This case involves two documents summarizing different cases. The first document summarizes a case where deeds of sale transferring land titles were executed by the Velos to the Bacungans as security for a loan, but the Bacungans never obtained the loan and secretly negotiated to sell the properties. The court held the arrangement was actually an equitable mortgage rather than a void sale. The second document summarizes another case where a deed of sale transferring land titles was claimed to be a forgery, but the court found it was actually an equitable mortgage based on the circumstances of the transaction between the parties.
This case involves two documents summarizing different cases. The first document summarizes a case where deeds of sale transferring land titles were executed by the Velos to the Bacungans as security for a loan, but the Bacungans never obtained the loan and secretly negotiated to sell the properties. The court held the arrangement was actually an equitable mortgage rather than a void sale. The second document summarizes another case where a deed of sale transferring land titles was claimed to be a forgery, but the court found it was actually an equitable mortgage based on the circumstances of the transaction between the parties.
This case involves two documents summarizing different cases. The first document summarizes a case where deeds of sale transferring land titles were executed by the Velos to the Bacungans as security for a loan, but the Bacungans never obtained the loan and secretly negotiated to sell the properties. The court held the arrangement was actually an equitable mortgage rather than a void sale. The second document summarizes another case where a deed of sale transferring land titles was claimed to be a forgery, but the court found it was actually an equitable mortgage based on the circumstances of the transaction between the parties.
This case involves two documents summarizing different cases. The first document summarizes a case where deeds of sale transferring land titles were executed by the Velos to the Bacungans as security for a loan, but the Bacungans never obtained the loan and secretly negotiated to sell the properties. The court held the arrangement was actually an equitable mortgage rather than a void sale. The second document summarizes another case where a deed of sale transferring land titles was claimed to be a forgery, but the court found it was actually an equitable mortgage based on the circumstances of the transaction between the parties.
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Bacungan vs.
Court of Appeals, 574 SCRA 642, December 18, 2008
Article No. 1470 DOCTRINE: Gross inadequacy of price by itself will not result in a void contract. Gross inadequacy of price does not even affect the validity of a contract of sale, unless it signifies a defect in the consent or that the parties actually intended a donation or some other contract. Inadequacy of cause will not invalidate a contract unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. The Spouses Velo sought the help of the Bacungans in securing a loan. The Bacungans agreed to obtain a loan from a bank provided the Velos transfer titles of certain parcels of land to them as security for the loan. The Velos executed deeds of sale and new TCTs were issued in the name of the Bacungans. !
FACTS: ALS2014B Page !148 of !175 Atty. Sta Maria
However, the Bacungans never applied for the loan with the bank and secretly began negotiating for the sale of the properties to third parties. The Velos filed an action to nullify the deeds of sale on the ground that the sale was simulated. The RTC held that the Velos voluntarily consented to the simulation of the contracts; thus, the principle of pari delicto must prevail and both parties were at fault. The CA reversed and said that the deeds of sale were simulated as the parties did not intend to be bound by them at all. The CA pointed out gross inadequacy of prices and the Velos failure to receive any part of the purchase price stated in the deeds of sale. ISSUE: W/N the deeds of sale are void HELD: No. The arrangement between the parties was in the nature of an equitable mortgage. Although the price of each of the properties was grossly inadequate, gross inadequacy of price by itself will not result in a void contract. Gross inadequacy of price does not even affect the validity of a contract of sale, unless it signifies a defect in the consent or that the parties actually intended a donation or some other contract. Inadequacy of cause will not invalidate a contract unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. That the Velos did not receive the purchase price is not entirely correct. The consideration for the transaction was to secure the payment of the Velos loan to the Bacungans. While the deeds of sale do not reflect the true intent of the parties, their real agreement must nonetheless be recognized and enforced. The proper remedy is to institute an action for the reformation. Deheza-Inamarga vs. Alano, 574 SCRA 651, December 18, 2008 ART. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases: (1) When the price of the sale with right to repurchase is unusually inadequate; (2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; ALS201(43B) When upon or after the expiration oPfagthe e!12r8igohft !1t7o5repurchase another instrument exAttetyn.dSintagMthaeria period of redemption or granting a new period is executed; (4) When the purchaser retains for himself a part of the purchase price;
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; (6) In any case where it may be fairly inferred that the real intention of the parties is that the transaction shall secure the payment of a debt or the performance of any other obligation. In any of the foregoing case, any money, fruits, or other benefit to be received by the vendee as rent or otherwise shall be considered as interest which shall be subject to the usury laws. ART. 1604. The provisions of Article 1602 shall also apply to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale. ART. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. Doctrine/s An equitable mortgage is one which, although lacking in some formality, or form, or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute, nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, and contains nothing impossible or contrary to law. Facts Tomas Alano, husband of respondent Celenia Alano, owned two parcels of land. He mortgaged the properties in favor of Renato Gepty. Gepty demanded that Tomas pay the loan. Tomas, however, did not have money at that time to redeem his properties so he sought help from his niece, petitioner Mary Ann Deheza-Inamarga. Petitioner agreed to pay the loan while the spouses, in turn, mortgaged said properties to her. Petitioner kept in her possession the OCTs and asked the spouses to sign blank pieces of paper which petitioner said will be converted into receipts evidencing their indebtedness to her. After Tomas had passed away, respondents Celenia and her children went to petitioner to redeem the property. Petitioner, however, told them that she had mortgaged the property to the Rural Bank of Libacao. Respondents verified the matter with the bank and discovered that the OCTs have been cancelled and in lieu thereof, new TCTs were issued in petitioners name. Respondents learned that the TCTs in petitioners favor were issued by virtue of a Deed of Sale purportedly executed by the Spouses Alano in her favor. Respondents filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of document, reconveyance and damages against petitioner and the Rural Bank of Libacao. Respondents contended that the deed of sale is null and void because the signatures of the Spouses Alano were forged and even if they were the signatures of the spouses, they were affixed on blank sheets of paper which were not intended to be a deed of sale. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied the allegation of forgery and maintained that the deed of sale was valid. She claimed that the spouses offered to sell her the property so they can use the purchase price to redeem the property from Gepty. Petitioner added that the action is barred by prescription, laches and estoppel. Issues (1) W/N the Deed of Sale is a forgery; (2) W/N the transaction between petitioner and the Spouses Alano is one of sale or equitable mortgage; (3) W/N respondents action is already barred by prescription, laches or estoppel; and Held (1) This Court finds sufficient basis for the finding of the Court of Appeals that the said signatures were indeed forged. The Court of Appeals cited apparent differences in the signatures on the face of the documentary evidence submitted before the RTC. Also, it found that the signatures on the deed of sale appeared to be different in characteristics, spacing and strokes from the signatures of the Spouses Alano
appearing in other documents forming part of the records of this case which are admittedly genuine. ALS2014B Page !129 of !175 Atty. Sta Maria (2) Respondents stress that they continued to be in possession of the property even after the alleged execution of the Deed of Sale and they claim that the P7,000 consideration is grossly inadequate for the market value of the property. Respondents further stated that they paid P500 interest annually for the loan. In Our considered view, the appellate court did not err in sustaining the decision of the trial court holding that the transaction between the parties is an equitable mortgage. In the instant case, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, correctly found that more than one of the circumstances enumerated in Article 1602 are present, to wit: the inadequacy of the selling price of the properties in relation to its true value; the vendors (Spouses Alano) remained in possession as lessee or otherwise; respondents paid the real property taxes; and the spouses secured the payment of the principal debt owed to petitioner with said properties.16 On this score, we are in agreement that the parties intended an equitable mortgage and not a contract of sale. (3) On the third issue, petitioner claims that the complaint was barred by extinctive prescription as it was filed only on January 24, 1991, or almost 13 years from March 7, 1978 when the TCTs were issued in favor of petitioner. Petitioner argues that the prescriptive period for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust is 10 years.17 Respondents counter that since the deed of sale and the certificates of title in the name of petitioner are all null and void, prescription, laches or estoppel has not set in. Again, we find for the respondents. Where there is no consent given by one party in a purported contract, such contract was not perfected; therefore, there is no contract to speak of. The deed of sale relied upon by petitioner is deemed a void contract. This being so, the action based on said deed of sale shall not prescribe in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
Nunga, Jr. vs. Nunga III, 574 SCRA 760, December 18, 2008 Doctrine/s: A void agreement will not be rendered operative by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations. A contract that violates the law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. While it is true that a law creating new rights may be given retroactive effect, the same can only be made possible if the new right does not prejudice or impair any vested right. Facts: Rural Bank of Apalit, Inc. (RBA) conducted its annual stockholders meeting. The parties involved in this case, Victor, Francisco Jr. (an American citizen), and Francisco III, are stockholders of RBA. During the meeting, another stockholder, Gonzales, expressed his intentions to sell his shares. Francisco Jr. negotiated with Gonzales for the purchase of the latters shares. They executed a Contract to Sell and thereafter, Francisco Jr. gave the initial payment of P50,000. However, before Francisco Jr. could pay the balance of the purchase price, Gonzales entered into another contract involving the very same shares. Gonzales executed a Deed of Assignment of the same shares in favor of Francisco III, and the latter paid the full purchase price of P300,000. Eventually, Francisco Jr. paid the balance of P150,000 for the purchase of the shares. He was, however, informed that the shares were already sold to Francisco III. After some discussion, Gonzales was somehow convinced to accept the balance of the purchase price and sign his name at the dorsal portion of the stock certificates to endorse the same to Francisco Jr. Gonzalez also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Francisco Jr. Both Francisco Jr. and Francisco III filed cases asserting their rights over the shares. Issues: Who among the parties has a better right to the RBA shares Held: Francisco III has a better right to the RBA shares. Francisco Jr. contends that the consummated sale of the RBA shares of stock by Gonzalez to Francisco Jr. gives him a superior right over the same, since the transaction complied with all the elements of a valid sale. The SC held that such sale was invalid because Francisco Jr. was not a Filipino citizen and was, by law, disqualified from owning capital stock of a rural bank. Francisco Jr. contends that the passage of Republic Act No. 8179, An Act to Further Liberalize Foreign Investment, cured whatever legal infirmity there may have been in his purchase of the RBA shares of stock from Gonzalez. As Republic Act No. 8179 expressly creates and declares for the first time a substantive right, then it may be given retroactive effect. However, even the subsequent enactment of Republic Act No. 8179 cannot benefit Francisco Jr. It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature, or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. Francisco Jr. asserts that, as an exception to the cardinal rule of prospective application of laws, Republic Act No. 8179 may be retroactively applied, since it creates for the first time a substantive right in favor of natural-born citizens of the Philippines. Francisco Jr., however, overlooked the vital exception to the exception. While it is true that a law creating new rights may be given retroactive effect, the same can only be made possible if the new right does not
prejudice or impair any vested right. ALS2014B Page !132 of !175 Atty. Sta Maria The SC held that Republic Act No. 8179 cannot be applied retroactively to the present case, as to do so would prejudice the vested rights of Francisco III to the disputed RBA shares of stock, since the Deed of Assignment in favor of him was valid.
The fact of partial payment by Francisco Jr. has no effect on the validity of the contract which was void because of his disqualification. A void agreement will not be rendered operative by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations. A contract that violates the law is null and void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all.
Eulogio vs. Apeles, 576 SCRA 561, January 20, 2009 Article 1479 Doctrine: According to 1479 of the Civil Code, an unaccepted unilateral promise to buy or sell a determinate thing for a price certain is upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration from the price. Facts: The spouses Apeles leased the property, a house and lot situated in Quezon City, to Enrico Eulogio after his father's death and he succeeded as lessor of the said property. Eulogio and the spouses Apeles later on entered in a Contract of Lease with Option to Purchase which afforded Eulogio the option to purchase the property for a price not exceeding 1.5 million, on or before the expiration of the 3 year lease period. Before the expiration of the lease period, Eulogio tried to purchase the property by communicating with Luz Apeles but the spouses ignored him. Eulogio then filed an action which was grounded on the contract allowing him to acquire ownership of the property after paying the agreed amount. Issue: Whether or not Eulogio has the right to acquire ownership of the property. Held: No. According to the contract, the option is not of itself a purchase but merely secures the privilege to buy. According to 1479 of the Civil Code, an unaccepted unilateral promise to buy or sell a determinate thing for a price certain is upon the promissor if the promise is supported by a consideration from the price. In the case of Eulogio, no consideration was given by him to the spouses for the option to the contract.