847 F.

2d 956
56 USLW 2735, 26 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 515

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.
Jason Brion ANGIULO, Defendant, Appellant.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
John Carmen CINCOTTI, Defendant, Appellant.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
William Joseph KAZONIS, Defendant, Appellant.
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
John Carmen CINCOTTI, William Joseph Kazonis, Jason
Brion
Angiulo, Defendants, Appellants.
Nos. 86-1965, 86-2000, 86-2017 and 87-1745.

United States Court of Appeals,

First Circuit.
Heard Dec. 10, 1987.
Decided May 24, 1988.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied in Nos. 86-1965 and
86-2017 July 6, 1988.

Robert L. Sheketoff, Boston, Mass., with whom Kimberly Homan and

Zalkind, Sheketoff, Homan, Rodriguez & Lunt, Boston, Mass., were on
brief, for defendant, appellant Jason Brion Angiulo.
Carolyn M. Conway with whom Francis J. DiMento and DiMento &
Sullivan, Boston, Mass., were on brief, for defendant, appellant William
Joseph Kazonis.
Willie J. Davis with whom Davis, Robinson & Smith, Boston, Mass., was
on brief, for defendant, appellant John Carmen Cincotti.

Frank J. Marine, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., with whom

Frank L. McNamara, Jr., U.S. Atty., Robert S. Mueller, III, Acting U.S.
Atty., Jeremiah T. O'Sullivan, Jeffrey Auerhahn and John Voorhees, Sp.
Attys., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., were on briefs for
appellee.
Before COFFIN, BREYER and TORRUELLA, Circuit Judges.
COFFIN, Circuit Judge.

These are consolidated appeals from convictions on jury verdicts rendered after
58 days of trial. The defendants, Jason Angiulo, William Kazonis, and John
Cincotti, were connected with the Patriarca Family of La Cosa Nostra, which
has developed a reputation in United States law enforcement circles for highly
organized criminal activities. Defendant Angiulo was convicted of participating
in illegal gambling (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955); Kazonis was convicted of conspiring
to obstruct and obstructing justice (18 U.S.C. Secs. 371, 1503); and Cincotti
was convicted of conspiring to participate and participating in an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering or collection of an unlawful debt (18 U.S.C.
Sec. 1962(d) and (c), respectively) and participating in an illegal gambling
business (18 U.S.C. Sec. 1955). We briefly describe the essential facts
pertaining to these convictions and then discuss the issues raised by defendants
on appeal.

I.
2

The bulk of evidence admitted against the defendants was the product of
lengthy electronic surveillance, both audio and video, conducted in 1981 at 98
Prince Street in Boston, the headquarters for operations of Gennaro Angiulo,
father of defendant Jason Angiulo and a known "underboss" of the Patriarca
Family,1 and at 51 North Margin Street, Boston, the site of certain high-stakes
poker games, with which defendant Cincotti had certain affiliations. Numerous
search warrants executed by FBI agents in 1981 produced physical evidence
that was introduced against Cincotti.

From this and other evidence introduced at trial, the jury would have been
warranted in finding the following facts pertaining to each defendant:

John Cincotti
4

In 1980 and 1981, Cincotti and other individuals operated high-stakes poker

games at 51 North Margin Street, Boston. Cincotti managed these games and
extended credit to players. Chips were provided at $500 each to the players.
Electronic surveillance conducted at one of these games revealed that betting
reached a sum of over $10,000. Cincotti kept a list of the gambling debts owed
by each player for each game. After a night of gambling, Cincotti would "settle
accounts" with the players and negotiate further extensions of credit and terms
of payment.
5

The gambling business at 51 North Margin Street was "owned" by a partnership

that included Gennaro Angiulo and Ilario Zannino, among others.2 A recorded
conversation between these two men, introduced at trial, revealed that Cincotti
was responsible for keeping track of the profits earned by the gambling
operation. On May 18, 1981, pursuant to authorized search warrants, FBI
agents entered 51 North Margin Street while poker games were in progress and
seized gambling paraphernalia. Searching Cincotti, they found on his person
$9500 in cash and slips of paper containing the names of individuals owing
debts from poker games that totalled over $56,000. The agents also found on a
table next to Cincotti a spiral notebook containing names of players to whom
credit had been extended that evening.

Tape recordings of conversations at 51 North Margin Street, not directly related

to the gambling operation, revealed Cincotti's participation in a plot to murder
one Harvey Cohen, the owner of an air freight business that operated in
competition with a similar business run by the Patriarca Family. The recordings
also revealed Cincotti's knowledge of murders previously committed by
members or associates of the Patriarca Family in furtherance of the interests of
the Family's operations.

Jason Angiulo
7

Between 1979 and 1981, Jason Angiulo managed and supervised a gambling
operation known as "Las Vegas Nights." Las Vegas Nights was routinely held
at various locations in the Greater Boston area ostensibly to raise money for
non-profit, charitable organizations. Testimony from members of the supposed
sponsoring charities as well as from undercover FBI agents who attended Las
Vegas Nights events revealed the following: (1) permits for certain events were
obtained by falsifying signatures of members of charitable organizations in
whose names the events were run; (2) gambling at the events was not operated
by members of the charitable organizations that supposedly sponsored them;
(3) events were held in the names of organizations that never authorized the use
of their names; and (4) organizations, in whose names the events were held,
received, in some instances, only token portions of the proceeds and, in others,

nothing. In conversations intercepted at 98 Prince Street between January and

March 1981 and introduced at trial, Jason Angiulo discussed the division of
profits from Las Vegas Nights with his father, Gennaro Angiulo, and others.
William Kazonis
8

Evidence from recordings made at 98 Prince Street on March 24 and 25, 1981
revealed that once a grand jury was convened to investigate matters described
above as well as the activities of other alleged co-conspirators in the Patriarca
Family, defendant Kazonis conspired with Gennaro Angiulo and others to
obstruct the grand jury investigation.

One Walter LaFreniere had been involved in loansharking activities of the

Patriarca Family. In March 1981, Gennaro Angiulo learned that LaFreniere had
been served with a grand jury subpoena to testify about the nature of those
activities. Although Gennaro Angiulo was aware that LaFreniere refused to
testify on Fifth Amendment grounds, he expressed concerns to LaFreniere's
attorney, William Cintolo,3 that if LaFreniere were granted immunity he would
be compelled to expose the lending activities of defendant Jason Angiulo. A
recorded conversation between Gennaro Angiulo, Richard Gambale, and Peter
Limone4 showed that Gennaro Angiulo asked the latter two to seek assurances
from LaFreniere that he would not cooperate with the grand jury investigation.
Gennaro Angiulo also instructed Cintolo to direct LaFreniere to refuse to testify
and to serve a prison sentence instead. Other recorded conversations revealed
that it was Gennaro Angiulo's intention to arrange the murder of LaFreniere if
he did not cooperate. LaFreniere subsequently was informed by the FBI that
there was a murder contract on his life.

10

On March 24, 1981, defendants Kazonis and Jason Angiulo met with Gennaro
Angiulo. Kazonis explained that he had learned that LaFreniere planned to
refuse to testify and to go to jail instead. After Gennaro Angiulo instructed
defendant Jason Angiulo to testify falsely before the grand jury and he agreed
to do so, the three men discussed the consequences that might befall defendant
Jason Angiulo if he were caught lying. They also discussed the danger that
LaFreniere's testimony posed for them. Gennaro Angiulo instructed Kazonis to
meet with LaFreniere and explain the plan that he go to jail rather than testify.
He made clear that it was Kazonis's responsibility to make sure that LaFreniere
said nothing to the grand jury.

11

The following day, Kazonis reported back to Gennaro Angiulo and assured him
that LaFreniere was told to keep quiet and go to jail for contempt. Later that
same day, Kazonis and Cintolo each described to Gennaro Angiulo their

meetings with LaFreniere and explained that they had each told LaFreniere that
the maximum sentence he would serve for contempt would be 18 months.
12

On April 1, 1981, the government granted LaFreniere immunity for the

testimony he was to give to the grand jury the following day. On April 2,
Gennaro Angiulo and Cintolo instructed Kazonis to get a message to LaFreniere
that if he were arrested for contempt, he should not talk to authorities. After
seeking a continuance due to Cintolo's disqualification as his attorney,
LaFreniere eventually appeared before the grand jury on April 23, 1981 and
refused to testify. On June 2, he was held in contempt and subsequently served
18 months in prison for that offense.

***
13
***
14
15

The defendants raise numerous issues on appeal. Cincotti raises issues that
pertain only to his conviction. Angiulo and Kazonis raise issues in common. We
begin by addressing Cincotti's arguments. We then turn to the common issues
raised by Angiulo and Kazonis and related issues asserted individually by those
defendants.

II.
16

We set the stage for our analysis of Cincotti's appeal by describing the
allegations in the indictment pertaining to the RICO charges as well as the
context in which Cincotti alleged errors at trial.

17

Cincotti was charged, in Count I, with conspiring to violate section 1962(c) of

the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
Secs. 1961-1968, under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(d). In Count II, he was charged
with a substantive RICO violation under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(c).5

18

In the RICO conspiracy count, the government alleged, in paragraph 1, that

Cincotti, Angiulo, and Kazonis joined together, as members and associates of
the Patriarca Family of La Cosa Nostra, and thereby constituted an "enterprise"
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(4).6 Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Count I
then described in detail the nature and structure of the alleged enterprise and its
functional relationship with La Cosa Nostra. Paragraph 2 alleged that Cincotti
and his co-defendants "agreed together ... to conduct and participate, directly
and indirectly, in the affairs of the Enterprise ... through a pattern of
racketeering activity as set forth in paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Count and the

collection of unlawful debt, as set forth in paragraph 7 of this Count."7

Paragraph 5 alleged that Cincotti engaged in two racketeering acts (or predicate
crimes): (a) during April, 1981, he conspired with others to murder Harvey
Cohen in violation of Massachusetts laws8 and (b) from on or about October
20, 1980 until on or about May 18, 1981, he operated an illegal gambling
business involving poker games in violation of Massachusetts laws. Paragraph 6
alleged that "[i]t was part of the conspiracy that [Cincotti] conducted and
participated in, and agreed to conduct and participate in, the affairs of the
Enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity" involving the same acts
described in paragraph 5. Finally, in paragraph 7, the government alleged that,
as part of the conspiracy, Cincotti participated directly and indirectly in the
affairs of the Enterprise "through the collection of unlawful debts ... incurred
and contracted in gambling activity" in violation of Massachusetts laws.
19

Count II incorporated, by reference, all of the allegations of paragraphs 1, 3, 4,

5, 6 and 7 in Count I. It simply reasserted those allegations as constituting the
substantive violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(c).

20

More than half-way through trial, on instructions from the district court, the
government amended its original indictment to eliminate references to codefendants who had pleaded guilty. The allegations in Counts I and II described
above were identical in both the original and the redacted indictments. Cincotti
filed a motion to dismiss, however, on the ground that the government made
additional substantive changes, resulting in a violation of his Fifth Amendment
right to be indicted by a grand jury. The district court denied that motion.

21

After the government rested, Cincotti moved for judgment of acquittal on the
ground that he could not be convicted for the alleged RICO violations because
at the time of the alleged violations, this court had held, in United States v.
Turkette, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir.1980), rev'd, 452 U.S. 576, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69
L.Ed.2d 246 (1981), that RICO prohibited only racketeering activities that
furthered the interests of legal enterprises, not illegal ones like the Patriarca
Family. Even though that decision had been subsequently reversed by the
Supreme Court, Cincotti contended that a conviction would violate his
constitutional rights to due process because he would suffer from an ex post
facto application of RICO. The district court denied that motion also. The jury
subsequently found Cincotti guilty of both the RICO conspiracy and the
substantive RICO violation.

22

Cincotti now asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
the amended indictment and his motion for judgment of acquital. He also
argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his substantive RICO

conviction. We address each argument in turn.

A. The Redacted Indictment
23

Cincotti contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
the indictment. He argues that by eliminating an allegation of a particular "overt
act" in the redacted indictment, the government made a substantive change in
the RICO conspiracy count and that this deprived him of his constitutional right
to be indicted by the Grand Jury.

24

Our assessment of Cincotti's position begins with a review of the requirements

for a valid RICO conspiracy charge that we established in United States v.
Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1136 (1st Cir.1981). In Winter, we held that to make
out the elements of a RICO conspiracy charge the government must allege (1)
the existence of an "enterprise," (2) that the defendant knowingly joined the
enterprise and (3) that the defendant agreed to commit, or in fact committed,
two or more specified predicate crimes as part of his participation in the affairs
of the enterprise. Id.; see also United States v. Turkette, 656 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.),
on remand from 452 U.S. 576, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981) (charges
that defendant joined enterprise, knew of its criminal activities, and agreed to
commit two illegal predicate offenses in furtherance of the enterprise legally
sufficient to make out racketeering conspiracy count). We now add that an
agreement to collect unlawful debts, or actual collection of unlawful debts, can
alternatively constitute the third required element of a RICO conspiracy.

25

We did not consider, in Winter, the function that "overt acts" might play in a
RICO conspiracy indictment. We now join with those circuits squarely holding
that the commission of "overt acts" is not required for a RICO conspiracy
conviction. E.g., United States v. Coia, 719 F.2d 1120, 1123-24 (11th
Cir.1983); United States v. Barton, 647 F.2d 224, 237 (2d Cir.1981). Since
section 1962(d) does not, itself, require overt acts, there is no reason for us to
imply such a requirement. Id. And we think the standards set forth in Winter are
sufficient to the point of rendering superfluous any "overt act" requirement
because, in any RICO conspiracy indictment the government must allege
agreement to commit or commission of specified predicate crimes or,
alternatively the collection of unlawful debts. That specificity is sufficient to
alert defendants to the nature of the conspiracy for which they are being
charged.

26

In this case, the government retained, in its amended indictment, the identical
allegations constituting the elements of a RICO conspiracy charge against
Cincotti that were present in its original indictment: (1) the existence of an

enterprise, (2) Cincotti's knowing participation in the enterprise, and (3) his
agreement to commit or actual commission of two specified predicate crimes
("racketeering acts"). No further allegations were needed, but by alleging that
Cincotti participated in the enterprise's affairs through the collection of
unlawful debts associated with gambling operations, the government
sufficiently alleged an alternative ground for the third required element of the
RICO conspiracy count.
27

"An indictment may not be amended except by resubmission to the grand jury,
unless the change is merely a matter of form," but withdrawal of a portion of
the indictment that the evidence does not support is not an impermissible
amendment, "provided nothing is thereby added to the indictment, and that the
remaining allegations charge an offense." United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d at
1139-40. The government's deletion of an "overt act" in its redacted indictment
did not change any of the allegations of the original indictment that adequately
had charged the substantive elements of a RICO conspiracy. Rather, by taking
out the "overt act," the government merely eliminated a superfluous allegation
that the evidence did not support.9 The redacted indictment added no new
charges, and the remaining allegations charged the same offenses as the
original. Under these circumstances, the changes in the indictment did not
violate Cincotti's constitutional rights to be charged by indictment of the grand
jury. See id. at 1140.

B. Due Process
28

Cincotti next argues that, under Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 84
S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), he was deprived of his constitutional right
to due process because he was convicted for violating RICO under an
unforseeable judicial construction of the statute, applied retroactively. He
contends that during his participation in the activities that gave rise to his
convictions, he had the right to rely upon our decision in United States v.
Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, where we held that RICO does not apply to wholly
illegal enterprises. He reasons that since the Patriarca Family of La Cosa Nostra
was a wholly illegal enterprise, his participation in its activities could not
constitute grounds for a RICO conviction under Turkette. While recognizing
that our construction of an "enterprise" under RICO was subsequently reversed
by the Supreme Court, 452 U.S. 576, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981),
he asserts that any application of the Supreme Court's decision would be an ex
post facto application of criminal law in violation of his rights to due process of
law.10

29

The government has supplied us with numerous counter arguments that check

the progress of Cincotti's due process theory at every turn. We need not
reiterate all of them to adequately dispose of this question.
30

This case is a far cry from the situation in Bouie. In that case, certain blacks
entered a South Carolina restaurant and refused to leave when they were not
served. There were no signs posted to indicate that the restaurant served whites
only. The blacks were arrested and convicted for criminal trespass under a
South Carolina statute that prohibited "entry upon the lands of another ... after
notice from the owner or tenant prohibiting such entry." Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. at 349-50 & n. 1, 84 S.Ct. at 1700-01 & n. 1. The Supreme
Court of South Carolina upheld their convictions by construing the otherwise
"admirably narrow and precise" language, 378 U.S. at 351, 84 S.Ct. at 1701, to
prohibit the act of remaining on the premises of another after receiving notice
to leave.

31

Recognizing that the Due Process Clause supports the "basic principle that a
criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime," id.
at 350, 84 S.Ct. at 1701, the United States Supreme Court reasoned "[t]here can
be no doubt that a deprivation of the right of fair warning can result ... from an
unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory
language." Id. at 352, 84 S.Ct. at 1702. Moreover, the Court said, "an
unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively,
operates precisely like an ex post facto law, such as Art. I, Sec. 10, of the
Constitution forbids." Id. at 353, 84 S.Ct. at 1702.

32

Upon surveying South Carolina caselaw and that of other states with statutes
carrying similar language, the Supreme Court concluded that the construction
that the South Carolina Supreme Court had given to its criminal trespass statute
was virtually " 'unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had
been expressed prior to the conduct in issue.' " Id. 378 U.S. at 354, 84 S.Ct. at
1703 (quoting Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (2d ed. 1960) at 5859), 356-62, 84 S.Ct. at 1704-07. Thus, the state court's unforeseeable
construction of the statute, applied retroactively, deprived the defendants of due
process of law since, at the time they committed the charged offenses, they had
no fair warning that their conduct was criminal. Id. at 361-62, 84 S.Ct. at 170607.

33

We cannot reasonably extend the principles of Bouie to the case at bar. In

reversing our decision in Turkette, the Supreme Court held that the term
"enterprise," as defined under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(4), see supra note 6, plainly
and unambiguously included illegitimate or illegal enterprises, and that nothing
in the legislative history of the statute provided otherwise. 452 U.S. at 580-93,

101 S.Ct. at 2527-34. The use of that term in the RICO statute was so
unambiguous, in fact, that the Court refused to apply the "rule of lenity" to bar
the application of its holding to the defendant in that case. Id. at 587-88 n. 10,
101 S.Ct. at 2531 n. 10. Implicit in the Court's rejection of the rule of lenity is
the conclusion that the term was not sufficiently ambiguous to allow the
defendant to be free of the retroactive application of the Court's decision. See
id.; United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 484, 104 S.Ct. 1942, 1948, 80
L.Ed.2d 492 (1984). Thus, unlike the situation in Bouie, where a narrowly and
precisely drawn statute could not possibly have been foreseen to render
criminal the conduct in question, the meaning of the term "enterprise" in the
RICO statute has been held by the highest authority to be so lacking in
ambiguity before our Turkette decision that individuals could not reasonably
rely on a possible limiting construction of that term to render their conduct
noncriminal.
34

That this post hoc pronouncement differed from our own assessment can give
little comfort to appellant. The fact that every other circuit court considering
the issue had taken a stance opposite to our position in Turkette, see 452 U.S. at
578 & n. 1, 101 S.Ct. at 2526 & n. 1, coupled with the fact that the Supreme
Court readily granted certiorari, should have placed Cincotti on notice that
throughout the period of his conduct in question the authority of our Turkette
decision was precarious at best. See United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. at 484,
104 S.Ct. at 2526 (rule of lenity not applied to defendant whose conviction was
vacated by a circuit court when Supreme Court reversed opinion of that court
and construed statute in question in line with every other circuit); cf. Bouie v.
City of Columbia, 378 U.S. at 356-61, 84 S.Ct. at 1704-06 (neither plain
statutory language nor South Carolina caselaw, or that of other states with
similar statutes, in any way supported the construction adopted by the South
Carolina Supreme Court). Thus, even if Cincotti established his reliance upon
our decision in Turkette,11 it would have been unavailing because the Supreme
Court's reversal of that decision was reasonably foreseeable. See United States
v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. at 484, 104 S.Ct. at 1948.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

35

Cincotti's final argument is that his conviction for the substantive RICO
violation should be reversed, or, in the alternative, a new trial granted due to
insufficient evidence. In assessing this claim we view all of the evidence,
including that pertaining to the credibility of witnesses, in the light most
favorable to the government. United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 983.

36

The government could have proved the RICO violation in one of two ways: by

showing that Cincotti engaged in two predicate offenses or by showing that

Cincotti collected an unlawful debt. The government was required to show, in
addition, that these acts were performed in furtherance of the Patriarca Family.
See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(c), quoted supra note 5. As we set forth above, there
were two predicate offenses charged in the indictment: Cincotti's participation
in a conspiracy to murder Harvey Cohen and his operation of an illegal
gambling business, both in violation of Massachusetts law. In addition, he was
charged with the collection of unlawful debts. While not contesting the
sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to his operation of an illegal gambling
business, Cincotti claims that the government failed to prove his participation in
plans to murder Harvey Cohen and his collection of an unlawful debt. We think
the evidence was sufficient on both of these issues. We address each in turn.
37

Cincotti asserts that the tape recordings of conversations intercepted at 51

North Margin Street, which were played to the jury, contained simultaneous
conversations that the jury could not distinguish in order properly to ascertain
that Cincotti participated in a conspiracy to murder Cohen. Relying on the
testimony of his expert witness, a voice therapist, he also argues that the
government failed to present evidence of voice identification. We disagree.

38

A government witness, FBI Agent Rafferty, testified that he listened to the tape
recordings intercepted at 51 North Margin Street, and based upon his own
personal conversations with the defendant, identified the voice as that of
Cincotti. The government also introduced into evidence videotapes of Cincotti
that showed his presence at 51 North Margin Street during the time that the
subject conversations were intercepted. Rafferty's testimony together with the
circumstantial evidence of Cincotti's presence at the time of the conversations
constituted sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that it was Cincotti who
was present and participated in the conversations with Zannino. See, e.g.,
United States v. Vitale, 549 F.2d 71, 73 (8th Cir.1977); United States v. Vento,
533 F.2d 838, 864-65 (3d Cir.1976). Although Cincotti presented testimony
contrary to that of Agent Rafferty, it was up to the jury to weigh the credibility
of the witnesses and resolve any conflicts in the evidence. See, e.g., United
States v. Cuesta, 597 F.2d 903, 915 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Vento, 533
F.2d at 865.12

39

The jury, having listened to the tapes at trial, had the opportunity to assess
evidence that was sufficient to establish Cincotti's involvement in the murder
scheme. As the government points out, the tape of the April 3, 1981
conversations reveals that co-defendant Zannino told Cincotti: "This Harvey
Cohen. I'm going to kill him, Johnny," and the tape of the April 23, 1981
conversations contained the statement from Zannino to Cincotti and others:

"Johnny. And Johnny here's another thing ... you two and you. I want to kill
Harvey Cohen very shortly. You ain't done a ... thing but tellin' me you're goin
by his ... house and see his car." These statements, taken together and viewed in
the light most favorable to the government, including any reasonable inferences
to be drawn therefrom, were sufficient for the jury to conclude that Cincotti
committed a RICO predicate offense by involving himself in a conspiracy to
murder Harvey Cohen.
40

Cincotti does not contest the sufficiency of evidence for his illegal gambling
conviction. That offense, coupled with the sufficient evidence that he
participated in plans to murder Harvey Cohen constitute the commission of two
predicate acts for his conviction on the substantive RICO count.13 We
nevertheless address Cincotti's challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for the
government's alternative basis for proving the RICO violation, that he allegedly
collected of unlawful debts in connection with gambling operations.

41

Cincotti argues that all that was exposed by the government's evidence was his
general involvement in gambling operations at 51 North Margin Street. He
contends that there was no specific evidence of transactions that would
constitute the collection of any "unlawful debt" as that term is used in the RICO
statute. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(6), quoted supra note 7. He argues:

42 would appear that the government is relying on collection of debts incurred in

[I]t
gambling activity. It is clear from the tapes that what is going on is the settling up at
the end of a poker game. This was hardly the intent of Congress when RICO was
passed.
43

Brief of John Cincotti at 48.

44

We disagree. The definition of "unlawful debt" clearly contemplates the type of

gambling debts involved in the illegal poker games operated by Cincotti at 51
North Margin Street. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(6); Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch.
271, Sec. 5 (West 1970). From evidence gleaned from both intercepted
conversations and the execution of search warrants, the jury could have
concluded beyond reasonable doubt that Cincotti engaged in the extension of
credit and the collection of debts for the illegal gambling operation, and that
these activities were carried out to further the interests of the Patriarca Family.
This would support his conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1962(c).

45

In sum, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find Cincotti guilty of the
substantive RICO violation by concluding that he engaged in either the

predicate offenses (participation in a conspiracy to murder Harvey Cohen and

the operation of an illegal gambling business) or the collection of unlawful
debts, all of which included participation in the affairs of the Patriarca Family.
III.
46

The jury acquitted defendants Angiulo and Kazonis of the substantive RICO
charges and the RICO conspiracy charges. It found Angiulo guilty, however, of
operating an illegal gambling business, and returned verdicts against Kazonis
for conspiring to obstruct and obstructing justice. Angiulo and Kazonis raise
several issues on appeal. First, they contend that the district court erred in
making "Petrozziello findings" regarding the scope of their involvement in the
RICO conspiracy as a predicate for the admission into evidence of coconspirators' statements concerning murders. Second, they contend that they
were deprived of a fair trial on the non-RICO counts because of the prejudicial
"spillover" effect of that evidence. Third, they argue that the district court
abused its discretion in admitting into evidence testimony from a government
expert witness concerning their association with the Patriarca Family. Fourth,
they challenge, on several grounds, procedures followed in the government's
recording and processing of conversations obtained through electronic
surveillance at 98 Prince Street. Finally, they jointly assert that the government
violated their Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection by using peremptory
challenges systematically to remove blacks and Italian-Americans from the
jury. We address each of these issues, as well as underlying sub-issues.

A. Petrozziello Findings
47

Angiulo and Kazonis challenge the admission into evidence of certain tape
recordings of discussions intercepted at 98 Prince Street, including the
discussions of Gennaro Angiulo and others concerning plans to murder Harvey
Cohen, threats on the life of Walter LaFreniere in relation to his grand jury
testimony, and murders carried out in the past to further the interests of the
Patriarca Family. These conversations were admitted against the defendants
under the co-conspirator provision of the hearsay rule, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)
(E).14 The defendants contend that the district court erred in finding, pursuant to
United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1977), that the
government satisfied evidentiary prerequisites to the admission of this evidence
under that rule.

48

Following typical procedures, at the close of the evidence the trial judge held a
hearing, outside the presence of the jury, to make the Petrozziello
determination. The court found that the government had shown that it was more

likely than not that challenged statements concerning past and future murder
plans were made in furtherance of the RICO conspiracy and that both Angiulo
and Kazonis--having committed the predicate acts charged in the indictment in
furtherance of the Patriarca Family--were members of that conspiracy.15 While
not challenging the district court's general finding that they were members of
the alleged RICO conspiracy, the defendants assert that there was no evidence
that they knew that the scope of that conspiracy included murders or murder
conspiracies. They claim, as a result, that conversations of alleged RICO coconspirators concerning past or present murders in furtherance of the interests
of the Patriarca Family should not have been admitted against them.16
49

This argument lacks merit. As we recently pointed out in United States v.

Cintolo, "[i]t is settled law ... that one who joins an ongoing conspiracy is
deemed to have adopted the prior acts and declarations of coconspirators, made
after the formation and in furtherance of the conspiracy." 818 F.2d at 997; see
also United States v. Baines, 812 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir.1987). As long as it is
shown that a party, having joined a conspiracy, is aware of the conspiracy's
features and general aims, statements pertaining to the details of plans to further
the conspiracy can be admitted against the party even if the party does not have
specific knowledge of the acts spoken of. See id.; United States v. Arruda, 715
F.2d 671, 685 (1st Cir.1983). The defendants do not challenge the court's
finding that they were members of the alleged RICO conspiracy and it was not
clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude that they were aware,
generally, that the Patriarca Family engaged in violent crimes, even murders, to
further its own interests. In these circumstances it was proper for the court to
allow into evidence statements of alleged RICO co-conspirators concerning
murder plans on behalf of the Patriarca Family. See United States v. Cintolo,
818 F.2d at 998; United States v. Baines, 812 F.2d at 42; United States v.
Arruda, 715 F.2d at 684-85.

B. Insufficient Limiting Instructions

50

The defendants' more substantial claim is that the conversations pertaining to

the organization's murder plans were completely irrelevant to the counts upon
which the jury convicted them. They argue that even if the co-conspirator
statements were admissible on the RICO counts, the district court did not
properly instruct the jury to compartmentalize the evidence in a way that would
sufficiently protect them from the jury's consideration of that evidence with
regard to the non-RICO crimes for which they were convicted. As a result, they
contend that they were prejudiced by "evidentiary spillover" and deprived of
fair trials.17

51

In setting forth its Petrozziello findings the district court found that the
conversations of alleged RICO co-conspirators regarding the murder plans
would be admissible as evidence tending to show the defendants' motive,
design or intent in participating in the RICO conspiracy or committing the other
substantive violations charged in the indictment. Tr. vol. 50, p. 169. The court
later instructed the jury to limit its consideration of the tape-recorded statements
by alleged co-conspirators as follows (the defendants' names and the
corresponding counts on which they were convicted are presented in italics):

52

During the trial and especially during your hearing of the tape-recorded
conversations you have heard evidence of alleged statements by alleged coconspirators. Unless I instructed you otherwise in a particular instance, you may
consider such evidence without any special limitations as you are weighing the
charges against each of the defendants in Counts 1 [RICO conspiracy], 2
[substantive RICO violation], and 6 [conspiracy to obstruct justice (Angiulo
and Kazonis ) ] of the indictment except as to your consideration of predicate
acts charged.

53

When you are considering Counts 3 [Cincotti], 4 [illegal gambling (Kazonis

and Angiulo) ], 5 [illegal gambling (Angiulo: "Las Vegas Nights") ], 7
[obstruction of justice (Kazonis) ] and 8 [obstruction of justice (Angiulo) ] and
when you are considering predicate acts charged in Counts 1 and 2, the
following limiting instruction applies:

54

In relation to any charge against a particular defendant in Counts 3, 4, 5, 7 and

8, when you are considering evidence of a co-conspirator statement made when
that defendant was not present, you may consider it for the limited purpose of
such bearing, if any, as you find it to have in relation to the intent, motive or
other state of mind of that defendant. You will not consider it for any other
purpose except as permitted by the following instruction:

55

You will not consider evidence of a co-conspirator statement made when the
defendant was not present as evidence of the defendant's participation in a
particular offense or predicate act charged unless, first, that statement related to
the particular offense or predicate act charged in the count you are considering
and, second, that statement related to participation in that offense or predicate
act by the defendant as to whom you are considering the charge. (Emphasis
added.)

56

Tr. vol. 52, p. 175. In short, the jury was allowed to consider the statements of
alleged co-conspirators for whatever purpose in their determination that

Kazonis was guilty, and Angiulo not guilty, of conspiring to obstruct justice
(Count 6). However, in considering whether Angiulo and Kazonis were guilty
on the illegal gambling counts (Counts 4 and 5) and whether they were guilty
on the substantive obstruction of justice counts (Counts 7 and 8), the jury could
only consider the alleged co-conspirator statements as they might bear upon
those defendants' general states of mind, but not otherwise as proof of their
commission of the crimes charged unless the statements related to (a) the
substantive offenses charged and (b) the particular defendant's participation in
that substantive offense. In addition, at the outset of its charge to the jury, the
district court instructed the jury to consider separately each separate charge
against each individual defendant. Tr. vol. 52, p. 145.
57

1. Co-Conspirator Statements and the Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice Charge

Against Kazonis

58

While we recognize the inherent complications involved in designing a jury

charge that will compartmentalize evidence of separate, but interconnected,
conspiracies in the context of a multiple defendant RICO trial of this sort, we
are troubled by the court's instruction that the jury could consider, "without any
special limitation," statements of the "alleged co-conspirators" in determining
Kazonis's guilt or innocence in the alleged conspiracy to obstruct justice (Count
6). By so instructing, the court allowed the jury to consider statements of
alleged RICO co-conspirators regarding plans to murder Harvey Cohen and
others when determining whether Kazonis participated in a wholly separate
conspiracy to obstruct justice. The statements pertaining to the conspiracy to
murder Harvey Cohen and others were largely irrelevant to the latter
conspiracy.18

59

Nevertheless, we are convinced, in light of the evidence and what the jury did
find, that any improper failure to give a further limiting instruction did not
harm Kazonis.

60

First, the jury did not find him guilty of either the RICO conspiracy or the
substantive RICO offense charged in the indictment, and returned mixed
verdicts against the defendants charged with those offenses. This shows that the
jury was able to isolate evidence relevant to the RICO conspiracy from that
relevant to the separate alleged conspiracy to obstruct justice. See United States
v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir.1985) (fact that jury returned different verdicts
against jointly charged and tried co-defendants indicates that court's limiting
instruction enabled jury separately to consider evidence pertaining to guilt or
innocence of each defendant).

61

Second, the instruction allowing the jury unlimited consideration of the alleged
RICO co-conspirators' statements did not apply to or taint the jury's conviction
of Kazonis for the substantive obstruction of justice count (Count 7), and there
was more than sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Kazonis obstructed
justice by interfering with LaFreniere's appearance before the grand jury. See
supra pp. 961-62. To convict Kazonis for conspiring to obstruct justice, the jury
needed to find, in addition to the elements of the substantive offense, only that
Kazonis agreed, or reached an understanding, with others to accomplish that
offense. The existence of such an agreement or mutual understanding was
established by more than substantial evidence, see supra at p. 961, regardless of
the collateral evidence of statements of alleged RICO co-conspirators
concerning the Patriarca Family's murder plans before the jury.

62

Thus, we find harmless beyond reasonable doubt the district court's error in
allowing the jury broadly to consider alleged RICO conspirators' statements in
assessing the separate obstruction of justice conspiracy charge asserted against
Kazonis. Cf. United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 106 S.Ct. 725, 732-33 n. 13,
88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (error involving misjoinder of defendants requires
reversal only if it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining jury's verdict, and a limiting instruction to jury to separately
consider evidence for guilt of separate defendants minimizes any prejudice).19

63

2. Co-conspirator Statements and the Substantive Charges Against Kazonis and

Angiulo

64

On the substantive charges that Angiulo engaged in an illegal gambling

business and Kazonis obstructed justice (Counts 5 and 7), the jury was
permitted to consider statements of "alleged co-conspirators" for the bearing
such statements might have on the defendants' "intent, motive or other state of
mind."

65

We can understand that the statements of members or associates of the Patriarca

Family could be relevant to show how it deals with those who either fail to
cooperate with the Family or interfere with its operations. In that sense,
statements of the alleged RICO co-conspirators pertaining to murder plans
could be relevant to show why individuals knowledgeable in the affairs of the
Family would carry out certain offenses on its behalf.20 As part of its
Petrozziello findings, the district court found, by a preponderance of evidence,
that both Angiulo and Kazonis were associates of the Patriarca Family and
knowledgeable in its affairs and that they carried out the predicate acts charged
in the indictment in furtherance of the Family's interests. Thus, statements by

the RICO conspirators showing generally how the Family dealt violently with
uncooperative individuals could have been relevant to show Angiulo's and
Kazonis's states of mind in agreeing to carry out the predicate offenses
underlying the RICO counts as the court instructed. Cf. United States v. Daly
and Giardina, 842 F.2d 1380, 1387 (2d Cir.1988) (taped conversations of
alleged RICO co-conspirators not mentioning defendant admissible to show
setting of alleged offense).
66

On the other hand, as both Kazonis and Angiulo point out, the relevance of such
statements is highly attenuated when there is no proof that they had actual
knowledge of the contents of those statements. The fact that such conversations
included discussions of murder added the possibility that they could prejudice
the defendants if given undue weight by the jury. We might question the
propriety of the court's instruction, in this light, were it not for the subsequent
limitation (italicized in the excerpt above) that minimized the weight that the
jury attached to such statements; the jury was only permitted to consider such
statements, beyond implications as to the defendants' states of mind, if they
were made in the presence of the particular defendant in question and related to
the offense for which that defendant was charged.

67

For Angiulo, the statements of alleged co-conspirators relating to murder plans,

made outside of his presence and unrelated to the charge that he operated an
illegal gambling business, were not probative on that alleged offense. That the
Patriarca Family was willing to murder people that interfered with, or failed to
carry through, its operations was irrelevant to Angiulo's state of mind in
conducting such an operation. Nevertheless, the limiting instruction (set forth in
italics above) properly directed the jury not to consider those statements in
deciding whether Angiulo participated in the illegal gambling offense unless he
was present when the statements were made and they related to that offense.21
Looking at the instruction as a whole, we conclude that it did not result in
prejudicial error warranting reversal of Angiulo's conviction for operating an
illegal gambling business. Cf. United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d at 13
(appropriate limiting instructions adequately safeguarded against evidentiary
spillover; we will not entertain speculative allegations of prejudice).

68

For Kazonis--who was found by the district court, in its Petrozziello findings, to
be a member of the alleged RICO conspiracy, knowledgeable about the
Family's general operations (including murders), and to be furthering the
Family's interests through the obstruction of justice--evidence of the Family's
practices in dealing violently with those they disapproved of may have had
some bearing on his intent or motive to interfere with LaFreniere's testimony
before the grand jury. See United States v. Daly and Giardina, supra at 1387. In

any event, the limiting instruction insured that, in assessing Kazonis's

"participation" in the substantive obstruction of justice offense, the jury would
not consider the statements concerning the Family's murder plans, other than
those involving Walter LaFreniere, see supra note 18, because those statements
were made outside of Kazonis's presence and were unrelated to the alleged
obstruction of justice. Beyond this, the district court properly instructed the jury
on the specific facts that the government was required to prove in order to
convict Kazonis for obstructing justice, see supra note 19, and there was more
than sufficient evidence for the jury to convict him on that count, without any
consideration of statements pertaining to murder plans. See supra pp. 961-962.
69 Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony Concerning the Defendants'
C.
Association with the Patriarca Family
70

The government called FBI Agent James Nelson to give expert testimony on
the structure and operations of La Cosa Nostra and, after listening to evidence
presented at trial, his opinion regarding the defendants' relationships to that
organization. He testified that both Angiulo and Kazonis were "close
associates" of the Patriarca Family of La Cosa Nostra.

71

While not contesting Agent Nelson's qualifications as an expert on La Cosa

Nostra, Angiulo and Kazonis argue that his testimony violated their rights to
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment because the district court allowed
him to testify even though he did not reveal the identity of certain informants.
They also contend that the district court improperly admitted his testimony on
issues that were within the province of the jury or related to the defendants'
states of mind. We address each of these contentions.

72

At trial, the defendants maintained that allowing Agent Nelson to testify

without disclosing the identities of informants would violate Rule 705 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, which requires expert witnesses to disclose facts
and data underlying their opinions on cross-examination.22 They also argued
that they would be deprived of their Sixth Amendment rights to fully crossexamine the witness because they would not be able to ascertain or test his
credibility without knowing the sources of his information. While preserving
an objection that none of his testimony should be allowed, the defendants
agreed to the court's instruction to Agent Nelson that he not answer any
questions on direct examination that would be based upon information provided
by informants whose identity he could not disclose on cross-examination.

73

The defendants contend that the court's instruction to Agent Nelson failed
adequately to protect their confrontation rights for the following reasons: Agent

Nelson was entrusted to sort out, in his own mind, those opinions grounded
upon information that he was willing to disclose and those grounded upon
sources he could not disclose; as such, to the extent that some of the sources he
would not disclose had provided information that contradicted the opinions he
was otherwise willing to express, the defendants were deprived of information
that would allow them to test the credibility of his testimony on crossexamination. We disagree.
74

Although the defendants claim that the jury could not have believed otherwise
than that Agent Nelson based his opinion that they were close associates of the
Patriarca Family on the wide range of informants with whom he had conferred,
including those whose identities he would not reveal, Agent Nelson testified
that his particular opinion regarding these defendants' relationship to the
organization was based only upon tape recordings played at trial. Tr. vol. 29, p.
112.23 Moreover, the defendants were given wide-ranging opportunities to
cross-examine Agent Nelson on his opinions and the factual bases underlying
them. Under these circumstances, we find no merit in the defendants'
contention that Agent Nelson's testimony was admitted in violation of Rule
705's requirement that experts disclose, on cross-examination, factual sources
underlying their opinion testimony. See United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18,
39 (1st Cir.1983). Nor do we find the defendants' rights to adequate crossexamination of this witness under the Confrontation Clause in any way
threatened by the procedures followed. See, e.g., Delaware v. Fensterer, 474
U.S. 15, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985); United States v. Bastanipour,
697 F.2d 170, 176-77 (7th Cir.1982).24

75

The defendants nevertheless argue that the district court erred by overruling
their objections that Agent Nelson's testimony was inadmissible under Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, because it was not helpful to the jury's
factfinding,25 and Rule 704(b), because his description of their particular
activities was an impermissible expert opinion on their intent to commit the
crimes for which they were found guilty.26 Neither argument is persuasive.

76

Rule 704(b) does not apply to Agent Nelson's testimony because he did not
testify as an expert on the defendants' mental states. See United States v. Cox,
826 F.2d 1518, 1524-25 (6th Cir.1987). His testimony that the tapes indicated
that they were close associates of the Patriarca Family was simply not a
statement of opinion about defendants' mental state or condition. That it may
have provided part of the basis for an inference of such state is unhelpful to
defendants. See United States v. Daly and Giardina, supra at 1387-88.

77

Although we have recognized that expert testimony of law enforcement

officials concerning the particular methods and practices of those engaged in

organized criminal activity carries the risk of prejudicing criminal defendants,
we have made clear that such evidence is often helpful to the factfinder in
understanding the criminal activity at issue. United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d
at 38; see United States v. Daniels, 723 F.2d 31, 33 (8th Cir.1983). We give
district courts broad discretion to determine the admissibility of such expert
testimony. Hensel at 38. Expert testimony, similar to that of Agent Nelson, is
helpful in cases where juries must make determinations about the nature and
structure of complex criminal organizations alleged to be engaged in criminal
activities. E.g., United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir.1987);
United States v. Ardito, 782 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir.1986); United States v.
Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 230-31 (3d Cir.1983). In the circumstances of this
case, Agent Nelson's testimony assisted the jury in understanding the complex
structure of the Patriarca Family and the defendants' relationship to members of
that organization, as evidenced by the tape recorded conversations. The district
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Agent Nelson's testimony under
Rule 702.
D. Challenges to the Government's Electronic Surveillance
78
79

Alleging that the government violated various provisions of the Omnibus

Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1969 pertaining to "Wire and Electronic
Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Communications," 18
U.S.C. Secs. 2510-2521, Angiulo and Kazonis moved to suppress all tape
recordings of conversations recorded by the government at 98 Prince Street and
51 North Margin Street. After hearing arguments and taking written
submissions from the parties, the district court denied the defendants' motions.
United States v. Gambale, 610 F.Supp. 1515 (D.Mass.1985). The defendants
now assert that the court erred in failing to suppress that evidence, or,
alternatively, by not providing them with evidentiary hearings on their
suppression motions.

80

As a preliminary matter, we agree with the district court that Angiulo and
Kazonis had no standing to challenge the admissibility of the tape recordings
made at 51 North Margin Street. We adopt the well-reasoned opinion of the
district court on that point. 610 F.Supp. at 1521-22. Thus, we focus solely on
the defendants' challenges to the tape recordings of conversations recorded at
98 Prince Street.
1. Background

81

Electronic surveillance of 98 Prince Street began on January 19, 1981 and

continued through May 3, 1981. On April 10, 1981, the district court granted
the government's motion for a "disclosure order" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec.
2517(5), thereby allowing the government to utilize intercepted conversations
to prosecute offenses that were not specified in the district court's surveillance
orders, including the RICO charges.
82

The government did not simultaneously record duplicate originals of all

recorded conversations, but made copies of all the conversations as the
surveillance progressed. In the course of the surveillance, the agents monitoring
the tapes became aware of audibility problems. On May 5, 1981, the original
tapes were placed under seal and supervision of the district court in compliance
with 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(8)(a), which provides that "[i]mmediately upon the
expiration of the period of the order [authorizing surveillance], ... such
recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such order and sealed
under his directions."

83

On three occasions, however, between June and September 1981, the

government moved for and was granted the right to unseal the bulk of the
original tape recordings (over 300 in total) for audio enhancement purposes.
The government allegedly needed to use the originals for the enhancement
process because of background noise in the copies. Pursuant to judicial order,
the government was permitted to transport the tapes to Washington, D.C.,
where they were enhanced and then returned to the court and placed under seal
again.

84

After the grand jury returned its indictment, Angiulo, Kazonis and other codefendants filed motions to suppress the tape recordings contending, inter alia,
that the court should suppress the original tapes because (1) the sealing
requirement of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(8)(a) had been violated, (2) the
government failed to minimize the interception of conversations outside the
scope of the court's surveillance orders in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(5),
and (3) under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2517(5), the court could not allow the government
to utilize (or "disclose") intercepted conversations unrelated to offenses set
forth in the surveillance orders. The defendants now appeal the district court's
denial of their motion to suppress on these grounds.27
2. Sealing Requirements

85

The question of whether and under what circumstances the government may
unseal tape recordings previously sealed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(8)(a)
is one of first impression for us, and it has not, to our knowledge, been

addressed by any other circuit.

86

Section 2518(8)(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

87 recording of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication under

The
this subsection shall be done in such way as will protect the recording from editing
or other alterations. Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or
extensions thereof, such recordings shall be made available to the judge issuing such
order and sealed under his directions. Custody of the recordings shall be wherever
the judge orders.... The presence of the seal provided for by this subsection, or a
satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof, shall be a prerequisite for the use or
disclosure of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence
derived therefrom under subsection (3) of section 2517.28
88

We recently addressed, in United States v. Mora, 821 F.2d 860 (1st Cir.1987),
the issue of whether section 2518(8)(a) mandated the suppression of
intercepted conversations when the government failed "immediately" to place
original tapes under judicial seal after the expiration of the period for
authorized surveillance. We concluded that section 2518(8)(a) contained its
own exclusionary rule, and if the government failed to comply with the sealing
requirements of that section, surveillance evidence would have to be suppressed
unless the government proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was
a "satisfactory explanation" for its failure immediately to seal. Id. at 866-68.
Recognizing that the essential purpose of this section "is to protect the
authenticity and accuracy of the recordings," we held that the government's first
task in establishing a "satisfactory explanation" would be to prove that the
integrity of the tapes had not been compromised. Id. at 867. If it met that
burden, the government would then be required to show that its delay in sealing
came about in good faith and that such delay did not prejudice the accused or
provide the prosecution with a tactical advantage. Id. at 868-69.

89

The district court's decision not to suppress the tapes in the case at bar was
made prior to our decision in Mora. The court concluded, in any event, that
cases from other circuits addressing the problem of delays in sealing were
inapplicable to the question of whether a judicial order allowing unsealing was
proper. United States v. Gambale, 610 F.Supp. at 1526. It held that Congress
simply failed to address the question of unsealing, and that courts have
"inherent authority to order unsealing of tapes previously sealed upon a
showing of good cause." Id. The district court therefore rejected the defendants'
position that the statute automatically required suppression of the tapes because
of the government's unsealing.

90

We agree that the defendants' argument for automatic suppression of unsealed

tapes is untenable. While such unsealing should never be allowed as a matter of
course, courts should have the discretion to order temporary unsealing, as the
district court concluded, for good cause shown.29 On the other hand, defendants
are not without protection in the unsealing context; we think that the standards
applicable in delay-of-sealing cases, like Mora, are relevant to the unsealing
problem.

91

The court's order allowing the government to unseal the original tapes and
transport them to Washington, D.C. for enhancement outside the presence of
any judicial officer created a risk that the original tapes could be altered or
tampered with. We agree with the district court's apparent reasoning, see 610
F.Supp. at 1526, that there was perhaps some moral deterrent to the agents'
alteration of the tapes since the government's unsealing and transportation of
the tapes was prescribed by court order. But that does not eliminate the risk of
alteration addressed by section 2518(8)(a).

92

In cases involving unsealing of tapes, there would seem to be no less of a risk of

frustrating the purposes underlying section 2518(8)(a)--the assurance of the
accuracy and genuineness of tape recordings--than in situations where the
government fails "immediately" to place the original tapes under seal. To the
extent that the procedures followed in sealing or unsealing compromise the
integrity of tape recorded conversations, the congressional purposes underlying
section 2518(8)(a) would be thwarted and suppression of that evidence would
be called for. See United States v. Mora, 821 F.2d at 867. We therefore
conclude that the guidelines set forth in Mora apply to cases involving the
government's unsealing.

93

Accordingly, judicial orders authorizing the unsealing of tape recordings

previously placed under judicial seal pursuant to section 2518(8)(a) should be
granted only for good cause shown by the government. If the unsealing of such
tapes is challenged in a motion to suppress, the government should be required
to prove (1) that the unsealing and use of the tapes did not result in alterations
or tampering and (2) that the circumstances necessitating unsealing were not
manufactured for tactical gain and that the defendants will not be unduly
prejudiced as a result of the unsealing. See United States v. Mora, 821 F.2d at
867-68.

94

In this case all standards have been met. First, the district court properly found
that the government made a "good cause" showing for the temporary unsealing.
United States v. Gambale, 610 F.Supp. at 1526. Second, although the court

made no pretrial findings, the record shows that there was extensive
examination and cross-examination of the agents involved in the custody and
enhancing of the tapes while unsealed, and permits only the conclusion that the
integrity of the tapes was not compromised. The chain of custody was clearly
established, the extensive spatial security arrangements at the FBI
headquarters, where the tapes were kept, were described, and agents Quinn and
Ritenour, who were in charge of the custody and enhancement process, testified
unequivocally that there were no unauthorized persons with access to the tapes,
no tampering, no deletions, and no additions.30 Third, we find no indication or
suggestion of bad faith or of unnecessary delay in returning the tapes to the
court after enhancement.
3. Minimization
95

The defendants contend that the tapes should not have been admitted against
them because the government violated section 2518(5), which requires that
every authorized surveillance "shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize
the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under
this chapter...." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(5). They argue that the government's
practice of "intermittent monitoring"--the practice of randomly turning the
recording equipment on for two minutes and then off for one minute--was not
proper compliance with section 2518(5)'s "minimization" requirement; and they
point to the government's widespread interception, in the early weeks of
surveillance, of conversations that were noncriminal in nature as evidence of
the government's violation of the statute. We agree with the district court's
treatment of these arguments. See United States v. Gambale, 610 F.Supp. at
1527-29.31

96

The Supreme Court has pointed out that section 2518(5) "does not forbid the
interception of all nonrelevant conversations, but rather instructs the agents to
conduct the surveillance in such a manner as to 'minimize' the interception of
such conversations. Whether the agents have in fact conducted the wiretap in
such a manner will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case." Scott
v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1724, 56 L.Ed.2d 168
(1978). And whether the statute has been violated in any particular case
depends upon the objective reasonableness of the agents' conduct. Id. at 137, 98
S.Ct. at 1723; United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d 709, 716 (4th Cir.1977).

97

We follow the majority of other circuits that have considered this question and
look to three key factors to ascertain, in any given case, whether the
minimization requirements of section 2518(5) have been met: (1) the nature,
scope, and complexity of the alleged criminal activities under investigation; (2)

the extent to which the government had accrued, in advance of the surveillance,
information needed to screen out conversations that were not within the scope
of alleged offenses under investigation through the authorization for
surveillance; and (3) the degree of judicial supervision over the surveillance
practices. See id.; United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d 434, 441-42 (8th Cir.1976);
United States v. Vento, 533 F.2d 838, 852-53 (3d Cir.1976); United States v.
Quintana, 508 F.2d 867, 874-75 (7th Cir.1975). Considering each of these
factors, we conclude that the government's surveillance of 98 Prince Street did
not violate the statute.
98

First, the alleged criminal activities that the agents were authorized to
investigate were highly organized and complicated, involving multiple parties.
In this situation, as the district court pointed out, " 'more extensive surveillance
may be justified in an attempt to determine the precise scope of the enterprise.'
" United States v. Gambale, 610 F.Supp. at 1529 (quoting Scott v. United
States, 436 U.S. at 140, 98 S.Ct. at 1725).

99

Second, in the initial stages of surveillance, the monitoring agents could not
easily decipher which conversations were and were not relevant to the alleged
offenses under investigation. Given the complex nature of the criminal
activities in question and the jargon used by those under investigation, it was
reasonable for the agents to monitor, almost continuously, the conversations
taking place at 98 Prince Street in order to discern patterns of conversation that
were and were not relevant. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. at 140-42, 98
S.Ct. at 1724-26; United States v. Clerkley, 556 F.2d at 717. This was
particularly true during the early stages of the surveillance, see Scott, 436 U.S.
at 141, 98 S.Ct. at 1725, which was the only time, the defendants claimed, that
the agents intercepted a large number of conversations unrelated to criminal
offenses. See United States v. Gambale, 610 F.Supp. at 1529. In addition, the
intermittent monitoring technique used by agents to minimize interceptions of
conversations beyond the scope of the surveillance authorizations was a
reasonable and appropriate method for "spot-checking" the flow of
conversations in case the subject matter of those conversations turned from
matters outside of the authorized investigation to matters within the
surveillance authorization. See, e.g., United States v. Hinton, 543 F.2d 1002,
1012 (2d Cir.1976) (five minute spot checks not violative of minimization
requirement); United States v. Daly, 535 F.2d at 442 & n. 8).

100 Finally, the district court correctly found that the monitoring agents' submission
of regular five-day progress reports to the judge authorizing the surveillance
ensured compliance with the minimization requirements of the statute. See
United States v. Gambale, 610 F.Supp. at 1528. Such judicial oversight of

surveillance practices is recognized as an ongoing check upon the

reasonableness of the agents' conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Clerkley, 556
F.2d at 718; United States v. Quintana, 508 F.2d at 875.
101 Given all of these factors, we conclude that the government's monitoring
techniques were not unreasonable. The district court correctly concluded that
the minimization requirements of section 2518(5) did not require suppression of
the tape recordings made at 98 Prince Street.32
4. Disclosure
102 Angiulo's and Kazonis's final complaint regarding the taped conversations is
that the district court erred in failing to suppress the tapes on the grounds that
the government should not have been permitted to disclose or utilize
conversations related to crimes other than those for which surveillance was
authorized.
103 Upon intercepting conversations pertaining to RICO violations--crimes outside
the scope of the surveillance authorizations--the government moved for an
order, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2517(5), permitting it to utilize that evidence
to prosecute the defendants under RICO.33 A district court judge other than the
judge who presided over the defendants' motion to suppress the tapes had
granted the government's motion for disclosure of evidence pertaining to the
RICO offenses.
104 In United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d 19 (1st Cir.1983), we set forth the
standards for such disclosure orders as follows:
105
Congress
intended that evidence relating to unauthorized offenses should be given
retroactive judicial approval under section 2517(5) if the original wiretap warrant
was lawfully obtained, was sought in good faith and not as a subterfuge search, and
that the communication was in fact incidentally intercepted during the course of a
lawfully executed order.
106 Id. at 22 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The
defendants argued in their motion to suppress, and maintain on appeal, that the
government obtained its disclosure motion through subterfuge--that it always
intended to obtain conversations related to RICO violations, but was
constrained in applying for surveillance authorization to that end because of our
decision in Turkette, restricting application of RICO to wholly legal enterprises-and that the conversations pertaining to the RICO offenses were not

incidentally intercepted. We find no merit in these assertions; the district court's

finding that the government's application for surveillance at 98 Prince Street
was not subterfuge was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Gambale,
610 F.Supp. at 1527.
107 In any event, even if we held that disclosure of intercepted conversations
related to "other crimes" was improper and that suppression of those particular
conversations was required, the defendants' convictions would stand. As the
government points out, all its interceptions of conversations pertaining to the
offenses for which Angiulo and Kazonis were convicted were properly
authorized by the district court.34 The unauthorized interceptions that the
defendants complain of were RICO-related. The defendants were not convicted
on the RICO conspiracy or substantive RICO charges in the indictment, and we
have concluded, supra Part IIIB, that the claimed "spillover" effect of the
introduction of evidence concerning RICO violations at trial was harmless.
Thus, even if we agreed with the defendants and excluded the conversations
intercepted at 98 Prince Street concerning offenses not specified in the
surveillance authorizations, we would not disturb their convictions.
108The Government's Claim of Privilege Not to Disclose at Trial the Location of
E.
Microphones at 98 Prince Street, and Subsequent Disclosures to the Boston Globe
109 At trial, the defendants attempted to extract testimony from government agents
concerning the location of microphones used to intercept conversations at 98
Prince Street. The government claimed that it was entitled to a qualified
privilege not to disclose that information because disclosure would reveal
sensitive surveillance techniques and thereby hinder future criminal
investigations. The trial judge recognized the asserted privilege and allowed the
government to withhold the requested information. In response to the
defendants' contention that without disclosure they were unable to challenge
the government's asserted inferences that they participated in and heard certain
conversations at 98 Prince Street, the court gave the jury the following
instruction:
110
Members
of the jury, the defendants in this case have sought to establish the location
of the microphones both at 98 Prince Street and 51 North Margin Street. The
Government has elected to decline to furnish that information and claims a privilege
not to do so. I have ruled that such a privilege exists; and you may draw such
inferences, if any, as you may consider reasonable from the absence of evidence
before you as to the specific location of the microphones.
111 Tr. vol. 49, p. 147.

112 After trial and sentencing, certain newspaper articles appeared in the Boston
Globe concerning the investigation at 98 Prince Street. One article appearing
April 5, 1987, entitled "FBI bug marked beginning of end for Hub's Mafia
leaders," reported:
113
Resuming
their work, [FBI agents] wired the microphones to power cells the size of
fireplace logs and carefully placed them above the dropped ceiling tiles. The
installers made sure that the heavy units were safely in place. Their concern was that
the ceiling could collapse under their weight, and the units would crash into
Angiulo's lap. If that happened, the bugging operation would collapse too. They
stuffed mounds of insulation around the power units, the idea being to make it as
hard as possible for anyone to find the three power packs. In this case, there would
not be any hookup to a telephone or electrical line, not after the Angiulos caught
wind of their past efforts to use the two utility companies to supply power for a bug
and camera. They had learned their lesson not to go outside the agency. The
buzzword was self-reliance. The risk of having to reenter the apartment every 30
days to replace the drained power units was determined to be less than the risk of a
leak from outsiders.
114 United States v. Cincotti, 678 F.Supp. 346, 348 (D.Mass.1987). Another article
on April 7, 1987 reported on a discussion between Gennaro Angiulo and
Richard Gambale that took place on March 19, 1981. The article states,
"Angiulo turned up the TV even louder than usual and lowered his voice. It
was 9:29 a.m. and one of the two FBI microphones was hidden directly above
the two men." Id. at 349.
115 Following their convictions, the defendants moved for a new trial, contending
that these articles constituted newly discovered evidence that the government
had asserted its privilege not to disclose the whereabouts of the microphones in
bad faith, and, as a result, the defendants had been deprived of their
constitutional rights to cross-examine and confront government witnesses at
trial. We stayed the defendants' appeals to allow the district court the
opportunity to rule on the motion for new trial. In a memorandum and order
dated July 31, 1987, the district court denied that motion along with the
defendants' request for an evidentiary hearing on the government's alleged bad
faith. Id. at 347-53. Angiulo and Kazonis now assert that the district court erred
in denying their motion for a new trial.
116 1. The Government's Privilege of Nondisclosure
117 In its memorandum and order the district court correctly concluded that our
recent decision in United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 1001-03, was fully

dispositive of the government's claimed privilege. In Cintolo we recognized the

government's qualified privilege not to disclose, in the course of severed
codefendant Cintolo's trial, the location of the microphones at 98 Prince Street.
Id. at 1002. We said that the privilege could be overcome if the defendant
could show an authentic and sufficient need for the information that would
outweigh the government's privilege. Id. In evaluating the defendant's showing
of need, we considered whether there were " 'adequate alternative means' " for
the defendant to establish, before the jury, the same points that would be made
if the government made the requested disclosures. Id. (quoting United States v.
Harley, 682 F.2d 1018, 1020 (D.C.Cir.1982)).
118 Angiulo and Kazonis assert, as did Cintolo, that government testimony
concerning the location of the microphones was necessary to their defense
because the government relied on inferences that they participated in and heard
conversations at 98 Prince Street when they were present there.35 There was
more than sufficient opportunity, however, for the defendants to present their
argument to the jury about doubts as to the government's ability to prove the
defendants' participation in, and knowledge of, conversations that took place at
98 Prince Street. As in the Cintolo case, "the record reflects that the jury heard
evidence regarding the size of the Prince Street apartment--evidence from
which it could have concluded that not all persons present in the apartment
necessarily heard every conversation (let alone, every word of every
conversation)." Id. at 1003. In fact, the jury was taken to 98 Prince Street for a
viewing of the apartment. We made clear in Cintolo that this viewing would be
a means for a defendant to raise doubts to the jury concerning his involvement
in the conversations. Id.
119 These factors persuade us that sufficient alternative means other than disclosure
of the location of the government's microphones at 98 Prince Street were not
only open to, but were exploited by, the defendants in this case in order to make
the point that they wanted to make through use of the privileged information.
See id. at 1003. Beyond this, the district court's instruction to the jury singling
out the lack of evidence regarding the location of the microphones fully
protected the points that the defendant wished to raise; the defendants retained
wide latitude to paint a hypothesis about the location of the microphones that
would be most favorable to their position. We therefore find no error in the
district court's recognition of the government's privilege not to disclose the
location of the microphones.
2. Defendants' Rights to a New Trial
120 The defendants contend that the articles in the Boston Globe constitute newly

discovered evidence warranting the grant of a new trial. They assert that the
government's claim of privilege was made in bad faith because the FBI's
subsequent disclosure to the press of details concerning the surveillance at 98
Prince Street reveals that the location information sought by the defendants at
trial was not, in fact, confidential. They argue that if the information given to
the press had been provided to them at trial they would have been able to
establish the precise locations of the microphones and would have had a better
opportunity to rebut the government's asserted inference that they participated
in incriminating conversations at 98 Prince Street.36
121 Taking into account all the defense affidavits accompanying the motion for
new trial "as if there were no valid evidentiary objections to them," the district
court concluded that there was little support for the defendants' contention that
the government acted in bad faith in claiming its privilege at trial. United States
v. Cincotti, 678 F.Supp. at 350. It pointed out that the Boston Globe's reports
about the location of the microphones over the heads of Gennaro Angiulo and
Gambale were just as likely speculations based on journalistic license as they
were reports of facts obtained from FBI sources. The court concluded,
moreover, that even if the defendants showed bad faith on the part of the
government, they failed to show that they were prejudiced or harmed by not
having available the "newly discovered evidence" gleaned from the Boston
Globe articles at trial.
122 Motions for new trials are directed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
E.g., United States v. Rivera-Sola, 713 F.2d 866, 874 (1st Cir.1983); United
States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017, 1019 (1st Cir.1980). Keeping in mind that
such a remedy is sparingly used, we review the district court's denial of the
defendants' motion for abuse of discretion. Id. A district court is well within its
discretion in denying a defendant's motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence if the defendant has failed to demonstrate that access to
such evidence would probably result in an acquital. Id. And any factfinding on
the part of the district court will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. Id.
123 We find that the district court was well within its discretion in denying the
defendants' motion for a new trial. The defendants failed to show that their
access to the information in the Boston Globe articles would have changed the
jury's verdicts. Indeed, given the options available to, and exploited by, the
defendants to make their point to the jury about their possible lack of
participation in the incriminating conversations at 98 Prince Street and the
district court's instruction to the jury about the lack of evidence concerning the
location of the microphones, the defendants can hardly assert that they would
have benefitted from knowledge even of the precise locations of the

microphones at trial. Without that evidence they could exploit, to the fullest,
hypotheses about the locations that would raise reasonable doubts in the jurors
minds concerning their participation in those conversations.
124 We affirm the district court's denial of the defendants' motion for a new trial.
F. The Government's Use of Peremptory Challenges
125
126 The final argument jointly asserted by Angiulo and Kazonis is that the
government's use of peremptory challenges to strike blacks and ItalianAmericans from the jury violated their constitutional rights to equal protection
according to the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986).
127 The prosecution used 2 of its 7 peremptory challenges to eliminate 2 out of 4
blacks from the 31 member jury venire. It also used 4 of its peremptory
challenges to eliminate 4 out of 7 of the potential jurors who had ItalianAmerican sounding names. The defendants objected to the government's use of
peremptory challenges, claiming that it was excluding jurors on account of race
and national origin. The district judge then asked the government to explain its
use of peremptories, and found that the government had articulated sufficient
non-racial and non-ethnic reasons for its challenges. The defendants now argue
that they had established a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges by the government, and that the district court erred in concluding
that the government's explanation was sufficient to overcome their equal
protection claims.
128 We find no merit in the defendants' assertions. First, as the government points
out, to make out a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under Batson,
the defendants must be members of the ethnic or racial group that they contend
was discriminated against by the government. Since Angiulo and Kazonis are
not black, they cannot complain about the government's peremptory challenges
to black members of the jury venire. Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. at 1723;
United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir.1987). Second, "[b]ecause
appellants did not even attempt to show that Italian-Americans either have been
or are currently subjected to discriminatory treatment, their claim fails to meet
the initial requirement under Batson that the defendant show his or her
membership in a 'cognizable' group." United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 833
(1st Cir.1988). For these reasons, the district court correctly rejected the
defendants' equal protection claim.
129 Beyond this, even assuming that the defendants had established their prima

129 Beyond this, even assuming that the defendants had established their prima
facie case under Batson, the district court found "objectively reasonable" the
government's proffered non-discriminatory reasons for striking individuals with
Italian-American sounding names from the jury venire. In Batson, the Supreme
Court said that to overcome a defendant's prima facie showing of discrimination
the government must come forward with a "neutral explanation" for its use of
peremptory challenges. Here the government provided sufficient neutral
explanations for eliminating jurors with Italian-American sounding names.37
The district court's finding in this regard, which is "entitled to appropriate
deference by a reviewing court," Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21,
is not clearly erroneous.
130 We therefore conclude that the district court properly overruled the defendants'
objections to the government's use of peremptory challenges.38
IV.
131 We find no merit in arguments separately asserted by Angiulo challenging the
admissibility of expert testimony of the general counsel of the Massachusetts
State Lottery Commission regarding the requirements of Massachusetts
gambling laws and the sufficiency of evidence for his illegal gambling
conviction. His challenge to the expert witness testimony was not preserved for
appellate review and we find no plain error. See United States v. Williams, 809
F.2d 75, 82 (1st Cir.1986). Having reviewed the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, we conclude that the jury properly could have
found Angiulo guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for operating an illegal
gambling business.
132 Affirmed.

Gennaro Angiulo was separately convicted for crimes involving the alleged
conspiracies at issue in this case. He is not party to this appeal

Ilario Zannino, like Gennaro Angiulo, was also separately convicted for crimes
involving the alleged conspiracies at issue in this case, but he is not party to this
appeal

Under separate indictment, William Cintolo was convicted for his role in the
conspiracy to obstruct justice. On appeal, we affirmed his conviction. United
States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir.1987)

Richard Gambale and Peter Limone were indicted with the defendants. They

each pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice

5

Section 1962(c) reads in full:

It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection
of unlawful debt.
The conspiracy provision, section 1962(d), provides: "It shall be unlawful for
any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or
(c) of this section."

An "enterprise" is "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or

other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(4)

A "pattern of racketeering activity" is "at least two acts of racketeering

activity," the first having been committed after the enactment of RICO and the
second occurring within ten years of the first. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(5). Such
acts include, inter alia, "any act or threat involving murder [or] ... gambling ...,
which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year." 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(1)(A)
An "unlawful debt" is defined as:
a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in violation of
the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or which is
unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or
interest because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) which was incurred in
connection with the business of gambling in violation of the law of the United
States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of lending money
or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or Federal law, where the
usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate.
18 U.S.C. Sec. 1961(6).

The alleged conspiracy to murder Harvey Cohen may be a predicate offense

underlying the RICO conspiracy because it is listed as a predicate offense under
section 1961(1). See United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 918-19 (2d
Cir.1984)

The eliminated "overt act"--that Cincotti "instructed an underling to collect a

gambling debt"--was based upon an intercepted conversation and a voice

identification of Cincotti. At trial, the government was unable to prove the
voice identification because a government witness testified that he was
uncertain whether the voice on the tape was that of Cincotti
10

We decided Turkette on September 23, 1980. The Supreme Court granted

certiorari on January 26, 1981, 449 U.S. 1123, 101 S.Ct. 938, 67 L.Ed.2d 109
(1981), and then issued its opinion reversing our decision on July 17, 1981. The
indictment charged Cincotti with RICO predicate offenses occurring in April,
1981 (conspiracy to murder Harvey Cohen) and between October 20, 1980 and
May 18, 1981 (the operation of an illegal gambling business). The government's
proof at trial did not vary from these dates. Thus, all of the activities leading to
Cincotti's conviction occurred between our decision in Turkette and the
Supreme Court's reversal of that decision. Yet most of the alleged criminal
activities occurred after the Supreme Court granted certiorari, a factor we
consider below in assessing Cincotti's reasonable reliance on our opinion as an
authoritative construction of RICO

11

The government points out that there is no evidence in the record that Cincotti
(as opposed to other alleged co-conspirators) did, in fact, rely upon our decision
in Turkette when he engaged in the conduct that led to his RICO convictions.
That lack of reliance, it seems, would vitiate his due process claim to be free of
the retroactive application of the Supreme Court's decision in Turkette. See
United States v. Camara, 451 F.2d 1122, 1124-25 (1st Cir.1971)

12

We do not agree with Cincotti's argument that the jury should have given more
weight to the testimony of Carolyn Kingston, the voice therapist who testified
on his behalf, than to that of Agent Rafferty. As the government points out,
while concluding that the characteristics of the voice alleged to be that of
Cincotti were not the same in tape recordings for April 3 and 23, Kingston
testified that she had never spoken directly to Cincotti and could not testify
about his voice characteristics. Moreover, the district court ensured that the
jury would properly resolve any conflict in the testimony concerning voice
identification by instructing them that the government was required to prove the
defendants' voice identifications for all alleged intercepted conversations
played to the jury

13

Cincotti does not challenge the sufficiency of evidence concerning the

existence of the "enterprise" or the government's proof that he committed the
alleged predicate acts in furtherance of the enterprise's affairs

14

Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides, in pertinent part:

A statement is not hearsay if-- ... The statement is offered against a party and is

... a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance

of the conspiracy.
15

The court found, inter alia:

Each of the defendants Jason Brion Angiulo and William Kazonis was a
member of the RICO conspiracy as an associate of the Patriarca Family of La
Cosa Nostra for at least the period ... during which statements of coconspirators
received in evidence were made and that each of them was a member with
knowledge of the scope and nature of the RICO conspiracy.
Tr. vol. 50, pp. 165-66. The court further found "that each of the substantive
crimes charged against each of the defendants in this case has been proved by a
preponderance of the evidence to have been committed in furtherance of the
RICO conspiracy." Id. at p. 169. Taking into consideration evidence of these
defendants' frequent visits to 98 Prince Street, their participation in discussions
and sessions involving decision-making by Gennaro Angiulo concerning
various illegal activities of the Family, including some in which they
participated, the district court concluded that both Angiulo and Kazonis
[were] aware of the organizational relationship among Gennaro Angiulo and
others who participated in conversations in his presence and that [they] knew
the nature and scope of the RICO conspiracy--that is, the Patriarca Family of
La Cosa Nostra--including its willingness to engage in extreme criminal
activities, even murder, when those in decision-making positions felt the need
to resort to extreme measures to protect what they perceived to be the interests
of the organization.
Tr. vol. 51, pp. 41-44. The defendants objected to these conclusions.

16

Although the jury eventually acquitted both Angiulo and Kazonis on the
conspiracy charges, it does not follow that the district court erred in finding that
they were participating members of the RICO conspiracy for the purpose
admitting evidence pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E). While the more lenient
preponderance of the evidence standard supports the district court's Petrozziello
finding, the defendants' convictions for the RICO crimes would have to have
been based, of course, upon findings beyond a reasonable doubt. See United
States v. Masse, 816 F.2d 805, 810 n. 8 (1st Cir.1987)

17

This issue was raised on several occasions in the course of hearings pertaining
to the district court's Petrozziello findings and proposed jury instructions. Tr.
vol. 50, pp. 10-19, 72-76; Tr. vol. 51, pp. 77-87; Tr. vol. 52, p. 217, 227. The
defendants argued that the jury should have been instructed to ignore all alleged
co-conspirator statements not pertaining to the particular predicate offenses

charged against them. See Tr. vol. 50, pp. 17-18. Although conceding that they
cannot claim improper joinder of substantive counts in the indictment, the
defendants attempt to analogize from misjoinder cases to argue that an
"appropriate limiting instruction" was necessary to safeguard against
"evidentiary spillover." We have searched the record for a proposed limiting
instruction from the defendants and found none. We note, however, that since
the defendants objected throughout the trial to the jury's consideration of
alleged co-conspirator statements pertaining to murders and maintained that
objection when reluctantly accepting the limiting instruction proffered and
given by the court, their challenge to the instruction is sufficiently preserved for
our review
18

We note, however, that Kazonis cannot object to the jury's consideration of

statements concerning plans to murder Walter LaFreniere in assessing his guilt
under Count 6. Although the indictment alleged that Kazonis conspired, with
others, to obstruct justice by agreeing only "to threaten, inform, request and
otherwise cause Walter LaFreniere to refuse to testify" before the Grand Jury, it
also alleged that members of the same obstruction conspiracy agreed, as part of
that conspiracy, to kill Walter LaFreniere. Since the district court found, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Kazonis was a member of the obstruction
conspiracy and that violent means were employed by other members of that
conspiracy to further its objectives, the statements of co-conspirators regarding
plans to murder LaFreniere were admissible against him on Count 6. See, e.g.,
United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 997-98; United States v. Arruda, 715 F.2d
at 685

19

In so concluding, we also reject Kazonis's contention that he was entitled to an

instruction that the scope of his involvement in the alleged conspiracy to
obstruct justice did not include murder plans. Brief of William Kazonis at 2224. As we pointed out, supra note 18, the government did not allege that
Kazonis agreed to murder LaFreniere as part of the conspiracy to obstruct
justice, but the statements of co-conspirators who did plan to murder LaFreniere
in order to carry out the same conspiracy to obstruct justice were admissible
against him. Moreover, in instructing the jury on the alleged conspiracy to
obstruct justice, the district court did not focus the jury's attention on statements
concerning any murder plans. It properly instructed that the government was
required to prove that Kazonis intentionally agreed to obstruct justice through
unlawful means, which could include efforts to advise or plan "with the witness
to invoke the Fifth Amendment improperly" or "to limit or give false testimony
before the Grand Jury." Finally, there was clearly sufficient evidence for the
jury to convict Kazonis of conspiring to obstruct justice without taking into
account statements concerning the Family's murder plans. See supra p. 961

20

21

22

Kazonis was charged with substantive obstruction of justice both as a predicate

offense underlying the RICO counts and as a separate offense. Angiulo was
charged with the operation of an illegal gambling business both as a predicate
offense of the RICO counts and as a separate offense. We understand how-given the interconnection between the separately charged offenses and the
predicate acts underlying the RICO conspiracy count for both Kazonis and
Angiulo--the district court could conclude that Rule 801(d)(2)(E) permitted the
admissibility of these statements against all members of the charged RICO
conspiracy
There were no alleged co-conspirator statements admitted into evidence
concerning murders that were made in Angiulo's presence and related to his
alleged operation of Las Vegas Nights
Rule 705, "Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion," provides:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons
therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the
court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose
the underlying facts or data on cross-examination.

23

Agent Nelson testified about the different positions held by various individuals
in the organization and the titles associated with those positions. Using a
diagram, he explained that, based on his analysis of the tape recordings,
Raymond Patriarca was the "boss" of the Patriarca Family, Gerry (Gennaro)
Angiulo was the "underboss," Nicolas Angiulo was the "consigliere," and that
John Cincotti was a "soldier" in the "capo regime" of Larry Zannino. Tr. vol.
29, p. 110. He testified that Jason Angiulo and William Kazonis fell within the
category of close "associates" of the Patriarca Family. Id. at 121

24

The defendants seem to argue that even if Agent Nelson's particular testimony
concerning Angiulo's and Kazonis's association with the Patriarca Family was
based upon evidence presented at trial, he could not have formed his opinions
concerning collateral relationships in the organization that were essential to that
testimony, without access to informants' disclosures to him. A careful review of
the record reveals, however, that Agent Nelson was able conclusively to form
his opinions on these collateral relationships in the organization from nonconfidential sources of information

25

Rule 702 provides:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,

may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

26

Rule 704(b) provides:

No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are
matters for the trier of fact alone.

27

28

Although the defendants assert, in the alternative, that they should have been
granted evidentiary hearings on these issues, in their motion before the district
court they sought such a hearing only on their contention that the government
violated the statutory minimization requirements. See Record Item # 184
(defendants' motion and memorandum in support of motion to suppress and for
evidentiary hearing). Their argument concerning the alleged violation of the
sealing requirement centered solely on legal questions; they relied primarily on
evidentiary material from the case of co-defendant Cintolo for their factual
assertions. In arguing that the disclosure order was improper, they moved for
additional discovery of grand jury proceedings, but not for an evidentiary
hearing. The district court denied the defendants' request for an evidentiary
hearing on the minimization issue, and we review only that denial of an
evidentiary hearing. See infra note 32
Section 2517(3), which "is the general authorization-for-use statute concerning
intercepted communications," United States v. Mora, 821 F.2d 860, 863 n. 2
(1st Cir.1987), provides:
Any person who has received, by any means authorized by this chapter, any
information concerning a wire, oral, or electronic communication, or evidence
derived therefrom intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter
may disclose the contents of that communication or such derivative evidence
while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any proceeding held under
the authority of the United States or of any State or political subdivision
thereof.

29

We recognize that there may be many instances in which either the prosecution
or the defense would want to unseal original tape recordings. The prosecution,
for instance, might need to check the originals against portions of duplicates
that were inadvertently erased. Defense counsel, in turn, might ask that the tape
recordings be unsealed so that they can check the accuracy of duplicate tape
recordings or transcripts that they have obtained through discovery from the
prosecution

30

While, in this case, the government had no trouble in establishing the integrity
of the tapes while unsealed, the potential for challenging witnesses' memories
and credibility suggests the prudence of minimizing the problem of proving
that no alterations occurred. For instance, the government could make
simultaneous original recordings so that one untouched original could always
remain under seal. Alternatively, if only one original is made and sealed, and
only the original will do for enhancement, a copy of the original could be left
under seal with the court. In either case, the defendant would then be able to
check the enhanced original against a sealed original or copy for possible
alterations

31

In addressing the defendant's argument, the district court made certain factual
findings. It found:
Every monitoring agent maintained a log book in which the date, time, and
substance of any intercepted communications were recorded, as well as the
identities of the participants, if known. Other agents reviewed the logs and
tapes on a daily basis and five-day progress reports, submitted to the
supervising judge, detailed the progress and results of the surveillance.
***
Monitoring ceased when agents determined that only personal, non-criminal
activity was being discussed. Such intermittent monitoring did not commence
until it was ascertained that one of the interceptees named in the order
authorizing surveillance was in the room.
United States v. Gambale, 610 F.Supp. at 1528. The defendants do not
challenge these findings, but contest the district court's legal conclusions.

32

The defendants assert that at the very least the district court should have
granted their motion for an evidentiary hearing on the minimization issue.
Since they failed to allege sufficient specific facts that would substantiate their
claim, the district court properly denied their request for an evidentiary hearing.
See United States v. Migely, 596 F.2d 511, 513 (1st Cir.1979)

33

Section 2517(5) provides:

When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in
intercepting wire, oral, or electronic communications in the manner authorized
herein, intercepts wire, oral, or electronic communications relating to offenses
other than those specified in the order of authorization or approval, the contents
thereof, and evidence derived therefrom, may be disclosed or used as provided
in subsections (1) and (2) of this section. Such contents and any evidence

derived therefrom may be used under subsection (3) of this section when
authorized or approved by a judge of competent jurisdiction where such judge
finds on subsequent application that the contents were otherwise intercepted in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Such application shall be made
as soon as practicable.
Section 2517(3) is quoted supra note 28.
34

The government obtained authorization to intercept conversations concerning

the operation of an illegal gambling business on January 9, 1981. In the Matter
of the Application of the United States for An Order Authorizing the
Interception of Oral Communications, M.B.D. 81-12 (D.Mass. Jan. 9, 1981)
(order authorizing interception of oral communications). The intercepted
conversations introduced against Angiulo to support the charge of illegal
gambling were obtained on January 20 and 21, 1981 and in March, 1981. Thus
all intercepted conversations pertaining to the offense for which Angiulo was
convicted were fully authorized
The government was also authorized to intercept conversations pertaining to
conspiracy to obstruct and obstruction of state and local law enforcement on
February 6, 1981, and on April 3, 1981 obtained further authorization to
intercept conversations related to the federal offense of conspiring to obstruct
and obstruction of justice. In the Matter of the Application of the United States
for an Order Authorizing the Continued Interception of Oral Communications,
M.B.D. 81-12 (D.Mass. Feb. 6, 1981) (order authorizing interception of oral
communications); In the Matter of the Application of the United States for an
Order Authorizing the Continued Interception of Oral Communications, M.B.D.
81-12 (D.Mass. April 3, 1981) (order authorizing interception of oral
communications). The tape recordings that the government introduced into
evidence against Kazonis to support the obstruction of justice charges were
intercepted on March 24 and 25, 1981. Kazonis does not challenge the
propriety of the disclosure order allowing the government's use of
conversations related to the federal offenses of obstruction of justice, and we
find no evidence in the record that those conversations were not incidentally
intercepted or were purposefully obtained by subterfuge. Moreover, since they
were sufficiently related to the offenses that were the subject of bona fide
surveillance of 98 Prince Street, we find no fault with the disclosure order
allow their use by the prosecution. See United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d at
22-23. Cf. United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852, 866 (1st Cir.1984)
(government not required to obtain separate surveillance authorization in "rare
case" where elements of state offense, for which surveillance authorized,
paralleled federal offense for which government obtained indictment).

35

Kazonis points out, for example, that the government interpreted the flow of
one conversation as follows:
Gennaro Angiulo: Drink up Skinny, you might go away tomorrow.
William Kazonis: What reason? ... for what?
Gennaro Angiulo: Obstructing justice. Right Billy.
Kazonis's version of the same conversation, on the other hand, was as follows:
Gennaro Angiulo: Drink up Skinny, you might go away tomorrow.
Unknown male: What reason? ... for what?
Gennaro Angiulo: Obstructing justice. Right Billy.
Unknown male: ...
William Kazonis: Who they talking to?
Angiulo presents no separate arguments for need in relation to his own case, but
simply adopts, by reference, the arguments made by Kazonis on this point.

36

The defendants argue that since the Boston Globe reported that on March 19,
1981 the microphones were directly over the heads of Gennaro Angiulo and
Richard Gambale, the FBI must have disclosed the location of the microphones
to the press. They contend that if they had known the information reported in
that article at the time of trial, they could have questioned Gennaro Angiulo at
trial about where he was standing during his discussion with Gambale on that
day and thereby proved the precise location of the microphones

37

Its reasons were as follows: one juror had provided false or misleading
statements in responses to the government's questionaire; another was observed
as answering questions in a "flip" manner; the third was struck because of her
recent move to Boston and care of a small child, which the government thought
would cause her distractions; the fourth was from a small town where a number
of the defendants and their cousins resided

38

We reach the same conclusion with regard to the defendants' belatedly asserted
argument that the government's exercise of peremptory challenges violated their
rights "to an impartial jury" under the Sixth Amendment. Even assuming,
without deciding, that the Sixth Amendment applied to such a case, but cf.
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1764-65, 90 L.Ed.2d 137
(1986) (declining to extend Sixth Amendment "fair cross-section requirement"

to selection of petit juries), the defendants' failure to show that the eliminated
jurors with Italian-American sounding names were, in fact, members of an
Italian-American ethnic group within the community from which they were
drawn is fatal to their claim. United States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d at 834; see United
States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30, 33 & n. 2 (1st Cir.1987)