Jean-Pierre Halkin’s Post

🔔 In my latest policy brief, published by the Institute for Development and Diplomacy, a Baku-based think tank, I argue that the reciprocal return of exclaves to their respective de jure owners and adherence to internationally recognized borders offer the most viable path toward enduring peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Key insights from the brief include the following: - Given the economic and strategic significance of its exclaves, Azerbaijan is highly unlikely to agree to a straightforward land swap involving the exchange of its three exclaves (four villages) for one Armenian exclave. Even if Azerbaijan were to agree to a land swap deal, Armenia would not accept ceding additional territory - spanning well beyond its sole exclave - as a compensation for retaining Azerbaijan's three exclaves. - Both Armenia and Azerbaijan are likely to avoid resolving their border differences through popular referenda, which would be triggered in the case of any significant exchange of territories beyond minor border adjustments. Therefore, adhering to internationally-recognized de jure borders appears to be the most viable and pragmatic approach for both sides from a realist standpoint. - The exclaves do not have to be viewed as merely "territorial anomalies" that impede the peace process. They can serve as bridgeheads for building trust and confidence between Armenia and Azerbaijan. - The preservation of de jure borders is crucial for securing long-term peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is through this preservation and continuity that these inter-state borders will re-acquire and retain their legitimacy for generations to come. The full report titled "Armenia and Azerbaijan Should Return Each Other’s Exclaves: A Land Swap is Not the Best Policy Option" can be accessed here: https://lnkd.in/exuc-F6Z

Border semiotics new website: https://lnkd.in/e-ec2xak Have a look at the research we conduct at LISER about the changing significance of borders and their meaning-making capacity in different places and contexts

📑 In this new Centre for European Reform policy brief, Aslak Berg and I assess the impacts of the EU CBAM, one year after its implementation. What effects do we see on trade flows and trade discourse? What impacts has it had on climate policy? 1️⃣ Impacts on trade: so far, trade flows appear unaffected by the EU CBAM: importers of CBAM goods from outside the EU must already deal with bureaucratic costs like estimating embedded carbon and reporting on it, but CBAM will only impose carbon prices gradually and starting in 2026. 2️⃣ Impacts on trade discussions: CBAM has faced a lot of backlash from EU trade partners, particularly developing countries. Sure, carbon pricing gets a bad rap in general, but critics have pointed to CBAM as protectionist and discriminatory. China and India have threatened to challenge it at the WTO. 3️⃣ Impacts on climate policy: CBAM has had some positive spillovers on climate policy, leading governments worldwide to initiate or expand their own carbon markets. Have all these developments been directly caused by CBAM? Perhaps not, but CBAM has undoubtedly been a useful scapegoat in this sense.   4️⃣ Who’s most affected by CBAM? CBAM covers only a handful of industrial sectors for now – iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen. The countries that export the biggest volumes of these goods to the EU are mainly large rich economies, but developing countries will also take a hit. But looking at trade volumes only tells one part of the story. A country’s CBAM exposure depends on its dependence on exports to the EU, on its industries’ carbon emissions intensity, and on whether it applies a carbon price. 5️⃣ What impacts will CBAM have on industrial decarbonisation? The strongest impacts are yet to come. We will likely see some resource shuffling leading to split markets for CBAM goods, but this will be a temporary phase, until low-carbon goods become competitive with carbon-intensive counterparts. How quickly that happens will also depend on policy responses to CBAM outside the EU, and on how much regulatory pressure & investment support there is for decarbonisation in industry    6️⃣ Finally, our recommendations. At a time of rising trade protectionism, the EU should do all it can to avoid CBAM being perceived as a trade barrier. To avoid backlash, the EU should acknowledge its regressive impact on some of its trade partners and use CBAM revenues to mitigate it. To make CBAM an effective incentive for climate action, the EU should use CBAM revenues to support investments in industrial decarbonisation abroad, as part of its climate diplomacy. These efforts, at the intersection of green diplomacy and external investment strategy, should include financial aid, tech transfers, and capacity building for governments keen on adding carbon pricing to their policy mix. Read the full paper: https://lnkd.in/eayvKxnG

I write about the post-Galwan dialogue mechanism and border issue on @indfoundation. https://lnkd.in/gEcNT_iU

🌍 Breaking Down Borders! Check out how the B-Solutions project is tackling obstacles at EU borders, making cross-border cooperation smoother and more efficient. Learn how this initiative is adding value to people's lives. #EUinmyRegion #CrossBorderCooperation #Interreg

🌍 Breaking Down Borders! Check out how the B-Solutions project is tackling obstacles at EU borders, making cross-border cooperation smoother and more efficient. Learn how this initiative is adding value to people's lives. #EUinmyRegion #CrossBorderCooperation #Interreg

🌍 Breaking Down Borders! Check out how the B-Solutions project is tackling obstacles at EU borders, making cross-border cooperation smoother and more efficient. Learn how this initiative is adding value to people's lives. #EUinmyRegion #CrossBorderCooperation #Interreg

#30DayMapChallenge | Day 21: Conflict Border conflicts also happen at sea! What happens when neighbouring countries claim overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones? In some cases, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) steps in and draws the boundaries ⚖️. A maritime boundary dispute between Kenya and Somalia was resolved by a 2021 ICJ ruling, clearly shown by comparing v11 (2019) and v12 (2023) of Marine Regions’ Maritime Boundaries datasets. Download all versions of Maritime Boundaries at https://lnkd.in/eFx9PJ5N to explore other overlapping claims and court rulings 🌐 . Britt Lonneville Cyrielle Delvenne Salva Fernández Bejarano Lennert Schepers

💡 Want to learn more about the work of EFTA Surveillance Authority? 📘 Our 2023 Annual Report is now out and an overview of ESA’s work and priorities last year. Read more and download the report ⤵ https://lnkd.in/evhN798n Mission of Norway to the EU Embassy of Iceland Brussels Stefan Barriga Árni Páll Árnason Maroš Šefčovič EFTA EFTA Court European Commission Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iceland EEA and Norway Grants #Iceland #liechtenstein #Norway #law #internalmarket #singlemarket #EEA #europeanunion #EU #Europe

How Government Policies Fit Help or Scatter your JAPA Plans! Let's discuss it in the 5th Episode of The Blue Table Talk series! In this episode of the Blue Table Talk Series, Host Enitan Oteju Ibironke discusses the "The role of governments in addressing irregular migration, including border control and the provision of safe and legal pathways for migration for Nigeria is key and should be guided with the right procedures, processes and support to those who wish to migrate https://lnkd.in/dPtEeBMC