It’s not hard to phish-proof your comms. Why have I seen three cases of bank impersonation fraud this week? 📱 Criminal rings, impersonating the ANZ fraud department. The customer is told there’s fraudulent activity. 1️⃣2️⃣3️⃣4️⃣Codes then appear on their phone (via text) and the fake-fraud team even know the retailer and value. It’s incredibly plausible when they’ve named the transaction, then the text appears. The criminal has the online shopping pages open, ready to confirm payment with the stolen creditcard. They push “pay” at the right moment in the conversation with multiple transactions. 😵💫Then with a final flourish “we need to cancel your card, but can’t do that until we’ve cancelled each transaction. We need to input the visa-secure code into our system to reverse the purchase”. Again plausible to an ANZ customer. The message doesn’t contain an “effective warning” (a defined term in the UK). The customer isn’t told never to give a code to anyone, including staff. 💪🏻The Barclays customer is far better armed. The strength of messaging is in sharp contrast. ☎️ Note ANZ give out a phone number. The British Bank doesn’t. Why? Because phone numbers are just like links. A scammer can imitate the format of a message with a different phone number. If you train customers to call the number on your text messages, how can you blame them when they call the number sent by the fake fraud team. ✅The customer needs to look up the phone number themselves. Or, in the UK you can dial 159. That’s a number set up by the banks. It connects you safely to your bank and it can’t be spoofed. So far 400,000 customers have used it. 🛟 159 is the 111 of banking. Whats grossly unfair is banks have failed to phish-proof their 2FA, failed to place an effective warning and are using inferior security (text based codes). This was unauthorised fraud, but the customer gets held responsible. ANZ are currently offering 50% of the losses. Even worse, the Banking Ombudsman appears to agree this is acceptable and have a case study just like this awarding 50%. I’ve even seen a case where 25% repayment was accepted as the victim feared getting nothing. 💥 So your customer gets defrauded and ANZ play games with low ball offers - scammed for the second time, but by their own bank. We have to ban this type of conduct. These are victims of crime. Natasha McFlinn Kevin Green Kirsty Tones Jeremy Williams - CAMS, CGSS Ramon Reyes Jayden Howlett Jeff Napp Peter Plowman Ashley Kai Fong Joshua Begley ANZ Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bank of New Zealand ASB Bank Westpac New Zealand Kiwibank FMA Banking Ombudsman Scheme (NZ) Nicola Sladden Andrew Bayly Antonia Watson Dan Huggins Catherine McGrath Vittoria Shortt Steve Jurkovich Netsafe New Zealand Brent Carey CERT NZ Consumer NZ Jon Duffy Aneleise Gawn Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment Roger Beaumont #scam #fraudprevention
Ironically I’m finding genuine OTP messages are being reported back to me that the client thought it was fraud or a scam message, when we’re using our company name in the messaging and have talked to the client about what to expect… The lack of understanding by the public, and the mixed messaging on what is or is not an issue is also part of the problem here. We instigated OTP as an additional 2FA to help manage possible e-mail account compromise and the resulting experience from clients has been eye-opening. Thankfully, we are talking document-level transactions and not banking or money transactions, what I’ve seen would be horrifying to manage at a banking level. Part of the problem is all of “this” (finance, banking, technology) is seen by the general public as too hard for them to understand. That preconceived attitude people have coming into this is putting up barriers before people even get started on understanding things. It's not complicated, people need to: * slow down * stop and read messages * think about what they are doing. * And make sure the dots join up correctly. If they don't, then they need to ask more questions. As Einstein said, if you can't explain it simply you don't understand it well enough.
Banking should never have introduced 2FA via TXT/SMS. They should rather use TOTP through generator apps, or better hardware authentication keys (e.g. Yubikey) instead.
Why do banks not understand: NO LINKS in text messages.
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7moObviously if you can set this out so clearly but ANZ can't fix it then it's logical to believe it's actually a policy from ANZ not to fix it. That should make them liable for 100% plus punitive damages.