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    Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies
    Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies
    Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies
    Ebook1,435 pages18 hours

    Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies

    By McKinsey & Company, Inc., Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart and David Wessels

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    About this ebook

    The number one guide to corporate valuation is back and betterthan ever

    Thoroughly revised and expanded to reflect business conditionsin today's volatile global economy, Valuation, Fifth Editioncontinues the tradition of its bestselling predecessors byproviding up-to-date insights and practical advice on how tocreate, manage, and measure the value of an organization.

    Along with all new case studies that illustrate how valuationtechniques and principles are applied in real-world situations,this comprehensive guide has been updated to reflect newdevelopments in corporate finance, changes in accounting rules, andan enhanced global perspective. Valuation, Fifth Edition isfilled with expert guidance that managers at all levels, investors,and students can use to enhance their understanding of thisimportant discipline.

    • Contains strategies for multi-business valuation and valuationfor corporate restructuring, mergers, and acquisitions
    • Addresses how you can interpret the results of a valuation inlight of a company's competitive situation
    • Also available: a book plus CD-ROM package (978-0-470-42469-8)as well as a stand-alone CD-ROM (978-0-470-42457-7) containing aninteractive valuation DCF model

    Valuation, Fifth Edition stands alone in this field withits reputation of quality and consistency. If you want to hone yourvaluation skills today and improve them for years to come, look nofurther than this book.

    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherWiley
    Release dateJul 16, 2010
    ISBN9780470889930
    Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies
    Author

    McKinsey & Company, Inc.

    McKINSEY & COMPANY is a global management consulting firm, deeply committed to helping institutions in the private, public, and social sectors achieve lasting success. With over 100 offices in more than 60 countries, the firm is a trusted advisor to 90 of the world’s top 100 companies.

    Read more from Mc Kinsey & Company, Inc.

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    Valuation - McKinsey & Company, Inc.

    Part One

    Foundations of Value

    1

    Why Value Value?

    Value is the defining dimension of measurement in a market economy. People invest in the expectation that when they sell, the value of each investment will have grown by a sufficient amount above its cost to compensate them for the risk they took. This is true for all types of investments, be they bonds, derivatives, bank accounts, or company shares. Indeed, in a market economy, a company’s ability to create value for its shareholders and the amount of value it creates are the chief measures by which it is judged.

    Value is a particularly helpful measure of performance because it takes into account the long-term interests of all the stakeholders in a company, not just the shareholders. Alternative measures are neither as long-term nor as broad. For instance, accounting earnings assess only short-term performance from the viewpoint of shareholders; measures of employee satisfaction measure just that. Value, in contrast, is relevant to all stakeholders, because according to a growing body of research, companies that maximize value for their shareholders in the long term also create more employment, treat their current and former employees better, give their customers more satisfaction, and shoulder a greater burden of corporate responsibility than more shortsighted rivals. Competition among value-focused companies also helps to ensure that capital, human capital, and natural resources are used efficiently across the economy, leading to higher living standards for everyone. For these reasons, knowledge of how companies create value and how to measure value—the subjects of this book—is vital intellectual equipment in a market economy.

    In response to the economic crisis unfolding since 2007, when the U.S. housing bubble burst, several serious thinkers have argued that our ideas about market economies must change fundamentally if we are to avoid similar crises in the future. The changes they propose include more explicit regulation governing what companies and investors do, as well as new economic theories. Our view, however, is that neither regulation nor new theory will prevent future bubbles or crises. The reason is that past ones have occurred largely when companies, investors, and governments have forgotten how investments create value, how to measure value properly, or both. The result has been confusion about which investments are creating real value—confusion that persists until value-destroying investments have triggered a crisis.

    Accordingly, we believe that relearning how to create and measure value in the tried-and-true fashion is an essential step toward creating more secure economies and defending ourselves against future crises. That is why this fifth edition of Valuation rests on exactly the same core principles as the first.

    The guiding principle of value creation is that companies create value by investing capital they raise from investors to generate future cash flows at rates of return exceeding the cost of capital (the rate investors require to be paid for the use of their capital). The faster companies can increase their revenues and deploy more capital at attractive rates of return, the more value they create. The combination of growth and return on invested capital (ROIC) relative to its cost is what drives value. Companies can sustain strong growth and high returns on invested capital only if they have a well-defined competitive advantage. This is how competitive advantage, the core concept of business strategy, links to the guiding principle of value creation.

    The corollary of this guiding principle, known as the conservation of value, says anything that doesn’t increase cash flows doesn’t create value.1 For example, when a company substitutes debt for equity or issues debt to repurchase shares, it changes the ownership of claims to its cash flows. However, it doesn’t change the total available cash flows,2 so in this case value is conserved, not created. Similarly, changing accounting techniques will change the appearance of cash flows without actually changing the cash flows, so it won’t change the value of a company.

    To the core principles, we add the empirical observation that creating sustainable value is a long-term endeavor. Competition tends to erode competitive advantages and, with them, returns on invested capital. Therefore, companies must continually seek and exploit new sources of competitive advantage if they are to create long-term value. To that end, managers must resist short-term pressure to take actions that create illusory value quickly at the expense of the real thing in the long term. Creating value for shareholders is not the same as, for example, meeting the analysts’ consensus earnings forecast for the next quarter. It means balancing near-term financial performance against what it takes to develop a healthy company that can create value for decades ahead—a demanding challenge.

    This book explains both the economics of value creation (for instance, how competitive advantage enables some companies to earn higher returns on invested capital than others) and the process of measuring value (for example, how to calculate return on invested capital from a company’s accounting statements). With this knowledge, companies can make wiser strategic and operating decisions, such as what businesses to own and how to make trade-offs between growth and returns on invested capital. Equally, this knowledge will enable investors to calculate the risks and returns of their investments with greater confidence.

    CONSEQUENCES OF FORGETTING TO VALUE VALUE

    The guiding principle of value creation—the fact that return on invested capital and growth generate value—and its corollary, the conservation of value, have stood the test of time. Alfred Marshall spoke about the return on capital relative to the cost of capital in 1890.3 When managers, boards of directors, and investors have forgotten these simple truths, the consequences have been disastrous. The rise and fall of business conglomerates in the 1970s, hostile takeovers in the United States in the 1980s, the collapse of Japan’s bubble economy in the 1990s, the Southeast Asian crisis in 1998, the Internet bubble, and the economic crisis starting in 2007 can all, to some extent, be traced to a misunderstanding or misapplication of these principles.

    Market Bubbles

    During the Internet bubble, managers and investors lost sight of what drove return on invested capital; indeed, many forgot the importance of this ratio entirely. When Netscape Communications went public in 1995, the company saw its market capitalization soar to $6 billion on an annual revenue base of just $85 million, an astonishing valuation. This phenomenon convinced the financial world that the Internet could change the way business was done and value created in every sector, setting off a race to create Internet-related companies and take them public. Between 1995 and 2000, more than 4,700 companies went public in the United States and Europe, many with billion-dollar-plus market capitalizations.

    Many of the companies born in this era, including Amazon.com, eBay, and Yahoo!, have created and are likely to continue creating substantial profits and value. But for every solid, innovative new business idea, there were dozens of companies (including Netscape) that turned out to have nothing like the same ability to generate revenue or value in either the short or the long term. The initial stock market success of these flimsy companies represented a triumph of hype over experience.

    Many executives and investors either forgot or threw out fundamental rules of economics in the rarefied air of the Internet revolution. Consider the concept of increasing returns to scale, also known as network effects or demand-side economies of scale. The idea enjoyed great popularity during the 1990s after Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian, professors at the University of California–Berkeley, described it in a book titled Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy.4

    The basic idea is this: In certain situations, as companies get bigger, they can earn higher margins and return on capital because their product becomes more valuable with each new customer. In most industries, competition forces returns back to reasonable levels. But in increasing-returns industries, competition is kept at bay by the low and decreasing unit costs of the market leader (hence the tag winner takes all for this kind of industry).

    Take Microsoft’s Office software, a product that provides word processing, spreadsheets, and graphics. As the installed base of Office users expands, it becomes ever more attractive for new customers to use Office for these tasks, because they can share their documents, calculations, and images with so many others. Potential customers become increasingly unwilling to purchase and use competing products. Because of this advantage, Microsoft made profit margins of more than 60 percent and earned operating profits of approximately $12 billion on Office software in 2009, making it one of the most profitable products of all time.

    As Microsoft’s experience illustrates, the concept of increasing returns to scale is sound economics. What was unsound during the Internet era was its misapplication to almost every product and service related to the Internet. At that time, the concept was misinterpreted to mean that merely getting big faster than your competitors in a given market would result in enormous profits. To illustrate, some analysts applied the idea to mobile-phone service providers, even though mobile customers can and do easily switch providers, forcing the providers to compete largely on price. With no sustainable competitive advantage, mobile-phone service providers were unlikely ever to earn the 45 percent returns on invested capital that were projected for them. Increasing-returns logic was also applied to Internet grocery delivery services, even though these firms had to invest (unsustainably, eventually) in more drivers, trucks, warehouses, and inventory when their customer base grew.

    The history of innovation shows how difficult it is to earn monopoly-sized returns on capital for any length of time except in very special circumstances. That did not matter to commentators who ignored history in their indiscriminate recommendation of Internet stocks. The Internet bubble left a sorry trail of intellectual shortcuts taken to justify absurd prices for technology company shares. Those who questioned the new economics were branded as people who simply didn’t get it—the new-economy equivalents of defenders of Ptolemaic astronomy.

    When the laws of economics prevailed, as they always do, it was clear that many Internet businesses, including online pet food sales and grocery delivery companies, did not have the unassailable competitive advantages required to earn even modest returns on invested capital. The Internet has revolutionized the economy, as have other innovations, but it did not and could not render obsolete the rules of economics, competition, and value creation.

    Financial Crises

    Behind the more recent financial and economic crises beginning in 2007 lies the fact that banks and investors forgot the principle of the conservation of value. Let’s see how. First, individuals and speculators bought homes—illiquid assets, meaning they take a while to sell. They took out mortgages on which the interest was set at artificially low teaser rates for the first few years but rose substantially when the teaser rates expired and the required principal payments kicked in. In these transactions, the lender and buyer knew the buyer couldn’t afford the mortgage payments after the teaser period ended. But both assumed either that the buyer’s income would grow by enough to make the new payments or that the house value would increase enough to induce a new lender to refinance the mortgage at similar, low teaser rates.

    Banks packaged these high-risk debts into long-term securities and sold them to investors. The securities, too, were not very liquid, but the investors who bought them—typically other banks and hedge funds—used short-term debt to finance the purchase, thus creating a long-term risk for whoever lent them the money.

    When the interest rate on the home buyers’ adjustable-rate debt increased, many could no longer afford the payments. Reflecting their distress, the real estate market crashed, pushing the values of many homes below the values of loans taken out to buy them. At that point, homeowners could neither make the required payments nor sell their houses. Seeing this, the banks that had issued short-term loans to investors in securities backed by mortgages became unwilling to roll over those loans, prompting the investors to sell all such securities at once. The value of the securities plummeted. Finally, many of the large banks themselves owned these securities, which they, of course, had also financed with short-term debt they could no longer roll over.

    This story reveals two fundamental flaws in the decisions made by participants in the securitized mortgage market. They assumed that securitizing risky home loans made the loans more valuable because it reduced the risk of the assets. This violates the conservation of value rule. The aggregated cash flows of the home loans were not increased by securitization, so no value was created, and the initial risks remained. Securitizing the assets simply enabled their risks to be passed on to other owners: some investors, somewhere, had to be holding them. Yet the complexity of the chain of securities made it impossible to know who was holding precisely which risks. After the housing market turned, financial-services companies feared that any of their counterparties could be holding massive risks and almost ceased to do business with one another. This was the start of the credit crunch that triggered a recession in the real economy.

    The second flaw was to believe that using leverage to make an investment in itself creates value. It does not, because—referring once again to the conservation of value—it does not increase the cash flows from an investment. Many banks used large amounts of short-term debt to fund their illiquid long-term assets. This debt did not create long-term value for shareholders in those banks. On the contrary, it increased the risks of holding their equity.

    Financial crises and excessive leverage As many economic historians have described, aggressive use of leverage is the theme that links most major financial crises. The pattern is always the same: Companies, banks, or investors use short-term debt to buy long-lived, illiquid assets. Typically some event triggers unwillingness among lenders to refinance the short-term debt when it falls due. Since the borrowers don’t have enough cash on hand to repay the short-term debt, they must sell some of their assets. The assets are illiquid, and other borrowers are trying to do the same, so the price each borrower can realize is too low to repay the debt. In other words, the borrower’s assets and liabilities are mismatched.

    In the past 30 years, the world has seen at least six financial crises that arose largely because companies and banks were financing illiquid assets with short-term debt. In the United States in the 1980s, savings and loan institutions funded an aggressive expansion with short-term debt and deposits. When it became clear that these institutions’ investments (typically real estate) were worth less than their liabilities, lenders and depositors refused to lend more to them. In 1989, the U.S. government bailed out the industry.

    In the mid-1990s, the fast-growing economies in East Asia, including Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia, fueled their investments in illiquid industrial property, plant, and equipment with short-term debt, often denominated in U.S. dollars. When global interest rates rose and it became clear that the East Asian companies had built too much capacity, those companies were unable to repay or refinance their debt. The ensuing crisis destabilized local economies and damaged foreign investors.

    Other financial crises fueled by too much short-term debt have included the Russian government default and the collapse of the U.S. hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management, both in 1998; the U.S. commercial real estate crisis in the early 1990s; and the Japanese financial crisis that began in 1990 and, according to some, continues to this day.

    Market bubbles and crashes are painfully disruptive, but we don’t need to rewrite the rules of competition and finance to understand and avoid them. Certainly the Internet has changed the way we shop and communicate. But it has not created a New Economy, as the 1990s catchphrase went. On the contrary, it has made information, especially about prices, transparent in a way that intensifies old-style market competition in many real markets. Similarly, the financial crisis triggered in 2007 will wring out some of the economy’s recent excesses, such as people buying houses they can’t afford and uncontrolled credit card borrowing by consumers. But the key to avoiding the next crisis is to reassert the fundamental economic rules, not to revise them. If investors and lenders value their investments and loans according to the guiding principle of value creation and its corollary, prices for both kinds of assets will reflect the real risks underlying the transactions.

    Financial crises and equity markets Contrary to popular opinion, stock markets generally continue to reflect companies’ intrinsic value during financial crises. For instance, after the 2007 crisis had started in the credit markets, equity markets too came in for criticism. In October 2008, a New York Times editorial thundered, What’s been going on in the stock market hardly fits canonical notions of rationality. In the last month or so, shares in Bank of America plunged to $26, bounced to $37, slid to $30, rebounded to $38, plummeted to $20, sprung above $26 and skidded back to almost $24. Evidently, people don’t have a clue what Bank of America is worth.5 Far from showing that the equity market was broken, however, this example points up the fundamental difference between the equity markets and the credit markets. The critical difference is that investors could easily trade shares of Bank of America on the equity markets, whereas credit markets (with the possible exception of the government bond market) are not nearly as liquid. This is why economic crises typically stem from excesses in credit rather than equity markets.

    The two types of markets operate very differently. Equities are highly liquid because they trade on organized exchanges with many buyers and sellers for a relatively small number of securities. In contrast, there are many more debt securities than equities because there are often multiple debt instruments for each company and even more derivatives, many of which are not standardized. The result is a proliferation of small, illiquid credit markets. Furthermore, much debt doesn’t trade at all. For example, short-term loans between banks and from banks to hedge funds are one-to-one transactions that are difficult to buy or sell. Illiquidity leads to frozen markets where no one will trade or where prices fall to levels far below a level that reflects a reasonable economic value. Simply put, illiquid markets cease to function as markets at all.

    During the credit crisis beginning in 2007, prices on the equity markets became volatile, but they operated normally for the most part. The volatility reflected the uncertainty hanging over the real economy. (See Chapter 17 for more on volatility.) The S&P 500 index traded between 1,200 and 1,400 from January to September 2008. In October, upon the collapse of U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers and the U.S. government takeover of the insurance company American International Group (AIG), the index began its slide to a trading range of 800 to 900. But that drop of about 30 percent was not surprising given the uncertainty about the financial system, the availability of credit, and their impact on the real economy. Moreover, the 30 percent drop in the index was equivalent to an increase in the cost of equity of only about 1 percent,6 reflecting investors’ sense of the scale of increase in the risk of investing in equities generally.

    There was a brief period of extreme equity market activity in March 2009, when the S&P 500 index dropped from 800 to 700 and rose back to 800 in less than one month. Many investors were apparently sitting on the market sidelines, waiting until the market hit bottom. The moment the index dropped below 700 seemed to trigger their return. From there, the market began a steady increase to about 1,100 in December 2009. Our research suggests that a long-term trend value for the S&P 500 index would have been in the 1,100 to 1,300 range at that time, a reasonable reflection of the real value of equities.

    In hindsight, the behavior of the equity market has not been unreasonable. It actually functioned quite well in the sense that trading continued and price changes were not out of line with what was going on in the economy. True, the equity markets did not predict the economic crisis. However, a look at previous recessions shows that the equity markets rarely predict inflection points in the economy.7

    BENEFITS OF FOCUSING ON LONG-TERM VALUE

    There has long been vigorous debate on the importance of shareholder value relative to other measures of a company’s success, such as its record on employment, social responsibility, and the environment. In their ideology and legal frameworks, the United States and the United Kingdom have given most weight to the idea that the objective function of the corporation is to maximize shareholder value, because shareholders are the owners of the corporation who elect the board of directors to represent their interests in managing the corporation’s development. In continental Europe, an explicitly broader view of the objectives of business organizations has long been more influential. In many cases, this is embedded in the governance structures of the corporate form of organization. In the Netherlands and Germany, for example, the board of a large corporation has a duty to support the continuity of the business and to do that in the interests of all the corporation’s stakeholders, including employees and the local community, not just its shareholders. Similar philosophies underpin corporate governance in other continental European countries. In much of Asia, company boards are more likely than in the United States and Europe to be controlled by family members, and they are the stakeholders whose interests will set the direction of those companies.

    Our analysis and experience suggest that for most companies anywhere in the world, pursuing the creation of long-term shareholder value does not cause other stakeholders to suffer. We would go further and argue that companies dedicated to value creation are more robust and build stronger economies, higher living standards, and more opportunities for individuals.

    Consider employee stakeholders. A company that tries to boost profits by providing a shabby work environment, underpaying employees, and skimping on benefits will have trouble attracting and retaining high-quality employees. With today’s more mobile and more educated workforce, such a company would struggle in the long term against competitors offering more attractive environments. While it may feel good to treat people well, it is also good business.

    Value-creating companies also create more jobs. When examining employment, we found that the U.S. and European companies that created the most shareholder value in the past 15 years have shown stronger employment growth. In Exhibit 1.1, companies with the highest total returns to shareholders (TRS) also had the largest increases in employment. We tested this link within individual sectors of the economy and found similar results.

    c01f001

    EXHIBIT 1.1 Correlation between Total Returns to Shareholders (TRS) and Employment Growth

    An often-expressed concern is that companies that emphasize creating value for shareholders have a short time horizon that is overly focused on accounting earnings rather than revenue growth and return on invested capital. We disagree. We have found a strong positive correlation between long-term shareholder returns and investments in research and development (R&D)—evidence of a commitment to creating value in the longer term. As shown in Exhibit 1.2, companies that earned the highest shareholder returns also invested the most in R&D. These results also hold within individual sectors in the economy.

    c01f002

    EXHIBIT 1.2 Correlation between TRS and R&D Expenditures

    Companies that create value also tend to show a greater commitment to meeting their social responsibilities. Our research shows that many of the corporate social responsibility initiatives that companies take can help them create shareholder value.8 For example, IBM provides free Web-based resources on business management to small and midsize enterprises in developing economies. Helping build such businesses not only improves IBM’s reputation and relationships in new markets, but also helps it develop relationships with companies that could become future customers. And Best Buy has undertaken a targeted effort to reduce employee turnover among women. The program has helped women create their own support networks and build leadership skills. As a result of the program, turnover among female employees decreased by more than 5 percent.

    CHALLENGES OF FOCUSING ON LONG-TERM VALUE

    Focusing on return on invested capital and revenue growth over the long term is a tough job for executives. They can’t be expected to take it on unless they are sure it wins them more investor support and a stronger share price. But as later chapters will show, the evidence is overwhelming that investors do indeed value long-term cash flow, growth, and return on invested capital, and companies that perform well on those measures perform well in the stock market. The evidence also supports the corollary: companies that fail to create value over the long term do less well in the stock market.

    Yet despite the evidence that shareholders value value, companies continue to listen to misguided supposed truths about what the market wants and fall for the illusion of the free lunch—hoping, for example, that one accounting treatment will lead to a higher value than another, or some fancy financial structure or improvement in earnings per share will turn a mediocre deal into a winner.

    To illustrate, when analyzing a prospective acquisition, the question most frequently posed is whether the transaction will dilute earnings per share (EPS) over the first year or two. Given the popularity of EPS as a yardstick for company decisions, you would think that a predicted improvement in EPS would be an important indicator of whether the acquisition was actually likely to create value. However, there is no empirical evidence linking an increased EPS with the value created by a transaction (see Chapter 21 for the evidence). Deals that strengthen EPS and deals that dilute EPS are equally likely to create or destroy value.

    If such fallacies have no impact on value, why do they prevail? We recently participated in a discussion with a company pursuing a major acquisition and its bankers about whether the earnings dilution likely to result from the deal was important. To paraphrase one of the bankers, We know that any impact on EPS is irrelevant to value, but we use it as a simple way to communicate with boards of directors.

    Yet company executives say they, too, don’t believe the impact on EPS is so important. They tell us they are just using the measures the Street uses. Investors also tell us that a deal’s short-term impact on EPS is not that important for them. In sum, we hear from almost everyone we talk to that a transaction’s short-term impact on EPS does not matter, yet they all pay attention to it.

    As a result of their focus on short-term EPS, major companies not infrequently pass up value-creating opportunities. In a survey of 400 CFOs, two Duke University professors found that fully 80 percent of the CFOs said they would reduce discretionary spending on potentially value-creating activities such as marketing and R&D in order to meet their short-term earnings targets.9 In addition, 39 percent said they would give discounts to customers to make purchases this quarter rather than next, in order to hit quarterly EPS targets. Such biases shortchange all stakeholders.

    From 1997 to 2003, a leading company consistently generated annual EPS growth of between 11 percent and 16 percent. That seems impressive until you look at measures more important to value creation, like revenue growth. During the same period, the company increased revenues by only 2 percent a year. It achieved its profit growth by cutting costs, usually a good thing, and the cost cutting certainly did produce productivity improvements in the earlier years. However, as opportunities for those ran out, the company turned to reductions in marketing and product development to maintain its earnings growth. In 2003, its managers admitted they had underinvested in products and marketing and needed to go through a painful period of rebuilding, and the stock price fell.

    The pressure to show strong short-term results often mounts when businesses start to mature and see their growth begin to moderate. Investors go on baying for high growth. Managers are tempted to find ways to keep profits rising in the short term while they try to stimulate longer-term growth. However, any short-term efforts to massage earnings that undercut productive investment make achieving long-term growth even more difficult, spawning a vicious circle.

    Some analysts and some irrational investors will always clamor for short-term results. However, even though a company bent on growing long-term value will not be able to meet their demands all of the time, this continuous pressure has the virtue of keeping managers on their toes. Sorting out the trade-offs between short-term earnings and long-term value creation is part of a manager’s job, just as having the courage to make the right call is a critical personal quality. Perhaps even more important, it is up to corporate boards to investigate and understand the economics of the businesses in their portfolio well enough to judge when managers are making the right trade-offs and, above all, to protect managers when they choose to build long-term value at the expense of short-term profits.

    Applying the principles of value creation sometimes means going against the crowd. It means accepting that there are no free lunches. It means relying on data, thoughtful analysis, and a deep understanding of the competitive dynamics of your industry. We hope this book provides readers with the knowledge to help them make and defend decisions that will create value for investors and for society at large throughout their careers.

    1 Assuming there are no changes in the company’s risk profile.

    2 In Chapter 23 we show that the tax savings from debt may increase the company’s cash flows.

    3 A. Marshall, Principles of Economics, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1890), 142.

    4 C. Shapiro and H. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1999).

    5 Eduardo Porter, The Lion, the Bull and the Bears, New York Times, October 17, 2008.

    6 Richard Dobbs, Bin Jiang, and Timothy Koller, Why the Crisis Hasn’t Shaken the Cost of Capital, McKinsey on Finance, no. 30 (Winter 2009): 26–30.

    7 Richard Dobbs and Timothy Koller, The Crisis: Timing Strategic Moves, McKinsey on Finance, no. 31 (Spring 2009): 1–5.

    8 Sheila Bonini, Timothy Koller, and Philip H. Mirvis, Valuing Social Responsibility Programs, McKinsey on Finance, no. 32 (Summer 2009): 11–18.

    9 John R. Graham, Cam Harvey, and Shiva Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, Journal of Accounting and Economics 40 (2005): 3–73.

    2

    Fundamental Principles of Value Creation

    In Chapter 1, we introduced the fundamental principles of corporate finance. Companies create value by investing capital to generate future cash flows at rates of return that exceed their cost of capital. The faster they can grow and deploy more capital at attractive rates of return, the more value they create. The mix of growth and return on invested capital (ROIC)1 relative to the cost of capital is what drives the creation of value. A corollary of this principle is the conservation of value: any action that doesn’t increase cash flows doesn’t create value.

    The principles imply that a company’s primary task is to generate cash flows at rates of return on invested capital greater than the cost of capital. Following these principles helps managers decide which investments will create the most value for shareholders in the long term. The principles also help investors assess the potential value of alternative investments. Managers and investors alike need to understand in detail what relationships tie together cash flows, ROIC, and value; what consequences arise from the conservation of value; and how to factor any risks attached to future cash flows into their decision making. These are the main subjects of this chapter. The chapter concludes by setting out the relationships between cash flows, ROIC, and value in the key value driver formula—the equation underpinning discounted cash flow (DCF) valuation in both theory and practice.

    GROWTH AND ROIC: DRIVERS OF VALUE

    Companies create value for their owners by investing cash now to generate more cash in the future. The amount of value they create is the difference between cash inflows and the cost of the investments made, adjusted to reflect the fact that tomorrow’s cash flows are worth less than today’s because of the time value of money and the riskiness of future cash flows. As we will demonstrate later in this chapter, a company’s return on invested capital and its revenue growth together determine how revenues are converted to cash flows. That means the amount of value a company creates is governed ultimately by its ROIC, revenue growth, and of course its ability to sustain both over time. Exhibit 2.1 illustrates this core principle of value creation.2

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    EXHIBIT 2.1 Growth and ROIC Drive Value

    One might expect universal agreement on a notion as fundamental as value, but this isn’t the case: many executives, boards, and financial media still treat accounting earnings and value as one and the same, and focus almost obsessively on improving earnings. However, while earnings and cash flow are often correlated, earnings don’t tell the whole story of value creation, and focusing too much on earnings or earnings growth often leads companies to stray from a value-creating path.

    For example, earnings growth alone can’t explain why investors in drugstore chain Walgreens, with sales of $54 billion in 2007, and global chewing-gum maker Wm. Wrigley Jr. Company, with sales of $5 billion the same year, earned similar shareholder returns between 1968 and 2007.3 These two successful companies had very different growth rates. During the period, the net income of Walgreens grew at 14 percent per year, while Wrigley’s net income grew at 10 percent per year. Even though Walgreens was one of the fastest-growing companies in the United States during this time, its average annual shareholder returns were 16 percent, compared with 17 percent for the significantly slower-growing Wrigley. The reason Wrigley could create slightly more value than Walgreens despite 40 percent slower growth was that it earned a 28 percent ROIC, while the ROIC for Walgreens was 14 percent (a good rate for a retailer).

    To be fair, if all companies in an industry earned the same ROIC, then earnings growth would be the differentiating metric. For reasons of simplicity, analysts and academics have sometimes made this assumption, but as Chapter 4 will demonstrate, returns on invested capital can vary considerably, even between companies within the same industry.

    Relationship of Growth, ROIC, and Cash Flow

    Disaggregating cash flow into revenue growth and ROIC helps illuminate the underlying drivers of a company’s performance. Say a company’s cash flow was $100 last year and will be $150 next year. This doesn’t tell us much about its economic performance, since the $50 increase in cash flow could come from many sources, including revenue growth, a reduction in capital spending, or a reduction in marketing expenditures. But if we told you that the company was generating revenue growth of 7 percent per year and would earn a return on invested capital of 15 percent, then you would be able to evaluate its performance. You could, for instance, compare the company’s growth rate with the growth rate of its industry or the economy, and you could analyze its ROIC relative to peers, its cost of capital, and its own historical performance.

    Growth, ROIC, and cash flow are tightly linked. To see how, consider two companies, Value Inc. and Volume Inc., whose projected earnings and cash flows are displayed in Exhibit 2.2. Both companies earned $100 million in year 1 and increased their revenues and earnings at 5 percent per year, so their projected earnings are identical. If the popular view that value depends only on earnings were true, the two companies’ values also would be the same. But this simple example illustrates how wrong that view can be.

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    EXHIBIT 2.2 Tale of Two Companies: Same Earnings, Different Cash Flows

    Value Inc. generates higher cash flows with the same earnings because it invests only 25 percent of its profits (making its investment rate 25 percent) to achieve the same profit growth as Volume Inc., which invests 50 percent of its profits. Value Inc.’s lower investment rate results in 50 percent higher cash flows than Volume Inc. obtains from the same level of profits.

    We can value the two companies by discounting their future cash flows at a discount rate that reflects what investors expect to earn from investing in the company—that is, their cost of capital. For both companies, we discounted each year’s cash flow to the present at a 10 percent cost of capital and summed the results to derive a total present value of all future cash flows: $1,500 million for Value Inc. (shown in Exhibit 2.3) and $1,000 million for Volume Inc.

    c02f003

    EXHIBIT 2.3 Value Inc.: DCF Valuation

    The companies’ values can also be expressed as price-to-earnings ratios (P/Es). To do this, divide each company’s value by its first-year earnings of $100 million. Value Inc.’s P/E is 15, while Volume Inc.’s is only 10. Despite identical earnings and growth rates, the companies have different earnings multiples because their cash flows are so different.

    Value Inc. generates higher cash flows because it doesn’t have to invest as much as Volume Inc., thanks to its higher rate of ROIC. In this case, Value Inc. invested $25 million (out of $100 million earned) in year 1 to increase its revenues and profits by $5 million in year 2. Its return on new capital is 20 percent ($5 million of additional profits divided by $25 million of investment).4 In contrast, Volume Inc.’s return on invested capital is 10 percent ($5 million in additional profits in year 2 divided by an investment of $50 million).

    Growth, ROIC, and cash flow (as represented by the investment rate) are tied together mathematically in the following relationship:

    c02f021

    Applying that formula to Value Inc.,

    c02f026

    Applying it to Volume Inc.,

    c02f027

    Since the three variables are tied together, you only need two to know the third, so you can describe a company’s performance with any two of the variables.

    Balancing ROIC and Growth to Create Value

    Exhibit 2.4 shows how different combinations of growth and ROIC translate into value. Each cell in the matrix represents the present value of future cash flows under each of the assumptions of growth and ROIC, discounted at the company’s cost of capital. In this case, we’re assuming a 9 percent cost of capital and a company that earns $100 in the first year.5

    c02f004

    EXHIBIT 2.4 Translating Growth and ROIC into Value

    Using this simple approach, we get real-world results. Take the typical large company, which grows at about 5 to 6 percent per year (nominal), earns about a 13 percent return on equity, and has a 9 percent cost of capital. Finding the intersection of the typical company’s return leads you to a value of $1,500 to $1,600. Dividing this value by earnings of $100 results in a price-to-earnings ratio of 15 to 16 times—and 15 times is the median P/E for large U.S. companies outside of a recession.

    Observe that for any level of growth, value increases with improvements in ROIC. In other words, when all else is equal, a higher ROIC is always good. The same can’t be said of growth. When ROIC is high, faster growth increases value, but when ROIC is lower than the company’s cost of capital, faster growth necessarily destroys value, making the point where ROIC equals the cost of capital the dividing line between creating and destroying value through growth. On the line, value is neither created nor destroyed, regardless of how fast the company grows.

    We sometimes hear the argument that even low-ROIC companies should strive for growth, because if a company grows, its ROIC will naturally increase. However, we find this is true only for young, start-up businesses. Most often in mature companies, a low ROIC indicates a flawed business model or unattractive industry structure.

    Real-World Evidence

    The logic laid out in this section is reflected in the way companies perform in the stock market. Recall the earlier explanation of why shareholder returns for Walgreens and Wrigley were the same even though earnings for Walgreens grew much faster. General Electric (GE) provides another example of the relative impact of growth and ROIC on value. GE’s share price increased from about $5 in 1991 to about $40 in 2001, earning investors $519 billion from the increase in share value and distributions during the final 10 years of Jack Welch’s tenure as CEO. A similar amount invested in the S&P 500 index would have returned only $212 billion.

    How did GE do it? Its industrial and finance businesses both contributed significantly to its overall creation of value, but in different ways. Over the 10-year period, the industrial businesses increased revenues by only 4 percent a year (less than the growth of the economy), but their ROIC increased from about 13 percent to 31 percent. The finance businesses performed in a more balanced way, demonstrating growth of 18 percent per year and increasing ROIC from 14 percent to 21 percent. In the industrial businesses, ROIC was the key driver of value, while in the financial businesses, improvements in both growth and ROIC contributed significantly to value creation.

    Clearly, the core valuation principle applies at the company level. We have found that it applies at the sector level, too. Consider companies as a whole in the consumer packaged-goods sector. Even though well-known names in the sector such as Procter & Gamble and Colgate-Palmolive aren’t high-growth companies, the market values them at high earnings multiples because of their high returns on invested capital.

    The typical large packaged-goods company increased its revenues only 6 percent a year from 1998 to 2007, slower than the average of about 8 percent for all large U.S. companies. Yet at the end of 2007 (before the market crash), the median P/E of consumer packaged-goods companies was about 20, compared with 17 for the median large company. The high valuation of companies in this sector rested on their high ROICs—typically above 20 percent, compared with ROICs averaging 13 percent for the median large company between 1998 and 2007.

    Another example that underlines the point is a comparison of Campbell Soup Company ($8 billion in 2008 revenues) with fast-growing discount retailer Kohl’s (revenues of $16 billion in 2008). In the middle years of the decade, revenues for Kohl’s grew 15 percent annually, while Campbell achieved only 4 percent in annual organic growth. Yet the two companies had similar P/Es. Campbell’s high ROIC of 50 percent made up for its slower growth; Kohl’s ROIC averaged only 15 percent.

    To test whether the core valuation principle also applies at the level of countries and the aggregate economy, we asked why large U.S.-based companies typically trade at higher multiples than large companies in the more developed Asian countries of Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.6 Some executives assume the reason is that investors are simply willing to pay higher prices for U.S. companies (an assumption that has prompted some non-U.S. companies to consider moving their share listing to the New York Stock Exchange in an attempt to increase their value). But the real reason U.S. companies trade at higher multiples is that they typically earn higher returns on invested capital. The median large U.S. company earned a 16 percent ROIC in 2007, while the median large Asian company earned 10 percent. Of course, these broad comparisons hide the fact that some Asian sectors and companies—for example, Toyota in automobiles—outperform their U.S. counterparts. But for the most part, Asian companies historically have focused more on growth than profitability or ROIC, which explains the large difference between their average valuation and that of U.S. companies.

    More evidence showing that ROIC and growth drive value is presented in Chapters 15 and 16.

    Managerial Implications

    We’ll dive more deeply into the managerial dimensions of ROIC and growth in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. For now, we outline several lessons managers should learn for strategic decision making.

    Start by referring back to Exhibit 2.4, because it contains the most important strategic insights for managers concerning the relative impact that changes in ROIC and growth can have on a company’s value. In general, companies already earning a high ROIC can generate more additional value by increasing their rate of growth, rather than their ROIC, while low-ROIC companies will generate relatively more value by focusing on increasing their ROIC.

    For example, Exhibit 2.5 shows that a typical high-ROIC company, such as a branded consumer packaged-goods company, can increase its value by 10 percent if it increases its growth rate by one percentage point, while a typical moderate-ROIC company, such as the average retailer, will increase its value by only 5 percent for the same increase in growth. In contrast, the moderate-ROIC company gets a 15 percent bump in value from increasing its return on invested capital by one percentage point, while the high-ROIC company gets only a 6 percent bump from the same increase in return on invested capital.

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    EXHIBIT 2.5 Increasing Value: Impact of Higher Growth and ROIC

    Source: McKinsey Corporate Performance Center analysis

    The general lesson is that high-ROIC companies should focus on growth, while low-ROIC companies should focus on improving returns before growing. Of course, this analysis assumes that achieving a one percentage point increase in growth is as easy as achieving a one percentage point increase in ROIC, everything else being constant. In reality, achieving either type of increase poses different degrees of difficulty for different companies in different industries, and the impact of a change in growth and ROIC will also vary between companies. However, every company needs to make the analysis in order to set its strategic priorities.

    Until now, we have assumed that all growth earns the same ROIC and therefore generates the same value, but this is clearly unrealistic: different types of growth earn different degrees of return so not all growth is equally value-creating. Each company must understand the pecking order of growth-related value creation that applies to its industry and company type.

    Exhibit 2.6 shows the value created from different types of growth for a typical consumer products company. These results are based on cases with which we are familiar, not on a comprehensive analysis, but we believe they reflect the broader reality.7 The results are expressed in terms of value created for $1.00 of incremental revenue. For example, $1.00 of additional revenue from a new product creates $1.75 to $2.00 of value. The most important implication of this chart is the rank order. New products typically create more value for shareholders, while acquisitions typically create the least. The key to the difference between these extremes is differences in ROICs for the different types of investment.

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    EXHIBIT 2.6 Value Creation by Type of Growth

    Source: McKinsey Corporate Performance Center analysis.

    Growth strategies based on organic new product development frequently have the highest returns because they don’t require much new capital; companies can add new products to their existing factory lines and distribution systems. Furthermore, the investments to produce new products are not all required at once. If preliminary results are not promising, future investments can be scaled back or canceled.

    Acquisitions, by contrast, require that the entire investment be made up front. The amount of up-front payment reflects the expected cash flows from the target plus a premium to stave off other bidders. So even if the buyer can improve the target enough to generate an attractive ROIC, the rate of return is typically only a small amount higher than its cost of capital.

    To be fair, this analysis doesn’t reflect the risk of failure. Most product ideas fail before reaching the market, and the cost of failed ideas is not reflected in the numbers. By contrast, acquisitions typically bring existing revenues and cash flows that limit the downside risk to the acquirer. But including the risk of failure would not change the pecking order of investments from a value-creation viewpoint.

    The interaction between growth and ROIC is a key factor to consider when assessing the likely impact of a particular investment on a company’s overall ROIC. For example, we’ve found that some very successful, high-ROIC companies in the United States are reluctant to invest in growth if it will reduce their ROICs. One technology company had 30 percent operating margins and a 50+ percent ROIC, so it didn’t want to invest in projects that might earn only 25 percent returns, fearing this would dilute its average returns. But as the first principle of value creation would lead you to expect, even a 25 percent return opportunity would still create value as long as the cost of capital was lower, despite the resulting decline in average ROIC.

    The evidence backs this up. We examined the performance of 78 high-ROIC companies (greater than 30 percent ROIC) from 1996 to 2005.8 Not surprisingly, the companies that created the most value (measured by total returns to shareholders over the 10 years) were those that grew fastest and maintained their high ROICs. But the second-highest value creators were those that grew fastest even though they experienced moderate declines in their ROICs. They created more value than companies that increased their ROICs but grew slowly.

    We’ve also seen companies with low returns pursue growth on the assumption that this will also improve their profit margins and returns, reasoning that growth will increase returns by spreading fixed costs across more revenues. As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, however, except for small start-up companies, faster growth rarely fixes a company’s ROIC problem. Low returns usually indicate a poor industry structure (e.g., airlines), a flawed business model, or weak execution. If a company has a problem with ROIC, the company shouldn’t grow until the problem is fixed.

    The evidence backs this up as well. We examined the performance of 64 low-ROIC companies from 1996 to 2005. The companies that had low growth but increased their ROICs outperformed the faster-growing companies that did not improve their ROICs.

    CONSERVATION OF VALUE

    A corollary of the principle that discounted cash flow drives value is the conservation of value: anything that doesn’t increase cash flows doesn’t create value. So value is conserved, or unchanged, when a company changes the ownership of claims to its cash flows but doesn’t change the total available cash flows—for example, when it substitutes debt for equity or issues debt to repurchase shares. Similarly, changing the appearance of the cash flows without actually changing the cash flows—say, by changing accounting techniques—doesn’t change the value of a company.9 While the validity of this principle is obvious, it is worth emphasizing, because executives, investors, and pundits so often forget it—for example, when they hope that one accounting treatment will lead to a higher value than another, or that some fancy financial structure will turn a mediocre deal into a winner.

    The battle over how companies should account for executive stock options illustrates the extent to which executives continue to believe (wrongly) that the stock market is unaware of the conservation of value. Even though there is no cash effect when executive stock options are issued, they reduce the cash flow available to existing shareholders by diluting their ownership when the options are exercised. Under accounting rules dating back to the 1970s, companies could exclude the implicit cost of executive stock options from their income statements. In the early 1990s, as options became more material, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) proposed a change to the accounting rules, requiring companies to record an expense for the value of options when they are issued. A large group of executives and venture capitalists thought investors would be spooked if options were brought onto the income statement. Some claimed that the entire venture capital industry would be decimated because young start-up companies that provide much of their compensation through options would show low or negative profits.

    The FASB issued its new rules in 2004,10 more than a decade after taking up the issue and only after the bursting of the dot-com bubble. Despite dire predictions, the stock prices of companies didn’t change when the new accounting rules were implemented, because the market already reflected the cost of the options in its valuations of companies. One respected analyst said to us, I don’t care whether they are recorded as an expense or simply disclosed in the footnotes. I know what to do with the information.

    In this case, the conservation of value principle explains why executives didn’t need to worry about any effects that changes in stock option accounting would have on their share price. The same applies to questions such as whether an acquisition creates value simply because reported earnings increase, whether a company should return cash to shareholders through share repurchases instead of dividends, or whether financial engineering creates value. In every circumstance, executives should focus on increasing cash flows rather than finding gimmicks that merely redistribute value among investors or make reported results look better. Executives should also be wary of proposals that claim to create value unless they’re clear about how their actions will materially increase the size of the pie. If you can’t pinpoint the tangible source of value creation, you’re probably looking at an illusion, and you can be sure that’s what the market will think, too.

    Foundations of the Value Conservation Principle

    The value conservation principle is described in Richard Brealey and Stewart Myers’s seminal textbook, Principles of Corporate Finance.11 One of the earliest applications of the principle can be found in the pioneering work of Nobel Prize winners Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, financial economists who in the late 1950s and early 1960s questioned whether managers could use changes in capital structure to increase share prices. In 1958, they showed that the value of a company shouldn’t be affected by changing the structure of the debt and equity ownership unless the overall cash flows generated by the company also change.12

    Imagine a company that has no debt and generates $100 of cash flow each year before paying shareholders. Suppose the company is valued at $1,000. Now suppose the company borrows $200 and pays it out to the shareholders. Our knowledge of the core valuation principle and the value conservation principle tells us that the company would still be worth $1,000, with $200 for the creditors and $800 for the shareholders, because its cash flow available to pay the shareholders and creditors is still $100.

    In most countries, however, borrowing money does change cash flows because interest payments are tax deductible. The total taxes paid by the company are lower, thereby increasing the cash flow available to pay both shareholders and creditors. In addition, having debt may induce managers to be more diligent (because they must have cash available to repay the debt on time) and, therefore, increase the company’s cash flow. On the downside, having debt could make it more difficult for managers to raise capital for attractive investment opportunities, thereby reducing cash flow. The point is that what matters isn’t the substitution of debt for equity in and of itself; it only matters if the substitution changes the company’s cash flows through tax reductions or if associated changes in management decisions change cash flows.

    In a related vein, finance academics in the 1960s developed the idea of efficient markets. While the meaning and validity of efficient markets are subjects of continuing debate, especially after the bursting of the dot-com and real estate bubbles of the past decade, one implication of efficient market theory remains: the stock market isn’t easily fooled when companies undertake actions to increase reported accounting profit without increasing cash flows. One example is the market’s reaction to changes in accounting for employee stock options, just described. And when the FASB eliminated goodwill amortization effective in 2002 and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) did the same in 2005, many companies reported increased profits, but their underlying values and stock prices didn’t change, because the accounting change didn’t affect cash flows. The evidence is overwhelming that the market isn’t fooled by actions that don’t affect cash flow, as we will show in Chapter 16.

    Managerial Implications

    The conservation of value principle is so useful because it tells what to look for when analyzing whether some action will create value: the cash flow impact and nothing else. This principle applies across a wide range of important business decisions, such as accounting policy (Chapter 16), acquisitions (Chapter 21), corporate portfolio decisions (Chapter 19), dividend payout policy (Chapter 23), and capital structure (also Chapter 23). In this section, we provide three examples of useful applications for the conservation of value principle: share repurchases, acquisitions, and financial engineering.

    Share repurchases Share repurchases have become a popular way for companies to return cash to investors (see Chapter 23 for more detail). Until the early 1980s, more than 90 percent of the total distributions by large U.S. companies to shareholders were dividends, and fewer than 10 percent were share repurchases, but since 1998, about 50 to 60 percent of total distributions have been share repurchases.13

    To determine whether share repurchases create value, you must compare them with some other use of the cash. For example, assume that a company borrows $100 to repurchase 10 percent of its shares. For every $100 of shares repurchased, the company will pay, say, 6 percent interest on its new debt. After tax savings of 35 percent, its total earnings would decline by $3.90. However, the number of shares has declined by 10 percent, so earnings per share (EPS) would increase by about 5 percent.

    A 5 percent increase in EPS without working very hard sounds like a great deal. Assuming the company’s price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio doesn’t change, then its market value per share will also increase by 5 percent. In other words, you can get something for nothing: higher EPS with a constant P/E.

    Unfortunately, this doesn’t square with the conservation of value, because the total cash flow of the business has not increased. While EPS has increased by 5 percent, the company’s debt has increased as well. With higher leverage, the company’s equity cash flows will be more volatile, and investors will demand a higher return. This will bring down the company’s P/E, offsetting the increase in EPS.

    However, even if cash flow isn’t increased by a buyback, some have rightly argued that repurchasing shares can reduce the likelihood that management will invest the cash at low returns. If this is true, and it is likely that management would otherwise have invested the money unwisely, then you have a legitimate source of value creation, because the operating cash flows of the company would increase. Said another way, when the likelihood of investing cash at low returns is high, share repurchases make sense as a tactic for avoiding value destruction. But they don’t in themselves create value.

    Some argue that management should repurchase shares when its shares are undervalued. Suppose management believes that the current share price of the company doesn’t reflect its underlying potential, so it buys back shares today. One year later, the market price adjusts to reflect management’s expectations. Has value been created? Once again the answer is no, value has not been created; it has only

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