Peter Kesterton, MSc, FCMI, CMgr’s Post

FATO simultaneous OPS I recently received a question following up on my post about FATO (helicopter final approach and take-off areas) separation from runways and taxiways. “With flight instructors colleagues, we have had this question but we have different understanding of ICAO annex 14, Vol. II -helicopter FATO separation distances from runways. On take-off/Landing with a small airplane I have had the situation of "nearly" simultaneous OPS with a helicopter but not so clear for me finally because I thought about wake turbulence. Our question ? Helicopter H125 : MTOW : 2 250kg Airbus A320CEO : MTOW : 88 000 kg Ref. ICAO Annex 14 : distance between edge FATO and runway edge : 180m needed. If we understand correctly, if this distance is respected, may I land with my A320CEO simultaneously with a H125 without any other conditions (wake turbulence separation) ?” This is a very good question, and has been a finding several times when I have been auditing aerodromes with a FATO..  ICAO Annex 14 Vol 2's provision for separation between FATO and taxiways/runways is an aerodrome design criteria to permit simultaneous operations. Therefore, if the correct separation distances are provided, as you correctly state EDGE to EDGE, then simultaneous operations can take place SUBJECT TO ANY FLIGHT CRITERIA. The separation between a FATO and a runway does NOT supersede the requirement for wake vortex based separation. So wake vortex provisions still apply in addition to the design criteria and operation of separating FATO from taxiways and runway. ICAO reference is Annex 14 vol 2, Table 3-1, attached. Such issues are addressed in module 3 of my online Aerodrome Compliance course, more details at https://lnkd.in/e8fmxSqM #FATO #ICAO #airportdesign #aerodromestandards #flightsafety

Here is a a 1956 view of the operation of helicopters. Now, helicopters are far more capable, and used in huge variety of roles. From the aerodrome operator’s view point, two of the least observed ICAO recommended practices that I tend to find are (ICAO Annex 14 Vol 2): 6.2.4.1 At surface-level heliports, the operational objective of the RFF response should be to achieve response times not exceeding two minutes in optimum conditions of visibility and surface conditions. and Location of a FATO in relation to a runway or taxiway 3.1.56 Where a FATO is located near a runway or taxiway, and where simultaneous operations are planned, the separation distance between the edge of a runway or taxiway and the edge of a FATO shall not be less than the appropriate dimension in Table 3-1. FATO minimum separation distance for simultaneous operations. Aeroplane and/or helicopter mass..............Distance between FATO edge & ..................................................................................runway/taxiway edge up to but not including 3 175 kg ............................. 60 m 3 175 kg up to but not including 5 760 kg..............120 m 5 760 kg up to but not including 100 000 kg..........180 m 100 000 kg and over..........................................................250 m So, for most airports there should be at least 250m between the EDGES of a runway or taxiway and the FATO (helipad) to permit simultaneous operations. Find out more in Module 3 of my Aerodrome Compliance online course at https://lnkd.in/e8fmxSqM #heliports #aerodromestandards #runway #taxiway #FATO #airsideoperations #RFFS

The latest updates to ICAO Annex 14 include significant amendments that impact various design and operational standards for aerodromes. The key changes are: 1. **Revised Aerodrome Reference Code (ARC)**: The amendments introduce a new definition of "Outer Main Gear Wheel Span (OMGWS)" and modify ARC, now only considering wingspan without including OMGWS. 2. **Changes to Runway and Taxiway Design**: - **Runway Width**: Reduced to 45 meters for large aircraft with OMGWS from 9 to 15 meters (previously 60 meters). - **Taxiway Width**: Reduced to 23 meters for aircraft with OMGWS from 9 to 15 meters (previously 25 meters for Code F). - **Taxiway Shoulder Width**: Adjusted to 44 meters for Code F, 38 meters for Code E, and 34 meters for Code D. 3. **Reduced Separation Distances**: - **Runway-Taxiway Separation**: Reduced to 180 meters for Code 4 instrument runways (previously 190 meters). 4. **Runway and Taxiway Strip Widths**: For aerodromes with ARC number 3 or 4 (aircraft with a reference field length over 1200 meters), the runway strip width is reduced to 140 meters (previously 150 meters).

ATR Accident in Brazil - 09 Aug 2024 - Anything that can happen, it will, at some point in time, with someone and the consequences can be tragic. ⛔ Genesis ➡ Commercial aircraft have a very high degree of safety in their design and that includes stall protection and warning. By definition spin is yaw aggravated stall. Having said that unintentional direct entry into spin is possible ➡ Even though the Inquiry will determine the exact cause of the incident, after looking at the video there is little doubt that the aircraft has entered an unintentional spin, probably a flat spin. This is also confirmed by the flight radar data which shows that the aircraft was in a rate of descent of 8 to 24 thousand feet per minute in the last 60 seconds of its flight. ➡ Spin is a phenomena which is not understood by most in the aviation including pilots because it is never talked about and taught during training or even later. The mechanics and aerodynamics of spin are complex and not easy to understand. Anyone curious to know more about the basics of spin please click on the link below. https://lnkd.in/gwkWifg9 ⛔ Problem ➡ Intentional spin is prohibited by regulation and therefore cannot be demonstrated to trainees because recovery is not always guaranteed. ➡ All commercial aircraft are not cleared for intentional spin ➡ The experience level of instructors is not enough to demonstrate spin even if it was permitted. ➡ Lack of knowledge amongst the instructors prevents them from teaching in the classroom also. ➡ No emphasis on the topic by DGCA during examinations ➡ A combination of all the above leads to unawareness amongst the pilots, and should they do encounter it, they will have no idea what to do. ⛔ Solution ➡ Teaching of mechanics and aerodynamics of spin in the classroom should be mandatory during initial training ➡ It should also be part of annual recurrent training. If the manufacturer does not lay down specific recovery technique then atleast generic recovery should be discussed. ➡ DGCA should come out with a circular on spin which should include what is spin, how to recognize spin, recovery technique and prevention techniques. Even though tragic, every accident brings out the short comings in the system and we need to learn from them. The Golden rule is THAT THERE IS NOTHING IN AVIATION THAT CANNOT HAPPEN AND NO AMOUNT OF TECHNOLOGY WILL PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING. #dgca #airlines #spin #pilots #airsafety #atr #aircraftaccident

Step into the world of aviation safety with an in-depth overview of experimental testing 🛫 Wet runways play a significant role in runway excursions, with good airplane tire braking friction crucial for safe aircraft stops. The braking action is influenced by macro-texture (visible pavement roughness) and micro-texture (fine-scale roughness from individual aggregate particles). Both factors are pivotal for effective braking on wet surfaces. While there are established standards for macro-texture, there are none for micro-texture, prompting EASA - European Union Aviation Safety Agency to commission the development of minimum values and assessment methods. Collaborating with the German Aerospace Center (DLR), and the engineering advisory organization ESDU, we conducted this project to enhance runway safety by establishing standards for assessing micro-texture. In this comprehensive video, we embark on a journey through the key components of the project 📽 #EASA #AviationSafety #RunwayTesting

EASA - European Union Aviation Safety Agency proposes to issue a Certification Memorandum (CM) on "Certification of rotorcraft elastomeric components" The purpose of this Certification Memorandum is to provide specific guidance for CS-27 or CS-29 rotorcraft elastomeric component certification in the absence of a dedicated requirement and guidance material. Elastomeric components have been certified on rotorcraft since the 1940s and the number of those components entering the design of modern rotorcraft has increased over time. They are often part of helicopter rotor design (Spherical bearing, pitch control ends, damper rod end, damper body...) or interact with the fuselage design for suspension function (MGB coupling, engine mount, AVCS…). The major benefit introduced by this technology is to have an efficient and simplified system designed to react and accommodate loads and motions (angle and displacement). So far, no airworthiness requirement is specifically dedicated to elastomeric components. This CM addresses structural elastomer applications. Non-structural applications (e.g. seals such as O-rings) are excluded from this CM. For details: https://lnkd.in/dP9JNcNY #aviation #certification #sertifikasyon #helicopter #aircraft #rotorcraft

I was recently asked by a student why Annex 14 Vol 1 specifies different surface longitudinal and transverse gradients for the 4 different runway codes. ICAO uses aeroplane performance to define the 4 different aerodrome reference codes based on aeroplane reference field length. Therefore, aeroplanes for which the lower code numbers apply are slower moving, and for the most part, not jet powered.  Their landing and take-off speeds are significantly slower, therefore they are more tolerant of different slopes.  Also, if the criteria for code 4 runways were applied to all runways, then it would become non-financially viable to operate many small aerodromes.  It is better to think of it as the faster and heavier aeroplanes require much stricter criteria to be able to operate safely on runways than the lower reference code aeroplanes.  This is a great example of the value of my online Aerodrome Compliance course that enables students to pose questions at any stage during their study of the course.  Currently this course, and all other courses in my online school are available at a 25% discount. Have a look at Aerodrome Compliance at https://lnkd.in/e8fmxSqM To avail of the 25% discount, simply enter the code HOLIDAY24 when you check out your course. I am sure that there are many pilots out there who recall the bump in the runway at Perth when they trained on C310. That’s the Scottish Perth/Scone, not Australia! Perth/Scone does not have a Type A chart, but a little further north there is another runway where it is not possible to see the end from the threshold - Wick, EGPC, attached. #runway #aerodromestandards #aeroplaneperformance

ATR 72, a turboprop airliner that is very popular among airlines for operating commuter routes, suffered a horrific accident yesterday near Sao Paulo. After this accident, two questions remain among people and airlines: 1) How safe is an ATR 72 to operate in certain conditions? 2) What is the main cause of the flat spin that generated the Sao Paulo crash? It would be interesting to gain insights into these two questions from both technical and human factors perspectives. Also, it would be interesting to gain insights into the pilot and copilot's behaviour when the ATR 72 entered a stall condition. However, it is well known that ATR 72 is prone to certain conditions, like icing, due to the upward wings and flying at low altitudes, which can cause a decrease in the aerodynamic performance of the aircraft and a loss of engine performance during the flight. The icing was considered to be the main cause of the ATR 72 involved in the American Eagle 4184, TransAsia 791 and AeroCarribean 883 accidents. The airlines need to consider aspects like operating in environments like tropical and cold ones when deciding to put into service an aircraft like ATR 72 and improve the ATR 72 pilot training to include enhanced emergency procedures in case of a stall and flat spin condition of the aircraft. #safety #ATR72 #Brazil #accident #flatspin #stall https://lnkd.in/dWThTK9B

EASA - European Union Aviation Safety Agency ED Decision 2024/004/R Regular update of the aerodrome rules: Aerodrome safety and change of aerodrome operator | Occurrence reporting. The Decision amends the Acceptable Means of Compliance (AMC) and Guidance Material (GM) to Regulation (EU) No 139/2014 (the Aerodrome Regulation) to support stakeholders in implementing the recent amendments to the Regulation introduced through Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/894 and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1400. As regards the operation and organisation of aerodromes

Back to basics! It’s never to late to refresh our basics how to fly an airplane following only stick&rudder skills. And it’s even more important on such a modern and technology overloaded aircraft as Cirrus SR22T G6 version. Garmin Perspective+ and other features are the best tools on the market and they makes our life much more easier every single day when flying in severe CAVOK or hard IFR down to the minimums. To have an extra copilot on board is always pleasure and significantly help us to reduce possible crew overload. However from time to time system failure (electrical issue or fire) or just poor avionics management can easily lead to the situation when the best and only solution is to overtake his duty and fly an airplane following basic Aviate-Navigate-Communicate standards. Remember proper training is always better choice than suprise&startle! #fly #garmin #cirrusaircraft