between the totality of theoy and
physicalism at le#el '2( of dia!am 4. In this case the new theoy may le!itimately be
accepted and the thesis at le#el '1( may be e#ised. In pinciple" as I ha#e aleady
indicated" theses e#en hi!he up in the hieachy may le!itimately be e#ised in this way.
% #itue of the hieachical #iews is that they make possible and facilitate such two-way
e#isions.
6owe#e" anothe" potentially moe seious poblem faces the two hieachical #iews
indicated abo#e. ;oth incopoate what seems to be #icious ciculaity. %cceptance of
theoies is influenced by thei de!ee of accod with metaphysical pinciples" the
acceptance of which is in tun" in pat" influenced by an appeal the empiical success of
physical theoies. &he claim is that as theoetical knowled!e and undestandin!
impo#es" metaphysical theses and associated methods impo#e as well. &hee is
somethin! like positi#e feedback between impo#in! knowled!e" and impo#in!
35
knowled!e-about-how-to-impo#e knowled!e. &his" it is claimed" is the methodolo!ical
key to the !eat success of moden science" namely that it adapts its metaphysical
assumptions and methods 'its aims and methods( to what it finds out about the natue of
the uni#ese 'Maxwell" 1,,-" 1/-1,(. ;ut how can such a cicula pocedue concei#ably
be #alidE
&his is not an ob*ection to the a!uments and #iews put fowad so fa. No attempt has
been made to *ustify claims to theoetical knowled!e. &he a!ument has been modestA
!anted acceptance of cuent physical theoies and adoption of cuent methods" physics
is moe i!oous 'in that it accods bette with 9I>( if implicit metaphysical assumptions
ae made explicit" and those assumptions chosen which seem best to pomote what we
take to be scientific po!ess. &he ciculaity ob*ection does aise" howe#e" the moment
we !o beyond the modest aspiations of sections 4 to -" and attempt to sol#e the poblem
of induction" and *ustify acceptance of empiically successful unifyin! theoies" within
the context of %<E. 6ow is this ciculaity ob*ection to be metE
6ee" in a nutshell" is the answe. 9emittin! metaphysical assumptions to influence
what theoies ae accepted" and at the same time pemittin! theoies to influence what
metaphysical assumptions ae accepted" may 'if caied out popely(" in certain sorts of
universe" lead to !enuine po!ess in knowled!e. &he le#el '4( thesis of meta-
knowability" of %<E" assets that this is just such a universe. %nd futhemoe" cucially"
easons fo acceptin! meta-knowability make no appeal to the success of science. In this
way" meta-knowability le!itimises the potentially in#alid ciculaity of %<E" and of the
component #iew depicted in dia!am 1.
>elati#e to an existin! body of knowled!e and methods fo the ac$uisition of new
knowled!e" possible uni#eses can be di#ided up" ou!hly" into thee cate!oiesA 'i( those
31
which ae such that the meta-methodolo!y of %<E can meet with no success" not e#en
appaent success" in the sense that new metaphysical ideas and associated methods fo the
impo#ement of knowled!e cannot be put into pactice so that success 'o at least
appaent success( is achie#ed. 'ii( those which ae such that %<E can meet with !enuine
success. and 'iii( those which ae such that %<E appeas to be successful fo a time" but
this success is illusoy" this bein! impossible to disco#e duin! the peiod of illusoy
success. Meta-knowability assets that this uni#ese is a type 'ii( uni#ese. it ules out
uni#eses of type 'i( and 'iii(.
Meta-knowability assets" in shot" that the uni#ese is such that %<E can meet with
success and will not lead us astay in a way in which we cannot hope to disco#e by
nomal methods of scientific in$uiy 'as would be the case in a type 'iii( uni#ese(. If we
ha#e !ood !ounds fo acceptin! meta-knowability as a pat of scientific knowled!e =
!ounds which do not appeal to the success of science = then we ha#e !ood !ounds fo
adoptin! and implementin! %<E 'fom le#els '-( to '3((.
;ut what !ounds ae thee fo acceptin! the thesis of meta-knowability at le#el '4(E
&hee ae two.
'a( Fanted that thee is some kind of !eneal featue of the uni#ese which makes it
possible to ac$uie knowled!e of ou local en#ionment 'as !uaanteed by the thesis at
le#el '1((" it is easonable to suppose that we do not know all that thee is to be known
about what the nature of this !eneal featue is. It is easonable to suppose" in othe
wods" that we can impo#e ou knowled!e about the natue of this !eneal featue" thus
impo#in! methods fo the impo#ement of knowled!e. Not to suppose this is to assume"
ao!antly" that we aleady know all that thee is to be known about how to ac$uie new
knowled!e. Fanted that leanin! is possible 'as !uaanteed by the le#el '1( thesis(" it is
34
easonable to suppose that" as we lean moe about the wold" we will lean moe about
how to lean. Fanted the le#el '1( thesis" in othe wods" meta-knowability is a
easonable con*ectue.
'b( Meta-knowability is too !ood a possibility" fom the standpoint of the !owth of
knowled!e" not to be accepted initially" the idea only bein! eluctantly abandoned if all
attempts at impo#in! methods fo the impo#ement of knowled!e fail.
'a( and 'b( ae not" pehaps" #ey ston! !ounds fo acceptin! meta-knowability. both
ae open to citicism. ;ut the cucial point" fo the pesent a!ument" is that these
!ounds fo acceptin! meta-knowability" 'a( and 'b(" ae independent of the success of
science. &his suffices to a#oid ciculaity.
12
If %<E lacks meta-knowability" its cicula pocedue" intepeted as one desi!ned to
pocue *ustified knowled!e" becomes damatically in#alid" as the followin!
consideation e#eals. )oespondin! to the succession of accepted fundamental physical
theoies de#eloped fom Newton down to today" thee is a succession of abeant i#als
which postulate that !a#itation becomes a epulsi#e foce fom the be!innin! of 4525"
let us say. )oespondin! to these abeant theoies thee is a hieachy of abeant
#esions of physicalism" all of which asset that thee is an abupt chan!e in the laws of
natue at 4525. &he abeant theoies" *ust as empiically successful as the theoies we
accept" ende the abeant #esions of physicalism *ust as scientifically fuitful as non-
abeant #esions of physicalism ae endeed by the non-abeant theoies we actually
accept. If we take it as !i#en that we accept non-abeant theoies" the $uestion of what
easons thee ae fo e*ectin! empiically successful abeant theoies and associated
abeant #esions of physicalism does not aise. ;ut the moment we seek to justify
acceptance of non-abeant theoies and rejection of abeant theoies" within the
33
famewok of %<E" the $uestion of what easons thee ae fo e*ectin! abeant theoies
and associated abeant #esions of physicalism aises. If %<E is beeft of meta-
knowability" it is not easy to see what these easons can be. ;ut %<E with meta-
knowability included does po#ide a easonA the abeant #esions of physicalism asset
that this is a type 'iii( uni#ese" which #iolates meta-knowability.
Oesions of physicalism'n( fo which n I 1 o 3 and N L 1 would seem to #iolate meta-
knowability. ;ut othe #esions of physicalism with N L 1 need not clash with meta-
knowability.
>efeences
I. B. >. %itchison and %. B. F. 6ey" 1,-4" Gauge heories in !article !hysics" %dam
6il!e
%. Einstein" 1,0," G%utobio!aphical NotesG" in 9. %. Schilpp 'ed.( Albert "instein#
!hilosopher-$cientist" <pen )out" @a Salle" Illinois" 4-,0.
K. Fiffiths" 1,-/" %ntroduction to "lementary !articles" Bohn Wiley" New Vok.
). B. Isham" 1,-," &ectures on Groups and 'ector $paces for !hysicists" Wold
Scientific" @ondon.
6. +. Bones" 1,,5" Groups, (epresentations and !hysics" %dam 6il!e" ;istol.
&. S. ?uhn" 1,14" he $tructure of $cientific (evolutions" Dni#esity of )hica!o 9ess"
)hica!o.
@. @audan" 1,-5" W% )onfutation of )on#e!ent >ealism:" !hilosophy of $cience )*"
1,-0-.
+. Mandl" and F. Shaw" 1,-0" +uantum ,ield heory" Bohn Wiley" New Vok.
N. Maxwell" 1,/0" W&he >ationality of Scientific Kisco#ey:" !hilosophy of $cience )-"
143-23 and 40/-,2.
30
TTTTTT 1,/1" .hat/s .rong .ith $cience0" ;anGs 6ead ;ooks" +ome" En!land.
TTTTTT 1,-0" ,rom 1nowledge to .isdom" ;lackwell" <xfod.
TTTTTT 1,,3" WInduction and Scientific >ealismA Einstein #esus #an +aassen:" he
2ritish 3ournal for the !hilosophy of $cience ))" pp. 11-/," -1-151 and 4/2-352.
TTTTTT 1,,/" WMust Science Make )osmolo!ical %ssumptions if it is to be >ationalE:" in
he !hilosophy of $cience# !roceedings of the %rish !hilosophical $ociety $pring
4onference" &. ?elly 'ed.(" Iish 9hilosophical Society" Maynooth" pp. ,--101.
TTTTTT 1,,-" he 4omprehensibility of the 5niverse" <xfod Dni#esity 9ess" <xfod.
TTTTTT 1,,," W6as Science Established that the Dni#ese is )ompehensibleE:" 4ogito
-6" 13,-102.
TTTTTT 4555 W% new conception of science:, !hysics .orld -6" No. -" pp. 1/-1-.
TTTTTT 4551" he 7uman .orld in the !hysical 5niverse# 4onsciousness, ,ree .ill and
"volution" >owman and @ittlefield" @anham" Mayland.
TTTTTT 4554" W&he Need fo a >e#olution in the 9hilosophy of Science:" 3ournal for
General !hilosophy of $cience 6)" pp. 3-1-05-.
TTTTTT 4550" W9oppe" ?uhn" @akatos and %im-<iented Empiicism:" !hilosophia 68.
?. Moiyasu" 1,-3" An "lementary !rimer ,or Gauge heory" Wold Scientific"
Sin!apoe.
W. 6. Newton-Smith" 1,-1" he (ationality of $cience" >outled!e and ?e!an 9aul"
@ondon.
W. Salmon" 1,-," ,our 9ecades of $cientific "xplanation" Dni#esity of Minnesota
9ess" Minneapolis.
Notes
32
1
. +o discussion of the claim that ?uhn and @akatos defend #esions of SE see Maxwell '1,,-" 05(.
;ayesianism mi!ht seem to e*ect SE" in acknowled!in! both pio and posteioi pobabilities. ;ut
;ayesianism ties to confom to the spiit of SE as much as possible" by e!adin! pio pobabilities as
pesonal" sub*ecti#e and non-ational" thei ole in theoy choice bein! educed as apidly as possible by
empiical testin!A see Maxwell '1,,-" 00(.
2
. %ll the possible phenomena" pedicted by any dynamical physical theoy" &" may be epesented by an
ima!inay HspaceH" S" each point in S coespondin! to a paticula phenomenon" a paticula kind of
physical system e#ol#in! in time in the way pedicted by &. In ode to specify se#eely disunified
i#als to & that fit all a#ailable e#idence *ust as well as & does" all we need do is specify a e!ion in S
that consists of phenomena that ha#e not been obse#ed" and then eplace the phenomena pedicted by &
with anythin! we cae to think of. Fi#en any &" thee will always be infinitely many such disunified
i#als to &.
3
. +o a moe detailed discussion of empiically successful ad hoc i#als to accepted theoies" see
MaxwellA '1,/0. 1,,3. 1,,-" 21-0(.
4
0. It may be ob*ected that the uni#ese mi!ht ha#e been !enuinely disunified" so that physics could
consist only of a !eat numbe of physical laws. In this case" it may be a!ued" physics could not be
constued as makin! a metaphysical assumption about undelyin! unity. ;ut e#en in this
countefactual situation" endlessly many #ey much moe disunified but empiically moe successful
i#al laws could easily be fomulatedA these would ha#e to be e*ected on non-empiical !ounds" o
physics would down in an ocean of i#al laws. &he pesistent e*ection of such much moe disunified
but
empiically moe successful i#als would in#ol#e the methods of physics makin! an implicit
metaphysical assumption" to the effect that natue is unified to some extent at least 'all !ossly
disunified laws bein! false(. It is necessay to make some such assumption" howe#e disunified the
totality of accepted laws may be = e#en if the assumption made is athe weak in chaacte" in that only
!oss disunity is denied.
5
. See MaxwellA '1,-0" 440. 1,,-" 41(.
1
1. See Salmon '1,-,( fo a su#ey of attempts to sol#e the poblem.
/
/. )ountin! entities is endeed a little less ambi!uous if a system of M paticles is counted as 'a
somewhat peculia( field. &his means that M paticles all of the same kind 'i.e. with the same dynamic
popeties( is counted as one entity.
-
-. %n infomal sketch of these mattes is !i#en in Maxwell '1,,-" ch. 0" sections 11 to 13" and the
appendix(. +o athe moe detailed accounts of the locally !au!e in#aiant stuctue of $uantum field
theoies seeA Moiyasu '1,-3(" %itchison and 6ey '1,-4A pat III(" and Fiffiths '1,-/" ch. 11(. +o
intoductoy accounts of !oup theoy as it aises in physics see Isham '1,-,( o Bones '1,,5(.
,
,. +o accounts of spontaneous symmety beakin! see Moiyasu '1,-3( o Mandl and Shaw '1,-0(.
15
15. &he account of theoetical unity !i#en hee simplifies the account !i#en in 'Maxwell 1,,-" chs. 3
and 0(" whee unity is explicated as Hexemplifyin! physicalismH" whee physicalism is a metaphysical
thesis assetin! that the uni#ese has some kind of unified dynamic stuctue. Explicatin! unity in that
way in#ites the cha!e of ciculaity" a cha!e that is not actually #alid 'see Maxwell 1,,-" 11--43 and
11--/4(. &he account !i#en in this pape foestalls this cha!e fom the outset.
11
11. &his point is of fundamental impotance fo the poblem of induction. &aditionally" the poblem
is intepeted as the poblem of *ustifyin! exclusion of empiically successful theoies that ae ad hoc in
sense '1(A 6ow can e#idence fom the past po#ide !ounds fo any belief about the futueE &his makes
the poblem seem hi!hly HphilosophicalH" emote fom any poblem ealistically encounteed in
scientific pactice. ;ut the moment it is appeciated that the poblem of *ustifyin! exclusion of
empiically successful theoies that ae ad hoc in sense '1( is *ust an exteme" special case of the moe
!eneal poblem of excludin! empiically successful theoies that ae ad hoc in senses '1( to '-(" it
becomes clea that this latte poblem is a scientific poblem" a poblem of theoetical physics itself.
+o the implications of this cucial insi!ht" and fo a poposal as to how the poblem of induction is to
be sol#ed exploitin! it" see 'Maxwell 1,,-" especially chs. 0 and 2(.
12
14. It may seem that thee is athe a *ump hee" fom & efein! to any fundamental dynamical
physical theoy in '1( to '-(" to & efein! to a 7theoy of e#eythin!8. 6owe#e" the pope way to
apply '1( to '-( is to the totality of fundamental physical theoy 'whethe this consists of many o *ust
one theoy(" and thus" in a sense" to candidate 7theoies of e#eythin!8 'If a an!e of phenomena ha#e
no theoy" then empiical laws !o#enin! these phenomena must be teated as theoies.(. If we do not
do this" disunity could always be e#aded" as fa as '0( to '/( ae concened at least" by choppin! a
theoy disunified to de!ee N into N distinct unified theoies. When it comes to non-empiical
consideations !o#enin! choice of theoy" what mattes is the way indi#idual theoies fit into the
totality of fundamental physical theoy = the de!ee of unity of the whole of fundamental physical
theoy.
13
13. +o futhe discussion see 'Maxwell 1,,-" -5--," 131-05" 42/-12 and additional woks efeed
to theein(.
14
10. @a!an!ianism is discussed in Maxwell '1,,-" ---,(.
15
. %t this point I confess that in Maxwell '1,,-" 1,4-3( I !i#e a thid a!ument fo acceptin! meta-
knowability which does" pehaps" contain a whiff of ciculaity" in that it appeals to the apparent success
of science. &his suffices" I now think" to make this a!ument cicula.