Dak Hardwick’s Post

- **American F-35 vs. Chinese J-20 First Encounter**: For the first time, U.S. F-35 stealth fighters encountered Chinese J-20 stealth fighters over the East China Sea in March, in what was described as a "professional" interaction, allowing the U.S. to gather intelligence on China's growing stealth fleet (00:05, 01:22). - **Stealth Aviation Overview**: The U.S. operates the largest fleet of stealth aircraft, including over 450 F-35s and 150-186 F-22s, while China is second with 150 J-20s. Russia lags behind with only 16 Su-57s, most of which are prototypes (02:25, 04:24). - **J-20's Capabilities and Limitations**: China's J-20 is less stealthy than the U.S.'s F-35 and F-22, with ongoing struggles in developing a fifth-generation engine, relying on Russian engines instead. Its role was originally designed more for strikes than air superiority (06:06, 08:18). - **Command and Control Observations**: U.S. officials were impressed by China's improving command and control of the J-20 fleet, noting that while it's still early, China is gaining experience in operating these fighters (07:44, 17:56). - **The Growing Stealth Fighter Race**: Though the U.S. maintains a technological advantage in stealth aviation, China is rapidly improving its J-20 program, incorporating new capabilities such as advanced missiles and integration with airborne early warning systems (17:23).

Having fallen far behind China in shipbuilding, the U.S. is turning to allies in South Korea and Japan for the turnaround strategy. Key to that effort is attracting companies such as Hyundai that go head-to-head with the Chinese and can do everything America lacks: making ships quickly at low costs with modern techniques.

Great piece about the importance of the V-22 Osprey in Asia.

I recently came across an article in The Diplomat that highlights the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) use of various straits and channels around Taiwan to access the Philippine Sea. The article points to a combination of combatants and hydrographic survey vessels operating in the area, likely aimed at enhancing anti-submarine warfare capabilities. This activity ties into broader trends we’ve seen in PLAN strategic thought, where access to deep waters and the ability to control key maritime routes are critical to their growing regional ambitions. As tensions around Taiwan and the South China Sea continue to make headlines, this kind of maneuvering underscores China’s long-term goals in the Indo-Pacific. A must-read for anyone tracking security dynamics in the region. #indopacific #security

Here's my latest video presentation, posted today, in which I examine the rising threat posed by the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC) to the global duopoly of Airbus and Boeing. We're poised for an outbreak of trade tensions in 2025 between China and the West, especially in the aerospace sector.

How Europe is creating its own military-industrial complex by CaspianReport. Europe is working on its biggest #military overhaul since the end of the Cold War. The #EU wants to upend the way it finances and sells arms. In effect, it is a military-industrial complex all but in name. Source: CaspianReport, 30.07.2024 https://lnkd.in/eHvjhQXH

A sobering view of China's state-driven and state-owned maritime sector's advancement and virtual hegemony. This CRS note provides a concise assessment on where the US stands and how it has gotten there. https://lnkd.in/dxRx9wy7

Pillar II makes the most sense for South Korea and Japan (in discussion now).

Going to try and preempt the "KAUKUS!" headlines with more or less the same points I made about JAUKUS a few weeks ago, but with one important addition. South Korea undoubtedly has technological and industrial advantages that would be of immense value to specific AUKUS Pillar II projects. These should be considered in due course. But the reality is that: a) the three AUKUS countries are still setting the enabling conditions to facilitate more seamless collaboration between themselves, let alone with fourth parties. It would not be to their advantage – nor to Korea's – for Seoul to be invited without having demonstrated proof of concept, not just proof of life. b) If/when Korea is eventually invited to work on specific Pillar II projects, it would not enjoy the same regulatory or procedural carveouts as AUKUS countries in important areas like export controls, yet would likely still be expected to demonstrate a certain level of security of information-sharing and cyber hygiene in order to be invited in the first place. This would raise important questions around whether the cost of admission to a single ride inside the AUKUS carnival would be worth it of any of the parties involved. c) No matter the sound strategic logic of defence industrial and technology collaboration, South Korea's growing status as a commercial competitor to the United States and the United Kingdom in the arms trade space might limit the scope, scale and speed of such cooperation. Washington has refused to share technologies with South Korea in the past based on commercial interests and market dynamics; I don't see those disincentives as having disappeared.

China’s Sea Power Leaves U.S. Adrift Meanwhile, America’s commercial maritime industry has faltered. At the end of World War II, the U.S. boasted a fleet of more than 5,000 ships, which made up more than 40% of the world’s shipping capabilities. Today there are only about 90 U.S.-flagged ships involved in international trade, owing to increased international competition and scant support for the commercial maritime sector at home. At the same time, America’s maritime industrial base is shrinking.