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Is the StructuralModelStill Useful?

Charles Brenner
I was invited to discuss structural theory in about 2,000 words. My answer is essentially a prcis of three papersBrenner (1994 (with accompanying discussions by Arlow, Boesky, Kramer, Mahon, Shane and Shapiro), 1998, 2002). First, a word of explanation. The term topographic theory is often used to designate the whole of psychoanalytic theory as proposed by Freud prior to 1923 and the term structural theory to designate the whole of psychoanalytic theory as explicated by Freud beginning with 1923. I shall use the two terms in a more precise and limited sense as referring to that part of psychoanalytic theory, as proposed by Freud, that asserts that the mind is best understood as composed of separable components. In the case of the first theory the components were labeled by Freud (1900) the systems Ucs., Pcs. and Cs. (or Ucs. and Cs.-Pcs.). For reasons he gave in The ego and the id (1923) he redefined and relabeled the systems as ego, superego and id. Instead of being called systems, ego, superego and id are usually called structures, but, in fact, the words system, structure and agency are synonymous in this context. The change was a substantial one in many respects. The concepts id, ego and superego are by no means synonymous with Ucs., Pcs. and Cs. The one feature that did not change was the idea that the mind is best understood as consisting of separable systems or structures. That idea remained the same. Freud continued to hold this to be the case throughout his professional career. Later analysts have followed his lead in this respect. There has never been an explicit challenge to it in the analytic literature. Quite the contrary, in fact. As noted above, the terms topographic theory and structural theory, though never used by Freud himself, are often used to designate the whole of psychoanalytic theory. It is obvious that this is not the case. The theory that the mind is composed of separate or separable structures is but one element of Freud's theory of mental functioning and development. It is only this element that I suggest should be revised. As soon as he abandoned hypnosis as his method of treatment and began instead to develop the psychoanalytic method Freud (1924) discovered that his patients both wanted to and wanted not to remember the events that had precipitated their illnesses. Certain memories were repressed, that is, barred from access to consciousness, even though they lived on unconsciously and took an active part in symptom formation. It was to explain these observations that Freud first proposed the theory that the mind is composed of systems that are separable on the basis of their function, one system being unconscious

and the other conscious or accessible to consciousness (= preconscious). According to this theory, the system unconscious (Ucs.) contains wishes of childhood

origin for sexual gratification. The other system (Cs.-Pcs.) endeavors to repress those wishes and to keep them from access to consciousness and from being gratified. Psychoneurotic symptoms, according to this theory, result from conflict between the two systems, one of which, the Ucs., is the system containing the wish and the other, the Cs.-Pcs., is the defensive system. Two things are important to keep in mind about this theory. One is that conflict and compromise formation are considered to be in and of themselves pathological. According to Freud's theory, it is only when repression fails in its function that sexual wishes of childhood origin erupt into consciousness and give rise to conflict and compromise formation. Normally the sexual wishes of childhood origin are either securely repressed, dealt with by what Freud called judgmental repudiation or sublimated. Exceptions to this rule are to be found in dreams and in the slips and errors of daily life. Freud referred to the latter as examples of trivial or everyday pathology: the psychopathology of everyday life. The appearance in dreams of childhood sexual wishes that are normally kept unconscious in waking life he explained by the assumption that the mind functions differently during sleep than it does when awake. The second point that it is important to recognize is that Freud characterized the two systems not just by their relation to consciousness, but also by their mode of functioning. The system Ucs., he proposed, functions according to what he called the primary process. Opposites are equivalent to one another; rules of logic are ignored; there is no sense of time; displacement and condensation are accepted and used whenever desired, and thought processes are non-verbal, with words being treated as objects rather than as signifiers. The system Cs.-Pcs. by contrast, operates in conformity with rules of logic, has a realistic attitude toward time and space, abjures metonymy and functions verbally in the accepted sense of the term. Later, when he revised his theory of mental systems to take account of the fact that defenses and self-punitive trends are often inaccessible to consciousness as well as repudiated wishes (1923), he continued this aspect of the difference between id and ego. The id, he posited, functions according to the primary process, takes no account of external reality and is non-verbal, while the ego functions according to the secondary process and is as tied to external reality as the id is to the drives. Moreover, psychoneurotic symptoms are explained as a result of conflict between id and ego. Freud, after 1923, continued to consider conflict and compromise formation to be signs of psychopathology, whether major or minor. Most analysts agree, as witness the familiar formulation that a successful analysis resolves conflict, that is, makes it disappear. Freud (1926) also asserted that one structure, the id, is tied to the drives and ignores external reality, while another, the ego, is tied to external reality and frequently opposes the drives by means of defenses, of which repression is one. I suggested (Brenner, 1968, 1973, 1982) that both these theoretical conclusions are contradicted by the relevant data, both analytic and non-analytic. To begin with the assumption that conflict and compromise formation are signs of psychopathology, I believe that the relevant data make clear that conflict and compromise formation are not a sign of psychopathology. On the contrary, they are ubiquitous in mental life (Brenner, 1982). They are as characteristic of normal mental functioning as they are of psychopathology. When the mind functions in such a way that there is adequate gratification of pleasure-seeking wishes, not too much unpleasure in the form of anxiety

and depressive affect, not too much inhibition of function due to defense and not too much in the way of self-injurious or self-destructive behavior, its functioning qualifies as normal. When there is inadequate gratification, too much unpleasure, too much in

the way of inhibition and self-injury, mental functioning qualifies as pathological. Conflict and compromise formation are present in either case. They are as characteristic of what qualifies as normal mental functioning as they are of what is labeled pathological (Brenner, 1982). Neither is it correct to conclude from the relevant data that one part of the mind is tied to external reality while another part is tied to the drives. Though the pleasure-seeking wishes of early childhood which give rise to conflict and compromise formation are illogical and unrealistic by adult standards, they are quite in accord with what the child who has them understands of the world in which it lives. It is wholly at odds with the observable data to say that there is a part of the mind, the id, that strives for the satisfaction of pleasure-seeking sexual and aggressive wishes with no concern for external reality. Such childhood wishes are perfectly logical and reality bound by childhood standards. Nor is there a part of the mind that is reality bound and that strives to be mature and logical. The most intelligent of persons may believe religious myths that are obviously unrealistic and be guided by them in conscious thought and behavior. Every aspect of mental functioning that is attributed to what Freud proposed to call the ego is, in fact, a compromise formation serving the dual purpose of pleasurable gratification and of defense against pleasure-seeking wishes. There is no part of the mind that functions as the ego is supposed to do. Being logical, mature and realistic, for example, may gratify childhood wishes to be as omniscient as one's parents seem to every child to be, or to win their admiration and praise, or to compete with them or with siblings, while at the same time serving such defensive purposes as reassurance that one is not castrated or otherwise defective or that one is not murderously rebellious. Analytic and non-analytic data do not support the conclusion that what Freud called secondary-process mentation is characteristic of a part of the mind, the ego, that by its very nature operates in a mature, logical, realistic way. Everyone's mind functions at all times to gain as much as it can by way of pleasure through the gratification of childhood sexual and aggressive wishes and, at the same time, to avoid as much unpleasure as possible. When one wishes for something that is intensely pleasurable, either in fact or fantasy, and that is at the same time associated with intense unpleasure, what results is conflict and compromise formation. What the term compromise formation refers to, in what is called modern conflict theory, is just such conflict between pleasure-seeking wishes and defenses against them. When a pleasure-seeking wish is associated with unpleasure, the mind is in conflict. What one observes in thought and behavior in situations of conflict is compromise formation. Conflict and compromise formation characterize all mental life. Everything we observe that is of interest to us as analysts is a compromise formation. The theory that mental functioning is best understood by assuming the mind to be composed of separable systems, structures or agencies is not supported by the available, relevant data. A theory that the mind always functions to achieve gratification of pleasure-seeking wishes of childhood origin and, at the same time, to avoid any unpleasure associated with those wishes is, I believe, the theory that is the best conclusion one can draw at present from the available relevant data. The distinction is not merely an academic one. It has important consequences for analytic practice and, by extension, for any form of psychotherapy that is analytically

oriented and that aims, as does analysis, at achieving insight. Guided by knowledge that this is how the mind functions, one never asks whether a bit of thought or behavior is just a defense or whether it is the gratification of an instinctual wish. It is always both and, sooner or later, should be interpreted as such. Similarly, one is

guided by the knowledge that, however much a bit of thought or behavior may seem to be purely realistic and quite independent of a patient's conflicts, it is, in fact, always determinatively influenced by those conflicts. Like everything else during analysis it deserves to be analyzed, when possible, rather than to be dismissed as something imposed by reality. What is called normal can, in principle, be fruitfully analyzed just as much as what is called pathological. Neither is anything to be judged to be a true endopsychic perception. A feeling that one is alienated from one's environment, or that one's mind is fragmented, or that one is going insane, or that one's physical or mental boundaries are melting away, to give a few examples, is, in every case, a compromise formation to be analyzed in order for it to be understood. It is as much a consequence of conflict as is a fear of elevators or of closed spaces and should be treated in the same way, that is, by being analyzed (Brenner, 1976).