Hector Torres’ Post

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Former IMF Executive Director

Very interesting analysis by Guzmán and Stiglitz of which I highlight two particularly valuable elements: a)       The foreseeable effects of IMF financing: A balanced and adequate “dose” of IMF financing could facilitate a government's ability to return to the capital market, commonly referred as the "catalytic effect". However, an "overdose" of financing from a preferential creditor can have the opposite impact, creating a "crowding out" effect. If the private sector deems the that the sovereign is over-indebted to a preferential creditor (the IMF), this will diminish confidence, reducing the likelihood of re-engaging with private capital markets.  b)      Assumptions in DSA: Econometric projections are never done in a "chemically pure" environment. Debt sustainability analyses (DSAs) are no exception. All DSAs rely on certain assumptions and weights of variables, and subjectivity inevitably plays a role. As Guzmán rightly pointed out the 2018 program hinged on a political assumption: Macri’s re-election.  This assumption was critical, as it underpinned the second, that Argentina would regain access to the private capital market. While I agree with Guzmán on this point, it is important to acknowledge that the IMF, when assisting a country in the proximity of a presidential election, inevitably must make some assumption regarding the results of the next election. The 2018 election, as any other, was bound to have consequences on market expectations about Argentina’s ability to regain market access. However, this does justify the IMF’s decision to disburse 80% of a massive U$S 57 billion program during the rest of Macri’s term, effectively leaving the burden to the next government.

The Practice of Sovereign Debt Sustainability Analysis

The Practice of Sovereign Debt Sustainability Analysis

https://ipdcolumbia.org

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