Arms of Little Value: The Challenge of Insurgency and Global Instability in the Twenty-First Century

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the CIA or any other U.S. Government agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. Government authentication of information or Agency endorsement of the author's views. The material has been reviewed by the CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

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Copyright 2012 © G. L. Lamborn

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

Dedication

Foreword by Arturo G. Muñoz, Ph.D.

Explanatory Note

Preface

OVERVIEW Are Wise Counsels Possible in Insurgencies?

CHAPTER 1 How the Other Half Lives

CHAPTER 2 Many Roads to Insurgency

CHAPTER 3 A Peek at Western Strategic Thinking

CHAPTER 4 Neither Karl nor Antoine

CHAPTER 5 Three Cautionary Tales

CHAPTER 6 Root and Stem

CHAPTER 7 Counterinsurgency Conundrum

CHAPTER 8 American Myopia

CHAPTER 9 Wise Counsels at Home

Annex A: San Salvador 2038

Annex B: So-called Radical Islam

Annex C: Understanding Fanaticism

Annex D: Viet Cong Political Mobilization

Bibliography

Index

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to offer his grateful thanks to the following individuals for their help, expert advice, encouragement, and professional fellowship over the years. Several of these individuals offered timely, insightful comments on this work while it was still in draft. All contributed over the years to the author's understanding of insurgency and political warfare, and the vital connection between our forces overseas and our policy community here in Washington, D.C.

Doctor John J. LeBeau, George C. Marshall Center; Dr. Arturo G. Munoz, RAND Corporation; Col. Grant Newsham, USMC; Dr. John Nagl, Center for a New American Security; Dr. David Kilcullen, CAERUS; Dr. Marvin Weinbaum, Middle East Institute; Dr. T.X. Hammes, National Defense University; and Dr. Michael Shurkin, RAND Corporation.

Thanks also go to Ron Hammond, RA International Corporation; Col. Jeff Haynes, USMC (Ret.), Global-21 Strategic Solutions; Maj. David M. Lamborn, United States Army; Capt. Matt Pottinger, USMC, Council on Foreign Relations; Ms. Aurora D'Amico, U.S. Department of Education; and Wallace G. Klein, World War II veteran and my honored former teacher.

Special thanks also are due to Ms. Cassandra Sheehan for her tireless help with the text, especially with regard to the charts, footnotes and bibliography, to E.J. McCarthy, the author's agent, who kept the author's spirits up when he had almost thrown in the towel, and to Mr. Richard Kane of Casemate Publishers, who graciously accepted this work, did a superlative job editing the text, and creatively challenged the author at every stage. Author also wishes to thank many others who, though not named, at various times in the author's past have been of assistance. All are deeply appreciated.

The observations and opinions in this work are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of any U.S. Government department or agency, nor any private corporation or group. The author takes full responsibility for any errors of fact.

DEDICATION

This book is dedicated to the memory of 1st Lt. Todd W. Weaver, 101st Airborne Division, a graduate of the College of William and Mary, and to all other American soldiers and marines who lost their lives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other low intensity conflicts. Todd graduated summa cum laude in government from William and Mary, was inducted into Phi Beta Kappa, and graduated from that institution's senior ROTC program. On 9 September 2010, while leading his platoon in Kandahar province, Afghanistan, Todd was killed, the victim of an improvised explosive device (IED). He is mourned by his family and missed by us all.

It is also dedicated to the American policy community in the hope that our policymakers will exercise more thought and less haste when considering U.S. military involvement in politically unstable countries. As many regions become increasingly unstable, and the likelihood of violent upheaval in certain areas grows ever more likely, American policymakers will have to exercise great wisdom, restraint, and farsighted judgment before committing young Americans to battle. No American soldier, sailor, airman, or marine should have to die because the Washington policy community's political thinking was flawed or its military strategy was inappropriate to the situation.

If wisdom eventually prevails in our formulation of policy toward politically unstable lands, Todd, you and your brothers will not have died in vain.

FOREWORD

Arms of Little Value appears at an opportune moment. Retired U.S. Army Colonel Larry Lamborn's latest book serves as a very useful frame of reference for interpreting the basic shift in strategic thinking currently being implemented by the White House and the Pentagon. Afghanistan is the centerpiece of the new strategy. As has been widely publicized, conventional forces are withdrawing and the process of transition is under way calling for Afghan Security Forces to take responsibility for the conduct of the war by 2014. Although there has been much public hand-wringing about withdrawing U.S. combat forces before the job is done, Lamborn views the situation differently, offering the following observation:

The greater the cultural distance between the local population and that of an intervening force, the greater will be the strength of its rejection. It follows that forces deployed to intervene to counter an insurgency should ideally be home-grown, of the same culture as the people involved in the conflict. There may well be a negative reaction by the people to intervention, but it should be of less intensity if those who are assigned that task are of the same blood and belonging. Afghan forces, when properly trained and disciplined for counterinsurgency work, should be more effective with other Afghans than are American or European soldiers.

Regarding the debate over the optimal number of troops needed for an effective surge, Lamborn, in typical iconoclastic fashion, dismisses force ratios and population ratios as largely irrelevant: "The master insurgent, Mao Tse-tung, remarked that: ‘Numbers by themselves confer no particular advantage,’" given the fundamentally political and psychological nature of insurgency.

In announcing the time frame for withdrawal of conventional forces from Afghanistan, American officials have also stated that a much smaller contingent of U.S. military trainers, advisors and special operations forces (SOF) intend to fulfill a stay-behind role, assuming an appropriate agreement is reached with the Afghan government. The SOF function usually is described as counterterrorism, focusing on door-kicking raids at night to capture or kill targeted individuals wherever they are hiding. Putting aside the controversy in Afghanistan over these commando tactics, I would argue that the complementary counterinsurgency SOF mission to organize and support the village stability operations/Afghan local police (VSO/ALP) program is more consequential.

Accepting Lamborn's contention that insurgency stands Clausewitz on his head in that its centerpiece is the capture of the nation's people politically and psychologically, and that both insurgency and counterinsurgency should be conceived as armed politics, it is critical to involve the rural Afghan population in the campaign against the Taliban. Regardless of its shortcomings, VSO is the type of paradigm-changing initiative needed to defeat the insurgency, particularly as there is increasing concern among foreign observers and Afghans alike that the large conventional army and police that the United States and NATO have created will deteriorate once foreign funding, logistical support, and close air support have been withdrawn. As American and European politicians seek to stave off financial crises in their own countries, calling into question long-term commitments to continue pumping billions of dollars into Afghanistan, a new refrain is heard among analysts: We have built an Afghan army that Afghanistan cannot afford. Creating a counterinsurgency capability that Afghanistan could afford and sustain on its own would have been a better strategy. That path not taken is what Arms of Little Value is about.

In promoting his views on effective counterinsurgency, Lamborn touches on an underlying issue that transcends COIN pros and cons: how to best exercise American power abroad in a manner that is more effective and less costly in terms of treasure and blood than overreliance on outright military force. Part of the pleasure of reading Arms of Little Value is the irreverence with which it dismisses the conventional bureaucratic thinking of the Washington establishment on this issue. "Instead of understanding, we spout jargon. Instead of clear thinking, we employ catch phrases and acronyms. Instead of sound strategy, we act in spasms of uncoordinated activity. Instead of thoughtful policy aimed at shaping the future, we have knee-jerk reactions to the crisis of the moment." Seeking to shake readers’ assumptions, Lamborn's approach may seem counterintuitive. Arms of Little Value seeks to promote a change in mentality, a new way of looking at the recurring problem of insurgency and counterinsurgency in disparate regions of the world where the United States has a national security interest.

At the same time, his book falls within a long-established tradition of eclectic historiography in which a broad array of social science and humanities disciplines are brought to bear in explaining historical events.

Lamborn argues that the fundamental mistake of the United States has been to deal with insurgency essentially as a military conflict, despite repeated declarations about the need to win hearts and minds:

Acting together the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have created and published Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24). We have a handful of brilliant scholars such as Dr. [John] Nagl and a few others to thank for the field manual. But the existence of the FM does not by any means indicate that the army has had a Damascus Road-like doctrinal conversion. Many generals wedded to the old doctrine of firepower, massive force, and high technology still think these are the essential keys to victory in any war.

Arms of Little Value posits that insurgency has its roots deep in the grievances of the people as a whole. It is a social war with religious, racial, class, and economic aspects. Accordingly, multiple historical examples are summarized, including the American Revolution against the British, in which a militarily superior force ultimately lost to the insurgents because it did not understand or address the grievances of the people.

I also see in Arms of Little Value, a connecting thread to a great tradition in world literature going back to Thucydides: the soldier-scholar. As a combat veteran of the Vietnam War and a participant in counterinsurgency campaigns in various parts of the world since then, Lamborn falls within this literary tradition. Throughout history there have been perceptive military writers who have sought to analyze and describe warfare in terms of its political, social and economic context. For example, the eye-witness account of the conquest of Mexico by Bernal Diaz del Castillo gives considerable emphasis to the religion, customs and politics of the native Indians. At every step of the way on the march to the Aztec capital, Castillo describes how Hernan Cortes debriefed local chiefs thoroughly, seeking cultural intelligence to better understand the strengths and weaknesses of the people he intended to conquer.

In contrast to that sixteenth century example of human terrain mapping, Lamborn writes:

We may pause to ask ourselves how well we knew Vietnam, or Somalia, or Iraq, or Afghanistan before sending in our armies? Certainly we had maps and perhaps some overhead photography (for what those are worth in an insurgency), but did we have even so much as a clue about the political and cultural aspects of these lands, to say nothing of the nature of our potential enemies or the terrain, their home turf ? Or, did we merely plunge into these lands, supremely confident that our military might, technological advantages and American ingenuity were sufficient to guarantee victory?

Commenting on his own experiences in Vietnam, he adds, Certainly those of us who became new second lieutenants in the 1960s were steeped during our cadetship in the great campaigns of Grant, Pershing, and Patton against their uniformed foes. We were given virtually no training worthy of the name in either the theory or practice of the strange kind of war we faced in Vietnam. Reflecting on that experience, Lamborn became convinced that to defeat the insurgent it is necessary to understand him and, therefore, it is necessary to understand the environment that produces him: How, then, is it remotely possible for these pundits to discuss ‘counterinsurgency’ in a thoughtful manner if they cannot comprehend the highly complex roots of an insurgency they profess to be countering?

To get at the complex roots of insurgency Arms of Little Value delves not only into revolutionary ideology, but also material factors such as overpopulation, birth rates, literacy rates, income disparities and unemployment, education, hunger, poor health systems and even inequitable water distribution. Insurgencies are thought to be diseases, Lamborn writes, but they are not. Rather, insurgencies are merely the outward manifestations of deeper illnesses. In seeking to uncover the deeper illnesses promoting insurgency, Arms of Little Value mirrors the approach that outstanding revolutionary leaders have taken:

A good example of this thinking is seen in Mao's writings of the 1920s and 1930s in which he spends a great deal of time discussing political and economic conditions as opposed to strictly military tactics. As is well known, China suffered from gross inequity in land holdings, which was one of the key political problems Mao believed to be at the root of the country's ills…. By carefully examining each district's situation, Mao and his colleagues became more familiar with the economics and politics affecting the people living in those localities than were the appointed government officials sent out from Nanking. With Mao having greater knowledge of the land question, he was in a better position than were government officials to make political use of it.

It is important to point out that Lamborn avoids making facile correlations between poverty and insurgency, or injustice and insurgency. On the contrary, the poorest, most oppressed populations often do not revolt. It is the perception of disparity that seems to be the common denominator; with the corollary that enough people need to believe that their situation can improve through decisive action. This has been described by some theorists as the rising tide of expectations and helps explain why insurgencies can break out in countries where social and economic conditions are actually improving. Copious evidence exists that rapid modernization and economic growth do destabilize traditionalist societies.

Afghanistan is a current case in point. The billions of dollars that have poured into that impoverished country over the past decade through an uncoordinated array of foreign government and non-government donors have magnified income disparities, fueled corruption on an unprecedented scale and exacerbated social conflicts. Yet, going in, the assumption among U.S. military and civilian planners was the opposite, that economic development would produce stability. To strengthen the new regime, massive amounts of money were spent, whereas the approach suggested by Lamborn would have urged caution about overturning the existing system without first understanding it, or having a clear idea of what would replace it.

Although Arms of Little Value does not focus on the current state of the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, the lessons from the past that it provides are highly relevant. As a general principle, the United States must never agree to work with any regime anywhere at any time that adamantly refuses to put its own house in order. The issue of reform is paramount:

The problem that has vexed a string of U.S. administrations of both political persuasions was how to encourage certain client regimes that are battling active insurgencies to undertake serious programs of political, economic, social, and military reform. Despite heavy diplomatic pressure and huge amounts of aid, some client regimes—the former government in South Vietnam is a good example—seemed impervious to real change.

Despite the overriding need to implement long-term reforms that bring about genuine social change, a workable system of incentives and disincentives that produce the desired changes in clients … has not yet been devised. This complicates addressing the central question of insurgency defined as a clear choice between the promises of the government versus those of the insurgency, and actual deeds.

At a time when concepts of nation-building and active promotion of social progress abroad again seem to have fallen into disfavor among policymakers, Lamborn argues the contrary. We can and should be taking a greater interest in the needs of broad masses of people who … are now well aware of the social ills they suffer and are actively seeking means to redress their grievances. Rejecting alliances with rapacious and despotic local rulers, Arms of Little Value states that the people and government of the United States must always be on the side of the people, not necessarily on the side of rulers … American policymakers would do well to promote economic and social measures aimed at slowly, but steadily raising the socioeconomic standards of people in Third World lands. The people living in these lands must know … that we Americans are their allies.

How to let these foreign populations know that Americans are on their side raises the issue of what has been variously defined as strategic communication, public diplomacy, information operations and psychological operations. Lamborn laments that American capabilities in that field have deteriorated badly. His closing argument is compelling:

If the agony we experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan—due to our inability to grasp the nature and scope of those wars—has taught us nothing else, it should have taught us to pay attention to the aspirations of the local people and thereby avoid inflicting pain on ourselves and others. It should have taught us that insurgents fight on their terms, not on ours. Above all, it should have taught us to formulate a thoughtful policy and then develop an integrated civil-military strategy appropriate to that policy.

A final note on that comment is the quote from Cicero inspiring the book's title: For arms are of little value in the field unless there is wise counsel at home.

Arturo G. Muñoz, Ph.D.,

RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA,

March 20, 2012

EXPLANATORY NOTE

TERMINOLOGY

In this short work, there will be three frequently used terms that, for many, often carry somewhat nebulous meanings. Before we plunge into the substance of our discussion, we first should clarify what it is we mean when we use those terms.

The three terms are political mobilization, morale, and moral.

Political mobilization—central to an insurgency—derives from the verb to mobilize which, according to the American Heritage College Dictionary means to assemble or coordinate for a purpose and capable of movement. Mao Tse-tung, a master of the art who considered political mobilization vital to success, described the process as not only explaining one's purpose and goals to the people, but linking their interests to one's political program, then organizing and motivating the people to achieve those ends.

We might then define political mobilization as the process of organizing and motivating people to attain clearly defined goals that serve their perceived interests.

The terms morale and moral are closely related, deriving from the same root word.

Morale—a key element of success in battle—is formally defined as being the state of spirit as exhibited by confidence, cheerfulness, discipline, and willingness to perform assigned tasks. By contrast, a breakdown in morale entails loss of confidence, despair, indiscipline, and unwillingness to perform assigned tasks. We may infer that inspiring leadership, clarity of purpose, and certainty of success contribute to high morale.

Moral has several dictionary meanings, among which are the usual ideas of right conduct in human interactions. However, a less frequently used dictionary definition is: having psychological rather than physical or tangible effects. One of Napoleon's more famous maxims is: The moral is to the physical as three is to one. By this Napoleon meant that while physical effects of warfare were important, what really mattered to the soldier in the field was his psychological reaction to battle. It follows that if a soldier's morale is high, his psychological state will be positive and enable him to accomplish his mission.

WIKITANIA

As the reader progresses through the text, he or she will eventually discover the Republic of Wikitania, a politically unstable state somewhere in the so-called Third World whose leadership is questionable, whose people are restive, and whose economy is vulnerable to internal and international threats. Wikitania may resemble one or another Real World countries with which the reader is familiar, but it is doubtful that the Wikitanian regime will lodge a diplomatic protest over what bad things we may say about them.

PREFACE

A year and more has passed since the tragic death in Afghanistan of U.S. Army 1st Lieutenant Todd Weaver, to whom this work is dedicated. Since the fall of 2010, when this book was written, the world has witnessed the overthrow of four authoritarian regimes (Ivory Coast, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya), the independence of South Sudan, and deepening crises in Yemen and Syria. The war in Afghanistan continues with little improvement in the administration of justice or governance in that unhappy land, and it now appears that Pakistan's internal situation is becoming critical. Many of the world's less-publicized insurgencies continue on much as before. Conditions in the other halfhave not changed for the better.

The world greeted with enthusiasm what is called the Arab Spring, likely a journalistic reflection of the Prague Spring of 1968. As with the Prague Spring, which threatened the stability of Communist rule in eastern Europe a generation ago and raised so many similar hopes, we should be cautious about the Arab Spring we have just witnessed. Apart from the dismissal of an Old Guard of rulers in Cairo, Abidjan, Tripoli and Tunis, have there been any real changes in the underlying socio-economic factors that brought about these upheavals? Is the condition of the people in Egypt or Libya any different today than it was one year ago? If little has fundamentally changed in state or society, it is possible that, as in Prague a generation ago, we may at some point witness attempts by military forces or parties of zealots to restore authoritarian regimes to power. Certainly the possibility of renewed upheaval remains.

President Saleh in Yemen and Bashar Assad in Syria are now the focal points for popular uprisings, either of the snap insurrection type or more likely by means of protracted armed revolution. In both Syria and Yemen we see the possible defection to the rebels of elements of the armed forces. If this trend continues, we could see the fighting spread, just as it did in Gadhafi's Libya. And, like Gadhafi's forty-year long regime, the father and son Assad dictatorship may be in peril. Saleh, with thirty-three years in power, is vulnerable if his remaining base of support evaporates. But what then for Syria or Yemen?

Despite excellent news coverage of these important developments, one wonders how well the American public or the American policy community comprehends the changes taking place. If Americans think of foreign developments at all, they tend to the extremes of unwarranted optimism, as in the case of the Prague Spring, or total pessimism. Seldom do we reflect critically about foreign events based upon a healthy Missouri skepticism: show me. Change is afoot, to be sure. But what is its direction and pace?

Unbearable political and social conditions around the world are growing worse, and it is highly likely that we will witness other Springs. They may be in the Arab world, but countries in South Asia, Africa, and other regions also suffer from the social-economic conditions that foster instability. My strong suspicion is that Americans in general remain barely aware of the tumultuous events taking place in distant lands and lack both the foreign-area knowledge and political skills to deal with more Springs.

As the twenty-first century opens, the United States possesses unparalleled power: military, political, economic, cultural, and ideological. The question before the American public, its political leadership, and its civilian and military services, is how wisely that power will be used. What are our aims and our methods? Are we capable of longer-term strategic thinking or will an in-box, short-term mentality prevail? Will we use our military forces more wisely? How can America's cultural and ideological influence be put to positive use in a dynamic world? Have we the patience and knowledge needed to adjust intelligently to the changes now underway or yet to come?

G. L. Lamborn

April 2012

OVERVIEW:

ARE WISE COUNSELS POSSIBLE IN INSURGENCIES?

For arms are of little value in the field unless there is wise counsel at home.—Cicero

The punishment of wise men who refuse to take part in the affairs of government is to live under the government of unwise men.—Plato

In the coming century the security challenge for the United States will not originate from space-based lasers or high technology weapons, but from the crowded streets and marketplaces of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. While our policymakers and military planners fix their gaze on hyper-costly, space-age technology that can be applied to advanced weaponry, the most serious near-term threat to America's people, institutions and interests comes from overtaxed and undernourished people, fetid slums, high birthrates in squalid tenements, peasants living in unimaginable poverty, and callous exploitation. It will come from unfulfilled expectations and unrealized hopes, from ignorance manipulated by cynical zealots, from decades old resentments and hatreds, and from a growing desire by many people to change the world.

Despite unprecedented wealth and power enjoyed by the world's leading countries such as the Group of Twenty,¹ the fact remains that nearly three quarters of the world's population must survive on perhaps one quarter of the world's available resources. Worse than this lopsided disparity is the possibility that the gap may be widening between the rich and powerful West, and its East Asian allies, and the Rest of the World, as some corporations and even government bureaucracies call it.

Perhaps for millions of At the Mall Americans who know little world geography and even less history, and who could not distinguish Brazil from Brunei on a map, the festering security problem is invisible.

After all, if you can't see something, it doesn't exist. Right?

And yet, whether these At the Mall Americans realize it or not, they are joined at the hip with the lives and destinies of peoples half a world away. This is because people living in Asian slums or African shantytowns may now be at the societal breaking point. Rapidly expanding populations are overtaking limited food supplies, persistent disease is destroying families and sapping intellectual and physical capacity, illiteracy keeps people dependent on their masters and vulnerable to manipulation, and, impelled by gnawing hunger, the daily search for food keeps millions of people in fear and desperation. It should therefore come as no surprise, even to those sojourning at the Mall, that desperate people are highly susceptible to ideologies offering solutions to end their misery and degradation. Leaders who set themselves up by promising to change lives for the better will be followed. As noted by the sixteenth century Dutch scholar Erasmus: In the land of the blind, the man with one eye is king.

Insurgency is one potent option for change in politically unstable lands. Despite much airtime and printer's ink spent discussing insurgency, the American defense establishment and the policy community still wander in the dark about what it is and how best to deal with it. Many policymakers and generals are like the legendary blind men trying to describe an elephant. Each has part of the truth, but only a part. As a whole, however, the elephant of insurgency remains a mystery. Instead of understanding, we spout jargon. Instead of clear thinking, we employ catch phrases and acronyms. Instead of sound strategy, we act in spasms of uncoordinated activity. Instead of thoughtful policy aimed at shaping the future, we have knee-jerk reactions to the crisis of the moment. We prove Swedish chancellor Axel Oxenstierna's words to his son in 1648: Do you not know, my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed?

While it is true that the ideas of a number of great strategists have been advanced to explain instability and insurgency—and some of these theories do apply in part—no Western strategic thinker has yet succeeded in defining insurgency in strategic terms. Perhaps it cannot be done. But it is counterproductive for policymakers and generals to apply the wrong strategic ideas when dealing with an insurgency. Even worse is for them to have no discernable strategy at all.

The Fashion of the Day at the Pentagon is to discuss COIN. For those of us who speak English rather than Pentagonese, this means counterinsurgency. It is instructive, however, that the great majority of writers on the subject of COIN do not understand the IN in COIN. How, then, is it remotely possible for these pundits to discuss counterinsurgency in a thoughtful manner if they cannot comprehend the highly complex roots of an insurgency they profess to be countering? Pentagon pamphlets and PowerPoint presentations proliferate on COIN. And yet, the causes and nature of insurgency per se are seldom mentioned.

It is also instructive that little is taught either in public schools or universities about the nature of the Third World. Yes, some excellent programs exist at a number of our top universities. But how many students enroll in programs that require study of non-European languages or Third World politics? Relatively few. For this reason, we have a very thin bench of foreign area experts to staff critical positions in our government and military. Neither is it disclosing a great secret that the American public as a whole is woefully ignorant of lands and peoples beyond our shores—save, perhaps, Cancun and Baja California. Moreover, when thinking of foreign affairs the American voter appears stimulated more by preconceived notions and hazy misperceptions, often fired by some politician's praise or denunciation, than by patient research and careful thought.

Many years ago, the cartoon character Pogo, lamentably now almost forgotten, stated a truth that should be taken to heart by every policy-maker: Think ahead to put trouble behind. How often do we as a people, and the government, which is supposedly ours to direct, take thoughtful steps to prevent or pre-empt the violence and destruction of an insurgency or revolution by helping mitigate or eliminate the causes of the upheaval? How often have we as a people, or our representative government, come up with imaginative programs that guide otherwise vulnerable Third World regimes toward responsible government that truly is of the people, by the people, and for the people?

I believe that America is presently in a unique position—unique in history as well as in the present political world—to shape the future of humanity. I say that because we are still capable of influencing events in far off lands in a positive way through sober analysis and thoughtful policies. We are still in position to put ourselves on the side of the people, and not on the side of cozy protection rackets pretending to be governments. Through the ideals expressed by the Founding Fathers, we are