Expanded Science: João Carlos Holland de Barcellos
Expanded Science: João Carlos Holland de Barcellos
Expanded Science: João Carlos Holland de Barcellos
Abstract: initially, in this article, we present the foundation on which current science
stands. Next, we explain the main stream of modern science, the “Popperian
Falsificationism”, and show why the current criticism to the system is flawed. Later, we
will prove that the “falsificationism” is logically inconsistent and we will propose a
new concept of science, unifying it with philosophy.
Science has truth as its only objective. This objective is essential to any tentative of
classification in science.
The Truth in science can be defined as “all information compatible with reality”. The
term “compatible with reality”, in our definition of truth, must be understood as
“according to the facts”, never in contradiction to them. This way, “compatibility with
the facts” provides the empirical feature of science, as it links the scientific truth to the
reality of the facts.
Likewise, we must also take the fact that our universe is logical as a scientific postulate.
That is, the universe – defined as the set of all that exists – does not present logical
contradictions between its element and laws. It must, therefore, follow the classical
logic (aristotelic). Such an assumption is important because no illogical events have
ever been verified in the universe. Secondly, if contradiction was allowed, science
would be “trivialized”, that is, every kind of affirmation would be true, even if it was
absurd, since a logical system with incompatible premises necessarily implies that any
proposition is true. In the appendix ‘A’, at the end of this text, we prove that the
proposition “the universe does not exist” can be logically derived from a logical system
that presents contradictory premises. Some usual definitions of science can be found in
the appendix ‘B’.
The set of rules with which science seeks knowledge (information considered ‘true’ or
highly reliable) is what we usually call “Scientific Method”.
3.1-"The Deductive Method"
The deductive method comes from the assumption that the universe is logical, so the
logical inferences can be applied to scientific theories in order to extract other theories
which, by logical consequence, should also have the same degree of reliability. The
basis of the deductive method is the logical syllogism known as "modus ponens" [8]:
Example: "If all geese are white" and my aunt has a goose, I can conclude that it is
white. Thus, from the general theory H: "all geese are white", we can extract the
particular theory D, "my aunt’s goose is white."
One of the most important rules of the scientific method, "The Hypothetical-Deductive
Method" is based on the logical tautology known as "Modus Tollens" [7]:
(If "H" implies "D" and "D" did not happen, we can conclude that "H" did not happen).
Which can be interpreted as follows: "If 'H' implies 'D', and 'D' is false, we can conclude
that 'H' is false."
As an example: If "all geese are white", it implies that my aunt’s goose should be white,
but, in fact, my aunt has a red goose, so I can conclude that 'all geese are white' is a false
theory.
Thus, in order to investigate a theory "H" under the conditions in which this theory
implies the consequence "D" , if this consequence is not verified, that is, if the
conditions where H is true the consequence "D" is not true, we can conclude, logically,
that the theory "H" is not true (it is refuted). This is an important result since it becomes
unnecessary to investigate directly theory "H"; investigating its consequences ("D") to
conclude about "H" should be enough. Of course, if "D" is observed we cannot
conclude that "H" is correct, but "H" will be “stronger”, that is, with a higher degree of
reliability, having passed the test.
It is important to note that the scientific methodology comes directly from the postulate
that the universe behaves logically. If it were not so, neither the hypothetical-deductive
nor the deductive method could be justified.
The "Inductive Method", or simply induction, is not strictly considered part of the
scientific methodology, as it goes from particular events, or samples, to derive general
theories. Thus, we can never claim that what came from an induction is true simply
because it came from an induction. For example: "All geese I have seen in my life are
white, then, can I conclude that all geese are white?" We cannot. "The sun comes out
every day since mankind exists. Can I conclude that this will happen forever? "We also
cannot.
Nevertheless, we cannot put the "inductive method" in the ostracism because, although
not very reliable, it provides us with important clues to connect our mind to reality. No
scientific theory would have been discovered without induction. What are the scientific
observation and the empiricism if not an inductive method to get to hypotheses of a
general nature?
It is important to note that science does not make any restriction on the origin of
scientific hypotheses or theories. [We will consider, in this text, hypotheses and theories
as synonyms. In general, a theory begins as a hypothesis, and after several tests, if it
manages to pass unscathed, it receives the ‘status’ of scientific theory. However, a
'brand new' hypothesis can be true while a very old theory can be false (do you
remember the theory about the Earth being the center of the universe?). This way, with
all the logical and scientific rigour, a theory is not necessarily more valid than a
hypothesis. New theories can be achieved through induction (which is the most used
method), but they can also be achieved through pure imagination, or even dreams [9].
There are no restrictions to create hypothesis. The theories are not refuted by looking at
their origins, but at their consequences.
5-Pseudo-Sciences
The postulates and scientific methods described herein are adopted, if not explicitly, at
least implicitly, by nearly all scientists and philosophers in science. However, they are
yet not sufficient to accurately delimit what is scientific and what is not, or to separate
science from pseudo-science.
We will take, as an illustrative example, the "Green Imp Theory" (GIT): "There is
always a 'green devil' hovering over each person’s shoulder, but whenever someone
tries to look at it, or makes any attempt to detect it or record it somehow, it will get
invisible and undetectable. " This example proposes a theory that does not go against
any scientific postulate and is not inherently inconsistent, what could be enough reason
to reject it, but nevertheless, we are unable to test this theory. So what do we do?
The first philosopher who tried to clearly demarcate what is science and what is not was
Karl Popper (7/28/1902-9/17/1994) [1]. Popper delimited science by adding the
following criteria to it [10]:
Thus, with this new set of postulates, Popper introduced the 'falsifiability' (or
‘refutability’) as the main criterion of distinction between scientific and unscientific
theories. The ‘refutability’ of a theory means that, in principle, the theory is liable to be
distorted and thus be or not refuted (Modus-Tollens would be a way to refute a theory).
For example, when analyzing the case of our ‘Green Imp Theory (GIT) above, we now
realize it is not a scientific theory, since it is a theory that cannot be distorted neither
directly or indirectly; therefore, it is not refutable and cannot be a scientific theory.
In spite of the “popperian” ingenuity about delimiting science, the criticism was
abundant.
The main criticism to the "Popperian falsificationism" is that the tested theory is always
inside an environment which conditions cannot always be fully controlled or evaluated.
Thus, there can be a "false negative" in relation to its validation, and the theory can be
prematurely discarded. For example, suppose we want to test the theory "All geese are
white" and for that, we try to refute it by observing with binoculars, cameras and other
observation paraphernalia, several geese spread over the world. Finally, an observer is
able to shoot from far away, a brown goose flying along with his flock of white geese.
Now that he has this evidence, it is possible for him to refute the theory. But what if the
goose was only dirty with earth? Would we be prematurely dismissing a true theory?
Taking the basic postulate that science seeks truth and not necessarily the usefulness in
the theories, even because the "usefulness" of a theory is subjective, we should take the
postulate (i) not as a condition for a theory to be scientific, but as an impossibility of
proving it true.
At the very same time a theory is proved false, the theory that denies it is being proved
true. Here, the sense of the word "prove" has the same connotation as to prove a theory
false or true. As an illustration, consider, for example, theory A: "All geese are white."
If we can prove this theory false by presenting, for example, a red goose, we will be at
the same time proving that theory B "Not all geese are white" is true!
However, if we philosophically accept the fact (i) to be true, that is, if we admit that we
cannot be sure about the ultimate truth of reality, then, strictly speaking, we can never
say that a theory can be proved false, because if a theory "T" can be proved false, the
opposite theory "Non-T" (denial of "T") can be proved true, that is, we would have the
theory "Non-T" as an absolute truth . Anyhow, we conclude that the "Popperian
falsificationism" is intrinsically contradictory, and that makes it easier for a new theory
about science to be elaborated.
Science, just like philosophy, seeks the truth. It is then natural that they are unified, and
this project aims to redefine science and unify it with philosophy in a knowledge area I
called "Expanded Science" or "Ocanian Science”.
As truth is the only goal of the “Expanded Science"(ES), it should not be restricted to
the empirical sciences, although these are also part of the EC. However, the truth in the
ES means all information compatible with reality, where reality is the set of events that
happens or have happened. Propositions built on systems disconnected from reality do
not matter to the ES.
These two criteria compose the foundation of this new science. The criterion (i) intends
to distinguish what is part of the expanded science and what is not. Criterion (ii) intends
to classify the propositions in relation to their degree of veracity, that is, we must
believe the best “ranked” theories are closer to reality than those that do not fulfill the
Occam’s Razor criteria.
We can observe that there is no longer the criterion of distortion, precisely because,
strictly speaking, we cannot prove anything in terms of absolute truth (that is implicit in
the criterion (ii)), and of course, we cannot even prove that something is false.
Nevertheless, we can give a new meaning to the words "Proof" or "Rebuttal" if we
understand them as related to the Occam’s Razor.
Thus, we cannot undoubtedly prove that any statement about reality, as obvious as it
may seem, is in fact, reality. However, by the criteria of the "Ocanian Science", we can
use the Occam’s Razor and give preference to the more plausible theories in terms of
the "razor" and, that way, consider the proposition "the shoe box contains a brick" as the
most appropriate of them, the closest to reality.
It is interesting to note that the "theory of the green imp" (TGI) cited at the beginning of
this essay, which previously could not be approached by the Popperian science, since it
could not be tested or falsified, now can be easily approached by the "expanded
science”: the theory of the green imp must be considered less true in relation to the
theory that there is no such imp, since the latter is more appropriate in terms of the
Occam’s Razor.
The "Occam’s Razor" establishes that we should not put unnecessary hypotheses in a
theory. The term "unnecessary" is the key of the Occam’s Razor: If we can explain a
fact with fewer hypotheses, then it must be done. Extra hypothesis must be discarded. If
several theories explain the same phenomena, we should give preference to the theory
with the smaller subset of hypotheses. It is possible to show that the accretion of
unnecessary hypothesis to a theory makes it become less likely to be true [11]. Thus, we
can understand the Occam’s Razor as a criterion of classification of the most likely
theories. The theories that suit the Occam’s Razor the most are more likely to be true.
Many refer to the Occam’s Razor as the “simplicity” criterion, but this is dangerous.
The "simplicity" in Occam’s razor does not refer to what is simplest to understand, but
to what is most likely to happen. For example: for some, saying that life on Earth was
promoted by aliens may be much easier to understand than an explanation that uses
random and unlikely shocks of molecules, but not more likely to happen, since the alien
hypothesis would imply that it would be also necessary to explain the origin of these
aliens’ life added to explanations on how they would have acquired technology enough
to get to our planet..That is, the apparent "simplicity" of the hypotheses of life being
planted on Earth by aliens, contains, in fact, the complexity of the origin of
extraterrestrial life, added to the complexity of an evolution faster than ours.
The Popperian criterion (i) "No scientific theory can be proved true" was kept, and is
embedded in the criterion (ii) of “The Expanded Science "(ES), as this only refers to the
degree of proximity to reality. The "Falsifiability" is clearly disposed in item (i) of the
ES, since all propositions related to reality are addressed, not only those that can be
falsifiable. However, the popperian "rebuttable evidence” still has a high level of
relevance in the ES, precisely because it obliges the theories to put unlikely propositions
- thus contradicting the Occam’s Razor - in order to be coherent with the observed facts.
For example: the theory "the shoe box is empty" needs some unlikely hypothesis to
remain valid (as a brain 'short circuit'), if related to the evidence that we observed a
brick inside the box. Thus, "rebuttable evidence" is still valid to throw the refuted theory
to the last positions in the list of theories that are closer to reality.
7.5-Religions
If we define the universe as the set of all that exists, religions are also objects of the ES,
since they refer to aspects of reality. Thus, they are also subject to classification by the
Expanded Science, according to the Occam’s Razor.
The solipsistic idea is that everything we observe, feel and believe is nothing more than
an illusion of some consciousness (I) and, therefore, this reality we observe is false, it
does not exist. As solipsism makes references to reality, it is subject to the Expanded
Science analysis:
The hypothesis that the universe developed from a few physical laws and a finite
amount of elementary particles that led it to produce intelligent life with consciousness
requires much less hypothesis (and simpler ones) than those required for the existence
of such a being that would be able to imagine and relate every single detail of our
imaginary world. Moreover, we would also have to solve the problem of the origin of a
being with such complexity [13]. Therefore, by the Occam’s Razor, solipsism must be
pretermitted in relation to a universe that is not imagined or virtual. That is, now and not
before, we can scientifically "discard" the solipsistic hypothesis.
The hypothesis that the universe, including the laws of physics, was generated from the
Jocaxian Nothingness (JN) [12] (a nothingness without physical elements or laws) is
now considered a scientific hypothesis, since it refers to our reality: the origin of our
universe. As the JN is the simplest hypothesis about the origin of the universe that
respects the Kalam’s Argument [13] ("An infinite time in the past could never lead to
our present, since it would take an infinite time" = never), it should be one of the
theories that are closest to reality according to the Occam’s Razor.
7.8-The Philosophy
As Philosophy seeks the truth dealing with ideas and concepts, ultimately, related to
reality, it is also part of the Expanded Science.
Thus, we propose the unification of Science and Philosophy, in this new branch of
knowledge: The Expanded Science.
Appendix A
Evidence that contradictory premises imply that any conclusion is true, even that "the
universe does not exist":
That is an absurd.
This example shows that from contradictory premises we can prove any absurdity.
(* Tautology is an absolute logical truth; that is, a truth that does not depend on the
value of variables.)
Appendix B
Some definitions of science found on the Internet
Science:
The scientific method is a set of basic rules for a scientist to develop an experiment in
order to produce knowledge, as well as correcting and integrating pre-existing
knowledge. It is based on gathering observable, empirical and measurable evidence,
based on the use of reason [6].
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