New H-Diplo Article Review: Brian Cuddy on Mary Ann Heiss's “Presidential Cold War Doctrines: What Are They Good For?” Diplomatic History 48, no. 1 (2024): 1-19. https://lnkd.in/em-Q23qC "When trying to make sense of significant stretches of time in the history of US foreign relations, what anchor points might historians profitably use to ground their arguments and narratives? In her 2023 SHAFR Presidential Address, Mary Ann Heiss suggests that the publicly proclaimed “doctrines” of US presidents are an especially useful set of artifacts for exploring and explaining the foreign policy of the United States during the Cold War. As “performative pieces crafted with the express purpose of advancing a foreign policy goal or principle,” the eponymous doctrines of presidents Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan “can be invaluable vehicles for scholars today” (3). Whereas previous historians have “primarily considered individual doctrines in relative isolation from each other,” Heiss’s contribution is to consider them together as a means of tracking “the evolving conception of the U.S. national interest” across the Cold War years (3). In her consideration of the six Cold War presidential doctrines, Heiss identifies two main areas of change over time. Geographically, Heiss uses the presidential doctrines to trace the shifting focal point of US Cold War policy from Western Europe to other parts of the world, especially the Middle East (the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Carter Doctrine) and Latin America (the Kennedy Doctrine, the Johnson Doctrine). The connecting line Heiss draws among the six doctrines is not unilinear. Geographic commitments can contract, as with the Nixon Doctrine, as well as expand. But if there is a general trend that Heiss identifies across the doctrines, it is towards the accrual of more global commitments. The Nixon Doctrine did not just signal a drawdown of US forces in Southeast Asia, for example, but also “initiated a major transfer of U.S. military equipment to friendly states in the Persian Gulf region” (14). This trend is fully realized in the Reagan Doctrine’s universal orientation, which is “not bound geographically” to any particular region of the world, but committed to supporting, in Reagan’s own words, “those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression” (17)...
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Trouble on Route 40 -- A Talk at the Cecil County Public Library THE HISTORY OF THE ROAD AND ITS CONNECTIONS TO THE COLD WAR, CIVIL RIGHTS, SOVIET UNION & PRES. KENNEDY THUR., MAY 23, 2024, 6:30 p.m. CECIL COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARY - ELKTON BRANCH After tracing the history of Route 40 over generations, this program discusses how, in the early 1960s, the roadway between Baltimore and the Delaware Memorial Bridge became an unexpected battleground--a place where Cold War tensions, international diplomacy, and the civil rights movement intersected. Along this heavily traveled 63-mile stretch of road through northeastern Maryland and Delaware, powerful forces collided: communist propagandists, Jim Crow segregation, the Kennedy administration, and Freedom Riders. The spotlight fell on this unassuming highway as the Soviet Union and the United States vied for influence in Africa. From its origins to its enduring impact, we explore the road’s significance, shedding light on the complex interplay of unexpected global and domestic forces that shaped its story. It is a free program, but registration is required. Click the link for more information or to register for the program.
Trouble on Route 40: A Library Talk - Mike's History Blog
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I'm still processing an amazing experience... A couple weeks ago I had the honor of leading a delegation of LA-based screenwriters to NATO to learn about the Alliance, why it matters, and what its story is - and what it should be. Seeing this alliance that many of us work so hard to uphold through their eyes was truly inspiring. It was like putting on a new set of glasses, or walking into a room that I didn't previously know existed. I saw NATO differently. I saw how we can approach strategic problems differently. In world of policy dorkery, we start our analyses with the facts, numbers, and data points. The screenwriters showed me what an empathy-forward approach to policy analysis can look like - and the power of human connection to solve the world's hardest problems. Speaking of connection - Daniel Fata was a part of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) side of the delegation and it was just wonderful to be working alongside him again. He was a terrific boss in the Pentagon and is an incredible collaborator, mentor and friend today. Alexis Day and Audrey Aldisert were rock stars making all the movements happen seamlessly. We are so grateful to our friends in NATO's Public Diplomacy Division Kevin Leland Prager, Megan Minnion and Lucrezia S. for everything they did to pull off an outstanding program. And this would not have happened without the visionary leadership of Julianne Smith, the United States Permanent Representative to NATO and her amazing public affairs team including Jesse Shaw. There's more to follow and I can't wait to share what our next steps will be with you! #nato #policy #writing #screenwriter #creative #strategy #creativestatecraft #statecraft #story #storytelling #defense #nationalsecurity
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#OTD in 1946, American #diplomat George Kennan, sent a telegram from Moscow to the #US #statedepartment (#LongTelegram) which shaped the US #policy towards Soviet #Russia during the #coldwar. Many of Kennan's insights about Russia remain relevant today. Here are 7 that I find particularly interesting: 1. On the roots of Russian foreign policy: Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are inextricably confused. (…) At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. (…) Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it. 2. On the relations with the West: USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence. (…) no opportunity must be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as individually, of capitalist powers. 3. On Russia's approach to negotiations: This is only in line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is doming. For the other 4 insights please see the comments. #foreignpolicy #ukraine
George F. Kennan - Wikipedia
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Two new essays explore possible foreign policy paths under either candidate. Ben Rhodes, former deputy national security adviser under President Barack Obama, discusses a Biden strategy for a second term that is clear-eyed about the limits of American influence—something he also explores in this week’s episode of The Foreign Affairs Interview. And Robert O’Brien, who served as Trump’s national security adviser, outlines what Trump’s foreign policy priorities could look like. Rhodes writes that Joe Biden’s early presidency emphasized the slogan “America is back,” signaling a pivot from Donald Trump’s leadership and aiming to restore the U.S. as a virtuous hegemon within a rules-based international order. Additionally, the old international order is fractured, with institutions like the UN Security Council and the World Trade Organization hamstrung by member disagreements, while countries like China and Russia push for alternative orders. For Biden’s administration to effectively lead, it must shift away from old policies and adapt to a world that no longer revolves around American primacy, recognizing that future global stability requires new, inclusive strategies. https://lnkd.in/g85DgYdg Robert C. O’Brien on the other hand makes the case that the Latin phrase "Si vis pacem, para bellum" means "If you want peace, prepare for war," a concept dating back to Roman emperor Hadrian. U.S. leaders like George Washington, Theodore Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan have echoed this sentiment, emphasizing military strength to ensure peace. Donald Trump revived this ethos, advocating "peace through strength" and avoiding new wars, while achieving several diplomatic successes, such as the Abraham Accords and maintaining stability with adversaries like Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Trump’s foreign policy aimed to rectify perceived failures of neoliberal internationalism, emphasizing realism and strategic alliances. A potential second Trump term would continue this approach, focusing on strength and pragmatic diplomacy. https://lnkd.in/g7XJ_9rN #ForeignPolicy #GlobalLeadership #InternationalRelations
The Return of Peace Through Strength
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New review essay: Emily Conroy-Krutz on "The Monroe Doctrine at 200,” _Diplomatic History_, Vol. 47, Issue 5 (November 2023): 731-870. https://lnkd.in/e3H9VNJ8 "Two hundred years ago this past December, US President James Monroe delivered his Annual Address to Congress. By 1823, the United States had been watching revolutions unfold in Latin America for nearly a decade and anxiously observing the European creation of the Holy Alliance, which aimed at the containment of republicanism. In the midst of the routine comments, Monroe included a few paragraphs on foreign relations, largely written by his Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams. 'Our policy in regard to Europe,' he writes, is 'not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers.' At the same time, however, the United States would view any attempt to colonize or re-colonize the Americas as 'dangerous to our peace and safety.' The address, in short, asserted the United States’ intention to remain aloof from European affairs and its desire that Europe would stay out of the Americas in turn. If the address was met without fanfare in its own time—after all, the United States was a weak power with no ability to put force behind Monroe’s words—within a few decades it had been elevated to the status of Doctrine-with-a-capital-D. For the generations that followed, it proved to be a rather flexible doctrine, changing its meaning to reflect the political needs of those who invoked it. The confusion continues today: half of the students in my foreign relations course this fall came into class understanding the Monroe Doctrine to be about isolationism, while the other half saw it as a call for interventionism. That mixed legacy is precisely why the Monroe Doctrine matters today. As the essays in this forum reveal, studying the Monroe Doctrine can not only tell us a great deal about the US in the 1820s, but about ongoing debates about US foreign relations in general (even up to our present moment), about US relations with Latin America in particular, and about Latin American efforts over two centuries to turn the United States into a good neighbor. It is appropriate that the essays in this forum do not present a unified vision of the Monroe Doctrine. The Doctrine, after all, was nothing if not multi-faceted..."
AR1207.pdf
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A great article to share with you!
Lieutenant General (Ret.). Expert on geopolitics and international affairs. Senior adviser Norwegian Atlantic Committee. President Norwegian Defence Association. 1st Vice President Norwegian Confederation of Sports.
It is a most excellent piece written by Timothy Snyder on Russian history. And this history is immensely important to be reminded about. https://lnkd.in/d75fAEXJ
Opinion: Russia can lose this war | CNN
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Thrilled to see the publication of "Chaim Weizmann: A Biography"! As a research assistant, I'm proud to have played a small part in shedding light on the legacy of a leader who valued diplomacy and statesmanship. In an era where short-term gains often overshadow long-term vision, it's crucial to remember leaders like Weizmann who understood the importance of "the day after." #History #NewBook
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Two new essays explore possible foreign policy paths under either candidate. Ben Rhodes, former deputy national security adviser under President Barack Obama, discusses a Biden strategy for a second term that is clear-eyed about the limits of American influence—something he also explores in this week’s episode of The Foreign Affairs Interview. And Robert O’Brien, who served as Trump’s national security adviser, outlines what Trump’s foreign policy priorities could look like. Rhodes writes that Joe Biden’s early presidency emphasized the slogan “America is back,” signaling a pivot from Donald Trump’s leadership and aiming to restore the U.S. as a virtuous hegemon within a rules-based international order. Additionally, the old international order is fractured, with institutions like the UN Security Council and the World Trade Organization hamstrung by member disagreements, while countries like China and Russia push for alternative orders. For Biden’s administration to effectively lead, it must shift away from old policies and adapt to a world that no longer revolves around American primacy, recognizing that future global stability requires new, inclusive strategies. https://lnkd.in/gbD53CXY Robert C. O’Brien on the other hand makes the case that the Latin phrase "Si vis pacem, para bellum" means "If you want peace, prepare for war," a concept dating back to Roman emperor Hadrian. U.S. leaders like George Washington, Theodore Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan have echoed this sentiment, emphasizing military strength to ensure peace. Donald Trump revived this ethos, advocating "peace through strength" and avoiding new wars, while achieving several diplomatic successes, such as the Abraham Accords and maintaining stability with adversaries like Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Trump’s foreign policy aimed to rectify perceived failures of neoliberal internationalism, emphasizing realism and strategic alliances. A potential second Trump term would continue this approach, focusing on strength and pragmatic diplomacy. https://lnkd.in/gTxaC_bP #ForeignPolicy #GlobalLeadership #InternationalRelations
The Return of Peace Through Strength
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OPINION || Global Surge of Authoritarianism: A Threat to Democracy, Freedom, and Human Rights Author: Wania Jahangir Khan is a dedicated scholar specializing in Defence and Diplomatic Studies, with a particular focus on the South Asian region. Her academic pursuits involve a deep exploration of diplomatic engagements and strategic alignments between nations, emphasizing the analysis of geopolitical shifts, policy implications, and bilateral cooperation. Read the complete article at https://lnkd.in/dggYuM-V
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New H-Diplo Article Review: Richard Fieldhouse on Matthew Gerth's “Götterdämmerung Averted: Winston Churchill, Flensburg and the Unthinkable,” _Diplomacy & Statecraft_, 35:1 (2024): 36-63 https://lnkd.in/eRsfcJS9 "Wars rarely finish cleanly, most come to a ragged end, and World War II was no different in this respect. Among the ragged ends was the continuation of the Third Reich government in Flensburg, northern Germany under Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz and the question of why the Allies only took final control there two weeks after the German surrender. In his article “Götterdämmerung Averted: Winston Churchill, Flensburg and the Unthinkable,” Matthew Gerth argues that the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill wanted to use remaining elements of the German army to launch an attack on Britain’s then ally, the Soviet Union. For a politician with a longstanding dislike of Communism who a quarter of a century earlier had supported British intervention in the aftermath of the Russian revolution with the aim of ensuring its overthrow, this represented a logical continuation of his previous approach, adapted to the new circumstances of 1945. However, in order to pursue this aim he needed a German authority with whom he could negotiate. Dönitz’s government could provide this and his government in Flensburg on the Baltic was thus left untouched in the immediate post-surrender period while Churchill pursued his policy...."
AR1224.pdf
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