Case Doctrines For Uribe

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Case Doctrines for Atty. Uribes Quasi Delicts Lecture.

AIR FRANCE VS CARRASCOSO - Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. CALALAS VS SUNGA - The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation. Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. HEIRS OF GUARING N/A BLTB CO. INC N/A

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE VS COURT OF APPEALS The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined b y reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law consider s what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence Applying in Yabut, to original or duplicate. In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. SOLIMAN VS TUASON (1992) Where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. 2 Liability for illegal or harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such agency. 3 As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be demanded from the client whose premises or property are protected by the security guards. The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services entered into with the security agency. There being no employer-employee relationship between the Colleges and Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot impose vicarious liability upon the Colleges for the acts of security guard Solomon.

DULAY VS COURT OF APPEALS (April, 1995) - The extinction of civil liability referred to in Rule 111, Section 2 refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. GARCIA VS FLORIDO The same negligent act causing damage may produce a civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extracontractual under articles 2176 2194 of the New Civil Code. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. VALENZUELA VS. CA N/A CANLAS VS ASIAN SAVINGS BANK The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family;1[12] in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the necessary care and prudence in dealing even on a register or titled property. The business of a bank is affected with public interest, holding in trust the money of the depositors, which bank deposits the bank should guard against loss due to negligence or bad faith, by reason of which the bank would be denied the protective mantle of the land registration law, accorded only to purchases or mortgagees for value and in good faith.2[13] In the case under consideration, from the evidence on hand it can be gleaned unerringly that respondent bank did not observe the requisite diligence in ascertaining or verifying the real identity of the couple who introduced themselves as the spouses Osmundo Canlas and Angelina Canlas. It is worthy to note that not even a single identification card was exhibited by the said impostors to show their true identity; and yet, the bank acted on their representations simply on the basis of the residence certificates bearing signatures which tended to match the signatures affixed on a previous deed of mortgage to a certain Atty. Magno, covering the same parcels of land in question. Under the doctrine of last clear chance, which is applicable here, the respondent bank must suffer the resulting loss. In essence, the doctrine of last clear chance is to the effect that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.

HEDY GAN VS COURT OF APPEALS A corollary rule is what is known in the law as the emergency rule. "Under that rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence." Applying the above test to the case at bar, we find the petitioner not guilty of the crime of Simple Imprudence resulting in Homicide. ONG vs. METRO WATER N/A D.M. CONSUNJI VS JUEGO The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar: There is no dispute that appellees husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while he was working with appellants construction project, resulting to his death. The construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. x x x. No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellees deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises. RAMOS VS DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL CENTER Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. The phrase res ipsa loquitur is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation.i[13] Where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the

accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of care.ii[14] Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence; 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.iii[21] In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the control of the instrumentality which caused the damage.iv[22] Such element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the defendant. In order to have the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or damage, must show a situation where it is applicable, and must establish that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident.v[23] Medical malpracticevi[24]cases do not escape the application of this doctrine. Thus, res ipsa loquitur has been applied when the circumstances attendant upon the harm are themselves of such a character as to justify an inference of negligence as the cause of that harm.vii[25] The application of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases presents a question of law since it is a judicial function to determine whether a certain set of circumstances does, as a matter of law, permit a given inference. REYES VS SISTERS OF MERCY HOSPITAL Petitioners action is for medical malpractice. This is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure or action caused injury to the patient. There are thus four elements involved in medical negligence cases, namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate causation. In the present case, there is no doubt that a physician-patient relationship existed between respondent doctors and Jorge Reyes. Respondents were thus duty-bound to use at least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is breach of this duty which constitutes actionable malpractice.viii[14] As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential. Inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation. HEIRS OF ILDEFONSO N/A

BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS VS KALAW - The suit here revolves around the alleged negligent acts of Kalaw for having entered into the questioned contracts without prior approval of the board of directors, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff; A rule that has gained acceptance through the years is that a corporate officer "intrusted with the general management and control of its business, has implied authority to make any contract or do any other act which is necessary or appropriate to the conduct of the ordinary business of the corporation.21 As such officer, "he may, without any special authority from the Board of Directors perform all acts of an ordinary nature, which by usage or necessity are incident to his office, and may bind the corporation by contracts in matters arising in the usual course of business. GABETO N/A FERNANDO N/A JAVELLANA N/A PNB vs. CA N/A CITY OF MANILA VS TEOTICO - under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. CUADRA VS MONFORT (1970) - The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. When the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented. In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents. LIBI VS IAC the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, in applying Art. 2194 of the said code which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Such

parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Art. 2180 provides that the responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Accordingly, the civil liability of the parents for the crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. TAMARGO N/A BA FINANCE N/A PHIL RABBIT N/A RAMOS vs. PEPSI N/A MERRITT VS GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (1916) The Government of the Philippines is only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees when they are acting as special agents within the meaning of the Civil Code, and a chauffeur of the General Hospital is not such a special agent. A SPECIAL AGENT is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. PALAFOX N/A ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL VS COURT OF APPEALS (1991) Before an employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee, the act or omission which caused the damage or prejudice must have occurred while an employee was in the performance of his assigned task. The teachers in this case were not in the actual performance of their assigned task. The incident happened not within the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that incident happened while some members of the class were having a picnic at the beach. This picnic had no permit from the school head or its principal because it was not a school-sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an extra-curricular activity. PALISOC VS BRILLANTES (1971) The phrase used in the cited article "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils

and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. WORCESTER VS OCAMPO Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person injured may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage. It is not a defense, for one sued alone, that the others, who participated in the wrongful act, are not joint with him as defendants; nor is isnt any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant compared with that of the others. Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them, except by themselves. They cannot insist upon apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. JOINT TORTFEASORS as a general rule includes all persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. METRO MANILA TRANSIT N/A SINGAPORE AIRLINES N/A BACHELOR EXPRESS N/A GOTESCO VS CHATTO 2190 is a strict liability, the doctrine of last clear chance is not available for the defense of a proprietor. It is similar to Art. 2183. The owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means. BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS VS KALAW - The suit here revolves around the alleged negligent acts of Kalaw for having entered into the questioned contracts without prior approval of the board of directors, to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff; A rule that has gained acceptance through the years is that a corporate officer "intrusted with the general management and control of its business, has implied authority to make any contract or do any

other act which is necessary or appropriate to the conduct of the ordinary business of the corporation.21 As such officer, "he may, without any special authority from the Board of Directors perform all acts of an ordinary nature, which by usage or necessity are incident to his office, and may bind the corporation by contracts in matters arising in the usual course of business. PNR vs. CA N/A ESCUETA vs. FANDIALAN N/A PICART VS SMITH The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm. LBC AIR CARGO VS COURT OF APPEALS must clearly show it is doing so through the use of signal lights.) Petitioners poorly invoke the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times, as "super vening negligence" or as "discovered peril"). The doctrine, in essence, is to the effect that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than attributed and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof (seePicart vs. Smith, 37 Phil. 80 9). not preclude the recovery of damages for supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against th e liability sought by, another if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending TAYAG vs. ALCANTARA N/A

FERNANDEZ vs. MANILA N/A UE VS JADER Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. If mere fault or negligence in ones acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abused or bad faith make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts in a legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but no when he acts with negligence or abuse. GRAND UNION SUPERMARKET N/A HERMOSISIMA VS COURT OF APPEALS We find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy." TANJANCO VS COURT OF APPEALS To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123). VELASCO VS MANILA ELECTRIC Since there is no evidence upon which to compute any loss or damage allegedly incurred by the plaintiff by the frustration of the sale on account of the noise, his claim therefore was correctly disallowed by the trial court. It may be added that there is no showing of any further attempts on the part of appellant to dispose of the house, and this fact suffices to raise doubts as to whether he truly intended to dispose of it. He had no actual need to do so in order to escape deterioration of his health, as heretofore noted. DAMAGES VILLAREY TRANSIT N/A

PEOPLE VS QUILATON The more important variables taken into account in determining the compensable amount of lost earnings are: 1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived; and 2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. LBC EXPRESS VS COURT OF APPEALS Moral damages cannot be awarded to a corporation, an artificial person which has no feelings, emotions or senses, and which cannot experience physical suffering and mental anguish. Mental suffering can be experienced only by one having a nervous system and it flows from real ills, sorrows and griefs of life all of which cannot be suffered by a bank as an artificial person. PONCE VS LEGASPI In order, however, for the malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister motive. Atty. Legaspi may have suffered injury as a consequence of the disbarment proceedings. But the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject the actor to make payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. BAYANI VS PANAY ELECTRIC There is malicious prosecution when a person directly insinuates or imputes to an innocent person the commission of a crime and the maliciously accused is compelled to defend himself in court.[11] While generally associated with unfounded criminal actions, "the term has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action or probable cause."[12] The basis for a civil action for damages arising from malicious prosecution is found in Articles 19, 21, 29,[13] 35,[14] of the Civil Code. The requisites for an action for damages based on malicious prosecution are: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an ac quittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice. MAYO VS PEOPLE Reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple serious, less serious, and slight physical injuries; Moral damages. - The well-entrenched principle is that moral damages depend upon the discretion of the trial courts based on the facts and circumstances of each case. This discretion is, however, conditioned in that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and scandalously excessive" so as to indicate that it was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court." In determining the amount of moral damages, the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party and the gravity of the injuries must be considered. Finally, "moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action."

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. WASSMER VS VELEZ Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. SARKIES TOURS VS IAC The award of exemplary damages is not proper absent the showing that the defendant acted in a wanton or malevolent manner for the death of the passengers of one of its ferry boats

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