Hojas V PAB
Hojas V PAB
Hojas V PAB
FACTS: The petitioners alleged that they secured a loan from respondent Philippine Amanah Bank (PAB) in the amount of P450,000.00; that this loan was secured by a mortgage, covering both personal and real properties. For failure to pay the loan, PAB applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged real properties of petitioners and that consequently, a Notice of Extrajudicial Foreclosure was issued on January 12, 1987 setting the foreclosure sale on April 21, 1987 and, stating therein the mortgage debt in the sum of P450,000.00; and that, in the public auction conducted, PAB acquired said real property. It was further alleged that on March 9, 1988, through the intervention of then Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Farouk A. Carpizo (Carpizo), the OICPresident of PAB, wrote Roberto Hojas (Roberto), petitioners son, informing him that although the one-year redemption period would expire on April 21, 1988, by virtue of the banks incentive scheme, the redemption period was extended until December 31, 1988; They asserted that the March 9, 1988 Letter of Carpizo to Roberto Hojas extended the redemption period from April 21 to December 31, 1988. Considering that they had relied on Carpizos representation, PAB violated the principle of estoppel when it conducted the public sale on November 4, 1988.7 Their basis was the portion of said letter which stated: xxxx As the Bank has adopted an incentive scheme whereby payments are liberalized to give chances to former owners to repossess their properties, we suggest that you advise your parents to drop by at our Zamboanga Office so they can avail of this rare privilege which shall be good only up to December 31, 1988. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN NOT HOLDING PAB TO HAVE VIOLATED THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL WHEN THE LATTER CONDUCTED THE NOVEMBER 4, 1988 PUBLIC SALE. HELD: No. Through estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying on it.16 This doctrine is based on the grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith, and justice and its purpose is to forbid one to speak against his own act, representations or commitments to the injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied on it.17 Thus, in order for this doctrine to operate, a representation must have been made to the detriment of another who relied on it. In other words, estoppel would not lie against one who, in the first place, did not make any representation. In this case, a perusal of the letter, on which petitioners based their position that the redemption period had been extended, shows otherwise. Pertinent portions of the said letter read: xxxx Our records show that the above account has already been foreclosed by the bank. However, the borrowers concerned can still exercise the one (1) year right of redemption over the foreclosed properties until April 21, 1988. As the Bank has adopted an incentive scheme whereby payments are liberalized to give chances to former owners to repossess their properties, we suggest that you advise your parents to drop by at our Zamboanga Office so they can avail of this rare privilege which shall be good only up to December 31, 1988. As correctly held by the RTC and upheld by the CA, the date "December 31, 1988" refers to the last day when owners of foreclosed properties, like petitioners, could submit their payment proposals to the bank. The letter was very clear. It was about the availment of the liberalized payment scheme of the bank. On the last day for redemption, the letter was also clear. It was April 21, 1988. It was never extended. The opportunity given to the petitioners was to avail of the liberalized payment scheme which program would expire on December 31, 1988. As explained by Abraham Iribani (Iribani), the OIC of the Project Development Department of PAB, it was to give a chance to previous owners to repossess their properties on easy term basis, possibly by condonation of charges and penalties and payment on instalment. The letter of Carpizo was an invitation to the petitioners to come to the bank with their proposal. It appears that the petitioners could not come up with a proposal acceptable to the bank. Here, there is no estoppel to speak of. The letter does not show that the Bank had unqualifiedly represented to the Hojases that it had extended the redemption period to December 31, 1988. Thus, the Hojases have no basis in positing that the public sale conducted on November 4, 1988 was null and void for having been prematurely conducted.19