Case study

Merowe / Hamdab Dam Project

By
Amgad Moussa Falko Bethmann

Seminar
The Science and Politics of Large Dam Projects

Professors
Thomas Bernauer, Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH
Bernhard Wehrli, Department of Surface Waters - Research and Management,
EAWAG

Alfred Wüest, Department of Surface Waters - Research and Management, EAWAG

Department of Applied Aquatic Ecology, EAWAG

Submitted
July 16th, 2007
 “We need large Dams and we are not going to apologize for it.
Those in the developed countries who already have everything
put stumbling blocks in our way from the comfort of their
electrically lit and air conditioned homes…. The third world is not
ready to give up the construction of large dams, as much for water
supply and flood control as for power…Hydropower is the
cheapest and cleanest source of energy, but environmentalists do
not appreciate that. Certainly large dam projects create local
resettlement problems, but this should be a matter of local, not
international concern.”

Former president Theo van Robbroek of the International

Commission on Large Dams ICOLD

“To persuade Third World governments to abandon plans to build

water development schemes, to which they are often totally
committed, is very difficult. Nevertheless, every effort must be
made by local environmental groups to do so. If necessary they
should resort to non-violent direct actions at the dam site. We in
the west can best prevent the construction of further dams by
systematically lobbying donor governments, development banks
and international agencies, without whose financial help such
scheme could not be built. Indeed we call on those organizations
herewith to cut off funds from all large-scale water development
schemes.”

Edward Goldsmith and Nicholas Hildyard, editors of The Ecologist.

Source: “Dams and development: transnational struggles for water and power”.
Sanjeev Khagram, 2004, Ithaca, Cornell University Press[2].

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Table of contents:

Introducing statements 2

Preface 4

A The project
A.1 Introduction to Merowe dam 5
A.2 Merowe Dam- technical details 5
A.3 Geography, Geology and Geophysics 6
A.4 Hydrology 6
A.5 Socioeconomic context 8
A.6 Political context 8

B The challenges
B.1 International relations 10
B.2 Resettlement 12
B.3 Environmental impact 14
B.3.1 Ecology 15
B.3.2 Water loss 15
B.3.3 Downstream effects 15
B.3.4 Greenhouse gas emissions 16
B.3.5 Increased salt content and sedimentation 16
B.4 Health 16
B.5 Archaeological heritage 17

C Evaluation of performance
C.1 PER analysis 19
C.1.1 Introduction 19
C.1.2 PER scores 19
C.1.2.1 Hydropower production 19
C.1.2.2 International tensions and relations 20
C.1.2.3 Resident people and cultural heritage 21
C.1.2.4 Environmental Consequences 22
C.1.3 Summary of PER analysis 23
C.2 The 1959 agreement as a framework to
manage Merowe-dam-related international conflicts. 24
C.3 Assessment of Merowe dam as an electricity production option 24
C.3.1 Weighted score assessment of electricity production alternatives 25
C.3.1.1 Alternatives 26
C.3.1.1.1 Thermal power plant 26
C.3.1.1.2 Distributed photovoltaic panels 26
C.3.1.1.3 Wind farms 27
C.3.1.1.4 Solar-thermal power plant 27
C.3.1.2 Assessment criteria 28
C.3.1.3 Results of Weighed score assessment for the most promising alternatives 28
C.3.2 Economic assessment of the dam 29
C.3.2.1 Cash flow and Net Present Worth (NPW) 29
C.3.2.2 Merowe dam from sustainability perspective 30
C.3.2.2.1 Weak sustainability and external cost 31
D Conclusion 33
E Epilogue 35
References 36

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Preface:

Construction of large dams raises controversy as to which extent their negative

impacts should be accepted compared to their positive outcomes. Moreover, the
geopolitics of many river basins is such that international disputes are created and/or
exacerbated by the construction of large dams. Evaluation studies therefore are vital
in the decision making process if a specific large dam should be built or not and how
the various side effects should be handled during construction and operation.

Ahead of construction, the economic, social and environmental changes, both

positive and negative, must be determined and contrasted. History of dam
construction especially in Africa has shown that the performance and net effect of the
dam could hardly be described as satisfactory [3]. In some cases societies ended up
worse off after the construction of a dam. It is therefore necessary to combine the
technical and economic feasibility studies with the environmental and social impact
assessments. In addition, the effectiveness of the international river management
regimes in resolving conflicts and satisfying the needs of the riparian countries must
be assessed. Still the situation can be far from optimal even with river management
regimes in place, due to modest cooperation levels of the complying riparian
countries [4].

Against this background we conducted an evaluation of the Merowe dam project. We

reviewed its positive and negative impacts. We also examined whether the 1959
treaty between Egypt and Sudan was effective in enabling the construction of the
dam without causing tension, and to what extent this treaty will be effective in solving
probable conflicts in the future due to dam-related changes.

The study is organized as follows: the first chapter reviews basic information about
the dam. The second chapter will look at problems that might be caused by the dam’s
construction and operation, followed by the discussion of political, social and
environmental problems. Evaluation of (future-) performance is presented in chapter
three, as well as alternative scenarios that could have been realized instead of the
construction of Merowe Dam.

4
A The Project
A.1 Introduction to Merowe dam

The 'Merowe Multi-Purpose Hydro Project' or Merowe High Dam is currently under
construction near the Nile River’s 4th cataract close to the small village Hamdab. The
Dam’s main purpose is electricity generation; although it is also designed for irrigation
purposes. Its dimensions make it the largest contemporary hydropower project in
Africa. The retained lake will submerge the 4th cataract and will inundate irrigated
land as well as farmland used for flood recession agriculture [5]. 55.000 to 70.000
people are currently resettled into new areas.

Several international contractors are involved in the project. A Chinese engineering

consortium is executing the civil works, while Lahmeyer International (Germany)
manages the construction of the project. Alstom (France) is supplying hydro turbines.
ABB (Switzerland) is building transmission substations. River diversion and work on
the concrete dam began on the 8th of December 2003.

The idea of constructing a large storage dam at Merowe site already dates back to
colonial times [6]. The original purpose of Merowe Dam was to protect Egypt from
floods and droughts. After gaining independence, the Egyptian government chose to
construct Aswan High Dam (AHD) in Egyptian territory instead, putting a preliminary
end to Merowe construction plans. The idea of Merowe Dam was revived in 1979 but
the resumption of the civil war as well as insufficient funding and lack of investors’
interest delayed the project. By a change in political relations by the end of the last
century, funding for the project could be secured from China and Arab countries. The
dam is planned to be fully operational, by mid-2008.

A.2 Merowe Dam technical details

The dam will be in total 9.2 km long,

consisting of a 311 m long homogeneous
earth dyke and a 4.4 km long major
concrete face rock-fill dam on the right
bank. A 154 m long spillway and a 370 m
long power intake dam will sit in the right
river channel and on Marawa Island,
followed by an 841 m long major earth core Major concrete face rock-
rock-fill dam in the left river channel. On the fill dam
left bank a 1.4 km concrete face rock fill Maximum height 52 m
Crest lengths 1,437 m +4,364 m
dam and a 1.7 km long earth dyke are Upstream slope 1 V:1.3 H
under construction. The power plant will be Downstream slope 1 V:1.6 H
equipped with ten Francis-turbines totaling Volume 6.1x106 m³
in a peak capacity of 1,250 MW. Each Major earth core rock-fill
turbine has a flow rate of 300 m³/s and a dam
head of 43 m. With an estimated efficiency Maximum height 67 m
Crest lengths 841 m
of 50% this totals to a yearly electric power Upstream slope 1 V:2 H
production of 5.5 TWh, almost doubling the Downstream slope 1 V:1.8 H
Sudanese power production. Further Volume 10x106 m³
technical details are shown on the data Spillway capacity 19,900 m³/s
sheet to the right [7]. Penstock diameter 8.5 m
Table 1: Merowe Dam technical details

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A.3 Geography, Geology & Geophysics

Merowe dam (official name) is located at 18.40 N and 32.03 E. It is situated 350 km
northwards the Sudanese capital Khartoum or 800 km downstream along the Nile.
The dam is constructed near the Nile
River’s 4th cataract close to the small
village Hamdab, the reason why it is
also referred to as Hamdab dam. The
planned reservoir will be an estimated
170 to 200 km long and will reach up to
the island Mograt close to Abu Hamad.
The lake will have a surface of 800 km²
and an average depth of 26m. The
resulting impoundment volume is 12.5
km³, which equals to 20% of the Nile’s
annual flow [8]. The course of the Nile
along the fourth cataract follows a
Precambrian basement rock zone,
marking-off the south end of the so
called Nubian swell, a tectonic uplift
zone mainly active during Cenozoic
Fig. 1: times [9] (Fig.1). SIR-C/X-SAR Imagery
Geological and structural map of the Cataract region of studies have shown that the course of
the Nile (after the 1988 Geological Research Authority
of the Sudan and Robertson Research)
the Nile has recently (in geologic terms)
shifted south due to the relative uplift. It
is inferred that fracturing has followed after or accompanied the tectonic uplift [10]
The embankment dams will mostly be funded on migmatites and granite-gneiss.
Parts of the rock-fill dam in the left river channel will be founded on some 30 m deep
alluvial deposits. The EIAR of 2002 carried out by Lahmeyer International assumes
the Merowe area to be tectonically stable and without significant implications for the
project. It states that the faults of the tectonic rift system do not extend to the area of
the project. The triggering of earthquakes due to changes of the stress regime by the
new mass of the reservoir was observed during the construction of the Aswan dam,
however earthquakes going beyond the maximum credible earthquake design of Ml 6
on the Richter scale are assumed to be unlikely.

A.4 Hydrology

The Nile River actually consists of two different hydraulic regimes at Merowe site, the
White Nile and the Blue Nile/Atabara system. The latter regime corresponds to the
wet and dry season in the Ethiopian highlands. During winter, when little rain falls in
the highlands, the Atabara and Blue Nile dry up. The peak flow is reached in
summer, when the monsoon winds from the Indian Ocean bring torrential rains to the
highlands. On the other hand, there is the White Nile regime, which rises from Lake
Victoria, flowing through Uganda, Lake Kyoga and Lake Albert. It maintains a
constant flow over the year. The flow is buffered due to the storage capacities of the
two big lakes and by evaporative losses in the Sudd, the world’s largest freshwater
swamp. The steady stream of the White Nile keeps the Nile at Merowe flowing during
the winter months, when the blue Nile/Atabara system has dried up. Fig 2 & 3 [11]
give a detailed overview, how the Nile flow behaves during the year.

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Damming the river at Merowe will eliminate the
downstream annual flooding of the 900 km down
to Aswan Dam, which flushed and cleaned the
river once a year. For the Merowe Reservoir, the
EIAR of 2002 predicts an annual inflow of 84 km³
per year, corresponding to an average flow rate
of 2,660 m³s-1. These values agree roughly with
later studies of Failer 2004 [12] presenting an
annual flow of 65km³ per year and an average
value of 2,055 m³s-1.

Fig. 3: Fig.2:
Seasonal flow patterns of the Nile. Flow patterns and seasonal
contributions to the Nile flow.

Table2: Calculated hydrologic parameters after the EAWAG independent review of Merowe Dam project
Water balance [km³/yr]
Average annual inflow [m³s-1] 2664 84.0
Average runoff flood(4 months) [m³s-1] 6400 67.2
Average runoff dry season (8 months) [m³s-1] 800 16.8
Max. runoff flood [m³s-1] 7400 77.8
Max. runoff dry season [m³s-1] 900 18.9
Average daily release [m³s-1] 1000 31.5
Max. release flow (4 h per day) [m³s-1] 3000 15.8
Min. release flow (20 h per day) [m³s-1] 600 15.8
Average irrigation [m³s-1] 233 7.3
Max. irrigation flow (8 months) [m³s-1] 300 6.3
Min. irrigation flow (4 months) [m³s-1] 100 1.0
Max. theoretical turbine flow [m³s-1] 2498 31.5
Average evaporation [mm/d] 6 1.75
Regime at low flow
Average runoff dry season (8 months) [m³s-1] 800
Minimum turbinate [m³s-1] 600
Reservoir filling rate [m³s-1] 200
Max. time to fill reservoir [d] 480
Regime at high flow
Average runoff flood (4 months) [m³s-1] 6400
Peak capacity [m³s-1] 3000
Reservoir filling rate [m³s-1] 3400
Min. time to fill reservoir [d] 28

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More hydrological parameters according to the EIAR 2002 are presented in Table 1.
Recalculations in the EAWAG independent review conclude that the reservoir can be
safely filled within 4 weeks during the wet season and the reservoir can be operated
as designed with a discharge of 3000 m3s-1 during peak hours and 600 m³s-1 during
the rest of the day. Critical issues regarding performance are the frequency of
occurrence for dry years in the future and the corresponding probability of the
reservoir not procuring the 4hours of peak power. According to Roskar (2000) [13],
who analyzed the flow for the past 135 years, future flow will slightly increase by 10%
in the year 2125.

A.5 Socioeconomic context

Sudan had a population of 40 million people in the year 2005 [14]. The country has
been classified as a presidential republic with low human development in many
annual UN human development reports. Only in the year 2006 was Sudan
considered as a country with medium human development having a human
development index rank (HDI) of 141 [15]. The GDP per capita (purchasing power
parity) was $1949 in 2004 compared to $4211 in neighboring Egypt and $39,676 in
the USA[15]. Around 40% of the population is estimated to be below poverty line.

Energy consumption per capita was 4.1 million Btus, almost 1/8 of that in Egypt, 32.3
million Btu, 42 times smaller than that of Germany, 172.7 million Btus, and 63 time
smaller than that of Australia, 260.4 million Btus, [14, 16-18]. Electricity consumption
was 2.9 billion kWh which, in per capita basis, is 13 times less than that in Egypt and
180 times less than that in Germany. Sudan has an installed electric power
generation capacity of 760 MW. For comparison, that is less than half of the capacity
of Albania, where the population is less than 1/10 of the population in Sudan [19].
The country’s electricity grid is still plagued with blackouts and reaches a meager
fraction of the population. Electrification is vital for any human development since
education, sanitation and health services are dependent on electrification levels. To
reach some of the development standards of today, Sudan has to undergo major
changes in energy production.

Main Sudanese exports are cotton, sesame, livestock, groundnuts, Arabic gum, and
sugar [20] Expansion in producing these goods is hindered by the lack of modern
irrigation systems, agricultural processing and food producing industries. Textiles,
edible oils, leather and tanning industry are Sudan’s main industrial sectors, though
they are limited in size. The value of all Sudanese exports was $ 6.989 billion in the
year 2005 [20]. The country is believed to have considerable mineral resources but
the civil war prevented the assessment of resources and their exploitation.
Development of these economic sectors to an extent that enables Sudan to benefit
from its advantages and profit from the global trade will require stable and substantial
electricity supply. The inadequate electric power generation capacity of Sudan
implies that its economic potentials remain untapped, which makes human and
economic development almost impossible.

A.6 Political context

In this section we give a quick overview of the political climate in Sudan. Though the
topics discussed below might seem of little consequences for a dam project involving
one country, they are in reality very influential as they shape Sudan’s relations with

8
the outside world, thus, determine the available technological and economical
support to development projects in Sudan.

The current Sudanese president, Gen. Omar Al Bashir, seized power after leading a
coup d'état in 1989 to overthrow the democratically elected government of El Sadiq
Al-Mahdi. This coup was carried out by Islamists officers from the National Islamic
Front, an offshoot from the Muslim Brotherhood. The National Islamic Front and its
members in the military strongly opposed the concessions that the civilian
government of El Sadiq El Mahdi was going to give to the southern rebels as well as
its plans to abolish Sharia. They considered the policies of El Mahdi as intents to
weaken the Islamic character of Sudan and secularize the Sudanese state. Al-Bashir
ruled as a leader of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, a
military junta, till late 1993 when he became president of the Republic of Sudan.
During the first decade of his rule, he and Dr Hassan al-Turabi, the founder of the
National Islamic Front and an influential ideologue for the Islamist political
movements on the global level, were very strong alleys.

El Turabi dominated, at least, the steering of Sudanese foreign policy agenda. In

1990-1991 Sudan was among a handful of nations to oppose the USA-led war on
Iraq. This stance alienated Sudan within the Arab formal political sphere and
damaged its relation with other Arab regimes. El Turabi orchestrated an alliance
between all the Islamist opposition movements and invited them for a conference in
Sudan in 1993. This move proved costly for Sudan as it was declared a state sponsor
of Terror by the USA. In 1995 Hosny Mubarak, president of Egypt for the last quarter
of a century, survived an assassination attempt while attending an African Union
summit in Addis Abbaba. Islamist armed groups claimed responsibility. Sudan was
accused of harboring and supporting these groups, a plausible accusation given el
Turabi’s ideological stances and his major influence on Sudanese politics and
decision making. This led to deterioration in the relations between Sudan and Egypt.
In 1997, a trade embargo and a total asset freeze were enacted by the U.S.
government against Sudan. The deterioration in Sudan’s foreign relations culminated
in August 1998, when USA air forces bombarded Sudanese pharmaceutical
installations, allegedly manufacturing chemical weapons. This was a reprisal for the
bombing of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar Es Salam earlier the same
year, two terrorist acts whose perpetrators were allegedly harbored and supported by
Sudan, as well.

In 1999 a power struggle between El Turabi and El Bashir erupted as El Turabi

opposed El Bashir’s re-election. It concluded with the house imprisonment of El
Turabi in 2001 and his marginalization in the Sudanese politics. El Bashir, after
wining the presidential election of 2001, started transition from “the revolutionary
legality” to the “constitutional legality”. This meant that his policies will be judged by
what they achieve to the Sudanese people in terms of security and prosperity and not
according to the extent of advancement of an ideological agenda. The boost given to
major development projects, e.g., Merowe dam, and achieving the peace agreement
can be understood in light of this policy change.

Marginalization of el Turabi, moderation of the regime’s Islamist rhetoric, the move

away from a revolutionary ideologically motivated state toward more pragmatic
approaches, peace agreement with the southern rebels, and the finding of
considerable oil reserves improved to some extent Sudans situation as aid and credit

9
receiving country. However, the fact that the same president and many of the high
ranking officials who were in charge during the turbulent decade of the 90’s are still in
powerful positions, along with their refusal to allow international intervention to stop
the catastrophe in Darfur, hinder cooperation and loans from western states. This has
direct implications on the funding and construction of Merowe dam, as for Sudan it
was more viable to obtain financial and technical assistance from Arab development
funds and the Chinese government (Table 3). An important note is that the Arab
Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), a joint fund of all the states
member of the Arab league, suspended its operations in Sudan from 1988 to 2000.
Merowe dam was given the first priority upon resumption of activities in accordance
with the Sudanese government request.

Table 3 Funding sources of Merowe dam project [21]

Investor Fund (in million $US)
1 Government of Sudan 575
2 Government of China 520
3 Arab Fund for Economical and Social Development. 250
4. Saudi Fund for Development 200
5. Abu Dhabi Fund for Development 150
6. Kuwaiti Fund for Economical Development 150
7 Sultanate of Oman 106
8. State of Qatar 15
Total, including electricity transmission lines 1966

The composition of the funding sources meant that the guidelines advanced by
international NGOs, as well as their leverage on project planning, were of little
significance. Moreover, the scantiness of the democratic means and the participatory
platforms available to the Sudanese citizens diminishes greatly the ability of grass-
root pressure groups to alter the course of the project through peaceful means. Most
of the western partners are engineering companies. They focus on the technical
aspects of the project as per their contracts, with negligible interference, or interest,
in the policies, the planning, or the wide-scale consequences of the project.
Operating in relative comfort from pressure and rules advanced by western NGOs’
does not necessarily mean that the dam project is advancing despite having negative
impacts that outweighs its positive outcomes. It only means that the dynamics of
decision making are different than that dominating other projects such as the
Narmada [2]. Decisions made are mostly in favor of achieving national targets and
technical effectiveness rather than preserving local ecological and social fabric. This
is exhibited, for example, on the official website of the dam. The section entitled
environmental issues discusses wild life, flora, fauna, water quality, and health in 660
words. Affirmation of positive impacts without explaining the mechanisms bringing
them about is obvious in statements like “Due to the construction work, the breeding
places and habitat for insects, particularly mosquitoes (anopheles, simulium, culex)
and snails, which are known to be vector of malaria, filariasis, onchocerciasis and
bilharzias will be destroyed, while new habitat will most likely not be created or will be
unsuitable for establishment of breeding grounds (italics added)”. On the other hand,
the dam’s body alone is detailed in around 1200 words. The deficiencies in the
official environmental impact assessment prepared by Lahmeyer International, are
illustrated in the review by EAWAG [5]. Again, such circumstances do not mean that
Merowe Dam project will necessarily have negative impacts that outweigh its positive
outcome. Assessment of both is presented in the following chapters.

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B Challenges
B.1 International relations

Stark contrast exists in the Eastern Nile Basin (Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt) between
the share of riparian countries in the runoff and their consumption of the Nile water
[22]. Ethiopia uses only 3% of the runoff, while rains falling in its territory contribute
85 % of the Nile water reaching Aswan. Beside this asymmetry, another thorny issue
in the interstate relations is that of Egypt’s historically acquired rights to the Nile water
entering Egyptian territory versus Ethiopia’s right to use the water falling in its
sovereign territory. Ethiopia’s position is that all the treaties agreed upon during
colonial times and those that did not include Ethiopia are invalid, a fresh system-wide
agreement is needed, and the concept of historically acquired rights must be
abandoned. While Egypt insists that its share of 55.5 km3 yr-1 acquired in the 1959
agreement is, as we will detail later, the minimum to accept therefore is not open to
negotiations.

The essence of this problem can be explained in the following. The inhabited parts in
Egypt are basically the shores of the Nile, irrigated land in a vast desert. Population
of this land by humans was concomitant to the formation of the Nile in its
contemporary form around 10,000 years ago. The Egyptians can assert, without
exaggeration that they have been surviving on the Nile waters since Egypt, the
Egyptians and the Nile itself came to existence, while the upstream nations survived
on the riches of their environments with inconsequential consumption of Nile water.
However, this does not change the fact that most this water falls in Ethiopian territory
and that the Ethiopians are facing acute food shortage problems due to their
dependence on rain for irrigation. Moreover, population growth forces Ethiopia to use
all resources at its reach to save Ethiopians form starving to death. Sudan is in the
middle between these two countries, therefore, its success in using the Nile water
depends on the relation between Egypt and Ethiopia [23] as well as its own relations
to both countries.

Ethiopian efforts to assert its rights to the Nile runoff and to exploit water resources of
the Nile River were unsuccessful, but catalyzed international tension in many
occasions. Sudan and Egypt are not sympathetic to these efforts, stating that the
rainfall in Ethiopia dwarfs the runoff entering their territories and their national water
resources are scarce. Almost the totality of their populations’ water needs is, and has
always been, satisfied by the Nile water. They usually suggest that Ethiopia’s chronic
food security problems should be solved by local water management projects that do
not influence the quantity of water flowing into their territories, which is considered to
be an acquired right. However, the rigidity of their positions gave way recently to
negotiation and cooperation in joint projects such as Baro-Akobo project [22]. This
was mainly due to a paradigm shift from single focus to multi-focus interaction.
Currently the countries in the basin are involved in discussing overarching
management schemes and fundamental concepts, as well as planning and executing
individual projects.

Egypt and Sudan were under British tutelage during the first half of the 20th century.
Between 1882 and 1914 Egypt was under British military occupation. It was declared
a British protectorate in 1914. Independence was unilaterally granted in February

11
1922 after a period of riots and civil unrest between 1919 and 1921. British troops
however did not leave Suez Canal till 1956.

The Sudan was ruled by a British-Egyptian condominium from 1899 to 1953. Starting
from 1924 Egyptian influence in Sudan was dramatically reduced after Britain forced
the Egyptian army out of Sudan. In 1955, the Sudanese Parliament decided Sudan to
be a fully independent sovereign state. Consequently British troops and officials, and
the little remaining Egyptian troops and officials, left the country by the year 1956.
During these years the British high commissioner exercised significant power in the
governance of both Egypt and Sudan. Under these circumstances, Britain and Egypt
made the 1929 agreement. The agreement was far from being a comprehensive plan
to manage Nile water. The idea of the British was to build Jabal Auliya dam in Sudan
to store water for irrigation of the Gezira project and to withdraw more water from
Sennar dam to irrigate the same project. Egypt was staunchly opposing these
projects, fearing that irrigating this project and storing water in the new dam in Sudan
will cause droughts in Egypt in the low flood years. Acknowledging Egypt’s
historically acquired right of 48 km3 water per year, an ample amount compared to
Egypt needs back then, was in the end sufficient to make the Egyptians agree.

Plans to construct a large dam with a huge reservoir that can store the whole annual
flow of the Nile was revived and advanced by the new regime in Egypt after 1952.
However, construction of this dam required the negotiation of a new agreement
between the independent republics of Egypt and Sudan. In 1959 the two countries
finally reached an agreement. In this agreement “The two Republics agree that the
Republic of Sudan shall construct the Rosseires Dam on the Blue Nile and any other
work which the Republic of Sudan considers essential for the utilization of its share
[24]”. Until now Sudan has not been using its full share of 18.5 km3 annually [23],
therefore Sudan is entitled to Egypt’s agreement and cooperation through the
Permanent Joint Technical Commission for Nile Waters, created by the 1959
agreement. In summary, Egypt has not objected to Merowe dam project because it is
bound to the 1959 agreement. Moreover, Egypt supported the project by backing
Sudan’s effort to secure funding from Arab funds and states. Showing goodwill and
strengthening friendship with Sudan are vital to Egypt’s interests, especially in Nile
related issues. Ethiopia also did not object to the project since it has no direct impact
on water issues in Ethiopia, while objecting to the project may antagonize Sudan and
hinder the development of further projects and water management schemes.

B.2 Resettlement

All the resettlement issues such as entitlement to compensation, estimation of

compensation, construction of new communities to receive the evacuees, and
reaching agreements with the affected people were left to the ministry of irrigation
and subsequently to the Dams Implementation Unit (DIU). This unit was formed by a
presidential decree and is supervised by a Higher Political Committee headed by the
president of the republic himself [25]. These issues were not included in the studies
presented to the funding bodies. Financing of these issues is entirely the
responsibility of the Sudanese government. The consequences of this arrangement
are highlighted in the following paragraphs.

Three communities will be affected by the Merowe dam: The Hamdab, by 8%, the
Amri by 28%, and the Manasir tribe by 64% of the population. Each of these

12
communities underwent different circumstances in the evacuations, compensation
and resettlement process. Therefore, in the following we discuss the experiences of
each of these communities separately.

The Hamdab people were the first to be evacuated since their villages are located on
the island where the dam body is located. The evacuation started on the 15th of June
2003. It was carried out in four stages; the last of them in April 2005. The assessment
of compensations and the evacuation went smoothly in general, with insignificant
quarrels and very little litigation. The first stage was particularly taken care of. The
DIU went to the extent of filling the new homes with enough supplies for weeks and
contracting a catering service to provide hot meals free of charge for the evacuees
during the first three days in their new homes [26]. The following stages did not
receive such warm reception but the new situation was generally accepted. The
troubles appeared afterwards. Concerned Sudanese citizens [26-28] and
international NGOs [29] report “field studies” that reveal the problems facing the
evacuees in their new homes. Unfortunately, a systematic and comprehensive study
of the situation of the evacuees in their new communities was not done, or at least
not published, by the Sudanese government. Therefore, we rely on the efforts of
concerned individuals who visited the new communities and interviewed the
evacuees in the assessment of the resettlement effort. In general, disappointment,
dissatisfaction and economic hardship are prevailing among the Hamdab community
in their new homes [26-32]. This state of affairs is due to shortcomings of the DIU in
many aspects such as:

1- Specification of the homes, especially the reduced area and the compact
layout of buildings.
2- Specification of the agriculture land, many of the places are of poor fertility or
even barren. No substitute for the areas that were commonly used is provided.
3- Cost of sand removal and land reclamation has to be borne by the farmers.
4- Period of time during which subsidized fertilizers will be made available, this
time period is too short compared to the necessary time to reclaim the land
due to its low organic content.
5- Cost of energy for irrigation, this represents a new cost item that, among many
others, did not exist for the old land.
6- Dependence of the agricultural production of the whole community on a
central agency with constant overheads that will be reflected as a cost in the
water price.
7- Payment of compensation in installments without taking inflation into
consideration.
8- Overlooking the loss of livestock and poultry and the unsuitability of the new
places to accommodate them. This loss will deprive the diet from protein
sources and marginalize the women from the production process.
9- Excluding the unmarried men from receiving homes even if they had homes in
the old villages.
10- Compensation based on residence not on ownership.
11- Incessant efforts to bypass and surmount elected committees, while
encouraging some “friendly representatives” of the affected communities.
12- A psychological trauma when the old villages were razed to ground once the
Hamdab people left them, long before the dam completion. The people were
denied a readjustment period in which they are still in contact with their old
habitat, while adapting and understanding the new one.

13
Amri people, having witnessed the disappointments and the hardship of Hamdab
people, opposed staunchly to let the DIU survey their region before agreeing to all
the details of entitlement, relocation site and compensation, and having guarantees
that the DIU will rigorously fulfill its part of the agreement. Their protests against the
census of their properties by the DIU and the attempt of the DIU to proceed with this
step aided by the Sudanese police, turned into violent clashes that resulted in the
death of three civilians in April 2006 [33]. These serious events called for intervention
of the state. Consequently, a committee from the ministry of justice replaced the DIU
in carrying out the census and estimating the compensation that the DIU will have to
pay [34].

The stance of the DIU was reflected in the comments of Mr. Osama Abdullah, the
Minister of State at the Ministry of Irrigation and the Executive Director of DIU, “ it is
not in our interest or in the country’s interest to pay more reparations and
compensations since this money comes from the national treasure and not from the
funds financing the dam” [35]. This stance that views the compensation as an
incurred cost that must be minimized using all possible means had very detrimental
effects for Hamdab and Amri people. However, the root causes to the problem, in our
opinion, are the omission of detailed and consented resettlement planning from the
most preliminary plans of the project and the assignment of all resettlement issues to
the same body that handles the construction of the dam with the same budget.

The proposed new location of the Manasir community is essentially a desert.

Consequently, the Manasir had a nonnegotiable request to stay close to the Nile
around the new lake and not to be relocated to a barren place. The request was
refused categorically by the DIU, which also did not recognize a committee elected
by Manasir to represent them. The DIU bypassed this committee and encouraged
another one friendly to the DIU. The frustrations of some of Manasir people that their
goals cannot be achieved peacefully lead some of them to join armed opposition
movements. Alarmed by the incidence involving Amri people the Sudanese president
intervened before another violent struggle could erupt. He issued a decree relieving
the DIU from the resettlement issues and assigned the competencies to be handled
by local government representatives with a special budget. The vital request of
Manasir people to stay on the river or the lake banks was consented [36]. However,
tension and discord accompanying the resettlement of Manasir people have not yet
been dissipated. The resentment of the treatment they received initially has not been
reconciled yet. Moreover, the continuation of construction work by the DIU at the
rejected site is spreading fear and distrust that eventually they will be forced to move.

B.3 Environmental impact

B.3.1 Ecology

The construction of Merowe dam will have some impacts on wildlife population. The
dam and its lake will not block any migration route. Nile crocodiles, monitor lizards
and aquatic birds will loose their nesting grounds, as the reservoir will flood the
natural moist river banks and will be surrounded by bare rock in the future. Waders
and other birds depending on shallow water for support of food will loose their source
for nutrition. Nesting trees were chopped down during the digging process of the
reservoir, inhibiting birds from breeding.

14
Severe change will be on the aquatic ecology. It is expected that the alteration of fish
population will resemble that observed after the construction of the Aswan High dam.
Fishes that can not adapt to the new environment will disappear while easily
adaptable species may have a benefit. For migratory fishes it is likely to find new
spawning areas further upstream, while fish populations below the dam will be
locked. A ladder construction will not be built as it would be too high and too long for
migratory fish. Changes in water level will have positive and negative consequences.
On the one hand when the water level is high during spawning season, fishes can
find more reproduction areas, on the other hand these can be easily destroyed and
fishes will be stranded during lower water levels. The Merowe reservoir can be used
for commercial fishing a few years after compounding. The composition of fish
population is expected to be similar to Lake Nubia or the Aswan reservoir. An
increase in population and plankton in the early stages is followed by a stabilization
process, when environmental conditions also reach a steady state. A decline of fish
will be observed due to an increase in predator fish population. Traditional fishing
methods will not be suitable anymore, once the reservoir is filled [5, 37]. The
Lahmeyer Report states that the fish resources will not be sensitive to environmental
change caused by the reservoir, arguing that there will be only lateral movement,
none of the present fish species is in danger, there is no commercial interest in
fishing and local population does not eat fish. The fact that the present fish
population of Lake Nubia indeed consists of several migratory fish is neglected.

B.3.2 Water loss

Impounding the river to form the reservoir lake will increase the surface area of the
Nile subjected to solar radiation and therefore increasing evaporation losses.
The EIAR gives two different values for evaporation, 2.4 km3/yr and later 1.9 km3/yr.
Older studies (e.g. Sadek et al. 1997 for Lake Nasser [38]) calculate evaporation
rates which are 30% lower. In relation to the annual flow of the Nile of 84 m³/yr, the
water loss is roughly two percent of the annual river inflow or 8% of the Sudan’s
contingency constituted in the 1959 Nile Water Agreement. According to the official
website Merowe dam is basically intended for generating hydropower, however it is
also constructed to serve for irrigation purposes. Two irrigation intakes have been
incorporated in the dam structure design. According to Yang Zhong, the Deputy
Manager of the contractor firm, the reservoir is capable to irrigate 60,000 hectares of
farmland, benefiting more than 3 million people [39]. Taking the numbers introduced
in the Lahmeyer study, the possible amount of water used for irrigation can sum up to
60% per year of the reservoir volume or 9% of the annual river inflow.

B.3.3 Downstream effects

Water exiting a turbine contains very little suspended sediment which can lead to
scouring of river beds and loss of riverbanks downstream. Erosion rates of the river
bed and banks are expected to increase (Table 4). Spawning areas along the river
stretch turn into impropriate habitat conditions with consequences on downstream
fishery and fishes.
The river water levels will fluctuate daily with a magnitude between 2.6 m and 4.9 m
downstream of the dam. Fluctuation will occur some 20 km along the river and
dampen out further downstream. Sudden changes of water level result in a wall of
water and will threaten people working on the river banks or on small boats.

15
Changing water levels will also have a significant impact on small-scale irrigation
pumps and ferry landing sites.
The construction of a small dam to limit the amplitude of daily level fluctuation was
not taken into consideration and therefore was not evaluated in any impact study.

Table 4: predictions for river bed degradation downstream of Merowe dam (Monenco 1993)
Years after Distance downstream
completion km 17 km 25 km 40 km 56 km 75
2 years 0.1 m 0.9m 0.1m -0.5m -0.2m
5 years 0.4m 1.0m 0.2m -0.4m -0.1m

B.3.4 Greenhouse gas emissions

Applying the Aswan High Dam scenario to Merowe Dam the EAWAG study predicts
an annually contribution of carbon for greenhouse gasses between 250,000 and
300,000 tons per year. This compares to average greenhouse gas emissions from
reservoirs in Canada or Finland (calculated in g CO2/(m2yr)). According to IRN
calculations, the Merowe Project will emit roughly the same amount of greenhouse
gases as a natural gas project generating the same amount of electricity. The EIAR
predicts a carbon amount of only 40,000 t arguing that the reservoir will be cleared of
all biomass.

B.3.5 Increased salt content and sedimentation

Assuming a sediment load entering the Merowe reservoir equal to that of Aswan High
Dam, the load of sediments sums up to 143x106 tons per year (1.7 g/l at a flow rate
of 84 km3/yr). Continuing with the AHD scenario, this load will be mainly deposited in
the upper stretch of the reservoir, forming a delta close to the reservoir inflow. The
predicted water velocity in the future reservoir of ~3 km/h leads to a sediment
retention of 90% of the suspended load. Using the physical parameters of Shalash
(1982) [40] the average sedimentation rate will be 10.5 cm/year, meaning the total
volume of the reservoir will be lost in 150 years. The dead storage capacity will be
lost in less than 50 years. This is much shorter compared to AHD reservoir, which
would loose its dead storage capacity in 360 years - without the Merowe Dam being
built.

Another issue is the increase of salt content due to evaporation. It is expected that
the reservoir water will loose about 15% of its volume (1.7km3/yr) due to evaporation.
A 15% increase of salt content in the reservoir is the consequence. When the
reservoir is also used for irrigation purposes, a volume of up to 9% of the river inflow
(7.4 km3/yr) will be exposed to radiation and will eventually return with a higher salt
content back to the reservoir or further downstream. In general the Merowe Dam
together with the AHD will allow a higher salt water intrusion from the Mediterranean
into the Nile Delta and will accelerate salinization of the fertile farmlands present.

B.4 Health

Insufficient medical services, the lack of proper water supply and sanitation
characterize the state of health at Merowe. Usually water is stored in large clay pots.
Drinking water is often obtained from ponds at the end of irrigation canals. Health
education and waste management are undeveloped among local population.
16
Currently 4000 people die every month of Malaria in Sudan. As the Merowe reservoir
is filling with sediments, new reproduction areas for hosts of plasmodium causing
Malaria will become available. During low water levels, submerged islands will
become wetlands or pounds, providing new breeding grounds for insects and
mosquitoes. During construction of the dam new breeding possibilities are available
in ditches, puddles or excavations, increasing the risk of infections for local workers
and population. The history of dam construction also showed, that standing waters
favored the increase in population of the vector snail, host of schistomiasis. In case of
the Aswan High Dam however the infection rate dropped by 75% since its
construction, due to proper sanitation and water supply for the population [41].
William Robin (1999) [42] identified an additional 18 major health impacts related with
the construction of Merowe Dam,
like increased cases of river
blindness and rift valley disease.
Two major epidemics of rift valley
fever also occurred at Aswan Dam
after construction.
Research of the Queen Mary
University of London [43] on the
other hand, sees the construction
of Merowe Dam as an ideal
opportunity to fight malaria up to
extinction in the area by deploying
sterile male mosquitoes. According
to a health impact analysis by Blue
Nile Associates [44] the
construction of the dam will reduce Fig.4: collection of insect larva on the shores of the Nile
diarrhea and malnutrition

B.5 Archaeological heritage

The area upstream the 4th cataract has been densely populated through nearly all
periods of (pre)history, but very little archaeological work has ever been conducted in
this particular region. Recent
surveys have confirmed the
richness and diversity of traceable
remains, including among others
the noted towns and cemeteries
from the Pharaonic period and the
Napato-Meroitic era, which
stretched from 900 B.C. to A.D.
350. At Gebel Barkal, the post-
Meroitic tumuli, or grave mounds of
Zuma and the Christian monastery
of Ghazali give an insight on the
cultural heritage.
No archaeological research project
was planned before the Fig.5: Workers excavating an ancient church near the Nile’s
construction. Described as an fourth cataract (taken from Sudan Tribune)
important opportunity for ‘final
rescue of valuable remains’ the EIAR commemorates the fact, that now funding from

17
all over the world was made possible for scientific evaluation and public exhibition. In
fact it is a race against time. Eight foreign institutions are currently involved in
salvage archaeology in the region; however by Feb 27th 2007 representatives of the
communities affected by Merowe Dam have requested that archaeologists
excavating the reservoir area should leave immediately. Promises for a museum to
exhibit their cultural heritage were not kept and the fear of loosing their history to
other communities is seen as a dishonor of the commitments that were made with the
Manasir community. Archaeological teams from Germany, Czech Republic and
Canada have left to return home [45].

18
C Evaluation of Performance

C.1 PER analysis

C.1.1 Introduction

As a summary to our research work, we will perform an educated attempt to break

down the (future-) consequences of the Merowe Dam into beneficial and detrimental
consequences of the dam, represented by numeric values (PER scores). The
‘Environmental Assessment Report’ done by Lahmeyer International as well as the
independent review conducted by Eawag aquatic research and the performance of
Aswan High Dam, a project of similar size and similar conditions lead to a first
performance score analysis.

Usually a PER analysis involves three variables: the optimal performance (OP), when
everything turns out as planned, the counterfactual performance (CP) for the
scenario of the dam not been built and the actual performance (AP). As we stated
that the Sudan is in desperate need of electrical power and the dam construction will
be presumably finished mid 2008, we tried to evaluate alternatives of electricity
production in chapter C4. As the Dam is actually not performing, we chose to split the
AP into two future performance (FP) values using the forecasted scenarios of
Lahmeyer and Eawag, when possible.

We chose four topics for analysis: (sustainable-) hydropower generation, international

tensions/relations, displaced/affected people including their cultural heritage and
consequences for the environment. These are split into various aspects, for example
the topic hydropower generation is split into production, stability and sustainability
aspects. Then each aspect is given a number from 0 (worst score) to 10 being the
highest. An average over the aspects gives the final value to be used for PER
analysis.

For each topic the PER score is calculated using the following formula:
AP − CP FP − CP
PER = =
OP − CP OP − CP

The highest PER score of 1 is achieved when the actual performance is the optimal
one. The given objective was fully effective and its targets were fully achieved. A
score towards 0 indicates ineffective management or bad planning. A negative score
means that the construction of the dam made things worse than before.

C1.2 PER Scores

C1.2.1 Hydropower production

The dam is constructed to run with a max. power of 1250 MW and an average power
production equal to 50 % of capacity (Lahmeyer). The reservoir will reach its dead
storage capacity in more than 150 years (Lahmeyer). The Eawag report comes to a
much shorter lifespan of only 50 years (see chapter B3.5). Another question is, if
electricity can be distributed to the people and industry. Sudan heavily suffered under
bad distribution systems and black-outs, crippling businesses which could not afford
their own generators and pushing up operational costs for those that could. However
19
the national grid and distribution systems have undergone extensive improvements
since 1997, so that load shedding and blackouts have been reduced to a great
extent.

Table 5: PER analysis on Hydropower Production

Attribute CP OP FP Lahmeyer FP Eawag PER
Production 1) 1 10 10 10
Stability 2) 1 10 10 10
Sustainability 3) 5 10 10 3.33
Average 2.33 10 10 7.78 1 / 0.70

1) Both EIA come to the conclusion that Merowe Dam can operate as planned with an installed
1250 MW power at 50% power production. It seems the optimal planed performance can be
achieved (FP=10). The Eawag study even gives an indication that efficiency might be higher as
the reservoir could store more than 150% of its planned capacity. Not building the dam would
leave Sudan in the state of heavy power shortage (CP=1). Alternative power production would
only be available in later future.
2) According to Roskar (2000) [13] there is a high probability that the flow of the Nile will not be
lower than 80 km3/yr in the future and it might slightly increase to 95 km3/yr around 2125. The
Eawag study calculates that the reservoir can operate as designed. Not building the dam would
leave Sudan in the state of intermittent power supply (CP=1).
3) Due to different calculation in sedimentation rate Eawag predicts the storage capacity to
diminish by 34% in 50 years instead of predicted 17% by Lahmeyer. The retention rate differs by a
factor of 3 (90% Eawag, 30% Lahmeyer). On the long term it is likely that other power sources are
used for sustainable power production instead of Merowe Dam, therefore a factor of 5 was given
for the counterfactual performance.

The PER score from table 4 of 0.7 or even 1 in case of Lahmeyer, indicates that the
production and distribution of hydropower will be managed well. Presuming an
effective reservoir/sedimentation management and a reliable power distribution, the
FP score based on Eawag data is likely to rise. The PER will fall when the addressed
issues will not be managed well as indicated in Sudan’s past.

C1.2.2 International tensions and relations

As conducted in chapter B1, the construction of Merowe Dam was in conformity with
the 1959 agreement. No issues have been raised by Sudan’s neighboring states
relating water quotas. Problems may arise if increased salinization starts to affect
Egyptian agriculture. AHD reservoir, however will profit of major sediment intake
reduction, 30 to 90% of the sediment load will be deposited in Merowe reservoir.

Table 6: PER analysis on international tensions and relations

Attribute CP OP AP PER
Conformity 6 7 6
with treaties 1)
International 2 3 1
prestige 2)
International 2 5 3
relations 3)
Average 3.33 5 3.33 0
1) Construction of the dam is in conformity of 1959 agreement. Ethiopia is not included in this
water management scheme and is opposing the agreement (-> CP&AP=6). The optimum
performance (for Sudan and Egypt) is 7, a treaty handling also salinization and sedimentation,
respectively fertilization issues.

20
 2) Sudan’s prestige is low, especially in the western world (CP=2). Merowe Dam could have been
an object for increased (economic-) reputation (OP=3). The chance was missed, Merowe Dam
mainly produces negative news (AP=1).
3) Merowe Dam helped to improve relations between Sudan and the financial backing nations,
and especially China - given the chance to demonstrate their construction skills in their largest
foreign project at that time. Suppression of local population is counterproductive in lifting the trade
embargo by the US (AP=3).

The PER score of 0 is indicating that constructing the dam has in the sum no impact
on international relations. However, (economic-) relations to the majority of countries
and especially international reputation is already very low. construction of Merowe
Dam will have positive effects on relations between China and Sudan and other
nations linked to the project. Negative aspects of the construction on prestige and
international relations will contribute to continuing bad reputation; however these
aspects will be topped in reality by the human crisis in Darfur.

C1.2.3 Resident people and cultural heritage

All issues regarding resettlement of local tribes and compensation was managed by
the Dam implementation unit (DIU) installed by the ministry of irrigation. Until now
tensions between the local population and the DIU resulted in the loss of three lives.
Furthermore as indicated in detail in chapter B2, many promises were/could not be
kept due to insufficient planning. The rescuing of cultural heritage and excavating of
archaeological sites looks like a complete flop as well. Among other reasons,
promises for a museum were not kept and archaeological teams were forced to leave
the reservoir area by the local population. The danger of loosing knowledge about
ancient history and cultural heritage is imminent.

Table 7: PER analysis on resident people and cultural heritage

Attribute CP OP AP PER
adjacent 8 9 4
industry 1)
Housing 2) 5 7 2
Farming 3) 5 6 1
Health 4) 3 8 3
Cultural 5 8 1
heritage 5)
Quality of life 6) 5 7 1
Compensation 0 7 1
7)

Average 4.43 7.42 1.86 -0.86

1) Downstream ferries and agricultural farming is affected by seasonal fluctuations of water level
as indicated in chapter B3.3. Local industries have adapted to this scenario fairly well (CP=8). The
Dam will reduce seasonal effects and will create daily fluctuations in water level of up to 4.6 m
instead. A small dam as proposed in the Eawag study could reduce this effect, leaving enterprises
better of (OP=9). Without a regulated daily flood e.g. ferry landing stations and farming pumps will
have to adapt to the new scenario (AP=4).
2) We listed 12 reasons why resettlement failed in terms of housing in chapter B2. Intended was a
slight upgrade of housing for local population (CP=5 to OP=7), however due to the mentioned
shortcomings, it could not be achieved (AP=2)
3) Simple farming (CP=5) was common along the future reservoir. Farmers were granted more
land (3:1), however less fertile. With the right techniques and improved knowledge this was

21
 considered as a gain for farmers (OP=6), however the soil turned out to be almost infertile and
only to be cultivated by high financial efforts by local farmers. (AP=1).
4) The health situation in the region is characterized by insufficient medical services and hygiene
(CP=3) (see chapter B3.6). The Lahmeyer report states that Malaria is a common disease,
however gives no referral how to address problems of increased mosquito breeding areas.
According to studies by Blue Nile Associates and Queen Mary University of London [43, 44]
significant improvements in health might be accomplished up to extinction of Malaria in this region
(OP=8). None of the proposed measures have been realized, a hospital for workers has been built
(AP=3).
5) It is known that the reservoir region was populated back to ancient times and historic ruins exist
in the area, however no funds were available for excavation (CP=5). The fear of loosing important
parts of Niles former history, made international funding available for rescue work (OP=8). Broken
promises caused concern to local people, resulting in a partial stop of excavation work. Currently 3
out of 8 teams left. The future of archaeological work is unclear. (AP=1)
6) People lived a simple life, but were more or less satisfied (CP=5). Higher living standard and an
improvement of education was anticipated in the resettlement scheme (OP=7). Partial loss of
identity and unhappiness led to civil unrest resulting in three deaths (AP=1).
7) Not building the dam results in no compensation (CP=0). Compensation was higher as
proposed by the first 1993’s Report delivered by the Canadian Company Monenco Aqra and
financed by the World Bank, however compensation was less than the demands of the local
population (OP=7). Further reduction of compensation and violation against Sudanese law led to
civil unrest. 2/3 of the population will be ineligible of any compensation (AP=1).

The failure of resettlement and archaeological rescue is also represented in a

negative PER score, leaving all local people in a worse state than before. The threat
of loosing their cultural identity is imminent. The effort to improve the situation by
negotiations with representatives of the Manasir and the DIU peaked in the
assassination attempt of two Manasir leaders [46]. No significant improvement is
expected in the near future.

C1.2.4 Environmental consequences

The construction of a dam will have positive and negative influences on many
environmental aspects. To forecast these effects is a difficult task and depends on
many unknowns and estimations. They can only be reduced by permanent
observations and ongoing research. The uncertainty is also reflected in the big
differences to be found in both EIA reports. Detailed forecasts for environmental
changes can be found in chapter B3 ff. In general for wildlife a reservoir is
characterized by reduced species diversity but on a higher productivity level. For the
local population the higher productivity level of fish will not play an important role in
the Merowe case, as their diet contains little fish and export is difficult. Downstream
population and local economy like farms and ferry services will have to adapt to - and
bear the cost for reduced nutrient content and heavy daily fluctuation levels of the
Nile. A small dam in short distance to Merowe Dam to alter the heavy downstream
fluctuations in water level as well as a fish ladder for migratory fish was not realized.
The dam is also built for irrigation purposes, however will be only used for power
generation in the near future. Irrigation will significantly change the environmental
impact as indicated in chapter B3.5.

After the construction of the dam, the environment will suffer. Some fish species will
profit, however in general the environment will be worse off. The negative PER score
represents this. The fact that little biodiversity exists and the reservoir will be placed
in a desert area, lead to insufficient evaluation by the Lahmeyer report. The Eawag
review lists many shortcomings and gives recommendations for future operation. A
statement on the Eawag review was refused by Lahmeyer.

22
Table 8: PER analysis for environmental consequences
Attribute CP OP FP FP Eawag PER
Lahmeyer
Aquatic 7 9 9 7
ecology 1)
Terrestrial 3 4 1 1
ecology 2)
Sedimentation, 6 8 5 2
soil Erosion 3)
Water loss, 7 8 8 8
quality & salt
content 4)
Greenhouse 8 9 7 2
gas emission
5)

Average 6.2 7.2 6 4 -1.2/-3.2

1) Before the dam was built almost no impact on aquatic biodiversity existed. The local
populations diet contains no or little fish (CP=7). The optimum case would be to preserve this
diversity and increase populations (OP=9). Preservation measures were or could not be taken. In
the future diversity will decrease, the fish population will increase (FP=7). The Lahmeyer study
states that ‘fish resources are not sensitive to environmental change caused by a new reservoir’
(FP=9). More details to be found in chapter B.3.1
2) The project area consists mainly of desert with emergent vegetation after rainfall. The cultivated
areas and river banks leave some refuge for birds and minor animals (CP=3).
In the optimal case wildlife will find a new habitat on the reservoir shore and will be less disturbed
by humans (OP=4). Nesting grounds will disappear a long time before the reservoir will be filled,
as the reservoir will be cleared out of vegetation. The shore will mainly consist of bare rock. Most
wildlife population will be lost as indicated in chapter B.3.1(FP=1).
3) Annual flooding of the Nile left sediments rich in nutrients for vegetation (CP=6). Special sluices
have been constructed to avoid sedimentation in the lake, the dam is stopping the danger of
uncontrolled flooding (OP=8). Erosion will increase downstream, due to daily fluctuations in water
level. Eawag states that the flushing of the reservoir sediment will not work as the special sluices
are far away from where the sedimentation occurs. Sediments will be deposited at the entrance of
the reservoir 3 times faster than assumed by Lahmeyer (FP=2&5).
4) Water loss and salt content will remain unchanged without dam (CP=7). The reservoir is an
area subjected to evaporation. Losses of water and therefore an increase in salt content will
increase if the dam is used for irrigation. Various numbers are given in both reports, mentioned
also in chapter B3.2. Water quality will not degrade (OP=8). As uncertainty is large and is
dependant on the purpose of the dam, FP will be also assumed 8, but can change significantly
with time.
5) A flowing river is barely emitting greenhouse gas (CP=8). The reservoir is cleared of (desert-)
vegetation, almost no emission is expected (OP=9). Eawag review predicts a magnitude higher
emission than Lahmeyer as expressed in detail in chapter B.3.4 (FP=2&7).

C.1.3 Summary of PER Analysis

It is hard to evaluate a project that is still under construction. Some of the positive or
negative effects will manifest years after the Dam has been built and electric power is
generated. First indications towards success or failure in terms of economic profit,
environmental impact and future performance have been given in previous chapters.
However they will be of limited significance, as new facts are created every day.
A worst case scenario not mentioned yet, is a complete destruction of the dam by an
earthquake or terrorist attack. The threat of terrorism is given, as Sudan is suffering
of civil unrest e.g. in the region of Darfur. Earthquakes triggered by the reservoir may
be unlikely, however the fact that the reservoir is placed in an area that has or still is

23
undergoing tectonic uplift, might be an underestimated threat to the project.
Seismologic-, GPS- or INSAR- surveys, to insure tectonic stability were not
conducted. Both issues are not or briefly discussed in previous reports and cannot be
estimated with current knowledge.
The PER scores represent common features of dam construction. Industrial targets
are promising to be met, while the price will usually be paid by the environment and
by local population. Merowe is no exception to that. The lack of proper planning and
the neglect of human rights issues already lead to uprisings and human casualties.
All lessons learnt from previous dam constructions in Africa seem to be forgotten.

C.2 The 1959 agreement as a framework to manage Merowe-dam-related

international conflicts.

The preamble of this agreement starts with the phrase “As the River Nile needs
projects …”. This start sums up the purpose of the whole agreement, which is to
provide a foundation for consensus and cooperation in the development, execution
and administration of Nile management projects. The absence of interstate conflicts
during and after the construction of Aswan High Dam, Rosseires dam, and many
other water management projects indicates that the 1959 agreement fulfilled its
purpose within the prevailing circumstances. In this agreement Sudan was allocated
18.5 km3/yr and the consent of Egypt was given to any projects to use this quota.
Article two item two of this agreement states “In order to enable the Sudan to utilize
its share of the water, the two Republics agree that the Republic of Sudan shall
construct the Rosseires Dam on the Blue Nile and any other works which the
Republic of the Sudan considers essential for the utilization of its share” Until now
Sudan consumes around 14 km3/yr [23], leaving enough water to account for the
evaporation losses of Merowe Dam, estimated to be 1.75 km3/yr [5]. Therefore, 1959
agreement can still provide a framework to construct Merowe Dam.

A shortcoming of this agreement is the absence of any provision for water quality.
This shortcoming may become a flash point if the salinity of the river water increases
significantly due to evaporation losses or riparian urban development. The increase
in salinity will then be felt downstream in the Nile delta. If salt content increases in the
delta waters, farmers there will tend to plant more rice as it can mitigate and endure
salinity increase. Rice plantations however will exacerbate the problem of water
quantity. Currently, the ministry of irrigation tries to limit the areas planted with rice
each year to save water. Such increasing salinity, besides increasing water
consumption by favoring rice plantation, will hinder projects to reuse drainage water.
It will also reduce the amount of fertilizers that can be added to compensate for the
absence of the fertilizing silt. However, industrial and urban pollution of the Nile River
in Egypt could be reduced significantly. The resulting increase in water quality could
then account for the increase in salinity due to Merowe Dam. Detailed studies on this
issue do not yet exist. The shortcoming of the 1959 agreement in terms of water
quality may lead to future discrepancies between Egypt and Sudan.

C.3 Assessment of Merowe Dam as an electricity production option

In this section we discuss some alternatives for electricity production and compare
the two most feasible alternatives to the adopted option of hydropower using the
weighted score methodology. In these discussion and comparison we examine how
efficient would each of the technologies be in providing 1250 MW of power, the

24
nominal generation capacity of Merowe dam. Subsequently, we study in details the
economic performance of Merowe dam project using cash flow analysis and discuss
how the dam can be viewed from sustainability perspective

C.3.1 Weighted score assessment of electricity production alternatives

The weighed score methodology consists of the following steps:

1- Generate set of alternatives

In this set the probable alternatives are listed and discussed, and then the feasible
ones are selected for further considerations. For the problem in hand, the do-nothing
alternative was discarded from the outset since the need for electricity generation in
Sudan is so acute and can not be disregarded. The use of nuclear energy was not
considered due to obvious reasons (embargo, etc.). The alternatives are: distributed
photovoltaic cells, solar (thermal) power plants, wind farms and thermal power plants.
Scale considerations, as we explain below, narrowed these alternatives to the last 3
options.

2- Determine the set of important attributes

This set should include characteristics of the project, e.g., execution time, capital
cost, operating and maintenance cost, availability of funds and technical assistance,
the ease of application and reliability. It also includes the changes the project is
expected to induce in the environment and society, e.g., creation of jobs, and impact
on air, water and soil quality.

3- Weigh each of the attributes versus all the others.

In this step a quantity of 10 points is divided between each pair of attributes. The
importance of an attribute relative to another is reflected in the fraction of the 10
points assigned to it, with the other attribute assigned the remainder. In each pair, the
attribute considered to be more important from the decision makers’ point of view,
takes the largest fraction. An attribute weight will be the sum of all its points in all
pairs. This assignation of importance and thus assessment of weights of each
attribute depends on the peculiarities of each project.

4- Determine the relative score of each option in each of the attributes

This determination of scores can be done based on quantitative data in most of the
attributes. For example, the option with the lowest capital investment would receive a
score of 10. Any other option will receive a smaller score inversely proportional to
quotients of its cost divided by that of the cheapest alternative. Another example is
the execution time; the dam will have the shortest execution time since all necessary
studies are more or less carried out and the technology is mature. Therefore it will get
a score of 10. The thermal power plant will require slightly more time for construction,
as most of the components have to be imported. It will get a score of 9. The time
required to build the solar-thermal and wind farm will be at least twice as long as the
time required by the dam due to the need for detailed studies.

5- Multiply the weight of the attribute with the score of each option in this attribute, to
get a weighted score.

6- Calculate the sum of weighted score for each option.

25
7- Rank the options based on this sum.

C.3.1.1 Alternatives

C.3.1.1.1 Thermal power plant

The highest estimate of greenhouse gas emission from dam reservoir suggests that it
will be close to CO2 emissions from a natural gas fed power plant with the same
electricity generation capacity [5]. However, Sudan does not have noteworthy natural
gas reserves and therefore would most probably use fuel oil for electricity generation.
In this case CO2 emission will be many times as much [3]. Sudan’s’ share in global
greenhouse gas production is small compared to that of any OECD country. For
example energy-related greenhouse gas production in Sudan was 0.3 tons per capita
in 2003 [14] compared to, for example, 10.5 tons in Germany [16] and 19.1 tons in
Australia [18]. The disparities are even higher in transportation-related greenhouse
gas emissions. Therefore such a factor plays a modest role in decision making.
However, other local environmental impacts of thermal power plants must in all cases
be taken into account. Fuel-oil is the most probable fuel if a thermal power plant is
constructed in Sudan. Natural gas is scarce and lighter oil fractions can fetch high
market prices. Fuel oil can cause health and environmental problems because of
SOx, NOx, and particulate matter emission. Heavy metal contamination of soil and
water is imminent without filters. Estimations of external cost, i.e., quantification of the
environmental impact, give an external cost an order of magnitude higher than that
estimated for hydropower (illustrated in Figure 6). This figure shows also the external
costs of the various electricity production technologies.

The levelised cost of electricity produced in heavy fuel oil steam turbine power plants
can be as low as ¢1.5/ kWh. The overnight cost and the power generation capacity of
a thermal power plant are comparable to those of the dam. It is also a reliable well
established technology.
Figure 6 External costs of various electricity generation technologies[1]. Note the logarithmic scale

10000
Coal
Estimate of external cost in year

1000 Oil
Gas
100 Nuclear fission
Hydro
1995 ¢/kWh

10
PV Biomass
1 Wind
0.1

0.01

0.001

0.0001
Technology

C.3.1.1.2 Distributed photovoltaic panels

Herman Scheer [47] makes a compelling argument that distributed solar power
systems are the most plausible road toward a strongly sustainable economy.
However this alternative faces three main obstacles to becoming the main electricity
production technology in Sudan. It is very expensive in comparison to any other

26
option, levelised cost is around ¢50 /kWh. At this price, power must be heavily
subsidized to enable people with modest income to access electricity. Moreover, it
can not boost economic activities that depend on economy of scale. There is also no
local industry capable of producing advanced photovoltaic panels and no change is
expected in the near future. Thus the country will be dependent on foreign
assistance. Another issue is the availability of silicon, the principle component in the
solar panels. It is also used in electronic devices, which are at very high demand right
now. Therefore, the world market and production capacity of the silicon are currently
unable to satisfy a huge surge in demand, if a country with the size and acute
electricity shortage like Sudan decides to adopt photovoltaic panels for electricity
generation. Two other drawbacks of lesser severity are the significant energy and
chemicals consumption involved in the manufacturing of solar panels and the need
for regular maintenance and dust removal.

C.3.1.1.3 Wind farms

Wind power is the most economically promising clean and renewable electricity
production technology, with a levelised cost of ¢4-8 / kWh [48]. In Egypt this cost is
¢2.5/kWh [49]. Based on levelised cost alone wind farms can compete with gas, coal
and nuclear electricity production technologies, whose levelised cost is in the range
of ¢2.5-6/kWh [50], but not with a heavy oil thermal power plant. A downside of wind
energy is the considerably long planning time and capital to collect the necessary
data. It took Egypt 8 years to prepare a wind map with Danish financial and technical
assistance [51]. Moreover, optimization of layout, which requires a certain level of
experience, is crucial to get satisfactory performance. Wind farms might disrupt birds’
migratory routes, however, the effects of wind farms on birds is comparable to those
of other manmade structures with similar sizes [52]. The main environmental
concerns of wind power are visual changes in the landscape, noise, and light
reflection from the blades. Such effects have minimal impact on humans if the wind
farms are constructed in uninhabited places, as they usually are. What constitutes a
serious obstacle to adopting this alternative is that the required electricity generation
capacity is enormous compared to the current levels of application of wind power.
The generation capacity of the dam is equivalent to all the wind power installed
capacity in the UK and the Netherlands combined [53]. A wind farm with the same
production capacity would have 2000 600 kW turbines, typically with a blade
diameter of 35 meters mounted on a 50 meter concrete or steel tower [48].
Intermittency of power generation is another drawback.

C.3.1.1.4 Solar-thermal power plant

This technology to harness solar energy is gaining ground in the renewable energy
market, with countries like Spain and Germany leading the way. Currently, solar
thermal projects are underway in Morocco, Algeria and Egypt, usually combined with
gas-fired thermal power generation in hybrid designs to compensate for the
intermittency of sunshine. The levelised cost of this option ranges between ¢8-
15/kWh [54], which is higher than that of other conventional technologies and wind
energy. However, the speed of research and development in this field and the
increased interest by many countries in this technology makes it a promising option.
The power generation capacity of a typical solar thermal power generation plant is
less than 1/6 of the installed power generation capacity of Merowe dam.

27
From the above we formulated the alternative to the dam as
1- A combination of a wind farm and a solar thermal power plant,
2- A fuel-oil based thermal power plant.

C.3.1.2 Assessment criteria

Our comparison of the 3 alternatives is based on 10 attributes. The relative weights

of the attributes are given in table 9. Of these 10 attributes, 4 are related to
environmental and social aspects (air quality, water quality, soil quality and creation
of jobs), with a total weight of 3.4. 3 attributes focus on economic and financial
aspects (capital cost, operating and maintenance cost, and availability of external
funds) with a total weight of 3.6. 3 attributes express technical performance
(reliability, ease of application and execution time) with a total weight of 3. The
relative weights are given in Table 9. The only attribute where we think that
substantial weight must be assigned is the availability of external funds and technical
support since Sudan, after decades of civil war and economic embargo, can not
finance and execute such a large increase in its electricity generation capacity only
with its own resources.

Table 9 Assignation of relative importance and assessment of attribute weights

Ease
Capital OM Creation Air Water External Soil
attributes of Reliability Time weight
cost cost of jobs quality quality funding quality
app.
Capital
cost 5 5 5 5 3 5 6 5 0 6 0.9
OM cost 5 5 5 2 5 5 5 5 0 5 0.84
Creation
of jobs 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 5 0 5 0.94
Ease of
application 5 8 5 5 5 6 6 5 0 7 1.04
Reliability 7 5 5 5 5 7 7 5 0 5 1.02
Air quality 5 5 4 4 3 5 5 5 0 5 0.82
Water
quality 4 5 4 4 3 5 5 5 0 5 0.8
Time 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 0.9
External
funding 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 10 1.9
Soil
quality 4 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 0 5 0.84

C 3.1.3 Results of weighted score assessment for most promising alternatives

Some of the scores are based on quantitative data, while others are based on
informed presumptions. For instance the solar-wind option was rated low in reliability
because power is produced with variability that is hard, or impossible, to control and
the ability of this option to respond to peak or sudden surge in demand is very limited.
On the other hand, the thermal option was rated very low in air quality because of the
fuel used which would most probably be heavy fuel oil. The weights and the scores
and the final result of the weight score assessment are given in Table 10.

28
Table 10, results of weighed score assessment of the three selected options
relative score of options
dam solar-wind thermal
options
attributes
weights
Capital cost 0.82 10 5 5
Operation and maintenance cost 0.88 10 3 3
Creation of jobs 0.94 7 10 7
Ease of application 1.08 10 5 7
Reliability 1.02 7.5 2.5 10
Air quality 0.82 5 10 1
Water quality 0.8 5 10 7
Time 0.9 10 5 9
Availability of external funding 1.9 10 5 7
Soil quality 0.84 5 10 7
Weighted sum 82.33 62.69 64.78

C.3.2 Economic assessment of the dam

C.3.2.1 Cash flow analysis and Net Present Worth (NPW)

To assess the profitability of any project one must analyze its cash flows over a
certain time span to obtain some measures of profitability like payback time, internal
rate of return and net present worth. Of these measures the Net Present Worth
(NPW) is the most informative and commonly used project evaluation criterion [55].
The time span is usually taken to be the life time of the project. To carry out cash flow
analysis for Merowe dam project we needed to gather some data and make some
assumptions. The data and assumptions are given in Table 11. Some of the
assumptions are based on data from other sources. For example the operating and
maintenance costs are the average operation and maintenance costs of all
hydropower projects in the United States [56]. The sales price is taken to 0.9 the
price of electricity in Egypt. There are two points of view for selecting the discount
rate: 1- the minimum acceptable rate of return on investment and 2- the rate of
returns on the second most attractive alternative for investment. In deciding the
discount rate we followed the second perspective and used the interest rate on US
treasury bonds, that is approximately 5%. We also assumed an availability ratio,
which is the percentage of the power produced to the installed capacity, of 60%,
taking into account the learning curve and the need for overhauls. We also assumed
that the availability ratio will increase by a fixed 2%, as in the case of AHD, until full
capacity is reached. This will happen long before silt starts to influence hydropower
production. According to the estimates of EAWAG, dam operation will not be
influenced by silt during the first 50 years, which is the time horizon of our cash flow
analysis. We used a moderate inflation rate in operation and maintenance cost since
all quantities are calculated in US dollars. The assumed inflation rate in energy price
is also moderate taking the projected huge increase in global and local energy
demand into account. For the interest rate, the grace period and the maturity period
we used those of the loan offered by the Arab Development Fund[57], we assumed
that the other funding sources will offer the same conditions. Finally the life time

29
assumed is much shorter than the estimated life time of the dam, taking silting into
account. Results of the cash flow analysis are given in table 12.

Table 11, Data and assumptions of Cash flow analysis

Data
funding by the Sudanese government $575,000,000
external funding $1,391,000,000
production capacity 1.25 GW
Assumptions
operating and maintenance cost 0.71 ¢/kWh
sales price 4.0 ¢/kWh
availability ratio 60%
rate of increase in production 2% yearly untill full capacity is reached
discount rate 5%
inflation in O&M costs 5%
inflation in sales price 8%
loan interest rate 3%
method of payment equal installments
grace period 7 years
maturity period 25 years
project life time 50 years

Cash flow analysis predicts more than satisfactory performance. The predicted
internal rate of return (IRR) is high enough for most economic enterprises. The net
present worth (NPW) reflects the impressive gains from the project around $57
billion. Beside these two figures we made a sensitivity analysis in order to find:
1- The increase in operating cost which would be enough to reduce the IRR of
the project to the discount rate, or respectively the operating cost at which the
NPW is zero. The use of this number in decision making is discussed in the
next section. Note that it is higher than the sales price because of the
difference in the inflation rates
2- The sales price at which the IRR equals the discount rate. This price indicates
the total cost of the project, both capital and operating. It can be viewed as the
minimum sales price and might be used in pricing electricity for the local
market.

Table 12, Results of cash flow analysis

Internal Rate of Return IRR 30.9%
Net Present Worth NPW(2007) $27,171,611,004
Maximum O&M costs (2007) 5.4 ¢/kWh
Minimum sales price (2007) 0.64 ¢/kWh

C.3.2.2 Merowe dam from a sustainability perspective

C.3.2.2.1 Weak sustainability, incorporation of externalities

The main concept behind weak sustainability is that natural capital and man-made
capital are exchangeable. This concept is precursory to the concept of external cost,
where the environmental goods and services used, or destroyed, in an economic
activity are priced. The consequent concept is that sustainability can be achieved if
the “proper” prices are attached to external environmental costs and the economic

30
activities are charged these prices in the form of taxes, thus correcting the market
failure of disregarding the environmental costs of the economic activity. A
complementary concept to interchangeability is the preservation of critical
environmental capital, in other words the components and characteristics of the
ecosystem whose “proper” price is deemed infinitely large [58]. Without fixing a
minimum critical environmental capital, development is very weakly sustainable [58].
This type of development is precarious and can lead to real social and environmental
disasters as in the case of the Pacific Island Nation of Nauru. In this case the
islanders traded the ecological system of their island for revenues from phosphate
mining. Unfortunately the financial turmoil of the Asian-Pacific market during the late
90th eroded most of their money and thus they are now left with little means for
subsistence [59].

Various studies have been carried out to estimates of external costs for hydropower
production, adopting different methodologies [60]. The different estimates are
presented in figure 7. The reason for the disparities in theses estimates are explained
by Sundqvist [60] and are not the scope of this report. Interestingly, the two countries,
where the largest estimates of external costs were obtained are major hydropower
producers. In Sweden, hydro power supplies are around 60 TWh, approximately 45%
of the total electricity production. Installed hydropower capacity is 16,400 MW [61].
Norway is completely dependent on hydropower. 99.4 % of the total annual electricity
production is obtained from hydropower plants. A trading scheme with other Nordic
countries, mainly producing nuclear energy, serves to even the variations in supply
and demand over the year [62].

From a weak sustainability perspective, Merowe dam should be given the go ahead if
it can pay for its external costs. The maximum operating cost beyond which the IRR
becomes equal to the discount can serve as a guide to the maximum external cost
Merowe Dam is able to compensate, while still being profitable in economic terms.
From the cash flow analysis we found this value to be ¢5.4/kWh. This value, as we
can see in figure 7, is much larger than almost all the estimates for the external cost
of hydropower production in several countries. This could lead to the conclusion that
the economic earnings of the dam are enough to compensate for external
environmental damage up to ¢5.4/kWh. Such a value is improbable if the dam is
constructed similar to many other dams, where the external cost estimates predict a
much smaller value. However, there are two flaws in this argument. First, the critical
natural capital must be defined in terms of minimum health standards of the
environment. Second, even if the natural capital is assumed to be exchangeable with
man-made capital, the human suffering and demise of the individuals in the affected
communities’ certainly are not, at least for them.

Externalities, i.e., side effects of an economic activity that affect somebody other than
the people engaged in the economic activity and are not reflected fully in the price,
are not always negative. In some case the externalities of an economic activity are
deemed positive and thus this economic activity can become worthy of subsidies
[10]. However, this is rarely the case with environmental externalities.

The conclusion of this section is that economic benefits of Merowe Dam will be
higher than its external cost. Environmental- and social impacts should not be
disregarded or neglected. The NPW of the dam is high enough to make mitigation
measures affordable; however the Sudanese government may be short of capital to

31
invest in mitigation measures before the dam starts to generate revenue. A smart
impact study to be presented to the funding bodies, would have recommended the
incorporation of consensual social and environmental mitigation measures.
Figure 7, the threshold external cost of Merowe dam (the red horizontal line) versus the external cost of
hydroelectricity generation in various countries (shaded columns where a range is given and a dash when only a
single value is given). Data from studies reviewed by Sundqvist [60], Note the logarithmic scale.

100
26.26
18.53
External cost ¢/kWh

10
7.83
1.62 1.5 1.76
2.68 0.71 0.47
1
1.43 0.32 0.32
0.09 0.25
0.1 0.07
0.02 0.02
0.03
0.01
US UK No US No Ch, At, Gr, It, 1 No Pt, Se, Ch,
,19 , 19 , 19 , 19 , 19 19 19 19 99 , 19 199 19
91 92 93 94-1 95 97 99 99 9 99 9 99 1999
998

32
D Conclusions

Merowe dam will be a profitable project. Its profit will probably compensate for
negative external costs, if these costs are within the range found in other hydropower
projects. However, resettlements issues are poorly managed, resulting in undue
suffering of the affected communities. A possibility for international tension to arise
between Egypt and Sudan exist, however, no provisions are made to avoid it from
either states. Many environmental issues are overlooked; however devastating
environmental impacts are not expected. The following is a summary of what we
learned and what we found in this study:

♦ Resettlement projects must be considered as an integral, inseparable part of the

dam planning and funding. No funding body should contemplate participating in
a dam project without clear, well reasoned resettlement plans presented hand in
hand with technical issues. However, managing the resettlement issues should
be delegated to a separate body independent of the dam administration.
♦ These resettlement and compensation plans must be agreed upon with the
affected communities and people prior to dam construction or granting of its
funds. However, the mandate given to the government to manage the state
natural resources should be taken into account and respected.
♦ Integration of resettlement plans with dam design and planning should help
optimizing the whole project. In other words, dam design and operation plans
should aim to minimize the financial and human cost of resettlement while
observing two sets of constraints: hard constraints with respect to keeping the
quality of life of the affected communities intact or improved, soft constraints
with respect to the dam specification controlling its economic performance
(electricity generation capacity, flexibility to satisfy peak, and year-round,
demand in electricity, etc.). However, soft here does not mean that this set of
constraints is of a secondary importance, it solely indicates that they probably
have a wider range of acceptable values.
♦ Merowe Dam can be a very successful economic enterprise. It will supply
electricity at less than half of the levelised cost of the cheapest conventional
technology (fuel-oil thermal power plant), or at ¼ of the levelised cost of the
cheapest renewable technology (wind), and still be profitable.
♦ The debate between dam opponents and dam proponents should be divided
into two parts: the dam as a structure and the dam as a policy. Confounding
these two aspects hinders problem solving and conflict resolution in the cases
where problems are mainly caused by policy faults while the dam performance
is satisfactory. Dam opponents can conclude that the dam as a structure should
not exist because of problems caused by deficient policies, while dam
proponents stick to emphasizing its positive outcomes as a structure, paying
little attention to the crises created by poor planning and policy faults. The
epilogue is dedicated to developing this point.
♦ Evaluation of the dam should be carried out on three levels: the river basin, the
state constructing the dam, and the communities in the proximity of the dam.
Construction of the dam can have overall positive effects on the state
constructing it while causing dire impacts, both as a policy and as a structure,
on the local level or on the basin level.
♦ International treaties must contain provisions for water quality. The expected
increase in salinity of the Nile might force Egyptian farmers to plant certain
crops that will increase water demand.

33
♦ Friendship, engagement and cooperation can be more effective in influencing
policies than boycotts, threats and continuous criticism. The absence of mutual
relations limits, or even eliminates, the leverage of a party to change the other
parties’ policies. As we have seen the absence of working relations between the
West and Sudan rendered the standards advocated by NGOs and Western
funding bodies inconsequential. Governments and trans-national corporations,
that do not share the same view, can usually provide enough capital and
technical assistance to controversial development projects.
♦ The concepts of weak sustainability and external costs must be used with
caution. The critical components and the critical characteristics of the
ecosystem must be decided prior to any pricing of the environmental goods and
services exploited, or damaged.

34
E Epilogue

Large dams are intended to boost human welfare by controlling floods, generating
electricity and providing water for irrigation. However, in several cases supposed
improvements in human welfare after construction of the dam are dubious[3]. This
undesirable situation is due to policy failures in some cases while in others the dam
structure itself is to blame. Examples for situations when the dam as a structure is the
cause of failure are illustrated in the following questions:
1. Is the sedimentation rate so high such that the service life is too short for the dam
to be profitable?
2. Does the reservoir weight induce substantial earthquake threats such that an
event leading to the failure of the dam, and consequent destructive floods,
becomes probable in its service life?
3. Does the decrease in food production caused by soil erosion, submergence of
reservoir land, loss in fishery and loss of land fertility outweigh the increase in
food production due to stable irrigation, water saving measures, alleviation of
droughts and fish farming?
4. Is the cost of reinforcing river banks, the river mouth and its coastline against
erosion as well as compensation for lost homes and property higher than the
revenues from electricity sales and increase in crop production?
5. Is the environmental damage too high?

When the answer to any of these questions is “yes”, then it is unlikely that the
construction of a dam can generate a positive overall outcome.

In other cases, the dam as structure does satisfactorily fulfill its part in the generation
of electricity and revenue, protection against floods, and securing water supply for
perennial irrigation, however human welfare is not boosted and the environmental
degradation advances. Examples for situations where the wrong policies are the
cause of failure are illustrated in the following questions when the answer is “No”:
1. Does the produced electricity reach the people who paid for the dam construction
and those who suffered of resettlement?
2. Are revenues from electricity sales used in sustainable and comprehensive
development schemes?
3. Are the resettlement schemes and compensations ready to be delivered to the
displaced people without agonizing delays and litigation?
4. Is the infrastructure, like irrigation and drainage canals necessary to use the water
newly made available for irrigation, in place and functioning?
5. Do the resettled farmers have an overall benefit from the new infrastructure?
6. Does the government engage in the debate about development policies,
objectives? Are the government actions transparent and provide enough
information for a fair debate about critical issues? Are different opinions
acknowledged and is opposition integrated in dialogue instead of violent
oppression?

Even the most successful dam comes with a price. The people, who will build the
dam, must know this price and why it is that much. It is up to them to decide whether
they can, or should, pay for it.

35
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