National Strategic Research Institute (NSRI) at the University of Nebraska’s Post

Twenty years ago the Council on Foreign Relations released a report that stated incorporating nonlethal weapons and capabilities into the equipment, training and doctrine of the armed services could substantially improve U.S. military effectiveness. The Task Force also recommended that the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate (JNLWD) - now the Joint Intermediate Force Capabilities Office - receive a 7-fold increase in funding. The funding increase never occurred, but there is more at issue here than funding. One Task Force member made a very astute observation: “… no matter how well conceived by the Task Force and distinguished advisors - debate and discussion on the ‘who/ where /what level’ etc. of a JNLWD only serves to blur the need for political direction. NLW suffer a lack of prioritization by key civilian leaders. The fielding of a robust NLW capability requires that Congress (members and staff) and the administration (both the White House and the Defense Department) determine that NLW play an essential role in American defense policy. Only decisive political direction will enable NLW to compete with the plethora of mission critical program priorities.” Today, 28 years after Congress established a law mandating that the DoD have a formalized NLW program, these capabilities are not integrated into the equipment, training, and doctrine of the military in a meaningful way. This is despite almost three decades of significant technology advancements, prototype developments, military utility assessments, inclusion in wargames and repeated urgent operational need requests. Without visionary leadership, guidance and advocacy, non-lethal / intermediate force capabilities will never be available to support national security objectives such as pushing back on adversary aggression in the gray zone, minimizing civilian casualties in urban conflicts during major combat operations and/or during post-conflict stability operations, and enhancing critical infrastructure / force protection. The doctrinal foundation in particular has lagged the technology advancement, but that is unlikely to change without the aformentioned determination of the role of NLW in American defense policy. #nationalsecurity #defense #defenseinnovation #strategy

The concept of Joint Fires Network sounds pretty ambitious, and links together a bunch of existing capabilities to meet a real need. "...“The approach we’ve taken with the Joint Fires Network is to pull together a best-of-breed approach of Project Convergence from the Army, Overmatch from the Navy and Marine Corps and then ABMS from the Air Force along with the DARPA aspect of Assault Breaker II, to pull all those together and deliver a real near-time, best-of-breed solution to be able to command and control the joint force and ultimately close the kill chain,” [outgoing Indo-Pacom chief Adm. John Aquilino] told the Senate Armed Services Committee Thursday. “The way we have articulated it and linked it with the building … is we’re going to provide some insights into the further development of CJADC2 as it goes forward.” Assault Breaker II, modeled after the initial effort in 1978, aims to alter how the U.S. military thinks about designing, buying and deploying systems in the future using existing and emerging technologies across the services and commercial industry to address capability gaps. Budget documents note it’s critical to designing and fielding near-, mid- and far-term solutions to outpace adversaries..."

Utah’s aerospace and defense sector continues to grow in national importance, as revealed by the FY 2023 Defense Spending by State report. With a significant portion of the state’s GDP linked to defense contracts, Utah stands out for its contributions to missile defense, aerospace innovation, and military infrastructure. Key 47G member companies, such as Northrop Grumman, Albany International Corp., Boeing, Mortenson, RTX, BAE Systems, Raytheon, Nammo Defense Systems Inc., and Utah State University, have made tremendous strides. Northrop Grumman leads in solid rocket motors, while Albany International Corp. advances composite materials technology. Boeing and Raytheon are enhancing missile defense capabilities, and BAE Systems and Nammo are focused on precision-guided munitions and propulsion technologies. Utah State University's local expertise further enriches cutting-edge research and workforce development in the state. Together, these companies are not only advancing the U.S. defense mission but are also integral to the resilience and strength of Utah’s economy. Check out the full report here ↘ #aerospace #aerospaceanddefense #utahaerospace #northropgrumman #albany #boeing #mortenson #rtx #baesystems #nammo #utahstateuniverstiy #47G

When I was working the 2004 POM at the initial surge for the Global War on Terror, one of my more seasoned co-workers said that he remembered working the 1986 POM, at the height of the Reagan buildup, and it was the most difficult ever with all of the money they had. Every wish became a requirement. The force needs a re-balancing, for sure. During GWOT, there were also pressures on the Air Force like a US-Army-driven 90 ISR CAP that dramatically damaged the Combat Air Forces in terms of resources and manpower focus. The Pacific is the 800-lb gorilla that we currently face. But we seldom seem to fight where we expect to fight. The largest DoD problem is how we prioritize, budget, develop and buy things. We are literally fighting our enemies with both hands tied behind our backs. Everything we buy is easy 3x what it should be. All in the name of accountability to the taxpayer and a disciplined approach. Picket's charge was disciplined, orderly, and tragically stupid.

This is and incredible article portraying the future of hybrid warfare and it's implications for international security, this should be a central point of discussion during the Washington Summit of the NATO Alliance. The threats emanating from this type of tactics aren't just reserved to armed conflicts, they also affect the well functioning of societies during peace periods. As civil society we need to be aware of this threats and how they affect us.

NATO should embrace the concept of hybrid warfare and incorporate it into deterrence and defense, writes Benjamin Jensen with Frank Hoffman and Colonel Matt Neumeyer. See more in the #NATOFutures series: https://lnkd.in/esD4tybY

I’m astounded by the findings in the National Defense Commission's recent report that states we cannot fight two simultaneous battles and have insufficient equipment, technology and munitions. While we’ve seen the huge pull from Ukraine on artillery shells and the DoD is slowly turning the carrier around to ramp production—it’s forecast to take another 12 months to really be humming along. However, the routine Quadrennial Defense Review—which formally defines America’s defense strategy—has long stated the ability to fight two simultaneous conflicts in different parts of the world as a cornerstone policy. So now we are ill equipped to do this? And…we have insignificant technology for ourselves and our allies? What have we been spending money on?! I fear this is an example not only of “pork” spending and Congressional pet projects, but increasingly more complex programs that require massive investment such as F-35 and our upgraded ICBM network. While most programs are viable when viewed individually—one has to ask: Are we doing the right planning? How do we turn this around? Breaking Defense: https://lnkd.in/giWF25NG

We MUST defend the bases from which we project power. And, these bases ARE already in the first island chain. Fighting from these bases assures our allies, keeps the pressure on China, and enables attack density and initiative. If we aren’t there, we cede key initiative to China, end up on the wrong side of the cost equation, limit our attack magazine, and abandon our allies and partners who don’t have the luxury of changing their geography. The more we stand off, the more China stands in. Air base defense is doctrinally an Army job, and would be the best way for them to demonstrate relevance in the Pacific and contribute to the “joint fight”… but will they? Check out my colleague, Mike Dahm’s paper on base defense and why it’s crucial to operate out of the first island - and how we can do it. https://lnkd.in/ez9W2Tsq #natsec #nationalsecurity #indopacific #firstlslandchain #basedefense #airpower #airforce

"Air base defense is doctrinally an Army job." Not going to lie, that statement gave me pause, given our 'joint' construct--and especially in the context of a recent Mitchell institute paper on how USAF air bases should prepare to fight a potential fight in the Pacific. Someone needs to be doing it! Makes Admiral Paparo's recent USNI article on indispensable aircraft carriers all the more on point. "Carrier strike groups (CSGs) work continually to enhance their defenses and operational tactics to counter emerging threats, while adversaries seek new methods to challenge this dominance. Though the specifics are classified, methods for CSGs to project power and protect themselves include countertargeting, exoatmospheric ballistic-missile defense, and medium- and short-range air and missile defense. Through the combination of countertargeting, mobility, deception, electronic warfare, directed energy, and kinetic kill, a layered approach can provide defense-in-depth against and across enemy kill chains." https://lnkd.in/gqVNP9nw

“The overall level of funding is inadequate given today’s threat environment” Today, Mr. John Hill, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space and Missile Defense for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, LTG Thomas James, Deputy Commander US Space Command, Lt. Gen. Heath Collins, MDA Director, and LTG Sean Gainey, Commanding General, US Army SMDC testified in front of the House Armed Services Committee to discuss missile defense of the homeland, MDA budget cuts, and hypersonic glide defense. “I have a number of concerns just right off the bat here. First, the overall level of funding is inadequate given today’s threat environment, the fiscal year 25 budget requests $10.4 billion for the Missile Defense Agency. That’s more than $400 million less than last year and almost a billion dollars below the level projected for fiscal year 25 and last year’s FYDP. I want to reiterate this point. The fiscal year 25 budget request for the Missile Defense Agency is $960 million, almost a billion dollars below the level planned for in last year’s budget. Further, these draconian cuts are not limited to just fiscal year 25. The out year spending projections included in this budget envision continued reductions in missile defense spending compared to the spending plan in the budget submitted last year. This budget forecast cuts over $2.6 billion in missile defense funding between fiscal year 25 and fiscal year 28.” Rep. Doug Lamborn, Colorado’s 5th District