Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26406 October 31, 1969
AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & EQUIPMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JOSE B. LINGAD, Secretary of Labor and RUBEN F. SANTOS, Director, Bureau of Labor
Standards,respondents-appellees.
Benjamin S. Benito for petitioner-appellant.
Villavieja and Villanueva for respondents-appellees.
FERNANDO, J .:
What the Constitution ordains in its avowed principle of the promotion of social
justice
1
and the explicit mandate of protection to labor
2
was once again given concrete
expression in a statute of recent date increasing the minimum wage.
3
Thus, for
industrial establishments, a six pesos (P6.00) daily wage is now the law, a two-peso
(2.00) increase.
4
In view of its explicit language, it would be difficult for a business firm
so minded to escape its operation directly, whether its employees are paid on a daily or
a monthly basis. Likewise, an attempt to do so has been forestalled by a provision found
in the original Minimum Wage Law which prohibits an employer from "reducing the
wage now paid to any of his employees in excess of the minimum wage established
under [the Act] or in reducing supplements furnished on the date of enactment."
5
In this
action for declaratory relief, petitioner-appellant Automotive Parts & Equipment
Company, Incorporated would seek to construe the above section to enable it to reduce
its liability for its monthly paid employees from P180.00 to P152.00, by paying them at
the rate of six days a week from Monday to Saturday computed at the rate of the
minimum daily wage.
The lower court was not sympathetic to such a plea. Hence, this appeal from its
decision. It ought to have known better. No court could indulge in such an unworthy
objective especially when sought to be attained by advancing arguments of the flimsiest
and most insubstantial character. We affirm.
In the petition for declaratory relief, the then Secretary of Labor, Jose B. Lingad and the
then Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards, Ruben F. Santos being named as
respondents, appellant Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Incorporated alleged
that it was duly incorporated on January 5, 1961 and that from the start of its operation,
its employees were paid on a daily and monthly basis.
6
It there noted that on April 21,
1965 the aforesaid amendatory act took effect and that respondents Secretary of Labor
and the Director of the Bureau of Labor Standards construed its provision "in such a
way as to require the petitioner to increase the salaries of all the monthly paid
employees of the petitioner to a minimum of P180.00 (not P152.00) which according to
them is the applicable minimum wage rate for the monthly paid employees of
petitioner."
7

After an allegation that it had already increased the salaries of its monthly paid
employees to a minimum of P152.00 a month, in accordance with its own interpretation
of the act, it sought to justify its refusal to abide by the interpretative bulletin of
respondents requiring the increase to a minimum of P180.00 a month for employees
paid on a monthly basis in this wise: "That the petitioner believes that Section 19 of
Republic Act No. 602 particularly that portion prohibiting the reduction of wages paid to
employees in excess of the minimum wage established in the Act or supplements
theretofore granted to employees only refers and applies to employers in business prior
to and at the time of enactment of said Republic Act No. 602 and that the prohibition
thereof against reduction of supplements as envisioned in Section 19 of Republic Act
No. 602 should not be applied prospectively to employers coming into existence
subsequent to the effective date of said Republic Act No. 602. This belief has not been
altered despite the passage of the Amendatory Act namely Republic Act No. 4180
particularly so because the latter act only amended one section, i.e., Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 602 and it did not in any way repeal in its entirety said Republic Act
No. 602. Furthermore, Section 19 of Republic Act No. 602 has not been reenacted in
the Amendatory Act 4180 and for the Bureau of Labor now to construe the Amendatory
Act in such a way as to require petitioner to increase, by compulsion, the salaries of its
monthly paid employees to a minimum of P180.00 due to a customary practice of the
petitioner in considering unworked Sundays and legal holidays as a paid day, would be
beyond the clear and express provisions of the law and constitutes legislation by the
Bureau of Labor."
8

As noted, the lower court rejected such a contention. Thus: "Section 2 of R.A. No. 4180
provides that 'Any provision of law previously enacted on the subject matter of this Act
that is inconsistent with any provision of this Act is hereby repealed.' Section 19 of R.A.
No. 602 not being inconsistent with R.A. No. 4180 has not been repealed; on the other
hand, the provisions of Section 19 of R.A. No. 602 not being inconsistent with R.A. No.
4180 were deemed and impliedly reenacted. Furthermore, according to Article 1702 of
the Civil Code, 'In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.' This is in consonance
with the intention of Congress to protect the minimum wage of laborers. Both Section 19
of R.A. No. 602 prohibiting the reduction of supplements granted to employees and the
minimum wage of P6.00 a day and R.A. No. 4180 are for the purpose of securing a
'decent living for the laborer.'"
9
In the dispositive portion of the decision, it was declared
"that Section 19 of R.A. No. 602 is applicable to the petitioner in connection with the
enforcement of the provisions of R.A. No. 4180."
10

From such a decision, this appeal was taken to us. It cannot prosper. The lower court
decided the matter correctly. It cannot be reversed.
1. To state the construction sought to be fastened on the clear and explicit language of
the statute is to reject it. It comes into collision with the constitutional command
pursuant to the social justice principle that the government extend protection to labor.
On the one hand, appellant would recognize that the increase in minimum wage was so
legislatively decreed. On the other, it would impute to the same enactment, without any
support in the statutory language, a means whereby to frustrate in part such
commendable legislative objective. No such intent could rightfully be imputed to
Congress. Moreover, to cast a suspicion that such a form of evasion was legislative
willed may even raise serious constitutional doubts. For it is undeniable that every
statute, much more so one arising from a legislative implementation of a constitutional
mandate, must be so construed that no question as to its conformity with what the
fundamental law requires need arise. Apparently, appellant is unaware of such a basic
postulate, or, if aware; is not inclined to accord it deference. It cannot expect
approbation from any court, much less from this Tribunal.
2. Even if the plain legislative purpose so evident on the face of the statute is not to
vitalize and implement what the Constitution enjoins, still there is no escape from an
equally authoritative principle of statutory construction that bars acceptance on what
appellant would foist upon the judiciary as an acceptable interpretation. As noted in the
recent case of Sarcos v. Castillo:
11
"It is fundamental that once the policy or purpose of
the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. From Ty Sue
v. Hord, decided in 1909, it has been our constant holding that the choice between
conflicting theories falls on that which best accords with the letter of the law and with its
purpose. The next year, in an equally leading decision, United States v. Toribio, there
was a caveat against a construction that would tend 'to defeat the purpose and object of
the legislator.' Then came the admonition in Riera v. Palmaroli, against an application
so narrow 'as to defeat the manifest purpose of the legislator.' This was repeated in the
latest case, Commissioner of Customs v. Caltex, in almost identical language."
If the interpretation offered by appellant would be considered acceptable, then there
would be a negation of the above purpose of the amendatory act increasing the
minimum wage law. That would be to defeat and frustrate rather than to foster its policy.
It must be rejected.
3. The futility of the appeal is thus apparent. The first two assigned errors that the lower
court should not have relied on Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which would require that
in case of doubt all labor legislation should be construed in favor of the safety and
decent living for the laborer and of the continuing of Section 19 prohibiting any
interpretation of the Minimum Wage Law that would justify the reduction of the wage
then paid to any of its employees, obviously lack merit.
Much less could it be alleged that the lower court erred in disregarding the clear context
of the above Section 19, particularly the use of the word "now" and the phrase "furnish
on the date of enactment." What does it provide? "Nothing in this Act shall deprive an
employee of the right to seek fair wages, shorter working hours and better working
conditions nor justify an employer in violating any other labor law applicable to his
employees, in reducing the wage now paid to any of his employees in excess of the
minimum wage established under this Act, or in reducing supplements furnished on the
date of enactment."
12
Appellant thus would have this Court accept the view that as it
began business after the Minimum Wage Law was enacted in 1951 the above
safeguard in the act that would preclude any evasion thereof becomes nugatory
because of the presence therein of the word "now", which for appellant, would have the
effect of limiting its application only to business establishments existing as of the date of
its effectivity on April 6, 1951. Appellant apparently is in no mood to pay heed to the
constitutional command of protection to labor or to assure that the legislative purpose
be attained. It would defy common sense.
Nothing is better settled then that courts are not to give words a meaning which would
lead to absurd or unreasonable consequence.
13
That is a principle that goes back to In
re Allen
14
decided on October 29, 1903, where it was held that a literal interpretation is
to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results. That is a strong argument
against its adoption.
15
The words of Justice Laurel are particularly apt. Thus: "The fact
that the construction placed upon the statute by the appellants would lead to an
absurdity is another argument for rejecting it ... ."
16

It is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable
result. That has long been a judicial function.
17
A literal reading of a legislative act which
could be thus characterized is to be avoided if the language thereof can be given a
reasonable application consistent with the legislative purpose.
18
In the apt language of
Frankfurter: "A decent respect for the policy of Congress must save us from imputing to
it a self-defeating, if not disingenuous purpose."
19
Certainly, we must reject a
construction that at best amounts to a manifestation of verbal ingenuity but hardly
satisfies the test of rationality on which law must be based.
4. It would not be easy to imagine an interpretation more clearly designed to circumvent
the statute or more transparent. It did not require the lower court too much effort to see
through the scheme. It decided as it ought to having respect for the clear statutory
purpose. We cannot reverse it.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of March 30, 1966 is affirmed. With costs
against appellant Automotive Parts & Equipment Company, Incorporated.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Teehankee and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.


Footnotes
1
Art. II, Sec. 5, Constitution.
2
Art. XIV, Sec. 6, Ibid.
3
Republic Act No. 4180, An Act Amending Republic Act No. 602, Otherwise
Known as the Minimum Wage Law by Raising the Minimum Wage for Certain
Workers. This Act took effect on April 21, 1965.
4
Insofar as relevant, Sec. 1 of Republic Act No. 4180 provides: "Section three of
Republic Act Numbered Six hundred two is hereby amended to read as follows:
'Sec. 3. Minimum Wage. (a) Every employer shall pay to each of his
employees who is employed by an enterprise other than in agriculture minimum
wages of not less than six pesos a day: Provided, That this Act shall not apply to
any retail or service enterprise that regularly employs not more than five
employees; or mining enterprises; (b) Every employer who operates a farm
enterprise shall pay to each of his employees, who is engaged in agriculture,
minimum wages at the rate prescribed in Section forty-two of Republic Act
Numbered Thirty-eight hundred forty-four; (c) Effective on the first of July,
nineteen hundred and sixty-five the minimum wage rates for employees in the
government service shall be as follows: for national government laborers and
workers, six pesos a day; for provinces and cities, first and second class, six
pesos a day; third and fourth class, five pesos a day; and for all other classes the
minimum wage shall be fixed by the respective provinces and cities as their
finances may permit, provided the same shall not be less than four pesos; for first
and second class municipalities, six pesos a day; for third and fourth class
municipalities, five pesos a day; and for all other classes of municipalities the
minimum wage shall be fixed by the respective municipalities as their finances
may permit, provided that the same shall not be less than four pesos."
5
Sec. 19 of the Minimum Wage Law reads in full: "Relations to other labor laws
and practices. Nothing in this Act shall deprive an employee of the right to
seek fair wages, shorter working hours and better working conditions nor justify
an employer in violating any other labor law applicable to his employees, in
reducing the wage now paid to any of his employees in excess of the minimum
wage established under this Act, or in reducing supplements furnished on the
date of enactment."
6
Record on Appeal, Petition, pars. 3 & 4.
7
Ibid., pars. 7 & 10.
8
Ibid., par. 12.
9
Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 44.
10
Ibid., pp. 44-45.
11
Sarcos v. Castillo, 26 SCRA 853, 859-860 (1969).
12
Sec. 19, Republic Act No. 602 (1951).
13
Cf. Yrostorza v. Republic, 83 Phil. 727 (1949).
14
2 Phil. 630. Cf. Ledesma v. Pictain, 79 Phil. 95 (1947) and Pritchard v.
Republic, 81 Phil. 244 (1948).
15
Chartered Bank v. Imperial and National Bank, 48 Phil. 931 (1921).
16
Director of Lands v. Abaja, 63 Phil. 559, 565 (1936). Cf. People v. De Guzman,
90 Phil. 132 (1951).
17
Cf. Armstrong Paint and Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 US 315
(1938).
18
Cf. Haggar Co. v. Helvering, 308 US 389 (1940).
19
Cf. Nardone v. United States, 308 US 338, 341 (1939).