Ouf…. The Willow chip is not capable of breaking modern cryptography,” Google Quantum AI director and COO Charina Chou. #Google #Quantum #cryptography #security
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Quantum is unimportant to post-quantum: https://lnkd.in/gfi5uHfh #crypto #quantum #infosec #cryptography #informationsecurity #cybersecurity
Quantum is unimportant to post-quantum
http://blog.trailofbits.com
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Although currently there are no quantum computers capable of breaking existing cryptographic schemes, now is the time to start the preparations since making the transition to PQC is expected to be difficult and costly. NIST IR 8547 outlines NIST’s strategy for migrating from current cryptographic algorithms vulnerable to quantum computing attacks to quantum-resistant alternatives. You may read more about this essential publication on my latest blog for the Information Security Buzz.
🔐 Preparing for the Quantum Era National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has unveiled its draft strategy for transitioning to post-quantum cryptography, addressing the looming "harvest now, decrypt later" threat. Read about the phased approach and why early preparation is key. 🔗Learn more: https://lnkd.in/g_JWfbBi Anastasios Arampatzis Tomas Gustavsson #PostQuantum #Cryptography #ISBNews
NIST Publishes Draft Strategy for Post-Quantum Cryptography Transition
https://informationsecuritybuzz.com
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Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standards by the American NIST are out, and as mentioned in this EDN: Voice of the Engineer's article, Xiphera is also reacting to the finalised standards. Our xQlave® PQC family and its IP cores, ML-KEM for quantum-secure key exchange and ML-DSA for digital signature algorithm, follow the final PQC standards from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Learn more about xQlave® family of Post-Quantum Cryptography: https://lnkd.in/dzHn35dE #PQC #cryptography #NIST #standards
While #quantum #computers seem like a thing of future, post-quantum #cryptography #PQC is already here, thanks to #NIST standards. https://lnkd.in/eV2S2m2N
PQC algorithms: Security of the future is ready for the present - EDN
https://www.edn.com
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It will probably take many years, if not decades, to fully transition to post-quantum cryptography. Until that happens, any messages sent with the old forms of cryptography will be potentially readable with a future quantum computer. Depending on how long you're hoping to keep a secret, the time for concern might already have passed…
Tomorrow's Quantum Computers Threaten Today's Secrets. Here's How to Protect Them
scientificamerican.com
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Researchers #crack #RSA and #AES #dataencryption - This breakthrough has dramatically elevated the significance of #QuantumResistantCryptography, post-quantum cryptography, and decentralized technologies. https://lnkd.in/gt3Cccf3
Researchers crack RSA and AES data encryption | DISC InfoSec blog
https://blog.deurainfosec.com
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At the MADweb 2024 Workshop last week, Will Childs-Klein presented our new paper exploring time-to-last-byte as a metric to assess the total impact of data-heavy, quantum-resistant algorithms on real-world TLS 1.3 connections. Although previous works have been important in quantifying the slowdown in connection establishment, they did not capture the full picture regarding total connection time. Our paper shows that connections which transfer sizable amounts of data will be impacted by the new algorithms much less than the TLS 1.3 handshake itself especially under good network conditions. ML-KEM or ML-DSA will have some impact especially on the more constrained traffic profiles, but they do not seem like the deal-breaker for the total time of already poorly performing connections. That, of course, does not mean that trimming down the handshake data is undesirable, especially for applications that transfer small data sizes. For a summary of the most important findings of this work, refer to our AWS Science Blog post https://lnkd.in/ezSHfmeC For more details on our experiments and the full analysis, refer to the full paper https://lnkd.in/eE-SDexJ
Studies of the delays caused by quantum-computer-proof cryptographic protocols have focused on handshake time, or “time to first byte.” Amazon researchers show that instead using time to *last* byte — or overall transfer time — to assess the effects of post-quantum protocols on data-heavy transfers over real-world TLS 1.3 connections yields more encouraging results. #PostQuantumCryptography #Cryptography
Delays from post-quantum cryptography may not be so bad
amazon.science
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With the release of new post-quantum encryption standards, organizations need to manage the process of adoption and implementation. #quantum #encryption #cryptography https://lnkd.in/g4XEpKqG
The Quantum Leap in Cybersecurity: A New Era of Challenges
https://www.eetimes.eu
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After few days reading posts about post-quantum cryptography and the NIST proposed standards, I found this article very well explained. The new standards are ML-KEM, ML-SDA, and SLH-DSA. “The ML-KEM algorithm is somewhat similar to the kind of public-private encryption methods used today to establish a secure channel between two servers, for example. At its core, it uses a lattice system (and purposely generated errors) that researchers say will be very hard to solve even for a quantum computer.” OpenSSH 9.0, released on April 2022, brings by default lattice grids, the changelog file said: —- the hybrid Streamlined NTRU Prime + x25519 key exchange method by default ("sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com"). The NTRU algorithm is believed to resist attacks enabled by future quantum computers and is paired with the X25519 ECDH key exchange (the previous default) as a backstop against any weaknesses in NTRU Prime that may be discovered in the future. The combination ensures that the hybrid exchange offers at least as good security as the status quo. —— Harvest now, decrypt latter, is what hackers are doing now while listen communications, read files, or blocks in a blockchain encrypted with RSA. Step by step, we have solutions to remediate it👌🏻
The first post-quantum cryptography standards are here | TechCrunch
https://techcrunch.com
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Cryptography is everywhere: phones, webbrowsers, cars, satellites, pacemakers, and even dishwashers depend on it for secure communications. The problem is, cryptographic keys in use today can quite easily be broken with quantum computing. This means the Internet needs to move to post-quantum cryptography. This article by Bas Westerbaan gives a great overview of developments and what needs to happen to keep the Internet safe. https://lnkd.in/egM3E5EC #cybersecurity #internet #cryptography #postquantum #pq
The state of the post-quantum Internet
blog.cloudflare.com
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🔐 Systems relying on #cryptography might soon be facing security challenges due to the rise of #quantum computers. This means that systems of #digitalidentity, #banking, messaging and more can be in danger of being broken into. 💭 Cybernetica’s junior researcher focusing on cryptography Jelizaveta Vakarjuk discusses in the newest blog post the origins of pre- and post-quantum cryptography, and in which ways quantum adversaries can pose a danger to the Internet. ⬇️ Read more below!
The new era of safeguarding services relying on cryptography | Cybernetica
cyber.ee
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