These recent calls for the use of Special Operations Forces against the Mexican drug cartels ignore that the latter has developed capabilities perilously close to the former. Video evidence and Mexican officials have long revealed that the various cartels, particularly Los Zetas, the Sinaloa Cartel, and Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG), possess the force-multiplying equipment of a formidable asymmetric military force. Examples include the possession of armored vehicles, the use of armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), man-portable heavy weapons systems, as well as the possession of surface-to-air missiles and numerous crew-served weapons. Beyond equipment, the cartels, chiefly CJNG, have benefited from extensive tactical training, knowledge passed to them from Mexican military defectors, ironically enough, who were trained by US Special Operations forces. SOURCE: Brandan Buck is a research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. #sinaloa #jalisco #cartels #mexico #security #military #terrorism
War is not won but just having the best soldiers. It is multifaceted that is why you have to consider the entire swath of instruments of power; DIME-FIL (diplomatic, informational, military, economic, finance, intelligence, and law enforcement). If we only used the military power we would surely lose. We failed in Afghanistan to effectively mitigate the finances of our opponent and their informational capabilities. This requires buy in from Mexico as an ally against the cartels. But would require more than 3 Amigos to get the job done. This is no 1 week missio plannning event to effectively implement all aminstruments of US power to remove the cartels. It has to be Mexico’s idea with help from us as they too are going to feel the results. Your blanket statement that special forces wouldn’t irradicate the cartels is about as simple as saying vaccinations won’t stop COVID. Alone it will not but paired with other efforts and personal accountability in many would be required. Additionally for all the boarder states and beyond they would have to know that they are about to be living in a state of marshal law until this was over. Because they are already here in America.
just because they could doesn't mean they should. Dirty boots is dirty business and we should focus our best and brightest on more pressing matters existentially speaking. Available technical and remote kinetic capabilities could impose cost that the cartels could not bear assuming their business model is cash-flow based. For this to work Mexico would have to disallow the importation of Chinese fentanyl, develop the resolve to eliminate the cartels and partner with the US in the north and all their southern border countries to stop the flow of illegal activities from transiting Mexico.
Peter Zeihan discussed this scenario (general; not SOF specific) at a US Army conference at Fort Moore back in FEB 2022 (start at 38:18 mark). Mexico and Afghanistan have many similarities geographically and sociologically. The problem is we would be throwing rocks from a glass house. The cartels could escalate north of the border, and it could get very ugly. https://youtu.be/l0CQsifJrMc?si=cvuLK586OlU-Fdwm
I think the problem is more their extensive network and ratlines throughout CONUS. I'm not as worried about their weapons capability in Mexico- a sudden decapitation strike using massive airstrikes and DA missions from SOF could devastate their power in Mexico, but they could unleash waves of small scale attacks all over our country in retaliation. I think any action against them needs to be carefully planned, with a tight lash-up between NORTHCOM and local and Federal LE to prepare for their response to any aggression.
This has been an ongoing and highly interesting conversation. If this scenario unfolds, what might it look like, and how would it compare to our other operations in the ME? For one, logistics would play a significant role. Being landlocked with Mexico presents both an advantage and a disadvantage. On one hand, proximity offers logistical benefits; on the other, it introduces complexities unique to a shared border.We could apply lessons learned from previous operations, particularly the “Syria model.” This includes the establishment of demilitarized zones, which could be a critical element of any strategy. However, implementing such zones would come with challenges and require careful consideration.If such an operation were to proceed, the secondary and tertiary effects would be farreaching. The conflict would likely be extremely violent, with direct impacts not only along the border but also in major cities deeper within the U.S. that have cartel influences.One thing is certain: if this were to happen, it would require an all-out effort, with no half-measures. The operation would need to aim for the complete eradication of the cartels leaving no remnants and likely necessitate a comprehensive overhaul of the Mexican government.
wow. WHO allows these people to flourish? GOVTs?? Which ones? Mexican Drug Cartels more advanced than Military units? Which ones? Again, WHO allowed that to happen? You KNOW where they reside: strike there first. You KNOW where the money is kept? There second. You KNOW who the major contributors are? Strike third. Problem with going to war nowadays, is people PLAY WAR too much, and attempt to negate what war IS. WAR: Death, destruction of things, people and places. Horrible in form and nature; smells gross and looks terrible. NEAT WARS: Star Trek had a show on that aspect. Neat War. ONLY fight against combatants....well, hell, WHO are THEY nowadays? Uniforms are almost useless in todays world. "Keep bomb damage to a minimum, we don't want kids killed off." Too late. "One must understand the economics of the issue"...Global trading. I drop bomb on YOU, sending metals, combustionables, plastics AND petroleum products in return? You give me opportunity to rebuild once conflict is over, earning large sums of cash for the victor! Our bomb: Bad guys death. Use the Monroe doctrine, and figure out WHEN you want to stop playing footsies with these people and deal with them harshly, and with EXTREME prejudice.
Lot of comments on here saying this is an overestimation of cartel capability. Hot take: Even if that is true— better to overestimate and be wrong than to underestimate and be wrong. We have a MDCOA for a reason. Personally speaking, I would have preferred an outcome where we took the Taliban a bit more credible in August of 2021. Worst case… Vanity and hubris will get you killed. On the other hand… skepticism and caution… worst case = target overkill. I know which I prefer.
Irregular Warfare & Latin America National Security Commentator
1moI respectfully disagree. While the cartels’ firepower and capabilities have grown, they are nowhere near the level of the Mexican Armed Forces, let alone U.S. Special Operations. This should be handled as a law enforcement operation, not a military one, in my opinion.