Article III, 2: Power of Federal judiciary is that of deciding cases and controversies.

!"I#IA$I%I&' %I(I&A&I)*+:
,-. Prohi/its advisory o0inions
,2. +tanding: deter1ination of whether a s0ecific 0erson is the 0ro0er 0arty to /ring a 1atter to
the court for adjudication2 whether litigant is entitled to have court decide 1erits of the
dis0ute or of 0articular issues.
,3. 4i0eness: deter1ination of when a case is a00ro0riate for federal judicial review.
,5. (ootness: whether there is a live controversy ,actual controversy /etween adverse litigants.
at all stages of litigation
,6. Political 7uestion "octrine: allegations of constitutional violations that federal courts will
not hear /ecause they are left to the 0olitical /ranches of govern1ent to inter0ret8enforce.
Advisory )0inions Prohi/ited
,-. (ust /e actual dis0ute /etween adverse litigants ,)0. of ustices.
,2. (ust /e su/stantial li9elihood that decision will /ring a/out so1e change or have so1e
effect ,:ay/urn;s #ase.
,3. (ust not direct federal courts to reo0en decided cases, rendering those o0inions
essentially advisory ,Plaut v. +0endthrift Far1.
,5. 4easons for Prohi/ition: ,a. +e0aration of 0owers<courts are given 0ower to decide
cases, not to hy0othesi=e on unsu/stantiated factual scenarios, ,/. conservation of judicial
resources, ,c. $etter decisions are 1ade with concrete facts in the record
+tanding 4e>uire1ents:
,-. Injury. ? has suffered or i11inently will suffer a direct ,not hy0othetical or conjectural.
0ersonal injury.
,2. #ausation. Injury 1ust /e fairly tracea/le to @;s conduct.
,3. 4edressa/ility. A favora/le federal court decision is li9ely to create a re1edy for the
injury.
&he a/ove 3 are constitutionally mandated and cannot /e overridden /y #ongress. &he last 2 are
prudential and 1ay /e overridden /y #ongress.
,5. Personal 4ight. Party 1ay generally assert only his own rights and cannot raise clai1s of
a 3d 0arty unless ,a. the 0arty has standing hi1self2 ,/. the interests of the 0arties are
sufficiently close to 1a9e the litigant an effective advocate of 3d 0arty;s rights and ,c.
there are genuine o/stacles to the 3d 0arty asserting her own rights. +ingleton v. Aulff.
,6. Beneral Brievances Prohi/ited. +uit for those grievances that are shared with everyone
else are 0rohi/ited<taC0ayer suits.
DCce0tion: &aC0ayer status confers standing to challenge #ongressional authori=ation of
eC0enditures that violate the Dsta/lish1ent #lause /8c every citi=en has a right not to
have her taC dollars s0ent in violation thereof.. Flast v. #ohen. I10acts of 1unici0al
ordinances on 1unici0al taC0ayers are ty0ically 1ore concrete, and courts ty0ically allow
those suits /ased on 1unici0al taC0ayer standing so long as taC0ayer can show injury.
4i0eness
,-. #ase is ri0e when it involves legal issues a00ro0riate for court to decide ,it is a 0ure legal
issue, we have a concrete record and don;t need further facts. and 0arties would suffer
hardshi0 if court declined to hear the case. A//ott %a/s v. Bardner.
,2. A/sent state 0rosecution, the 1ere eCistence of a statute does not 1a9e a challenge to it
ri0e. Poe v. !ll1an.
,3. +0eculative or hy0othetical threats are not sufficient for ri0eness.
,5. Ahere violations of a statute are inevitable, ri0eness eCists.
(ootness: 5 DE#DP&I)*+
,-. Arongs #a0a/le of 4e0etition /ut Dvading 4eview F/y the s0ecific ? onlyG: elections and
0regnancy. Ad1ission to a school is probably not within the eCce0tion.
,2. Holuntary #essation: @ has heavy /urden of showing that it is a/solutely clear that the
allegedly wrongful /ehavior could not reasona/ly /e eC0ected to recur. Friends of the
Darth v. %aidlaw. $y contrast, ? 1ust show F)4 4IPD*D++ that @;s allegedly wrongful
/ehavior is likely to occur or continue, rendering injury i10ending.
,3. #lass Action +uits: #lass action does not /eco1e 1oot si10ly /ecause na1ed ?;s case is
1ooted so long as a live dis0ute re1ains /etween 1e1/ers of the 0otential class and @
,5. #ollateral #onse>uences: "a1age clai1s for e1otional distress fro1 @;s actions
Political 7uestion "octrine
,-. #onstitutional teCt co11its the issue to another /ranch of govern1ent ,i10each1ent is
delegated to #ongress.
,2. %ac9 of judicially 1anagea/le standard for adjudication ,1ala00ortion1ent, where the
Buaranty #lause had no clear standards to deter1ine what constitutes a re0u/lican for1
of govern1ent.
,3. &he ele1ents descri/ed in $a9er to avoid eCcessive conflict with other /ranches:
a. see ,-. and ,2.
/. i10ossi/ility of court;s deciding the issue without an initial 0olicy deter1ination of a
9ind clearly for nonIjudicial discretion
c. i10ossi/ility of court;s underta9ing inde0endent resolution without eC0ressing lac9
of res0ect to other /ranches
d. unusual need for adherence to 0olitical decision already 1ade
e. 0otential for e1/arrass1ent fro1 various 0ronounce1ents on a single issue /y
different de0art1ents of govern1ent
,5. 3 Areas where P7" has /een a00lied:
a. #hallenges to restrictions on #ongressional 1e1/ershi0 ,P7" rejected.
/. #hallenges to President;s conduct of foreign 0olicy ,P7" a00lied.
c. #hallenges to i10each1ent 0rocess ,P7" a00lied.
&:D FD"D4A% DED#!&IHD P)AD4
Article II differs fro1 Article I: II states 0ower shall /e vested in a President of the !+, where I says
all legislative 0owers herein granted are vested in #ongress.
I In the -J6Ks, +u0re1e #ourt declared President;s 0ower is li1ited to that granted in #onstitution
0lus whatever 0ower is authori=ed /y #ongress. 'oungstown +heet L &u/e v. +awyer.
I #ertain a1ount of inherent 0ower eCists /y necessity: ,a. authority to fire highIlevel, 0urely
eCecutive individuals and ,/. DCecutive Privilege.
DCecutive Privilege: A/ility of President to 9ee0 secret conversations with or 1e1oranda to8fro1
advisors. Privilege is not absolute.
I Aeight the need for secrecy against need for disclosure. *iCon v. !.+.
I #ourts should /e 1indful of the /urdens i10osed on DCec. $ranch when re>uiring co10liance with
a discovery re>uest. #heney v. !.+. "ist. #t. of "#.
Authority of #ongress to Increase DCecutive Power: #ongress alone 1ay legislate and cannot give
law1a9ing authority to President. #linton v. #ity of *'.
Ad1inistrative Agencies: :el0er organi=ations needed /8c govern1ent is so large L co10leC that
1e1/ers of #ongress si10ly cannot 9now everything L re>uire /odies of s0ecialists who i10le1ent
and enforce the laws.
I DCercise all 3 /ranches; 0owers:
,-. %egislative. Authority to 0ro1ulgate rules having effect of law.
,2. DCecutive. $ring enforce1ent actions against violators of federal laws L regs.
,3. udicial. D10loy ad1inistrative law judges who hear the cases.
I #hec9s on Ad1inistrative Agencies:
,-. #ongressional statutes directing agencies to 0erfor1 certain tas9s or denying the1 certain
authority
,2. #ongress can overturn agency decisions /y statute
,3. #ongress controls the /udget of ad1inistrative agencies.
,5. A00oint1ent L re1oval 0ower
,6. *onIdelegation "octrine: #ongress cannot give an ad1inistrative agency unfettered discretion in
0ro1ulgating rules2 1ust set out intelligi/le 0rinci0le setting /oundaries to the authority.
*ever overruled, /ut not used to invalidate a law since -J36.
,M. %egislative Heto: #ongress reserved right to undo actions via a - or 2 house legislative veto.
)verruled as unconstitutional /8c violated /ica1eralis1 ,0resenting to /oth houses. and
0resent1ent ,to President.
A00oint1ent Power. Pres. a00oints L +enate confir1s 0rinci0al officers. #ongress 1ay assign
a00oint1ent of inferior officers to President, "e0t. :eads and the #ourts. (orrison v. )lson. #ongress
1ay not give itself or legislative officers 0ower to a00oint inferior officers.
I Inde0endent #ounsel is inferior officer /ecause: ,-. su/ject to re1oval /y higher eCecutive /ranch
official, ,2. e10owered /y an Act to 0erfor1 only certain, li1ited duties, ,3. office of I.#. is li1ited
to jurisdiction granted /y a +0ecial "ivisioin, and ,5. office of I.#. is li1ited in tenure, it is
te10orary and for li1ited 0ur0ose of acco10lishing a single tas9. (orrison.
+e0aration of Powers L Foreign Policy: A citi=enIdetainee held indefinitely under sus0icion of /eing an
ene1y co1/atant is entitled to due 0rocess such that he is entitled to receive notice of factual /asis for
his detention L fair o00ortunity to re/ut govern1ent;s factual assertions /efore neutral decision1a9er.
#hec9s on the President.
,-. Pressure of Pu/lic )0inion8"esire for 4eIelection
,2. Press +crutiny
,3. )versight L $udgeting /y #ongress
,5. *eed to 1aintain 0restige of office8historical stature
,6. #ivil +uits L #ri1inal Proceedings.
a. A/solute i11unity fro1 da1ages lia/ility 0redicated on official acts.
i. "on;t want Pres. to /e distracted /y fear of lawsuits2 would jeo0ardi=e effective
functioning of govern1ent.
ii. Pres. is too visi/le L acts affect too 1any 0eo0le2 easily identifia/le target for suits
iii. Affects decisionI1a9ing: Aant Pres. to act fearlessly for the 0u/lic good
/. *o i11unity for acts not ta9en in official ca0acity.
,M. I10each1ent.
a. +enate 1ust find Pres. guilty of treason, /ri/ery, or high cri1es81isde1eanors
/. :ouse votes for i10each1ent L +enate tries. 283 vote of +enate needed for re1oval.
c. Ahat constitutes high cri1es81isde1eanors is nonIjusticia/le 0olitical >uestion
d. 3 i10each1ent atte10ts: Andrew ohnson, 4ichard *iCon L $ill #linton
&:D FI4+& A(D*"(D*&: #ongress shall 1a9e no law res0ecting an esta/lish1ent of religion, or
0rohi/iting the free eCercise thereof, or a/ridging the freedo1 of s0eech, or of the 0ress2 or the right of
the 0eo0le 0eacea/ly to asse1/le, and to 0etition the Bovern1ent for a redress of grievances.
5 4easons why Freedo1 of +0eech is a Funda1ental 4ight:
,-. +elfIBovernance. #rucial in de1ocracy to allow de/ates L infor1ed voters
,2. "iscovering &ruth. (ar9et0lace of ideas.
,3. Advancing Autono1y. +0eech is selfIdefinition.
,5. Pro1oting &olerance.
#ontentI$ased 4estrictions N strict scrutiny.
#ontentI*eutral 4estrictions N inter1ediate scrutiny.
I (ust /e /oth su/jectI1atter neutral ,1ust not disallow discussion of certain to0ics. and view0oint
neutral ,1ust not a00ly only to su00orters or o00onents of certain view0oint.
#ategories of Presu10tively !n0rotected +0eech
,-. )/scenity
,2. %i/el
,3. Incite1ent to lawless action
,5. #hild 0ornogra0hy
+econdary Dffects 4egulations:
I Ooning ordinances co1/ating secondary effects are to /e reviewed under standards a00lica/le to
&i1e (anner Place 4estrictions. #ity of 4enton v. Playti1e &heaters.
I 2dry effects regulations have only /een effective with seCually eC0licit s0eech.
I &I(D (A**D4 P%A#D 4estrictions :
,-. #ontent *eutral. Bovt. can avoid contentIneutrality if they clai1 that the 0ur0ose of law is not
/e su00ression of s0eech /ut is ai1ed at secondary effects
,2. +u/stantial ,rather than co10elling. govern1ent interest
,3. 4easona/le alternative channels of co11unication are availa/le F*ote that in 4enton #ourt said
they did not need to /e ample alternative channels and that a =oning restriction leaving virtually
no 0lace for an adult /usiness was still o9ayG
,5. *arrowlyItailoredP in the Aard sense, this 1eans the govt.;s 1eans are not su/stantially
/roader than necessary and the govt.;s goals would /e less effectively served w8o the ordinance.
Bovern1entI+u/sidi=ed Funding
I Bovern1ent 1ay fund art /ased on its assess1ent of its artistic content, as long as it does not a/use
its discretion /y 0enali=ing disfavored view0oints. *ational Dndow1ent for the Arts v. Finley.
Hagueness
I %aw is unconstitutionally vague when a reasona/le 0erson cannot tell what s0eech is 0rohi/ited and
what is 0er1itted. !nduly vague laws violate due process.
I Hague laws leave too 1uch discretion in their enforce1ent.
)ver/readth ,1ust /e substantially over/road.
I 4eaches a su/stantial a1ount of 0rotected s0eech
I +0ecial +tanding 4ule: A 0erson to who1 the law constitutionally can /e a00lied can argue that it
would /e unconstitutional as a00lied to others.
I DCce0tions :
,-. As A00lied: %aw is overIrestrictive /ut unli9ely to a00lied often2 courts will not declare it
wholly unconstitutional /ut will evaluate legality on caseI/yIcase /asis
,2. #o11ercial +0eech: )ver/readth is inapplicable to co11ercial s0eech
,3. %i1iting #onstruction: #ourts 1ay read8inter0ret a statute narrowly to avoid declaring it
unconstitutional.
Prior 4estraint
I +trongly disfavored2 heavy 0resu10tion of invalidity
I (ay /e used to 0rotect national security during warti1e
I #ourt )rders to Protect Fair &rials: $arring 0retrial 0u/licity /y the 1edia N heavy 0resu10tion of
invalidity. DCa1ine:
,-. DCtent L 0rejudicial nature of 0retrial 0u/licity
,2. Ahether other 1eans would 1itigate that 0u/licity;s effects
,3. :ow effective such an order would /e
,5. &he order;s 0recise ter1s
I #ourt )rders /arring 0retrial 0u/licity /y attorneys L court 0ersonnel usually u0held.
I %icensing8Per1its : Ahen gov;t re>uires license80er1it /efore 1a9ing certain co11unications,
1ust 1eet:
,-. Bovern1ent has i10ortant reason for licensing
a. E.g., Preserving order /y li1iting si1ultaneous 0arades or affording o00ortunity for 0ro0er
0olicing /y giving 0olice advance notice of de1onstrations
,2. %aw has clear standards leaving al1ost no discretion to govern1ent
a. %i1it licensor;s discretion L give eC0ress standards for deciding whether to grant 0er1it
,3. %icensing syste1 has 0rocedural safeguards
a. Pro10t decision after full L fair hearing
i. First /y an ad1inistrative /ody
ii. &hen /y a court of law
/. $urden of Proof is on the censor
i. +how un0rotected s0eech
ii. Initiate judicial 0roceedings
#)(PD%%D" +PDD#::
I Bovern1ent cannot co10el silence or s0eech, whether ver/al or sy1/olic, eCce0t to 0revent clear
and 0resent danger of cri1e. AH $d. of Dduc. v. $arnette.
I &he govern1ent cannot co10el anony1ous s0ea9ers to reveal their identities. (cIntyre v. ):.
I Bovern1ent cannot co10el electioneers to reveal their identity /y re>uiring na1e /adges or
1andatory disclosure. $uc9ley v. A1erican #onst. %aw Foundation, Inc.
!nconstitutional #onditions:
I Bovern1ent cannot condition a /enefit on the re>uire1ent that a 0erson forgo a constitutional right.
&he govern1ent 1ay not deny a /enefit to a 0erson /ecause he eCercises a constitutional right.
I *)&D : A case that falls under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine re>uires strict scrutiny /ut
that a case falling under the notion that govern1ent need to su/sidi=e the eCercise of first
a1end1ent rights falls under rational /asis.
!*P4)&D#&D"8%D++ P4)&D#&D"8P4)+#4I$D" +PDD#: &'PD+
Incite1ent to Illegal Activity
,-. #lear and Present "anger &est: AAI. -st A1end. does not 0rotect s0eech which is used
under such circu1stances L is of such a nature that it creates a clear L 0resent danger of
inciting illegal activity.
,2. 4easona/leness &est: -J2KsI-J3Ks. Bovern1ent could 0unish incite1ent when reasona/le.
,3. 4is9 For1ulation &est: -J6Ks. (ay restrict incite1ents to illegality if 0otential har1s; severity
discounted /y their i10ro/a/ility justifies the degree of restriction.
,5. BRANDENBURG TEST : -JMKs Q Present. Bovern1ent cannot cri1inali=e advocacy of cri1e
eCce0t where such advocacy is: ,-. Intended to incite ,2. I11inent lawless action, A*" ,3. is
li9ely to 0roduce such action.
Fighting Aords
,-. #ha0lins9y: Aords which /y their very utterance ,-. inflict injury or ,2. incite i11ediate
/reach of 0eace.
,2. +0eech 1ust /e ,-. targeted at a s0ecific 0erson ,i.e., faceItoIface encounter. and ,2. incite the
average 0erson to react with violence.
,3. Dven un0rotected s0eech, li9e fighting words, cannot /e su/ject to contentI/ased 8 view0ointI
/ased regulation. &hus, a contentI/ased 0roscri0tion of certain fighting words is
unconstitutional. 4AH v. #ity of +t. Paul.
:ostile Audiences
,-. Darly cases held that 0olice 1ay sto0 s0eech when 0u/lic s0ea9ers incite their audience to
i11inent riot. Feiner v. *'.
,2. %ater decisions suggest 0olice 1ust 1a9e reasona/le efforts to control the audience and allow
the s0eech to continue, sto00ing the s0eech only if crowd control fails L violence is i11inent.
4acist +0eech
,-. Initially the #ourt held govern1ent 1ay 0unish racist s0eech as grou0 li/el if such 0unish1ent
is rationally related to 0reserving 0eace. $eauharnais v. I%.
,2. %ater decisions suggest racist s0eech enjoys greater 0rotection: ,-. -st A1end. li1its lia/ility for
defa1ation 0er *' &i1es v. +ullivan. ,2. :ate s0eech enjoys so1e constitutional 0rotection 0er
4AH. ,3. :ate s0eech laws are assaila/le for vagueness8over/readth.
&rue &hreats
,-. (ust /e a threat to a s0ecific 0erson
,2. (ust /e a history of such violence in whatever grou0 to which the s0eech was directed or fro1
which the s0eech ca1e.
Intent to Inti1idate
,-. +u/Icategory of &rue &hreats
,2. (ust /e targeted to a s0ecific 0erson8grou0
,3. E.g., Hirginia v. $lac9: +tatute /anning crossI/urning with an intent to inti1idate was
constitutional /ecause crossI/urning was a 0articularly virulent for1 of inti1idation.
+eCually )riented +0eech: )/scenity
,-. Paris Adult &heater : +tates have an interest in ste11ing the flow of co11erciali=ed o/scenity
a. &o 0reserve the >uality of life and total co11unity environ1ent
/. &o 0reserve the tone of co11erce in great city centers, and
c. &o 0reserve 0u/lic safety.
d. ,)ther argu1ents not fro1 the case include enforcing 1orality, 0rotecting 0rudes; delicate
sensi/ilities, 0reventing ra0e and other secondary cri1es, and 0reventing 0orn;s
discri1ination against wo1en.
,2. (iller v. #A : )/scenity is 1aterial which
a. "e0icts 8 descri/es seCual conduct
/. Ahich conduct is s0ecifically defined /y state law
c. Aould /e found to a00eal to the 0rurient interest ,i.e., /e seCually arousing. /y the average
0erson a00lying conte10orary co11unity ,local, not national. standards
d. Portrays seCual conduct in a 0atently offensive way
e. :as no serious value ,literary, artistic, 0olitical or scientific. ,national standard as judged /y
an o/jective, reasona/le 0erson.
+eCually )riented +0eech: #hild Pornogra0hy
,-. #hild 0ornogra0hy is un0rotected whether it is o/scene or not. &he (iller test is ina00lica/le.
,2. Bovern1ent;s co10elling interest is 0reventing the seCual eC0loitation of children
,3. Per *' v. Fer/er, state 1ay regulate child 0orn if it is:
a. A visual de0iction
/. )f seCual conduct s0ecifically descri/ed /y the state
c. $y real children under a s0ecified age, A*"
d. (ade with so1e scienter.
Bovern1ent #ontrol of )/scenity L #hild Porn:
,-. &he govern1ent 1ay li1it the sale 8 eChi/ition of o/scenity, even to willing /uyers.
,2. Bovern1ent 1ay not 0unish 1ere 0rivate 0ossession of o/scenity. +tanley v. BA.
,3. +tates 1ay /an creation and8or distri/ution of o/scenity, 1a9ing +tanley al1ost o/solete.
,5. Possession of child 0orn is still 0unisha/le /ecause it discourages the eC0loitation of children
used in 1a9ing 0orn. )s/orne v. ):.
Protected, %owIHalue +eCual +0eech: +o1e co11ercial, seCuallyIeC0licit co11unication enjoys
so1e 0rotection /y falling short of o/scenity, /ut the govern1ent has greater leeway in regulating
it /ecause it is dee1ed to /e of lowIvalue.
,-. Ooning )rdinances: (ay /e used to restrict concentration of 0ornogra0hic /usinesses.
,2. *ude "ancing: #ity of Drie v. Pa0;s A.(.:
It is sy1/olic s0eech 8 eC0ressive conduct: Bovern1ent 1ay /an if:
a. Intent is to 0revent the secondary effects rather than to su00ress the content
/. 4egulation is rationally related to 0ro1oting legiti1ate state interests
c. *)&D: &he least restrictive 1eans standard is not a00lica/le to these contentIneutral
regulations
Profanity L Indecent +0eech
,-. Benerally the state cannot 0unish 0u/lic ,inI0erson. use 8 dis0lay of eC0letives. #ohen v. #A.
,2. Profanity in &H84adio ,$roadcast.: Bovern1ent 1ay i10ose certain sanctions against radio8&H
/roadcasts containing 0atently offensive language involving seC or eCcretion in certain
circu1stances, unless the sanctions target their social or 0olitical 1essage ,1ust /e regulating
context not content.. F## v. Pacifica.
,3. #a0tive Audience "octrine :
a. Pri1arily in ho1e Q once you leave the ho1e, it is your duty to avert your eyes
/. Privacy 1ust /e invaded in an intolera/le 1anner
c. Aith broadcast medium, it is uni>uely accessi/le to children
,5. &ele0hone 0rofanity: Bovern1ent 1ay regulate dialIu0 tele0hone 1essages, /ut only ,-. to
0ro1ote co10elling govern1ent interests and ,2. /y using least restrictive 1ans.
,6. Internet: #hildren can /e 0rotected fro1 internet indecency only /y using the leastI/urdenso1e
1ethods. 4eno v. A#%!.
,M. #a/le &H: An early, frag1ented 0lurality o0inion held that while govern1ent 1ay /an
/roadcasting 0atently offensive seCual8eCcretory 0orn, it cannot re>uire all such 0rogra1s /e
0ut on a single, /yIre>uestIonly channel, nor /an all seCIoriented 0rogra1s fro1 0u/lic &H.
%ater, the #ourt held govern1ent 1ay regulate ca/le &H to shield children, /ut 1ust 0rove that
its 1ethod is the leastIrestrictive. !.+. v. Play/oy.
#)((D4#IA% +PDD#:
I #o11ercial s0eech defined as a co11unication which ,-. does no 1ore than 0ro0ose a co11ercial
transaction and ,2. references s0ecific 0roducts and ,3. is 1ailed for econo1ic 1otivations. $olger
v. 'oung "rug Products #or0. *ote that it can do *) ()4D than 0ro0ose a co11ercial
transaction2 if it does 1ore than that, it is not co11ercial s0eech.
I !n0rotected:
,-. Ads for illegal activities are un0rotected. Ads which are false or 1isleading have also lost
constitutional 0rotection.
,2. &rue /ut 1isleading advertise1ents:
a. &rade *a1e 4estrictions: Bovern1ent 1ay /an 0rofessionals fro1 0racticing under trade
na1es, which are 0otentially 1isleading. Fried1an v. 4ogers.
/. Attorneys; +olicitation of #lients:
i. %awyers have right to honest, nonIdece0tive advertise1ents, /ut govern1ent 1ay /an inI
0erson, forI0rofit solicitation. )hrali9 v. ): +tate $ar Assn.
ii. A#%! Attorneys 1ay solicit for free re0resentation. In re Pri1us.
iii. Benerally, the state 1ust allow targeted, direct 1ail solicitation. +cha0ero v. R' $ar
Assn. :owever, 0ersonal injury8wrongful death solicitations too soon after the accident
1ay /e /anned. F% $ar v. Aent for It, Inc.
c. Accountants; +olicitation of #lients: Bovern1ent cannot /an accountants; inI0erson
solicitations. Ddenfield v. Fane. "istinguished )hrali9 /8c accountants are not 0ersuaders,
li9e attorneys, and unli9e attorneys, accountants deal w8so0histicated clients.
I Per #entral :udson Bas, *onI"ece0tive8%egal Advertising (ay $e 4egulated IF:
,-. 4estriction justified /y su/stantial govern1ental interests
,2. 4estriction directly advances that interest, and
,3. 4egulation is sufficiently narrowlyItailored
a. 4egulation should /e no 1ore eCtensive than necessary
/. 4estriction should /e a reasona/le fit /etween interest and 1eans i10osed
I Paternalistic 4easons : Benerally, govern1ent 1ay not restrict advertise1ents of certain facts in
order to cur/ the de1and for those ite1s<eCce0t for ga1/ling:
,-. :ouse For +ale +igns: Bovern1ent cannot 0revent ho1esellers fro1 dis0laying for sale
signs ,even if the 1otivation for the /an is to 0revent white flight fro1 interracial
neigh/orhoods.. %i1ar9 Assoc. v. Ailling/oro.
,2. Alcohol: Bovern1ent 1ay not /an li>uor dealers fro1 advertising 0rices or li>uor 0otencies.
4u/in v. #oors2 55 %i>uor1art v. 4I.
,3. Ba1/ling: Bovern1ent 1ay restrict casino advertising to reduce ga1/ling. Puerto 4ico Assoc.
v. &ouris1 #o.2 !.+. v. Ddge. :owever, #ourt has since /egan scrutini=ing such restrictions
1ore strictly, declaring that govt. atte10t to da10en 0u/lic de1and for a 0roduct triggers
#entral :udson .
I "ifferences $etween Political L #o11ercial +0eech :
,-. Aith 0olitical s0eech, focus is on the speaker. Aith co11ercial s0eech, focus is on the
audience ,the consu1er..
,2. #o11ercial s0eech is 1ore verifia/le.
,3. !nli9e 0olitical s0eech, which allows falsity or 1isleading state1ents, co11ercial s0eech that is
false or 1isleading is un0rotected.
4DP!&A&I)* 8 P4IHA#' 8 P!$%I#I&'
"efa1ation L related offenses are actiona/le as torts. Ahile such tort suits are 0rivate actions, the
#ourt view the judge;s sentences and the tort laws as state action that 1ay violate the First A1end1ent.
P!$%I# )FFI#IA%+:
*ew 'or9 &i1es +tandard: Pu/lic officials 1ay recover if they can 0rove with clear L convincing
evidence a falsity 1ade with actual 1alice.
,-. Pu/lic )fficial: Includes only fairly authoritative 8 0ro1inent govern1ent wor9ers or
candidates for office. (ust relate to that 0erson;s official conduct.
,2. #lear L #onvincing: w8convincing clarity. (ore that 0re0onderance of evidence. A00ellate
judges conduct an inde0endent, de novo review.
,3. Falsity: +0ea9ers can only /e lia/le for false state1ents of fact, not false o0inions.
,5. Actual (alice: Dither ,a. s0ea9ing when you 9now the state1ent is false, or ,/. s0ea9ing
with rec9less disregard to whether or not your state1ents are true
,6. *)&D that a 0arty cannot avoid the actual 1alice standard /y 0hrasing their clai1 as one for
Intentional Infliction of D1otional "istress<the sa1e test will /e used for that as for li/el.
"a1ages Availa/le:
,-. #o10ensatory
a. Actual: ? 1ust 0rove da1ages
/. Presu1ed: urors 1ay assu1e an injury
,2. Punitive: &hough not addressed in *' &i1es, generally those who 1eet the high standard of
0roof are allowed 0unitive da1ages.
P!$%I# FIB!4D+: Benerally 1ust thrust the1selves into the 0u/lic eye, willingly L
affir1atively.
Bert= sets the state minimum of what 1ust /e re>uired for state li/el law:
,-. *egligence
,2. $)P on Plaintiff to 0rove falsity
,3. Actual 1alice re>uired to get 0resu1ed or 0unitive da1ages.
P4IHA&D FIB!4D+:
,-. &o recover actual damages, 1ust only esta/lish ,a. false state1ent and ,/. negligence
,2. :igher %evel of Protection $ecause:
a. (ore vulnera/le: *o ,or very li1ited. access to 1edia to defend re0utation
/. (ore deserving: *o voluntary waiver of right to 0rotection fro1 defa1atory 1aterial
,3. (atters of Pu/lic #oncern: Bert= a00lies and Plaintiffs 1ust 0rove falsity and injury and
negligence to get co10ensatory da1ages. &o get 0unitive da1ages, 1ust show actual
malice.
,5. (atters *ot of Pu/lic #oncern: (ay allow ?s to recover 0resu1ed and8or 0unitive da1ages
without proving actual malice. (ust still show negligence.
P!$%I# "I+#%)+!4D )F P4IHA&D FA#&+
,-. Involves 0u/lishing ,a. nonI0u/lic info ,/. that is not of legiti1ate concern to the 0u/lic and ,c.
the 0u/lication of which would offend reasona/le 0eo0le.
,2. If the 1edia lawfully o/tains truthful info a/out a 1atter of 0u/lic significance, state law 1ay
0unish its 0u/lication only to further a state interest of the highest order. Florida +tar v. $F.
#)((!*I#A&IHD #)*"!#&
Per +0encer v. Aashington, conduct is 0rotected as co11unicative with:
,-. An intent to convey a 0articulari=ed 1essage, and
,2. In the surrounding circu1stances, the li9elihood is great that the 1essage would /e
understood /y viewers.
);$rien &est: Ahen an act co1/ines s0eech and nonIs0eech ele1ents, the govern1ent 1ay
i10ose regulation if:
,-. Furthers an i10ortant or su/stantial govern1ent interest
,2. !nrelated to the su00ression of freedo1 of eC0ression
,3. Incidental restrictions on free s0eech no greater than necessary to further the interest, A*"
,5. Bovern1ent 1ay constitutionally regulate the conduct. ,#ourt said #ourt should not loo9
/ehind the legislature;s stated 0ur0ose to discern an i10er1issi/le 1otive, /ut if a law is too
/latant with an i10er1issi/le 1otive, then it won;t wor9..
I Bovern1ent 1ay not /an flagI/urning as a 1eans of eC0ression. &E v. ohnson2 !+ v. Dich1an.
I Bovern1ent 1ay li1it ca10aign contri/utions /ut not ca10aign eC0enditures. $uc9ley v. Haleo.
#a10aign contri/ution li1itations will /e voided only if:
,-. +o radical that it renders 0olitical associations ineffective
,2. (utes candidates; 1essages, or
,3. 4enders contri/ution 0ointless.
Anything that is the functional e>uivalent of a contri/ution should /e analy=ed as such, and not as
an eC0enditure. FD# v. #) 4e0u/lican Fed. #a10aign #o11ittee.
P%A#D+ A:I#: (A' $D !+D" F)4 +PDD#:
P!$%I# F)4!(+: Pu/lic 0ro0erties devoted to 0u/lic s0eech /y traditional or govern1ent
fiat8tolerance. DCa10le: +idewal9s, 0ar9s.
,-. #ontentI$ased 4estrictions: su/ject to strict scrutiny ,co10elling interest, narrowly tailored.
,2. &i1e (anner Place 4estrictions: I10osed to 1ini1i=e disru0tion, su/ject to inter1ediate
scrutiny
a. contentIneutral
/. significant govern1ent interest
c. narrowlyItailored ,so long as the regulation is 1ore effective than no regulation at all,
even if it is not the leastIrestrictive 1eans.
d. leaves alternative channels of co11unication availa/le.
,3. Per1its8%icenses Per1issi/le IF:
a. I10ortant 0ur0ose
/. +ets clear standards for granting8rejecting, allowing al1ost no discretion
c. Provides 0rocedural safeguards
%I(I&D" P!$%I# F)4!(+: Pu/lic 0laces which govern1ent affir1atively o0ened for 0u/lic
s0eech, at least te10orarily.
*)*IP!$%I# F)4!(+: )ther 0u/lic 0ro0erties, which were never o0ened for 0u/lic s0eech,
neither /y tradition, fiat, tolerance nor govern1ental 0osition
,-. If foru1 has /een o0ened to general access then treat as 0u/lic foru1.
,2. If foru1 has /een o0ened only to selective access then treat as nonI0u/lic foru1.
,3. Bovern1ent 1ay restrict s0ace to its intended function if restriction is ,a. reasona/le and ,/.
view0ointIneutral.
,5. ail 0ro0erty is nonI0u/lic ,Adderly v. F%., as are 1ilitary /ases ,Breer v. +0oc9..
,6. Ahen govern1ent o0erates co11ercial venture ,/us lines., it and its advertising are nonI
0u/lic foru1s. %eh1an v. +ha9er :eights.
,M. If sidewal9 outside a govern1ent 0ro0erty was constructed only to 0er1it access ,rather than
for 0u/lic convenience. then it is nonI0u/lic. !+ v. Ro9inda.
,S. Air0orts are nonI0u/lic L 1ay /an solicitation /ut not 0a10hleteering. Internatl. +oc. for
Rrishna #onsciousness.
,T. Dven in a nonI0u/lic foru1, govt. 1ay not /an leafleting<a /an on distri/uting literature is
unreasona/le /8c it is not inconsistent or inco10ati/le with nor1al 0ur0oses of that 0lace.
Rrishna. Dven in a 0rivate ho1e, solicitors distri/uting leaflets 0ro/a/ly are not invading
so1eone;s 0rivacy in an essentially intolera/le 1anner as re>uired /y #ohen.
,J. +tateIowned television stations are nonI0u/lic.
"ifferences on $roadcast (edia 4egulations
$roadcast (edia #a/le &elevision Internet
+carcity of /roadcast
fre>uencies
*)& regulated li9e /roadcast
1edia
4egulated li9e print 1edia
Pu/lic owns the airwaves
which are licensed L regulated
to 0rotect the 0u/lic
A%+), airwaves are scarce
(ust carry 0rovisions are
seen as contentIneutral
Breater regulation allowed:
,-. #a0tive audiences
,2. Accessi/ility to 9ids
Inter1ediate scrutiny ,);$rien
&est.
+trict +crutiny
+PDD#: )* P4IHA&D P4)PD4&'
,-. Darly cases held that so1e large 0rivate /usinesses could not eCclude 0rotesters. (arsh v. A%
,2. %ater decisions held -st A1end. ina00lica/le to 0rivate 0ro0erty owners and as not co10elling
the1 to allow s0eech there. :udgens v. *%4$.
+PDD#: I* P4I+)*+, +#:))%+ L &:D (I%I&A4': Benerally, greater restrictions on s0eech
are 0er1itted where ,-. attendance is often involuntary and ,2. authoritarianis1 reigns.
,-. (ilitary . -st A1end. offers 1ilitary 0ersonnel less 0rotection than civilians. Par9er v. %evy2
$rown v. Blines.
,2. Prisons . 4estrictions are valid if: ,a. govern1ent;s o/jective is legiti1ate, ,/. neutral, and
,c. regulations are rationally related to that o/jective. &horn/urgh v. A//ott.
a. ails cannot 0rohi/it in1ates fro1 writing uncensored letters to the outside. Procunier v.
(artine=.
/. Press 1ay /e denied access to jail L 0risoners.
c. In1ates asse1/ly 1ay /e curtailed.
,3. +chools .
a. If a student;s s0eech is 0assive, 0olitical and studentIinitiated, then school 1ust show
material and substantial interference with a00ro0riate school disci0line. &in9er. ust a
0otential for disru0tion, or s0eculative fear of disru0tion, is *)& sufficient.
/. +chools 1ay sanction lewd s0eech. $ethel v. Fraser.
c. +choolI+0onsored +0eech: Ahen schools s0onsor eC0ressive activities, they 1ay
edit8censor the 0roduct if ,-. their actions are reasona/ly related to ,2. legiti1ate
0edagogical concerns. :a=elwood v. Ruhl1eier.
d. +chool officials 1ay re1ove /oo9s fro1 li/rary if they are vulgar, and 1ay choose to
/uy so1e /oo9s and not others, /ut not in order to deny students access to their ideas.
P!$%I# D(P%)'DD;+ 4IB:& &) +PDAR
Pic9ering $alancing &est
,-. &hreshhold >uestion is whether it is a 1atter of 0u/lic concern ,s0eech of a disgruntled
e10loyee N less 0rotected than s0eech as a citi=en on a 0u/lic concern.. DCa1ine:
a. For1
/. #ontent
c. #onteCt ,is it s0eech as concerned citi=en or as disgruntled e10loyeeU.
,2. 4ight of e10loyee to s0ea9, and the 0u/lic to receive that infor1ation, is $A%A*#D"
against the 0u/lic entity;s right to effective L efficient functioning.
i. "isru0tion: "id the s0eech disru0t the functioning of the officeU
ii. "ishar1ony: Aas the s0eech directed at so1eone with who1 s0ea9er has a close
wor9ing relationshi0U
,3. &he 1ore the s0eech is a 1atter of 0u/lic concern, then the 1ore su/stantial disru0tion the
govt. will have to show to sanction it.
#o10are Pic9ering to #onnic9
,-. In Pic9ering, generally s0ea9ing, if the s0eech is of 0u/lic concern, govern1ent 1ust show
actual 1aterial and su/stantial disru0tion to sanction it.
,2. In #onnic9, where s0eech is less a 1atter of 0u/lic concern and therefore less 0rotected, then
a reasona/le /elief in disru0tive 0otential is sufficient to justify the sanction.
*ote that where an e10loyee serves no confidential, 0olicy1a9ing, or 0u/lic contact role, the danger
to the agency;s successful functioning fro1 that e10loyee;s 0rivate s0eech is 1ini1al. 4an9in v.
(cPherson.
F4DD")( )F A++)#IA&I)*
#ourt holds the -st A1end. to i10ly freedo1 of association with grou0s that advance certain ideologies,
0etition the govern1ent collectively, 0ool resources for 1ass 0ersuasion, etc.
%aws Prohi/iting 8 Punishing (e1/ershi0: &est is activated when govt. ta9es various sanctions,
including denying 0u/lic e10loy1ent, re>uiring loyalty oaths, denying /ar 1e1/ershi0, etc.
Bovern1ent 1ay 0unish 1e1/ershi0 only if the 1e1/er:
,-. Is actively affiliated with a grou0 with illegal o/jectives
,2. Rnows of those illegal o/jectives, A*"
,3. +0ecifically intends to further those o/jectives.
Patronage: #ourt /orrows language fro1 0revious case relying on "octrine of !nconstitutional
#onditions to say 0atronage firings were illegal. Dlrod v. $urns.
,-. Dfficiency:
a. +u00orters: official needs to /e surrounded /y his own 0eo0le
/. #hallengers: Inefficient2 /rings in 0eo0le who have no training
,2. +a/otage
a. +u00orters: D10loyees not of that 0arty would sa/otage the official
/. #hallengers: *o sense to assu1e that. #ould fire so1eone for not doing their jo/ if it
/eca1e an issue.
,3. +u00ort
a. If we don;t have the 0atronage jo/s as incentive, then 0eo0le won;t want to wor9 in
the ca10aigns.
%aws 4e>uiring (e1/ershi0s $e "isclosed
,-. +trict scrutiny used
,2. If disclosure of an eC0ressive asse1/ly;s 1e1/ershi0 would chill its s0eech 8 asse1/ly, then
state cannot co10el it without a valid, controlling reason. *AA#P v. A%.
,3. #a10aign Finance "isclosure: Benerally u0holds re>uire1ents of donors revealing their
identities. $uc9ley v. Haleo. $ut where ris9 of re0risal is great, #ourt 1ay eCe10t 0arties.
$rown v. +ocialist Aor9ers.
#o10elled Association
,-. (andatory organi=ations ,re>uired unions, /ar associations. 1ay collect dues L use for
functions /enefiting all 1e1/ers ,collective /argaining, 1aintaining 0rofessional standards.
/ut 1ay not s0end dues on view0oint advocacy. A/ood v. "etroit $d. of Dduc.2 Reller v. +t.
$ar of #A.
,2. +tateIowned schools 1ay collect 1andatory fees L s0end on 0ro1oting student orgs.; own
s0eech8advocacy, to further education L civics, /ut students 1ay insist on so1e view0ointI
neutral 0rocedural safeguards to li1it the s0eech the 1oney su00orts. $d. of 4egents of
!niv. of AI v. +outhworth.
AntiI"iscri1ination %aws. &wo sources of associational freedo1:
,-. Inti1ate, founded in due 0rocess li/erty and 0rivacy: right to for1 certain highly 0ersonal
relationshi0s
a. !sually involve fa1ily: 1arriage, child/irth, coha/itating with relatives
/. "egree of Inti1acy: +1all si=e, high selectivity, scheduled activities, congeniality,
0ur0ose, 0olicies
,2. DC0ressive: %in9ed /y /elief, not fa1ily. 4egulations su/ject to strict scrutiny.
a. Is the organi=ation engaged in an eC0ressive activityU Brou0 1ust show so1e 9ind of
discerna/le eC0ression or 1essage, eC0licit or i10licit.
/. If yes, would the ad1ission of the challenged 1e1/er,s. significantly i10air the
eC0ressionU
c. "oes the govern1ent have view0oint neutral co10elling interest to ending the
discri1ination that can /e 1et in no less restrictive wayU
F4DD")( )F &:D P4D++
,-. &aCes on the Press. (edia 1ust 0ay ordinary taCes, /ut s0ecial taCes levied just on the 0ress are
unconstitutional. Brosjean v. A1. Press #o. &he fear is that govt. could try to su00ress the
0ress; investigation L criticis1 using 0unitive taCes.
a. Dven differential taCes that /enefit news0a0ers are unconstitutional. (innea0olis +tar.
/. It is o9ay to su/ject different 1edia to different taCation, so long as it is not a taC directed
solely at the 0ress or that distinguishes a1ongst the 0ress. %eathers v. (edloc9 ,govt. could
taC gross recei0ts while eCe10ting news0a0ers and 1aga=ines /ut not eCe10ting ca/le
television..
,2. Beneral 4egulatory %aws. (edia not eCe10t fro1 general regulatory laws. A.P. v. !+ ,0ress
lia/le for antitrust.2 #ohen v. #owles (edia #o. ,re0orters who revealed confidential source
lia/le for 0ro1issory esto00el..
,3. Ree0ing 4e0orters; +ources #onfidential. It is 1ore i10ortant to solve cri1e than to tal9 a/out
it. &hus, news1en have no s0ecial 0rivilege against grand jury su/0oenas to identify
confidential sources, eCce0t that availa/le to the general 0u/lic. $ran=/urg v. :ays. +tates L
#ongress are free to create a news1en;s 0rivilege2 few states have done so.
,5. 4e>uired Access to (edia. Bovt. 1ay re>uire /roadcasters ,&H L radio. to give access to
o00osing views ,4ed %ion $roadcasting v. F##. /ut govt. cannot 1andate a right of re0ly for
news0a0ers ,(ia1i :erald v. &ornillo..
,6. -st A1end. 4ight of Access to Bovt. Places8Pa0ers. #ourt refuses s0ecial access for 0ress.
a. Access to udicial Proceedings: #ri1inal trials are presumptively open to the 0u/lic and
0ress a/sent overriding interests. 4ich1ond *ews0a0ers v. HA.
/. Access to Prisons: 4e0orters have no s0ecial right /eyond those granted to the general
0u/lic to enter 0risons or interview 0risoners. Pell v. Procunier ,jail 1ay /an individual
interviews w80risoners.2 :ouchins v. R7D" ,jail 1ay offer re0orters highlyIrestricted tours
L /an ca1eras 8 recorders.
,M. *ewsgathering is 0rotected /y the -st A1end., /ut only in very li1ited fashion.
a. Aithout so1e 0rotection for see9ing out the news, freedo1 of the 0ress could /e
eviscerated. #ourt in $ran=/urg doesn;t shut the door to the notion.
(ethods of 4estraining Press 4e0orting or #ourt Proceedings
Bag )rder: Press can /e in courtroo1 /ut cannot 0u/lish anything a/out it.
Prior 4estraintV (ust 1eet strict scrutiny.
AfterItheIFact Punish1ent of Press: Press can /e in courtroo1, 0u/lishes info L is 0unished for it
+trict +crutiny. Bovt. 1ust 1eet ++ if 0ress 0u/lished truthful, lawfully o/tained info.
#losure )rder: Pu/lic L 0ress have right of access to cri1inal 0roceedings
#ourt does not rely on any 0ress as watchdog argu1ent.
Beneral &est for Ahether ournalists #an $e Re0t )ut of a Proceeding:
,-. Is there a history of o0enness for that 0roceedingU
,2. Is there a notion of wanting the 0u/lic and 0ress to o/serve the 0roceedingU ,Ahat /enefit
would /e served /y their 0resenceU.
,3. If /oth ,-. and ,2. are 1et, then the govern1ent 1ust have a co10elling interest to 9ee0 the
0ress out.
4D%IBI)*
#ongress shall 1a9e no law res0ecting an esta/lish1ent of religion, or 0rohi/iting the free eCercise
thereof.
I &wo clauses: Dsta/lish1ent L Free DCercise a00ly to the states through incor0oration into the
"ue Process of -5th A1end. #antwell v. #&2 Dverson v. $d. of Dduc.
I $oth clauses act as coIguarantors of religious li/erty /8c fra1ers did not entrust li/erty of religious
/eliefs to either clause alone. A/ington +chool "ist. v. +che100.
I Free DCercise #lause 0rotects a/ility to /elieve and eCercise faith
I Dsta/lish1ent #lause 0revents govt. fro1 ta9ing actions that have 0ri1ary 0ur0ose or effect or
aiding8inhi/iting religion, and 0revents govt. entangle1ent with it.
I &hree Hiews of the Fra1ers :
,-. 4oger Aillia1s: Bovt. involve1ent would corru0t religion.
,2. &ho1as efferson: 4eligion would corru0t govt.
,3. a1es (adison: 4eligion is one of 1any factions re>uiring 0reservation.
I #ourt has never really defined religion /ut has considered it in 3 conteCts:
,-. !nder +elective +ervice Act
a. *ot actually -st A1end. cases2 statutory inter0retation
/. "efined religion as individual;s /elief in a relation to a +u0re1e $eing involving duties
su0erior to those arising fro1 any hu1an relation. !+ v. +eeger. &hose whose sincere L
1eaningful /eliefs occu0y a 0lace in their lives e>uivalent or 0arallel to that of an orthodoC
/elief in Bod >ualify for the eCce0tion.
c. Rey is whether these /eliefs 0lay the role of a religion and function as a religion in the
F0erson;sG life. Aelsh v. !+.
,2. +incerity of $eliefs
a. Finders of fact 1ay only deter1ine whether or not a religious /elief is sincere.
/. Finders of fact 1ay not deter1ine whether the /eliefs the1selves are true or false. !+ v.
$allard.
,3. 4elevance of 4eligious "og1a L +hared $eliefs
a. Individual can clai1 a religious /elief even if it is inconsistent with the doctrines of his
0rofessed religion. &ho1as v. 4eview $d. of I* D10loy1ents +ecurity "iv.
/. Factors for deter1ining the sincerity of religious /eliefs include 0revailing doctrines for that
religion and /eliefs of other 1e1/ers of that religion.
c. :owever, religious /eliefs are inherently personal so do1inant views are not deter1inative
in assessing whether an individual;s /elief is religious.
d. &he in>uiry 1ust /e individualized. Fra=ee v. I% D10loy1ent +ecurity "iv.
&:D F4DD DED4#I+D #%A!+D
I D1/races 2 conce0ts: ,-. freedo1 to /elieve and ,2. freedo1 to act. &he freedo1 to hold religious
/eliefs and o0inions is absolute, /ut the freedo1 of religiouslyI1otivated conduct is not. 4eynolds
v. !+.
I "oes the restriction8law 0ose a su/stantial /urden /y coercing 0arty into violating a religious tenet,
or /y 0enali=ing 0arty /y denying a govt. /enefit ,i.e., does it re>uire the 0arty to forego a religious
activity in eCchange for a govt. /enefit.U
I If a law /urdening the free eCercise of religion is neutral and generally-applicable, it will /e
analy=ed under rational /asis. D10loy1ent "iv. v. +1ith. +1ith involved a cri1inal statute /ut has
/een eCtended to civil conteCt.
o )*%' DCce0tion to +1ith are :y/rid 4ights . If the law also /urdens another constitutional
right, then it 1ust 1eet strict scrutiny. D.g., 0arental rights or une10loy1ent.
I If the law is either not neutral, or is not generally a00lica/le, then it 1ust /e su00orted /y a
co10elling govt. interest and narrowly tailored. #hurch of %u9u1i $a/alu Aye v. #ity of :ialeah.
I &here is so1e suggestion that even with a faciallyIdiscri1inatory law, you should eCa1ine whether
there is hostility /ehind the discri1ination or if it is si10ly a refusal to fund situation. %oc9e v.
"avey.
I 4e1e1/er: &he govt. need not fund the eCercise of constitutional rights, it 1ay selectively fund,
and it can 1a9e 0rogra11atic restrictions on 1onetary grants. 4ust v. +ullivan. It just cannot do so
in a view0ointI/ased 1anner.
&:D D+&A$%I+:(D*& #%A!+D
&here are 3 co10eting a00roaches:
,-. +trict +e0aration . Adhered to /y Bins/urg L +tevens. 4e>uires se0aration of govt. and religion
to the greatest 0ossi/le eCtent, which is seen as necessary to 0rotect religious li/erty. #alls for
co10lete L 0er1anent se0aration of church L state, for/idding every for1 of 0u/lic aid or
su00ort for religion.
a. (ain 0ro/le1 is that co10lete 0rohi/ition of all govt. assistance would threaten the free
eCercise of religion, 1a9ing total se0aration i10ossi/le. Issue is where to draw the line.
,2. *eutrality . 3 or 5 adherents to this view, including );#onnor, $reyer L +utor. Bovt. 1ust /e
neutral toward religion and not favor one or another, or favor religion over secularis1, as
evaluated /y the sy1/olic endorse1ent test as seen through they eyes of a reasona/le o/server.
a. &he reasona/le o/server is a well-informed o/server, who is 0resu1ed to 0ossess a certain
level of infor1ation that all citi=ens 1ay not share, including the differences /etween 0u/lic
and nonI0u/lic fora.
,3. Acco11odation . +calia, &ho1as. #ourt should acco11odate the 0resence of religion in govt.,
and a violation would occur only if the govt. actually esta/lished a church or coerces religious
0artici0ation. $elieve this reflects the i10ortance of religion in A1erican history.
I If a law facially discri1inates /etween religions, it is unconstitutional unless it 1eets strict scrutiny.
I %D()* &D+& : If a law is faciallyIneutral, it 1ust 1eet the %e1on &est.
,-. :ave a secular legislative 0ur0ose.
a. +tate law re>uiring 0osting of -K #o11and1ents in every 0u/lic school classroo1 was
unconstitutional /8c lac9ed secular 0ur0ose. +tone v. Braha1.
/. +tate law re>uiring /usinesses to /e closed on +undays was constitutional /8c had secular
goal of 0roviding unifor1 day of rest. (cBowan v. (".
,2. :ave 0rinci0al or 0ri1ary effect that neither advances nor inhi/its religion.
a. *ote that allowing a church to advance religion does not violate #onstitution2 govt. itself
1ust have advanced religion through its own activities L influence.
/. +tatute 0rohi/iting e10loyers fro1 re>uiring e10loyees to wor9 on +a//ath day was
unconstitutional /8c favored religion over all other interests. Dstate of &hornton.
c. DCe10tion for religious organi=ations fro1 &itle HII;s 0rohi/ition against discri1ination in
e10loy1ent /ased on religion was constitutional. #or0. of %"+ v. A1os.
,3. *ot foster eCcessive govt. entangle1ent with religion.
a. DCcessive entangle1ent is caused /y re>uiring a co10rehensive, discri1inating and
continuing state surveillance.
/. Bovt. cannot 0ay secularIsu/jects; teachers; salaries in 0arochial schools /8c it would force
the govt. to 1onitor the teachers and su/jects at those schools. Brand 4a0ids v. $all.
I Dven though the #ourt has never overruled %e1on, the 1ajority of the #ourt has 1oved to an
endorse1ent analysis. &hat is, would the 0ri1ary effect or 0ur0ose of allowing a 0erson to act8s0ea9
/e viewed as the govt. endorsing religionU
I *ote that the #ourt in A1os held that a law which see9s to acco11odate religion /y lifting a govt.I
i10osed /urden serves an i10ortant govt. interest and will /e viewed not as advancing religion /ut
1erely allowing religion to advance itself.
4estricting Private 4eligious +0eech: +0eech 4ights v. Dsta/lish1ent #lause
Ahere govt. choice to restrict 0rivate religious s0eech on govt. 0ro0erty or w8govt. funds /8c of a desire
to avoid violating the esta/lish1ent clause has /een challenged, the #ourt consistently held that
eCcluding religious s0eech violates the freedo1 of s0eech as contentI/ased restrictions.
I If there is a >uestion of accessi/ility that involves /oth s0eech and religion issues, you 1ust first
address the s0eech challenge:
o If it is a P!$%I# foru1, then the restriction 1ust /e contentIneutral L 1eet strict scrutiny
o If it is a %I(I&D" P!$%I# foru1, then the restriction 1ust /e view0ointIneutral L reasona/le.
'ou can have a contentI/ased restriction: you can /ar an entire su/ject2 you just cannot /ar a
view0oint on a 0articular su/ject.
I &hen loo9 to see if the religion is 0ro/le1atic: use the endorse1ent test.
I A 0rivate dis0lay of a religious 1essage on govern1entIs0onsored 0ro0erty leads to use of
endorse1ent test: would a wellIinfor1ed reasona/le o/server ,who has 9nowledge of the general
/ac9ground of the 0ro0erty<including its foru1 classification and conteCt of the dis0lay. /elieve
the govt. is endorsing the 1essageU
o 5 ustices would find that where the govt. creates an open foru1 and 1a9es that foru1 neturally
availa/le to a /road class, there can /e no violation of the Dsta/lish1ent #lause, and they reject
the transferred endorse1ent argu1ent. Further, even if it is *)& an o0en foru1, a/sent actual
coercion they would find no violation.
o For other justices, a disclai1er 1ight avoid the endorse1ent 0ro/le1.
Ahen can religion /eco1e a 0art of Bovern1ent activitiesU
,-. +chool 0olicy allowing students to /e released w80arental 0er1ission to religious instruction
classes conducted during school hours in the school /uilding /y outside teachers was
unconstitutional. (c#ollu1 v. $d. of Dduc.
,2. +tudents 1ay /e released during school hours for religious instruction outside the school /ecause
that si10ly acco11odates religion rather than advancing it ,/8c no govt. funds or facilities were
used.. Oorach v. #lauson.
,3. Ahere $oard of Dduc. directed a school 0rinci0al to cause a 0rayer, co10osed /y the $oard, to
/e said aloud at /eginning of class, govt. is furthering religious /eliefs. Dngel v. Hitale.
,5. +tate law authori=ing a 1o1ent of silence in 0u/lic schools for 1editation or voluntary 0rayer
was found to have the 0ur0ose of reintroducing 0rayer into 0u/lic schools L lac9ed secular
0ur0ose. Aallace v. affree.
,6. A school;s invitation to clergy1an to say a 0rayer at a graduation cere1ony is govt. coercion to
0artici0ate in religious activity. %ee v. Aeis1an.
,M. +tates 1ay not re>uire teaching8learning /e tailored to 0rinci0les of any religion: 0rohi/ition of
teaching evolution lac9s a secular 0ur0ose ,D00erson v. A4. and laws re>uiring creation science
/e taught with evolution advance religion ,Ddwards v. Aguillard..
Bovern1ent Aid to 4eligious +chools
&his is 0art of the atte10t to assess whether the 0ri1ary effect of the aid is endorse1ent 8 advance1ent
of religion.
,-. #an funds /e diverted to su00ort religionU
,2. Is the funding direct or indirectU
,3. #!44D*& %AA: Dven if the aid goes directly to the school, it is constitutional if it is a neutral
0rogra1 with a /road /ase of /eneficiaries, and in deciding whether we should find an
Dsta/lish1ent #lause violation, the 0lurality loo9s to actual diversion. "irect versus indirect aid
is a factor /ut 1ay not /e deter1inative. (itchell v. :el1s.
,5. &aC DCe10tions for 4eligious )rgani=ations:
a. $road class of /eneficiaries<the taCIeCe10t status su00orts all charita/le organi=ations L
educational institutions, not just religion.
/. *o one would really see this as endorsing religion. If we su/jected churches to taCation and
if govt. had to decide the value of religious o/jects on church 0ro0erty, that in and or itself
would /e 0ro/le1atic.
,6. Houchers:
a. Indirect aid. It is through the true choice of the 0arents that the schools get aid.
/. Actual diversion. )nce the 0arent 1a9es his choice to send the child to a religious school,
there aren;t any restrictions on the way the school can s0end the aid.
c. "I4D#& aid 1ust /e neutral with no actual diversion
d. I*"I4D#& aid 1ust /e neutral and have an ele1ent of true choice