Robert Dold’s Post

I try to stay out of politics here, LinkedIn friends, but this crosses too far into 'the practical'. We all want to live in a world where US and allied interests are sufficiently defended by a smaller, less funded US military. However, it's hard to imagine anyone believing that is the world we live in today, or that will exist in the near-to-mid-term future. Should our DoD do its best to spend and invest funding wisely? Of course, it should; but at a time when global instability and the likelihood of larger conflicts are increasing is not the time to be allowing inflation to erode US military funding. Doing this only increases the odds of us not being prepared for what seems to be coming in the next few years, and reducing readiness to address real threats is not a recipe for the kind of "peace" we should be willing to accept.

I spent some of the weekend immersed in Dr Andrew Curtis OBE book "We Need To Talk About Defence" I am currently on Chapter 4 "Learning From The Present" an idiom that is easier to say than do in Defence but I recognise the analysis and hope those responsible for the (SDR 24) have been gifted a copy. SDR24 commissioned in July this year and while the UK Government has conducted at least one review of its defence policy in every decade since the Second World War recent iterations have broadened beyond purely defence considerations. In 2021 the previous government published the integrated review of Security, Defence, Development, and Foreign Policy but the unforeseen pace of geopolitical change, necessitated a refresh of that strategy in 2023. Today, Defence Secretary, John Healey launched the Government’s Defence Industrial Strategy and invited investors, innovators, industry and trade unions to give their views on how to grow a better, more integrated, more innovative and more resilient defence sector. While at the same time the MoD prepares war games to test weapon supplies amid a new strategy to assess the capability of the armed forces as reported in The Times today; although I vividly recall The Chief of the General Staff General Sir Patrick Sanders' speech at the RUSI Land Warfare Conference 2022 when talking about munitions supplies "Ammunition expenditure rates that would exhaust the combined stockpiles of several NATO countries in a matter of days". I think it is fair to say this in the context of a MOD black hole anything between £11BN and £29BN depending on which papers/report you read, "Defence Present" as set out in Andrew’s book and considerations including Security, Defence, Development, Foreign Policy and now also the UK Industrial Strategy, none of us envy the wicked problem the SDR Team has. It will indeed require a pan DLOD, pan entperise approach to address the challenges we face.

British Air Strategy after the "Battle of Britain". Following the latest war-facts from 1941-42 its looks that the GAF High Command underestimated the Allied war potential, including armaments and military performance by Allied forces in the mediterranean and Africa theatre of operations. In 1942 the RAF started its offensive with better technological, manpower and airplane capacity. It was a large-scale air strategy with many number of Halifax and Lancaster bombers, later including Mosquito the faster attacking bombers involve in night operation attacking the territory of the Reich. Then it was clear that the air Allied superiority of air offensive was over air defence in relation to tactical and technical resources both belligerent sides were implementing at this stage of the war by 1942-43. E.g., in May 1942 about 1.000 RAF bombers had battered Cologne and dropped 1.500 tons within a space of 1.5 hours, in 1943 the same sort of blow was carried out by 400 planes in 15 minutes. In addition, the attack to dams of the Eder and Mohne rivers as well the battle of Hamburg seriously sharpened the defence situation of the air German space. To the worst in 1943 the Mosquito activities rose to a large-scale,and at this time the GAF did not possess any pursuit plane capable of fighting Mosquito reconnaissance successfully, all desperate efforts had no result. The GAF lacked force to compensate this technical inferiority. In conclusion, I can say that the Allied air control was the first step to the final victory and the end of the air defence of the Reich. Allied industrial superiority was a real and a definitive factor to the unconditional surrender of Hitler Third Reich. See photo: Mosquito Bomber, Armourers winching a 4000 lb 'Cookie' into the bomb bay of the Mosquito of the Light Night Striking Force. (c) Author Copyright. Image: Stuart Howe, LACCS-Archive, 2024.

This Week in History On June 6th, 1944, Operation Overlord begins as Allied forces cross the English Channel to attack "Fortress Europe." In the pre-dawn hours, C47 Dakotas took to the sky in massive ‘V’ formations to carry the 101st and 82nd airborne divisions over the English Channel to landing zones behind German lines. Many pilots were disoriented during night-time evasive maneuvers as anti-aircraft fire erupted from the German coastal batteries. Airborne troops were scattered throughout the French countryside, often miles from their intended drop zones. Likewise, faced with heavier than expected artillery and mortar fire, landing craft dropped their troops off target and occasionally in water over their heads. It is an inauspicious beginning to the Day of Days and the largest amphibious assault the world had ever seen. And yet, the Allies prevailed. Not because of their plan (noun), which was shredded the instant the first shot was fired, but because of their planning (verb), which emphasized small unit tactics and included junior officer and senior enlisted troops in preparing for the D and D+1 objectives. This reliance on non-general officers to continually assess their situation and (to borrow a phrase) improvise, adapt, and overcome was in stark contrast to the strict hierarchy of the German military. Here are the two main lessons for investors from Operation Overlord: 1) The situation on D-Day was fluid and required rapid adjustments. Members of the Greatest Generation were up to the task, shifting lost troops and stray units to take crucial objectives.Thorough research and due diligence are crucial in investing before making any investment decisions. But your plan won’t win the day unless you are active, flexible, and decisive. 2) The D-Day operation relied on the collaboration of various experts and allied nations. Investors, too, can benefit from seeking advice and leveraging the expertise of professionals. 

Please take a moment to read and critique the attached short paper on the implications of recent missile warfare in the Middle East. Like many, I'm trying to enhance my understanding of these rapidly evolving form of warfare.

https://lnkd.in/dfx8FpPG The PLA’s Joint Sword 2024B Exercise: Continuing Political Warfare and Creeping Territorial Encroachment John Dotson October 30, 2024 On October 14, the PLA conducted the Joint Sword-2024B multi-service exercise in the air and sea space around Taiwan. This exercise included operations by the aircraft carrier Liaoning and supporting ships east of Taiwan, as well as a circumnavigation of the island by PRC Coast Guard vessels. There was a significant political warfare element to the exercise, with PRC propaganda depicting it as a reaction to supposedly provocative statements made by Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te. This exercise may be part of an emerging series of exercises intended to place continued pressure on Taiwan, and to prepare PLA personnel for a potential future blockade or other major military scenario. The political warfare element is key to understanding these and other recent PLA military exercises. The steadily gathering encroachment of PLA naval and aviation activity—a “boiling the frog” process of creeping in closer and closer, in measured stages—is intended to intimidate Taiwan’s population and its political leadership, and to erode the effective sovereignty that Taiwan’s government exercises over its territory. In this respect, the declaration of military operational areas that cross into Taiwan’s contiguous zone is a significant provocation: not an outright violation of territorial waters and airspace, but a violation of norms—and one that points ultimately in the former direction.  The political warfare element is also clearly displayed in the narrative framing that Beijing places around these planned exercises: consistently portraying them as an aggrieved reaction to “Taiwan independence” moves undertaken by Taiwan’s leaders. This narrative framing has been remarkably successful in coloring international media coverage of these events, which often uncritically follows PRC messaging—and thereby (at least implicitly) paints Taiwan as the instigator, rather than identifying Beijing as the aggressor.

Great report and observations on sustainability and medical on modern battlefield

In 2024, the nature of warfare is evolving, necessitating military readiness and resilience based on innovative solutions and strategic planning. Global conflicts are intensifying with heightened uncertainty. Ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Israel underscore a shift away from conventional warfare towards high operational tempo and the integration of advanced technologies by warring factions. This transformation challenges established military doctrines that relied solely on mass and technology for victory. A critical aspect shaping the changing defense landscape is the shortfall of artillery shells in Ukraine, underscoring the significance of diversification and inventive approaches. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has witnessed an unprecedented use of artillery, with Ukraine requiring more than 200,000 rounds per month, possibly four times higher than Russia's demand. Ukraine has appealed to the European Union for 250,000 shells monthly due to the unmet requirement. The actual European manufacturing capacity for shells remains undisclosed, although reports from February 2023 indicated inadequate capacity. In essence, the defense landscape of 2024 underscores the need for adaptability in the face of evolving warfare dynamics, where conventional strategies may not ensure success. Prioritizing creativity, strategic foresight, and technological advancements will be pivotal for military readiness and resilience in this shifting environment.

https://lnkd.in/dp97Kx9B Reality vs. Wishful-thinking Warfare Anyone paying sober attention to the invasion of Ukraine has witnessed the resurgent power of mass over finesse. Even when elegant, expensive weaponry works well, as in the air-defense realm, its utility is constrained by staggering cost differentials. Monday, July 1, 2024 By: Ralph Peters Anyone paying sober attention to the invasion of Ukraine has witnessed the resurgent power of mass over finesse. Even when elegant, expensive weaponry works well, as in the air-defense realm, its utility is constrained by staggering cost differentials. Employing a million-dollar missile against a fifty-dollar drone is unsustainable. In a war of even greater scope, such lopsided expenditures would shatter budgets as munitions stockpiles dwindled. If there is one description that definitely does not apply to the current American way of war, it is “cost-effective.” Indeed, the most appropriate term for our approach to general war or even neo-colonial dustups (“Iraqistan”) would be “wishful-thinking warfare.” Whether evaluating the follies of an individual or the behavior of a complex institution, never underestimate the seductive power of self-delusion and the ability of both lost souls and powerful decision-makers to perceive reality in the most convenient and comforting terms.