Without Fear or Favor: Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability in the States

Stanford University Press

Stanford, California

© 2012 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University.

All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press.

Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Tarr, G. Alan (George Alan)

Without fear or favor : judicial independence and judicial accountability in the states / G. Alan Tarr.

p.   cm. — (Stanford studies in law and politics)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8047-6039-3 (cloth : alk. paper)

ISBN 978-0-8047-6040-9 (pbk. : alk. paper)

ISBN 978-0-8047-8350-7 (e-book)

1. Judicial process—United States—States.   2. Judicial independence—United States—States.   I. Title.

KF8736.T373    2012

347.73′5—dc23

2012020088

WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR

Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability in the States

G. Alan Tarr

Stanford University Press

Stanford, California

Stanford Studies in Law and Politics

A series edited by Keith J. Bybee

A full list of titles in the series can be found online at www.sup.org/lawandpolitics

For Susan, as always

At present it will be sufficient to remark that no citizen of Virginia can be prejudiced either in his person or his property, by any of the government of this commonwealth (or of the United States) so long as the judiciary departments of those governments, respectively, remain uncorrupt, and independent of legislative or executive control. But whenever the reverse of this happens, by whatever means it may be effected (whether fear or favour), liberty will be no more, and property but a shadow.

St. George Tucker, 1803

Those who effect to scout the phrase ‘sovereign people’ ask much in a jargon, understood by none but themselves, about ‘the independence of the Judges.’ Are they to be independent of THE PEOPLE? If they are to be independent of the people, and the people are not also to be independent of the judges; we may as well call them superior to the people, at once, and [be] done with it.

New-Hampshire Gazette, February 19, 1805

Contents

Copyright

Title Page

Introduction

1   Creating and Debating Judicial Independence and Accountability

2   Institutionalizing Judicial Independence and Accountability

3   The Changing Face of State Judicial Selection

4   Analyzing Judicial Independence and Accountability

5   Reconsidering Judicial Elections

6   Ensuring Judicial Independence and Accountability in the Twenty-first Century

Notes

Bibliography

Index

Introduction

The charges are familiar. conservative critics insist that judicial activism is rampant, with liberal judges legislating from the bench on social policy issues, such as abortion and same-sex marriage, ignoring long-standing community sentiment on issues such as the pledge of allegiance and school prayer, and making law rather than enforcing it in overturning the convictions in criminal cases.¹ For these critics, the solution is obvious. Out-of-control judges must be held accountable for their overreaching, so that self-government and the rule of law can be restored and judicial dictatorship ended.² Indeed, some wish to go further. As the chief of staff for Oklahoma Senator Tom Coburn declared, I don’t want to impeach judges. I want to impale them.³

Equally familiar are the counterclaims. Harsh criticism of judges and their rulings allegedly galvanizes public frustration over hot-button issues, so this pernicious rhetoric must stop, lest it erode the public’s confidence in judicial impartiality and threaten the rule of law.⁴ Legislative steps to curtail judicial power are portrayed as attempts to intimidate judges and threaten their independence.⁵ Efforts to hold state judges electorally accountable for their rulings are condemned for the same reasons.⁶ So too are judicial election campaigns, which purportedly promote a politics of slogans and thirty-second television spots singularly inappropriate to the evaluation of judicial candidates.⁷ Even inquiries into the political views and legal perspectives of judges before they ascend the bench are criticized as an American version of the telephone justice common in authoritarian regimes.⁸ Only when these threats are eliminated, it is argued, can the rule of law flourish and judges fulfill their responsibility of dispensing equal justice under law.⁹

Both sides in the contemporary debate over judicial independence and judicial accountability—we shall refer to them as the Bashers and the Defenders—claim to support the rule of law, but they disagree about what threatens it. Defenders see the danger as coming from external pressures on judges by those who seek to influence or intimidate them or induce them to abandon their commitment to the law in favor of what is popular or politically acceptable. But Bashers view the danger as rooted in the absence of checks on judges, which frees them to pursue their political or ideological or professional or class agendas at the expense of fidelity to the law. Impartial decision making, according to Bashers, is best promoted by the prospect of retribution for judicial activism, which keeps in line judges who might otherwise be tempted to read their own preferences into the law.

The current debate reflects as well differing conceptions of the role courts and judges should play in governing. Defenders typically celebrate the role courts have played in protecting rights, especially those of unpopular minorities, and tend to applaud vigorous judicial intervention.¹⁰ Bashers, by contrast, characteristically emphasize the importance of self-government and decry judicial involvement in policy-making as undemocratic. In part, inevitably, the conflict over judicial independence and accountability is tied to satisfaction—or dissatisfaction—with salient judicial decisions. If one is pleased with the general tenor of judicial rulings, one is more likely to champion judicial independence. If one is distressed by those rulings, one is more likely to demand that judges be held accountable. The current assumption on both the Right and the Left seems to be that the more independent judges are, the more liberal their rulings are likely to be, so promoting greater accountability will move decisions in a conservative direction. One may well question whether this assumption is accurate, especially in the Roberts Court era, or merely represents liberal nostalgia for and conservative antipathy toward the Warren Court. Whatever the accuracy of the assumption, it contrasts sharply with the perspective of earlier eras, when accountability was sought to counter judicial conservatism.¹¹

Connected with these differing conceptions of the role of courts are divergent portrayals of the judicial process. Defenders emphasize conflict resolution, with their prototypical example being a trial judge applying the law to resolve a dispute between two litigants. Framing the issue in this fashion underscores the importance of impartiality and obscures the courts’ policy role. Bashers, by contrast, highlight judicial policy-making, with their prototypical example an appellate court announcing a ruling with broad societal implications on an issue that had already been addressed—and resolved differently—by the other branches of government.

The contemporary debate has generated far more heat than light. For critics of judicial activism, the very term judicial independence has become anathema. For the critics of these critics, so has judicial accountability.¹² Yet in an era of overheated rhetoric, in which judicial independence exists primarily as a rhetorical notion rather than as a subject of sustained, organized study, a dispassionate discussion of judicial independence and accountability is sorely needed.¹³ This volume provides such an assessment, focusing on the American states, where the current debate is most heated and where historically the relation between independence and accountability has been the subject of wide-ranging and enlightening discussion.

Chapters 1–3 trace the debate over judicial independence and accountability in the states from the American founding to the present day, seeking to place this debate in a broader historical context. Chapter 1 examines the development of the idea of judicial independence during the antebellum era. Recalling the abuses of the colonial era, the founding generation sought to protect judges from the influence of the executive but debated whether judges should be insulated from popular influence as well. Moreover, the definition of the judicial function was itself contested. From the perspective of the present, questions about the character and legitimacy of judicial review stand out. However, also at issue were the division of responsibility between judge and jury, the legitimacy of legislative intervention to overturn judicial rulings or order new trials, the range of disputes to be settled by courts rather than by private laws, and the participation of nonjudges in appellate review. The history we examine reveals that two key issues—from whom judges should be independent, and what the scope of their responsibilities should be—dominate the debate in the states during the antebellum era. Put differently, the contemporary debate over judicial independence and judicial accountability is not simply a continuation of a debate that began in the American founding. Only after a consensus was achieved about the function that judges should serve could discussion begin about what influences inappropriately impinged on the performance of that function.

Chapter 2 traces the debate in the states over judicial selection and tenure through the early twentieth century. The federal Constitution grants federal judges tenure during good behavior, thereby coming down emphatically on the side of judicial independence. However, the states have approached judicial tenure quite differently. Several states established tenure during good behavior in their initial constitutions but then actively enforced the good-behavior requirement through impeachment, other forms of removal, and the abolition of courts and judgeships, thus ensuring accountability to the people’s representatives. Only when limited terms of office provided an opportunity for regularized assessments of judicial performance did these weapons fade into obsolescence. Also, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, most states moved from appointment or legislative election of judges to popular election. This shift did not ignite an early version of the contemporary debate; the impetus for this change and the debate that it engendered were distinctive. The shift to judicial elections was part of a set of constitutional reforms designed to impose restraints on state legislatures in the wake of their reckless promotional efforts, which brought several states to the brink of financial ruin. Moreover, those who favored judicial elections sought to empower judges, not rein them in. They argued that electing judges would free them from partisan control, and this greater independence, together with their electoral connection to the people, would embolden them to actively police the state legislature to ensure it stayed within constitutional bounds. Interestingly, judicial elections at the outset found significant support even within the legal profession.

Only during the Progressive era, when the issue of judicial selection again became controversial, did the debate shift to the arguments made familiar by Bashers and Defenders today. Defenders during the Progressive era sought to replace partisan election of judges with nonpartisan elections and later with merit selection, in order to insulate judges from external pressures. But Bashers championed judicial elections and sought additional weapons, such as the recall of judges and judicial decisions, to enforce judicial conformity with the popular will. Even so, the Progressive-era debate differed in some respects from the current debate. The Bashers of the Progressive era were on the political Left, while Defenders were on the political Right, although most of the legal profession supported elimination of contested judicial elections. Also, both Bashers and Defenders shared an expectation that, absent effective mechanisms of judicial accountability, judges would render conservative rather than liberal decisions. So if the arguments are familiar, the identity of those making them is not.

Chapter 3 describes the current controversy over judicial independence and accountability in the states, which focuses on judicial selection and identifies the political and legal developments that have contributed to it. It describes the politicization of judicial elections in the states, as shown in the dramatic rise in the cost of campaigns for judicial office, the proliferation of televised attack ads, and the increasing efforts of interest groups to influence their outcomes. It explains how the development of more contested and contentious judicial elections is rooted in trends that are unlikely to change in the near future. These include the rise of two-party competition in the states, the increasing activism of state courts, and the activation of interest groups committed to influencing court rulings by reshaping the composition of state supreme courts.

Chapter 4 shifts the focus from the historical to the analytical. Defenders’ arguments for judicial independence have tended to be long on pieties and short on precision. The Bashers’ calls for judicial accountability too have often substituted outrage for analysis. This chapter clarifies the terms of the debate, identifies the elements of judicial independence (decisional and institutional), the forms of judicial accountability (decisional, institutional, and behavioral), the mechanisms by which accountability is enforced, and the identity of those who might be held accountable (the individual judge, the court, or the judiciary as a whole). In assessing the current debate, this chapter finds serious weaknesses in both the Defender and Basher perspectives. The Defenders’ case for judicial independence typically rests on a simplistic understanding of law and judging that ignores what political scientists and legal scholars have demonstrated about indeterminacies in law and the necessity of judicial choice. Bashers tend to endorse the same simplistic understanding of law and judging, which enables them to condemn as intentional departures from proper interpretation rulings that may simply reflect good-faith efforts to deal with legal complexity and indeterminacy. The critique of these positions should point the way to an understanding of judicial independence and accountability that is compatible with a more sophisticated account of law and judging.

Much of the contemporary debate about judicial independence and judicial accountability in the states revolves around judicial elections. Over the last few decades, the importance of the issue has increased in the wake of greater electoral competition, escalating campaign spending by both candidates and independent groups, and nastier, noisier, and costlier campaigns for judicial office.¹⁴ Defenders have long opposed judicial elections as a threat to judicial independence, their perspective best captured in the pithy title of an article by Charles Geyh: Why Judicial Elections Stink. Chapter 5 challenges the Defender consensus. It analyzes the Defenders’ attacks on judicial elections in light of social science research into voting behavior, both in judicial elections and in low-salience elections more generally, and into the effects of campaigns and political advertising on voter choice and on voter attitudes toward the courts. The chapter also examines the available evidence on how the mode of selection affects the quality of the bench and the decisions judges render. The chapter concludes that the case against judicial elections is weak when elections do not involve incumbents, who might be tempted to modify their rulings in order to attract the support of voters or interest groups. It further argues that partisan judicial elections have virtues in terms of judicial accountability not present in nonpartisan elections or retention elections. However, this does not prove the case for judicial elections; it merely establishes that they remain a legitimate mode of judicial selection.

Chapter 6 addresses what is to be done, examining recent proposals designed to safeguard judicial independence or promote accountability, namely, the greater use of recusal and disqualification for judges who receive campaigns contributions, the public financing of judicial elections, and the establishment of a single nonrenewable term for state supreme court justices. It concludes by acknowledging that the need to respect judicial independence imposes severe limits on judicial accountability, and it therefore encourages a shift in popular focus from those interpreting the law to the substance of the law itself. It surveys the ease with which voters and legislators in the states can respond to judicial rulings with which they disagree. In particular, it suggests that the ease of constitutional amendment in the states creates an opportunity for a popular constitutionalism that respects the independence of judges while giving the people the final say.

My research on judicial independence and accountability has spanned more than a decade, and I have accumulated more intellectual debts over that period than I can easily list. My work on the topic was jump-started by the opportunity to contribute an essay to Justice in Jeopardy, a report of the American Bar Association’s Task Force on the 21st Century Judiciary. Involvement with that project led to a long and fruitful collaboration with Edward (Ned) Madeira, who chaired the task force and later the ABA’s Standing Committee on Judicial Independence. In 2006 the National Endowment for the Humanities awarded me a fellowship that provided an opportunity for concentrated research on the history of judicial independence and accountability in the states. As dean and then acting chancellor at Rutgers University-Camden, Margaret Marsh created an exemplary intellectual environment and provided encouragement and support throughout my research. I have benefited immensely from discussions with my Rutgers colleagues, most notably Robert F. Williams, Richard Harris, and Aman McLeod. I have also benefited from the advice and suggestions of numerous other scholars, among them Luke Bierman, Keith Bybee, Michael Dimino, John Dinan, Christian Fritz, Charles Geyh, Leslie Goldstein, Norman Green, Robert Peck, and Mary Cornelia Porter. Some of them will likely conclude that this would have been a better book had I followed more of their suggestions.

I am likewise grateful for opportunities to present my research at the University of Missouri Law School, at Willamette Law School, at the University of Ottawa, and at Harvard Law School. Portions of this volume appeared initially as articles: Contesting the Judicial Power, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy (2012); Do Retention Elections Work? Missouri Law Review 74 (2009); and Rethinking the Selection of State Supreme Court Justices, Willamette Law Review 39 (2003). I also want to thank those journals for permission to use material from those articles.

Sylvia Somers and Karen McGrath did a wonderful job in transforming disjointed and sometimes illegible material into a coherent manuscript, and Kyle Weber provided excellent research assistance. My wife, Susan, and my sons, Bob and Andy, have made all the work worthwhile.

1

Creating and Debating Judicial Independence and Accountability

Currently the conflict in the states over judicial independence and accountability focuses on judicial selection and tenure. Historically, however, the debate in the states has been far broader, a continuing constitutional conversation about the role of courts and judges in a republican polity. This conversation has involved the character of the judicial function and the place of legal professionals and laypeople in the administration of justice. It has also addressed from whom judges must be independent and for what purposes, to whom they should be accountable, and how that might be accomplished without jeopardizing independence. The states have tried various answers to these questions, and even states that resolved these issues at one point in time later revisited them. Simply put, the history of judicial independence and accountability in the states has been not a steady progression toward a single ideal but rather a record of competing and diverse conceptions of independence and accountability, with the prevailing understandings changing over time and among the states. This chapter traces the conflict over the contested concepts of judicial independence and judicial accountability from the founding era to the mid-nineteenth century. Chapter 2 extends the analysis into the twentieth century with particular emphasis on judicial selection and judicial tenure, and Chapter 3 analyzes the current debate. Political practice and political debate in the states highlight the complexities of judicial independence and judicial accountability and, in so doing, provide the basis for understanding and assessing current claims and arguments.¹

Independent of Whom?

Constitutional Arrangements

Before the American Revolution, colonial governors, selected by the Crown, appointed judges, raising concerns that those selected might be biased in favor of royal interests.² Those receiving these patronage appointments served at the pleasure of the Crown rather than, like their counterparts in Britain, during good behavior, increasing fears that they might pronounce that for law, which was most agreeable to the prince or his officers.³ Thus, the issue of judicial independence first arose in America in reaction to excessive executive control over—and possible manipulation of—the administration of justice.⁴ Thus the Declaration of Independence charges the king with refusing his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers, with making judges dependent on his will alone for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries, with depriving us in many cases of the benefits of trial by jury, and with transporting us beyond seas to be tried for pretended offenses.

The Declaration’s indictment of the Crown, it should be noted, is framed not in terms of judicial independence but in terms of popular access to justice, understood as encompassing both the availability of judicial forums (refusing his assent to laws establishing judiciary powers) and proper administration of justice within those forums. Proper administration of justice in turn required that trials be presided over by impartial magistrates (not judges dependent on his will alone), in venues subject to public scrutiny (not beyond seas), and with independent decision-makers who could be trusted to render impartial verdicts (not depriving us in many cases of the benefits of trial by jury). Insofar as the Declaration addresses judicial independence, it emphasizes freeing judges from subservience to an unaccountable executive whose interests differed from those of the general public. The Declaration thus left open whether making the judiciary answerable to the people, either directly or through their elected representatives, posed the same problems for the rule of law or for the impartial administration of justice. Or, put differently, it left open the relationship between republicanism and judicial independence.

Some early state constitutions contain stirring rhetoric on judicial independence. The Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780, for instance, proclaimed it the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as free, impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will admit, and the Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776 noted that the independency and uprightness of Judges are essential to the impartial administration of justice, and a great security to the rights and liberties of the people.⁵ Although proponents of judicial independence never tire of quoting such provisions, the institutional arrangements under eighteenth-century state constitutions emphasized judicial accountability to state legislatures, as short terms with election and reelection voted by the same lawmakers who set rates of compensation and paid their salaries made judges more dependent than independent.⁶ Indeed, those Massachusetts judges as free, impartial, and independent as the lot of humanity will admit could be removed upon a vote of two-thirds of the state legislature. In emphasizing judicial accountability to state legislatures, early state constitutions represented the culmination of what the colonial assemblies had been struggling for in their eighteenth-century contests with the Crown.⁷

State judges in the decades after Independence might be appointed by the executive, by the legislature, or by some combination of the two, but state legislatures generally dominated judicial selection (see Table 1.1).⁸ This legislative dominance is explicable on republican grounds. In most states, only legislators were directly elected by the people, and this—combined with their short term of office—encouraged the belief that the legislature embodied the people, whereas other branches did not. Given this understanding, legislatures seemed the safest repository of the appointment power. In addition, legislative dominance was a response to Americans’ suspicion of executive power in general and of the executive appointment power in particular. As Gordon Wood has noted, The power of [executive] appointment to offices was perceived as the most insidious and powerful weapon of eighteenth-century despotism.⁹ Thus, none of the initial state constitutions gave the governor acting alone the power to appoint judges. By 1800, two states—Delaware (1792) and Pennsylvania (1790)—authorized unilateral gubernatorial appointment, but seven continued to lodge the appointment power exclusively in the state legislature. The remaining states allowed the governor to appoint judges but required that appointments be confirmed by an executive council or the legislature. Even where governors participated in the selection process, their control over the composition of the bench was limited. For in several states the governors themselves were largely creatures of the legislature, chosen by it for short terms and dependent on it for their continuation in office, and this undoubtedly influenced their choices.

TABLE 1.1 State Judiciaries in the Eighteenth Century: Selection and Tenure*

* Excluding justices of the peace

1 = Gubernatorial appointment

2 = Gubernatorial appointment and council confirmation

3 = Gubernatorial appointment and legislative confirmation

4 = Legislative appointment

5 = Election

GB = During good behavior

(60) = Retirement age of sixty

Once selected, judges remained under legislative scrutiny. The Revolutionaries had no intention of curtailing legislative interference in the court structure and in judicial functions, and in fact they meant to increase it.¹⁰ During the colonial era, popular assemblies with some regularity restored [losing litigants] to the law by granting them a new trial, which served as a check on abuses by unelected judges. After Independence, those who lost in court might still appeal to the legislature for redress, and legislators could order new trials or pass private bills providing them with the compensation denied them at trial. This practice continued into the nineteenth century, with the Rhode Island Legislature overturning adjudicated verdicts almost to the Civil War.¹¹

Judges who issued unpopular rulings might be called before the legislature to explain their decisions. In 1786, for example, after the Rhode Island Supreme Court invalidated a law requiring creditors to accept paper money in payment for debts, its members were summoned before the legislature, and although the legislature took no disciplinary action, it refused to reappoint all but one of the justices when their terms expired.¹² When all else failed, a legislature might get rid of judges by enacting ripper bills that abolished the judges’ positions or the court on which they sat because the structure of state court systems typically was not entrenched in the state constitution. Thus in 1807, after the Ohio Supreme Court struck down a law extending the jurisdiction of justices of the peace, the legislature passed a resolution depriving the offending justices of their positions when their terms expired.¹³ New Hampshire twice legislated out of office all justices of the supreme court by repealing the statute that created the tribunal and establishing another court in its place.¹⁴ In New York in 1821, a new constitution reduced the membership of the supreme court from five to three, and the incumbents’ positions were terminated when the constitution went into effect.¹⁵ And in Kentucky in 1823, the legislature, after failing to muster the two-thirds vote necessary to impeach justices who had invalidated a law providing for debt relief, abolished the supreme court and created a new one with new judges.¹⁶

State constitutions guaranteed the people’s representatives control over judges’ continuation in office. One-third of eighteenth-century state constitutions established short terms of office for judges, ranging from one year in Vermont to a high of seven years in New Jersey and Pennsylvania (1776). Obviously, in those states the process of periodic reappointment, in which legislators played the central role, determined whether judges would continue in office. The remaining two-thirds of eighteenth-century state constitutions, reacting to the British imposition of service during the pleasure of the Crown, provided for judicial tenure during good behavior. During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, one can detect a slight movement toward longer judicial terms—for example, Georgia in 1789 increased the term of office to three years, and Pennsylvania in 1790 adopted tenure during good behavior. But even in the eleven states in which, by 1800, judges served during good behavior, legislatures scrutinized the judiciary. We understand good behavior today as a synonym for life tenure, but during the early decades of the Republic, it was understood as a standard of conduct enforceable by the legislature.¹⁷ Indeed, as a contemporary commentator noted, the nebulous character of that standard virtually invited legislators to apply it according to disaffection on the one Hand; or Favour on the other.¹⁸

The legislature might act against misbehaving judges through impeachment, and the grounds for impeachment under early state constitutions were considerably broader than those under the federal Constitution.¹⁹ States that defined impeachable offenses in their constitutions did so expansively. Thus New York (1777) and South Carolina (1778) permitted impeachment for mal and corrupt conduct; New Hampshire (1784) for bribery, corruption, malpractice, or maladministration in office; and New Jersey (1776) for misbehavior.²⁰ Other states declined to define—and thereby limit—the grounds for impeachment. For example, in constitutions written after the US Constitution had limited impeachable offenses to Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors, Georgia (1789), Kentucky (1799), and Tennessee (1796) all provided for impeachment without specifying what offenses justified removal.

Several states supplemented impeachment with provisions authorizing the governor to remove judges upon address by two-thirds of the state legislature, with the gubernatorial role typically more ministerial than discretionary. Rather than merely duplicating impeachment, removal by address offered an additional—and potentially more far-reaching—weapon for legislative control.²¹ For one thing, the address did not have to allege willful or criminal misconduct. It needed only a favorable vote by both houses, not an investigation or trial.²² Thus, judges were not guaranteed the basic elements of due process before they were removed. They did not have an opportunity to retain counsel, to cross-examine those accusing them, or to call their own witnesses. Early state constitutions did not even require a specification of the grounds for removal, although some later state constitutions mandated that the basis be stated at length in such address, and on the journal of each house.²³ Thus, the inclusion of removal by address in state constitutions potentially came close to service during the pleasure of the legislature (or at least an extraordinary majority of the legislature), although the guarantee of tenure during good behavior implied that some misconduct had to be alleged. Address allowed legislators to hold judges accountable not only in cases of clear wrongdoing, as might be reached by impeachment, but even in instances where their performance could not be characterized as any misdemeanor in office.²⁴ The Kentucky Constitution of 1799 made this clear, authorizing removal of judges by address for any reasonable cause, which shall not be sufficient ground for impeachment.²⁵ So too did the origins of the practice in England, where address served as a mechanism for inducing the king to remove unpopular ministers, serving as a vote of censure and no confidence.²⁶ In rejecting removal of federal judges by address, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 indicated their understanding that removal by address potentially had greater reach than did impeachment.²⁷ Thomas Jefferson agreed with the analysis but not the conclusion. He favored a constitutional amendment to permit removal of federal judges by the president upon address by Congress, insisting that in a government founded on the public will, [judicial independence] operates in an opposite direction, and against that will.²⁸

The Removal of Judges

Although state legislatures maintained close oversight over the judicial branch, their removal powers threatened judges’ decisional independence only if those powers were used to influence the substance of decisions or to penalize judges for their rulings. Often this was not the case. For example, New Jersey in 1782 impeached and removed two judges for corruption, and Massachusetts did the same for a justice of the peace in 1799. In 1791 Georgia impeached and removed a judge who misused his office to manipulate an election, and New Hampshire impeached a judge for maladministration based on unjustified absences from the court, though the judge resigned before he could be tried. Legislators in Massachusetts removed by address a judge after he was stricken with paralysis, and in 1805 legislators in North Carolina removed a justice of the peace by address for taking bribes and brawling with litigants. In that case legislators expressly recognized removal by address as a compromise between censure and impeachment.²⁹

However, state legislatures sometimes did employ their removal powers to advance political objectives or punish courts for their rulings. The use of impeachment for political purposes peaked at the state and federal levels during the first decade of the nineteenth century. This most sweeping impeachment movement in American history arose with the