Daniel Friedlaender’s Post

#CSAR: It looks like the Belgian EU Presidency is upping the pressure to reach a deal on the #ChildSexualAbuse Regulation this Thursday, despite widely held concerns this would ❌ come at the expense of Europeans’ right to #privacy and #encryption. 🔐 In this new blog post, our expert Claudia Canelles Quaroni explains how this would be a fundamental mistake and which four remaining problems still need to be addressed. 👇 #CSA #CSAM #EUvsChildSexualAbuse #EU2024BE #ChatControl #Chatkontrolle #EndToEndEncryption #DigitalEU #CCIAeurope https://lnkd.in/egzjPeem

In the modern digital landscape, it's more important than ever to protect data #privacy rights. Zeotap explains how a #CustomerDataPlatform can help businesses do so. https://lnkd.in/eUQ9B8UX From the CDP Institute Library.

Police and security services in Australia are using Grindr in similar ways. Not to uphold the law. But to target political opponents of senior politicians. Premier Daniel Andrews famously instructed his staff to "dig up dirt" on Victoria's anti corruption commissioner. This is one of the mechanisms they are using. I'm certain of it, because the messages I received once I got back to Australia are unlike any that I received elsewhere (perhaps other countries are more subtle). It's interesting watching the debate in Australia over children's access to Facebook (https://lnkd.in/gbm66Kcp) ... the difficulty of verifying their identity because they don't need to have ID at that age. The simple thing to do would be to require adult applications (like Grindr) to verify users to verify that they are adults before they can use them, on the basis that adults have to have ID. If they don't have ID, don't let them use the platform. Security services in Australia, like ASIO and even Victoria Police, are using Grindr to try to set everyday Australians up for blackmail. Not because they've done anything wrong. They are doing it for political and economic purposes. They are engaged in domestic terrorism and have no great desire to regulate to get the vendors to tighten up their controls. The industrial sabotage of the Murray Goulburn Dairy Cooperative is just one example. Here's a dossier I put together on former Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, who is working for one or more foreign governments against the interests of tens of millions of Australians - https://lnkd.in/g2nEaSs8 . Check out Downer's links to BREXIT, and the Greensill Scandal. Note the link between right wing extremism in Australia and emerging slavery - https://lnkd.in/gX7sqEXC . ==> I read a recent article that disclosed governments aren't interested in restricting data being gathered by large scale platform technologies. They aren't worried about privacy concerns. Rather, governments want to participate in the exploitation of that data. The question arises, why? The only answer can be "control". Then the question arises, what sort of control? Hint: it has nothing to do with protecting children, nor adults, nor defending democracy. When you start to see the regulatory arbitrage going on between the Five Eyes, and how that's being used against the interests of everyday people, then you know that something is going terribly wrong with democracies. ==> https://lnkd.in/g6ejBwXg . ==> https://lnkd.in/gkDQH9gU . ==> https://lnkd.in/gPeJerzK . ==> https://lnkd.in/gqHTS8RY .

🚨 New #CSA Regulation Proposal by the EU Council is rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic Belgian Presidency of the Council of European Union 2024's new proposed approach to the #CSA Regulation still raises serious concerns for people's safety and privacy online. Here are some of the major red flags the EDRi network has identified: 🔴Broad #DetectionOrders: The proposal still allows for overly broad issuance of detection orders. 🔴Recommendations based on statistical misunderstandings: Suggestions for repeated flagging reporting are based on statistical misunderstandings. 🔴Threat of weakening #encryption & applying #AgeVerification: The proposal urges the use of widespread age verification despite many known risks, and the turn-off of encryption by default. 🔴Making the EU Commission the ultimate decider on risk criteria: Relying on the EU Commission for risk criteria decisions, despite serious allegations of non-impartiality surrounding the Commissioner in charge of CSAR and DG HOME’s alleged closeness with the surveillance tech industry and targeting of manipulative online adverts based on protected characteristics. Read EDRi's assessment of the new proposal and share your thoughts in the comments: https://lnkd.in/dyXH4Xcn EDRi's blog on Belgium’s latest move on #CSAR is dedicated to our esteemed colleague Professor Ross Anderson, a bold and important voice in our collective work on the EU’s CSA Regulation and a part of EDRi since our inception in 2002. He will be deeply missed.

Digital accessibility is legally required, and leaving your PDFs inaccessible can lead to thousands of dollars (or more) in lawsuits and fines. Learn how to avoid them in today's blog. https://hubs.la/Q02W8B8f0 #a11y #accessibility #inclusion #Compliance #ADA

Digital rights worsened across ten countries in Central & Southeast Europe in 2023-24 due to restrictive legislation, malicious use of artificial intelligence, hate speech and the failure of major tech companies to prioritise rights and freedoms, warns Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN)'s #DigitalRights Violations Annual Report 2023-2024. Findings: - hate speech and disinformation remain an issue, with discrimination, genocide denial, foreign influence and disinformation continuing to mar digital spaces in the region, with the most prominent examples in #BosniaHerzegovina, #Montenegro and #NorthMacedonia; - phishing attempts across the region, cyber attacks and weak responses target digital economies and pose specific threats to some countries, such as #Croatia; - countries have toyed with harmful legislation, for example so-called “foreign agent” laws; - increased misogyny is still present in online “manospheres”. The most prominent examples of this were detected in #Kosovo, #Romania, #Hungary, #Serbia and #Albania; Recommendations: - #Turkey should amend its laws to narrow the scope of permissible content restrictions. Legal reforms should focus on the alignment of domestic laws with international human rights standards in cooperation with civil society, journalistic organisations & academia; - #Serbia's government and all respective ministries need to introduce a wide set of measures and activities to educate children, parents, guardians & educators on the dangers of digital violence on social platforms; - Lawmakers in #Romania should prioritise the introduction into national legislation of the EU’s directive on protecting persons engaged in public participation from SLAPPS; - the judicial system in #NorthMacedonia should further strengthen its capacities to tackle cases of hate speech and online threats, as more verdicts and sentences would discourage citizens from engaging in or supporting such narratives; - security services in #Montenegro need to become more effective in responding to false bomb threats, strengthen international cooperation & enhance technological capacities; - the criminal code of #Kosovo should be amended to criminalize various acts of online violence, including cyberbullying, “slut-shaming” and the production and distribution of non-consensual intimate images (NCII); - academia, independent researchers, civil society and others in #Hungary should engage in more research to identify local problems with digital platforms; - implementation of the Digital Services Act, DSA, should be accelerated in #Croatia. This will provide a legal framework to hold online platforms accountable for fake accounts, content manipulation, and fraudulent schemes; - carry out education and training of citizens and strengthen academic institutions to bolster the cyber literacy of young people in #BosniaHerzegovina. Country reports and full recommendations are available here: https://lnkd.in/dvkVN6kW

A proposed centralised agency to support the detection and removal of child sexual abuse material (#CSAM) will also be assessing how to technically preserve privacy while detecting such content in text communications included in the law’s scope, according to the latest compromise of the draft law to fight CSAM. The draft, dated 14 June and seen by Euractiv, gives examples of visual communications included in authorities’ powers to detect CSAM, as previously reported by Euractiv. The proposal was sent by the Belgian Presidency of the EU Council to the Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), including the 27 ambassadors. This could mean that the file, stuck in the legislative pipelines for months, could finally be resolved. As Euractiv reported, during last week’s Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting, the Belgian presidency addressed delegations’ concerns on the draft law. The Belgians aim for a COREPER agreement, with Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson expecting the interinstitutional negotiations, known as trilogues, to start after the summer. The previous draft excluded audio communications from the scope, but included visual content. The latest version excludes text communications and clarifies that detection orders apply only to visual content, from images and video components, to GIFs and stickers. However, the document says that the solicitation of children should still be identified through visual components as much as possible.

📢 Londa Report: Digital Rights in the DRC Our 2021 #LondaReport not only explores the DRC’s evolving ICT landscape but also shines a light on critical issues such as gender-based online violence against women human rights defenders as they advocate for a rights-respecting digital space. The report also examines the state of cybersecurity and data protection, noting that while no specific laws exist, some provisions are found in the 2020 Telecoms and ICT law and the 2023 Digital Code. Want to know more about the country’s digital rights and inclusion landscape? Download and read the country Londa report: https://lnkd.in/eWJhFT2g  #ParadigmInitiative

Friday afternoon, when some of us were super focused on the #NCAA women's #basketball #FinalFour, a crazy thing happened. Two members of #Congress announced a draft #BIPARTISAN, #BICAMERAL, #federal #privacy #bill. We are still studying the draft but it is by far the most #comprehensive proposal in history with bipartisan support. The timing--an election year--is surprising, to say the least. Hot takes: -Covers any entity that determines the purpose and means of collecting, processing, retaining, or transferring covered data (in interstate commerce). -Small businesses, governments, and a few other specific organizations are excluded - Covered data is information that identifies or is linked or reasonably linkable to an individual or device. - It excludes some types of public information - Sensitive personal data is a broad set of data elements that receive increased protections - Requires data minimization - Requires greater transparency - Increases and harmonizes consumer rights - Requires Privacy and Security Officers -Addresses AI (somewhat) - Enforcement is available for State AGs and individuals (privacy cause of action). - Pre-empts many state privacy laws. #TheFirstRuleofPrivacyIsTheLastRuleOfPrivacyJustChanged #Wow #USPrivacy #FederalPrivacy #BRG #MoreToCome #DataProtection #ThinkBRG #BRG https://lnkd.in/ejcykqhU

Digital accessibility is legally required, and leaving your PDFs inaccessible can lead to thousands of dollars (or more) in lawsuits and fines. Learn how to avoid them in today's blog. https://hubs.la/Q02W8w2w0 #a11y #accessibility #inclusion #Compliance #ADA