Contractors and War: The Transformation of United States’ Expeditionary Operations

Stanford University Press

Stanford, California

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Contractors and war : the transformation of US expeditionary operations / edited by Christopher Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8047-6990-7 (cloth : alk. paper)

ISBN 978-0-8047-6991-4 (pbk. : alk. paper)

ISBN 978-0-8047-8293-7 (e-book)

1. Defense contracts—United States. 2. Contracting out—United States. 3. Government contractors—United States. 4. United States—Armed Forces—Procurement. 5. Private military companies—United States. I. Kinsey, Christopher, editor of compilation. II. Patterson, Malcolm Hugh, 1959–editor of compilation.

UC267.C575 2012

355.6'2120973—dc23

2012007451

CONTRACTORS AND WAR

The Transformation of

US Expeditionary Operations

Edited by Christopher Kinsey and

Malcolm Hugh Patterson

Stanford Security Studies,

An Imprint of Stanford University Press

Stanford, California

Contents

Copyright

Title Page

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Christopher Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson

PART I: The Nature of Contractor Support in Future US Military Operations

1 Overview of American Government Expeditionary Operations Utilizing Private Contractors

Robert Mandel

2 Attitudes on the Ground: What Soldiers Think about Civilian Contractors

Ryan Kelty and Darcy Schnack

3 Looking Beyond Iraq: Contractors in US Global Activities

Renée de Nevers

PART II: Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations: A Market Growth Area

4 The Elephant in the Room

William J. Flavin

5 Sharing the Same Space: The Evolving Relationship between US NGOs, Battlefield Contractors, and US Armed Forces

Samuel A. Worthington

6 PMSCs and Risk in Counterinsurgency Warfare

Kateri Carmola

Part III: Legal Aspects of Future US Operations

7 Contractors and the Law

Geoffrey S. Corn

8 Contractors’ Wars and the Commission on Wartime Contracting

Allison Stanger

9 Private Contractors, Public Consequences: The Need for an Effective Criminal Justice Framework

David E. Price

PART IV: US Administrative Structures Required to Sustain Contractor Operations

10 How to Decide When a Contractor Source Is Better to Use Than a Government Source

Frank Camm

11 Reforming the US Approach to Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.

12 Contractors Supporting Military Operations: Many Challenges Remain

Jacques S. Gansler and William Lucyshyn

Conclusion

Christopher Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson

Contributors

Index

Acknowledgments

THERE ARE SEVERAL PEOPLE TO WHOM WE ARE BOTH GRATEFUL. WE wish to thank each of the contributors for sharing their extensive knowledge of the subject. We are also indebted to Asher Hildebrand, who helped us navigate the corridors of Congress; and special credit goes to Margaret Bennett and Mark Erbel, both of whom assisted in editing the manuscript. We owe thanks to Geoffrey Burn and his staff at Stanford University Press, and two anonymous reviewers, whose enlightened critiques proved encouraging and valuable. Last, the back cover remarks were provided by prominent individuals who were kind enough to set aside time to examine the manuscript and provide public opinions.

Introduction

Christopher Kinsey and Malcolm Hugh Patterson

1. Developments in US Expeditionary Operations

This book concerns the role of contractors in support of American expeditionary operations. Whether training a receiving state’s workforce, providing armed security for US and other nationals, or delivering logistics and technical services, contractors support the full spectrum of US operations. Today these may extend from conventional armed conflict to counterinsurgency; from reconstruction and stabilization deployments to American aid delivered in uncontested circumstances. In Afghanistan, South America, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere, the US military focuses on policy objectives while the marketplace supplies much of the support. This is why contractors are now part of the military structure and integral to the point where they have become essential strategic assets. In their absence, most expeditionary operations could not be deployed nor sustained.

This is very different from the Cold War model, in which the military functioned with a far higher high degree of self-sufficiency. Nor is the United States likely to return to even a modest degree of military self-reliance. Such a step is improbable for reasons of entrenched neoliberal economic philosophy,¹ legal obligations arising from statutory requirements,² executive policy direction,³ growing financial constraints as the US economy struggles with prodigious debt,⁴ and the momentum of foreign policies predicated on recruitment of personnel by means other than civil and/or military conscription.⁵

Unsurprisingly, self-sufficiency was discarded partly for reasons advanced by contractors. Arguments based on cost, reliability, speed of deployment, and the availability of specialist skills and equipment have proved persuasive. Should stability and reconstruction operations (SROs) become more prominent in US foreign engagement—as seems probable in the present climate—the scope for contractor involvement will grow. A major reason for this is that where America intervenes in this fashion, the utility of military force tends to be limited. Subduing threats to the United States and its interests will necessitate the deployment of personnel in addition to combat troops. And regardless of contractor weaknesses, the federal government is unlikely to abruptly recruit and train sufficient numbers of uniformed and civilian personnel to satisfy future needs. Cost aside, an unpopular conflict may attract few volunteers from a less than receptive populace. Nor should one expect every state plagued by conflict or civil disaster to be stabilized through American intervention. Whether benign or otherwise, current and future US deployments may be dogged by costly and indeterminate outcomes. In that event, deployment of a non-uniformed and mostly non-US presence may reduce political risk.

In one sense, there is little that is new in contract support of American forces on deployed operations. Today’s suppliers of goods and services have antecedents that extend back to the sutlers who equipped American revolutionaries in their war against the British.⁶ Another formative development of the eighteenth century was the enduring and widely accepted belief that states may be defined in part by their claim to a monopoly on legitimate violence.⁷ The precise form of this monopoly has never been static and today a spectrum of private contractors work in and around US deployments across the world. Yet changes over the last twenty years or so have been qualitatively and quantitatively different from the earlier evolution in twentieth-century roles.

One cause was the cut in defense spending as the Cold War began to wane. Consequently, civilians and uniformed military within the Department of Defense (DoD) faced staff redundancies, early retirement, and restricted recruiting. A decline in numbers was followed by a gradual rise in the number of civilians contracted to carry out an expanding range of tasks. This increase in contractors was also spurred by decreasing political will to sustain the various costs of armed conflict. That development was consistent with a broader shift in neoliberal economics and a reduction in government responsibilities as both Republicans and Democrats promised greater efficiency in delivery of public goods. The security of the state no longer enjoyed the extent of immunity from financial constraints applied elsewhere. State security instead became the subject of market ideology, as commercial entities began to perform tasks formerly carried out by civilian and uniformed government employees.

Nor have American governments and US corporations been hindered by debris left in the wake of Cold War political, social, cultural, and legal constraints. Corporations have experimented to their advantage with foreign subsidiaries and cultures. They now pursue business around the world without breaching US trade embargoes or enduring criticism for un-American conduct. The end of the Cold War also saw massive demobilization across the globe and the creation of a large pool of skilled and disciplined ex-military personnel. Proficient foreigners were always likely to attract US interest where their ready availability increased the appeal of lower costs than comparable American labor. The resultant mix of civilian and ex-military third country nationals (TCNs) combined with host-state labor and smaller numbers of Americans has assisted considerably in effective military outsourcing. This occurred at a time of enhanced global communications and trading technologies, while weakening labor unions accompanied fewer constraints on business migration and financial institutions wielded increased influence. Each of these factors permitted goods, services, money, and labor to flow over international borders in a less inhibited fashion.

Simultaneously, training soldiers for armed conflict became more expensive as the revolution in military affairs called for more lengthy and intensive training of American technicians and engineers. One example is the complexity of today’s network-centric warfare, which links command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). The costs of modern warfare have also risen as weapons systems have become more complicated and the skill required to maintain them has increased. This has caused greater numbers of civilians to be located in the operational theater, although in relatively safe locations. The systems they maintain include missiles, helicopters, artillery, tanks and unmanned aerial vehicles; the last deployed by both the US military and American intelligence agencies.⁸ The battlefield is being further civilianized through participation of nonmilitary labor in advanced information technology and intelligence collection.⁹

Other opportunities in contemporary support include planning and construction of military bases. This includes building fences, roads, landing strips, power generators, hangars, accommodation, latrines, and mess halls. After construction has been completed, there are further roles in postal services, fuel supply, static and mobile security, laundry, water purification and waste removal, pest control, preparation of foodstuffs, interpreter services, records and inventory maintenance. Logistic support in fact supplies the bulk of contractor revenue. The very large, multi-billion dollar tasks within the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) is the most prominent example of commercial sustainment of US expeditionary operations.¹⁰

2. The Reason for This Inquiry

A convincing anthology usually provides the reader with adequate explanations to two questions: the editors’ purpose(s) in investigating the topic at hand, and why the content has been conceived and ordered in a particular manner. In addressing the first query, most readers will be aware that despite some noteworthy commercial success, contractors grapple with substantial and persistent problems. In order to understand the growth, influence, and future of this industry, these matters bear some examination. To answer the second inquiry, the editorial intention is to avoid a thematic approach and instead divide the book into four parts. These draw the reader in a succession of coherent steps that explore different facets of the outsourcing of military responsibilities. In chronological order, these identify the major features; consider a prominent form of US expeditionary engagement; scrutinize some legal issues; then propose desirable changes to public administration. Although each chapter may be read individually to illuminate a particular aspect, the editors are mindful that to explore military outsourcing through one attribute is likely to limit one’s understanding. The purpose of this book is to impart a grasp of the subject through the collective application of a range of views and disciplines to a variety of issues.

These aspirations find a niche within vigorous debates over outsourcing and the privatization of security and logistic support. Those debates are concerned with many worthy issues. They range from the substance of evolving taxonomies to the nature of state and corporate control; from legitimacy and ethics to government and corporate financing; from theories of the modern state to definitions of inherently governmental goods and services—and how to keep the latter from private hands. To a greater or lesser degree, discussion of these matters has been a consistent feature in the literature. One can locate these themes in earlier American works in the field—by the likes of Robert Mandel, Peter W. Singer, and Deborah Avant.¹¹ These issues endure and often carry a normative aspect. Normative argument is not absent from the following pages, but this book is concerned with US government policy and practice. That is why the contributors have properly focused on ends demanded by the American government and the merits in practical means employed to achieve them. How these means are supplied and whether US government ends are fulfilled is a quite distinctive purpose and one without predecessors in book-length form. With this in mind, the editors complete the Conclusion by identifying lessons likely to guide greater operational success in the future.

The reader should also be without doubt as to what is not included and s/he may discern four topics that are absent from the pages that follow. The first is theory. This is a book concerned with US government policy; or more accurately, generating an impetus toward improved policy choices by the US executive, legislature, and bureaucracy. Second, the content is not intended to form an indirect critique of the first and second administrations of President G. W. Bush. Some readers will seek details of moral hazards arising from nepotistic government–contractor relations; the engineering of expanded choices for executive government through a democratic deficit as a consequence of extensive contractor deployments; or contractor-sourced covert homicide squads sent to Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan. Those readers will find ample information elsewhere.

A third omission is a more comprehensive examination of legal issues. Space constraints oblige the editors to refrain from examining the policy ramifications of litigation in US industrial courts over insurance held by wounded contractors; suits in negligence over contractors’ injuries and deaths; and criminal and tortious cases pursued by relatives of foreign civilians killed or injured intentionally or negligently by contractors in the course of their employment. Nor does this book assess quasi-legal codes of conduct or the impact of good corporate citizenship measures. By limiting Part III to problems of law and policy, the legal component remains of manageable size. Last, this is not a document preoccupied with armed contractors. They tend to receive most of the public attention and much of the journalistic, legal, and academic commentary. One does not wish to trivialize the more disagreeable aspects of their presence on operations. Yet armed contractors comprise only a small part of the overall labor force and financial costs involved in outsourced support. Accordingly, the editors have sought to focus the academic spotlight on a broader range of contractors and those issues that affect their roles in support of US expeditionary operations.

3. Structure of the Book

The first part begins with a chapter that explains the contracting phenomenon and summarizes current developments in the field. Robert Mandel’s succinct review suggests buoyant prospects resulting from tension between continuing global engagement by the United States and limits to American military workforce and budgets. He suggests that contractor influence may help to shape the nature of American expeditionary operations; yet there remains an inadequate bureaucratic grasp of the conditions under which deployment of private contractors makes the most and least sense. In the following chapter, Ryan Kelty and Darcy Schnack hold a sociological prism to views on contractors held by service personnel. These authors plumb the dynamic nature of military identity and plot a change in roles as civilians and their privatized workforce become more involved in battlefield roles. In the third chapter, Renée de Nevers studies the global breadth of contractor deployments and refers to their operations in areas as diverse as Afghanistan, Africa, and Latin America. She puts a case for improved effectiveness in governance and clarity in legal and military authority.

Part II explores three facets of reconstruction and stabilization operations, which is a growth market in the contracting business. In the first chapter, a US Army peace operations expert delivers an illuminating perspective on military expectations of those who provide essential resources to the armed forces. Colonel William Flavin supplies a view as to how contracting should be integrated or nested in the US military’s operational and strategic frameworks. He emphasizes the need for improved doctrinal and conceptual guidance and proposes an enhanced operational concept. This relationship between the military and corporate support has become increasingly complex, as it elevates the battlefield prominence of what has until recently been a less conspicuous body of civilians.

The following chapter was written by the chief executive of a prominent NGO. Samuel Worthington explains how reconstruction during counterinsurgency operations creates difficult relations between NGOs (and aid organizations in particular), the US military, and civilian contractors. This is especially likely where these contractors are armed and their behavior jeopardizes the delicate fabric of trust that sustains NGOs in turbulent places. US-based NGOs do not see themselves as an extension of US power; and Mr. Worthington is concerned with the imprudence of US militarization of foreign assistance. The third chapter is a quite different exploration of emerging battlefield complexity: a pessimistic hypothesis that concerns incompatible cultures of risk-taking held by contractors and the US military. Political scientist Kateri Carmola evaluates risks that private security contractors both reduce and escalate through deployments in counterinsurgency operations. She concludes that the organizational risk cultures of contractors do not align with those of the military or the requirements of counterinsurgency warfare more generally.

Part III is divided into topics of a broadly legal nature. Geoffrey Corn begins with a summary of three pressing issues: the status of contractors while accompanying US armed forces in an operational environment; those functions that may be legally transferred to contractors; and the nature of criminal justice remedies attracted by contractor misconduct. The American public has been aware for some time that in Iraq in particular, serious questions have been raised over improper contractor violence and the absence of a functional criminal justice system. In the next chapter, Allison Stanger explains how outsourcing has enabled American policy makers to spend their way out of crises rather than garner support for contingency operations from the American people. Her focus is the Commission on Wartime Contracting (CWC) and the moral and legal hazards that have driven its creation. As a consequence of critical CWC reports, it seems likely that some reforms in US law will follow. Professor Stanger provides her own remedies to address the excesses of what she describes as free market fundamentalism. The third contribution is by Congressman David Price, who writes on the uncertain and unsatisfactory legal framework attached to US government contractors. He provides a compelling case for an effective criminal justice system that would apply to all contractors deployed on future American expeditionary operations.

Part IV is a review of US administrative structures required to sustain and administer effective contractor operations. Frank Camm begins with the fundamental observation that there have been few attempts to compare the costs or performance of government and contractors where they have provided similar services to deployed military forces. In addressing this perhaps surprising situation, he devises a risk comparison that identifies which circumstances favor government or contractor sources. In the next chapter, Stuart Bowen draws on extensive personal experience in explaining how the reconstruction of Iraq grew from an adhocracy in which no US office had full responsibility for planning, executing, or being held accountable for the rebuilding program. The results were regrettable and burdened the US taxpayer with colossal costs. Mr. Bowen envisages extensive reform of stabilization and reconstruction operations through a range of institutional changes. These are intended to unify overlapping missions and resources; to reorganize those resources and existing structures; and to integrate management into a single agency.

In the third chapter Jacques Gansler and William Lucyshyn examine problems in Department of Defense contracting through three categories of analyses: human capital; policies, processes, and procedures; and information technology. They conclude that future deployments are likely to involve up to 50 percent contractors within the total force. This mix of military, US government civilian employees, and contractors of mixed nationality will require extensive DoD adjustments. These will affect the department’s organization, culture, doctrine, and planning.

When studying these chapters, the reader is likely to benefit from clarification in the meaning of several terms. One is contractor. In the present context, a contractor is an agent who carries out tasks on behalf of a government or corporate principal. Another distinction is between privatization and outsourcing. A persuasive view is that privatization involves the transfer to private contractors of responsibility for planning, organizing, financing, and managing a program. In contrast, outsourcing involves contracting military support services to outsiders while retaining responsibility for these within the military.¹² And defense logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of air, sea and land forces.¹³

4. Summary

An increased reliance on the commercial sector generates consequences that extend further than American objectives. This dependence is altering behavior among allies and adversaries, other governments and nongovernment organizations. All of these actors have their own reasons to better adapt to conventional hostilities, counterinsurgency campaigns, and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. There is little doubt that greater involvement of contractors implies an ongoing transformation in US expeditionary operations, the effects of which will exert both subtle and more apparent influence over the projection of American power.

While other scholars have written on this topic, Contractors and War stands alone in that it is the first publication to assemble essays by eminent American scholars drawn from the military, economics, law, an umbrella NGO, the legislature, civilian bureaucracies, and the social sciences. This is a book written by American authors for American readers who seek to improve their understanding of the impact of contractors on US expeditionary operations. The writers have applied collectively formidable knowledge to several of the thornier problems that confront policy makers today. The result is intended to propel debate a little further in constructive directions. Meanwhile, the private sector continues to influence and be influenced by current operations and planning for future deployments.

Notes

1

. For a sanguine view on the more positive possibilities of business–government relations in the context of contractor support, see Allison Stanger, One Nation Under Contract (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,

2009

), chap.

8

.

2

. See the US Office of Management and Budget Circular A-­

76

Fact Sheet at http://oma.od.nih.gov/ms/a

76

-fair/A-

76

%

20

HHS%

20

Fact%

20

Sheet.pdf.

3

. Christopher Hinton, Pentagon Still a Cash Cow Despite Budget Cuts, Market Watch, April

7

,

2009

, http.marketwatch.com/story/pentagon-still-a-cash-cow(accessed Dec.

23

,

2010

). The future for military contractors remains buoyant despite a Pentagon intention to cut contractors "as a percentage of its total workforce to

26

% from

39

%, and hire up to

30

,

000

new civil servants over the next five years."

4

. Donna Smith and Kenneth Barry, "US Debt to Rise to $

19

.

6

Trillion by

2015

," Reuters, June

8

,

2010

, www.reuters.com/article/idUSN

088462520100608

(accessed Dec.

22

,

2010

).

5

. In

2009

, there were more contractors than military in Afghanistan, and in Iraq the number of military and contractors were almost the same. See Richard Fontaine and John Nagl, Contractors in American Conflicts: Adapting to a New Reality (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, Dec.

2009

),

7

, http.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CNAS_ContractorsInAmericanConflicts.pdf (accessed Dec.

23

,

2010

). The

2010

Quadrennial Defense Review Report includes contractors within the total defense workforce (

55

–

56

).

6

. For a sound account of how George Washington’s revolutionary army was supplied, see J. A. Huston, Logistics of Liberty (Newark: University of Delaware Press,

1991

).

7

. Weber described this claim as essential. See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A. R. Henderson and T. Parsons (London: William Hodge:

1947

),

141

,

143

.

8

. C. Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire (London: Verso,

2004

), paperback ed.,

142

.

9

. Less well-known than the analytical services offered by American business is the collection of intelligence by manned and unmanned aerial vehicles operated by private firms. See, for example, Airscan, Inc. site, www.airscan.com/about.html (accessed June

11

,

2011

).

10

. LOGCAP was created by the US Army in

1985

. Its purpose has been to plan the integration of contractors in support of contingencies and crises, and utilize existing civilian resources in the United States and overseas to augment active and reserve forces. See United States General Accounting Office, Contingency Operations: Opportunities to Improve the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, GAO/NSIAD-­

97

-­

63

(Feb.

1997

),

2

.

11

. Robert Mandel, Armies Without States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,

2002

); P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,

2003

); and Deborah Avant, The Market for Force (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,

2005

).

12

. W. Mitchell, Privatizing Defense: Britain Leads the Way, National Center for Policy Analysis/Brief Analysis no.

391

, www.ncpa.org/pub/ba/ba

391

(accessed April

2

,

2005

).

13

. NATO Logistics Handbook

1997

,

1

.

I

THE NATURE OF CONTRACTOR SUPPORT IN FUTURE US MILITARY OPERATIONS

1

Overview of American Government Expeditionary Operations Utilizing Private Contractors

Robert Mandel

1. Introduction

The recent expanded reliance by the United States on private contractors in military operations overseas has reached unprecedented levels, so much so that the scope of today’s wartime contracting dwarfs that of past military conflicts.¹ Indeed, today the United States seems to be totally unable to engage in expeditionary operations without using private contractors: in particular, in 2007, over 190,000 contractors worked in Iraq on US-funded contracts, making the number of private contractors roughly equal to that of American government soldiers; in 2008, the Department of Defense spent around 316 billion dollars on contracted services, about as much as the total amount it spent on weapons systems and equipment; and in 2009, private contractors outnumbered military personnel in Afghanistan and nearly equaled the number of military personnel in Iraq.² No longer does the United States even attempt to achieve military self-sufficiency by maintaining enough government troops to fulfill its global security objectives.

This chapter’s explicitly conceptual analysis provides an explanation of why the American government chose recently to rely more on private contractors, the controversies surrounding this reliance, arguments identifying the strengths and weaknesses associated with American government use of private contractors, and the future course of private contractors in American expeditionary operations.³ The central purpose is to provide a deeper and more balanced perspective on well-publicized trends. In the process, this chapter carefully situates the private contractor issue within the broader security context.

2. Motivation for American Government Use of Private Contractors

This escalating use of private contracting has many roots. The supply and demand changes surrounding military personnel after the Cold War, the foreign policy limitations associated with exclusive reliance on government forces, and the reluctance by the government to undertake operations that risk significant citizen casualties have combined to foster a groundswell of interest and activity in this area. Private contractors have been adept recently at realizing and taking advantage of opportunities presented.

One of the pivotal causes is the post–Cold War downsizing of the American military.⁴ Since the mid-­1990s, the Department of Defense (DOD) has increasingly viewed contracted support as a ‘force multiplier’ that supplements existing U.S. force structure capacity and capability:⁵

The Department of Defense (DOD) has a long history of relying on contractors to support troops during wartime and expeditionary operations. Generally, from the Revolutionary War through the Vietnam War, contractors provided traditional logistical support such as medical care, transportation, and engineering to U.S. armed forces. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a significant increase in contractors supporting U.S. troops—in terms of the number and percentage of contractors, and the type of work being performed. . . . According to DOD, post–Cold War budget reductions resulted in significant cuts to military logistical and support personnel, requiring DOD to hire contractors to fill the gap.⁶

Between 1989 and 2002, the Department of Defense’s total civilian workforce shrunk by 38 percent.⁷ Shortages of trained personnel still hamper American expeditionary operations, as the United States has assumed security responsibilities in multiple parts of the world without enough qualified government personnel to support these far-flung responsibilities. The post–Cold War downsizing of government military personnel, which occurred not just within the United States, released onto the global market sizable numbers of people with soldiering skills looking for employment, and thus provided private contractors with ready manpower and an ability to supply requisite services on the battlefield.

At the same time the American military has been downsizing, global disruptions and threats to US interests abroad have appeared to multiply and diversify. The end to the Cold War opened the door to different kinds of foreign threats, including an increasing number of domestic insurgencies, internal civil wars, failing states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, transnational organized crime, and violent acts perpetrated by transnational terrorists. Emerging threats have been typically covert, dispersed, decentralized, adaptable, and fluid, with threat sources relatively difficult to identify, monitor, target, contain, destroy, and with these sources’ past actions not necessarily a sound guide to their future behavior. This pattern reflects the ‘de-massification’ of threats in the world, where a single giant threat of war . . . is replaced by a multitude of ‘niche threats’  in which war will not be waged by armies but by groups we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers.⁸ Many of these dangers are asymmetric threats involving ruthless adversaries that call for strong coercive responses. Because of widespread anti-American sentiments in various parts of the world, the United States or American interests are frequently directly or indirectly a target of these disruptions. So the demand for expeditionary operations to promote or maintain international stability has increased.

Recognition of foreign policy limitations associated with the use of government forces in expeditionary operations also has contributed to private contractor reliance. The inability of the United States to achieve a ground force victory in Vietnam persuaded a generation or more of American and Western generals that the use of Western and particularly American ground forces in foreign conflicts is a mistake; indeed, the mounting human and financial costs resulting from helping to manage seemingly intractable civil wars overseas has created a kind of intervention fatigue among Western states.⁹ Moreover, the unanticipated length and complexity of post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan provided incentives to move away from reliance on uniformed government soldiers.¹⁰ Particularly in dealing with the elusive security challenges they face today, the use of conventional government military forces alone has not shown itself consistently to be the most efficient and effective way to manage the threat.

In a related manner, casualty aversion helps to explain the increased reliance on private contractors. American political leaders have to some extent become quite terrified of taking casualties through interventions overseas, and as a result private contractors have begun to look awfully attractive: several years ago an American ambassador in Europe confessed that his country could no longer emotionally, psychologically or politically accept body bags coming home in double figures.¹¹ When a government chooses to outsource to private contractors, the attraction may result from the state bearing little public accountability for undesired consequences, deaths of citizens, or moral and legal dilemmas about the legitimacy of an intervention.¹² Moreover, when the US government wants to restrain its commitment in its international intervention, private security outfits give it a low-risk means to do so. Utilization of private contractors can capitalize on the vast numbers of trained, skilled former military personnel in foreign countries, many of which have depressed economies and have qualified people looking for work. As a result, missions that the United States would like to undertake for political or security reasons that do not warrant the loss of American lives or that do not enjoy substantial domestic political support (in Congress and the public) could then still be undertaken, since public concern would be much lower for the lives of foreign nationals who voluntarily sign a paid contract indicating a willingness to fight and die for American interests. Because the prevailing international security environment fosters considerable ambiguity in prioritizing areas for expeditionary operations, versatility in deployment options—facilitated by private contractors—becomes critical to cope with changing priorities.

3. Controversies Surrounding Private Contractor Use

Controversy surrounds the use of private contractors in recent American expeditionary operations. Areas of debate include (1) the level of corruption within private contractor activity; (2) the money savings (or lack thereof) associated with private contractor activity; (3) private contractors’ loyalty and suitability to the security tasks assigned; (4) private contractors’ level of adherence to high moral standards; (5) the proper balance between public and private support for expeditionary operations; (6) tensions between private contractors and government military personnel; and (7) the availability of appropriate policy options as alternatives to reliance on private contractors. Participating in this heated discussion are not just academic and policy experts but also members of the mass media and of antagonistic public interest groups.

Unfortunately, the character of this debate is far less than ideal. First, much analysis is polemical, evidencing a preconceived bias for or against the use of private contractors and simply attempting to find evidence supporting this prejudice. For opponents of American use of private contractors, the Blackwater scandal appears to be the primary—and in some cases the only—reference point. Second, many observers talk past each other because of the lack of specificity about what kind of private security in what context is being discussed. Specifically, the use of private contractors by the United States for expeditionary operations differs markedly from the use of private contractors by Third World countries to help with their own security or by international organizations for humanitarian assistance. Third, many analysts prefer to jump right to prescriptions about private contractors without first enhancing understanding of current and future opportunities and dangers. Lastly, many observers are exclusively concerned with the American use of private contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, without considering the broader implications of articulated critiques beyond these specific ongoing conflict zones.

One key ongoing disagreement surrounds the accusation that military contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan has been rife with fraud, waste, and abuse.¹³ As an example of alleged corruption, an October 2003 Center for Public Integrity study analyzing companies in Iraq and Afghanistan matched $49 million from 70 companies doing about $8 billion in government business to political contributions that went almost two to one to Republicans over Democrats, President George W. Bush pulling in the most of all.¹⁴ The United States Congress is very worried about oversight and management of Department of Defense private contracting in Iraq, particularly about a lack of accountability for large sums of money spent for Iraq contracts, due to the expense and difficulty of managing logistical support contracts and questions regarding DOD’s ability and capacity to manage such contracts.¹⁵ Deficient contractor management can keep vital support from getting to military troops and promote waste; and deficient contractor oversight can lead to contractor abuses that undermine security objectives.¹⁶ As with any incident of alleged misbehavior, the central bone of contention is how representative or widespread the dysfunctional activity is, and this is difficult to determine due to the lack of relevant reliable data.

A second major debate concerns whether using private contractors saves the American government money. On the surface, the answer would appear to be affirmative, for private contractors are not eligible for pensions, retirement benefits, and long-term health care the way government soldiers are. Popular news coverage has exaggerated the costs of private contractors, especially the salaries paid to contractors, and does not take into account benefits and compensation only regular military personnel—not private contractors—receive.¹⁷ Yet a recent Government Accountability Office report questions this conclusion:

A key assumption of many of the federal management reforms of the

1990

s was that the cost-efficiency of government operations could be improved through the use of contractors. GAO recently reported that sufficient data are not available to determine whether increased service contracting has caused DOD’s costs to be higher than they would have been had the contracted activities been performed by uniformed or DOD civilian personnel. GAO recently probed, in-depth, the cost of contractor versus government contract specialists at the Army’s Contracting Center for Excellence and found that the Army is paying up to

26

percent more for the contractors as compared to their government counterparts.¹⁸

Indeed, whether public or private security is more inexpensive may be situational:

It is not clear that outsourcing of military training saves the U.S. government any money. . . . Studies of privatization have found that cost savings depend on competition. . . . There is often collusion among competing firms, and long-term contracts lead to opportunistic behavior, such as firms bidding low, knowing that they can add on later. Further, the calculated costs of outsourcing rarely take into account the fact that the Pentagon must hire people to police the contractors.¹⁹

Once again, complexities surrounding private contractors impede gauging their overall value.

A third controversy revolves around the loyalty and task suitability of private contractors. First, about 80 percent of the Department of Defense contracted employees in Iraq and Afghanistan are foreign nationals, who may not be accountable to any American government authority.²⁰ Some analysts have accused private contractors of participating in illicit activities, including drug-trafficking, illegal extraction of resources, and even international terrorism:²¹ this possibility received some vindication when a Mexican drug-trafficking organization hired mercenaries to train cartel security forces in advanced military tactics and surveillance techniques,²² and occasionally links emerge between private contractors and all the unruly perpetrators of global privatized violence—transnational criminals, warlords, rebels/insurgents, and terrorists.²³ Second, the Rules of Engagement for the military differ significantly from the Rules for the Use of Force for private security contractors.²⁴ These differences can mean that even an effective private contractor behaving abroad in an unexpected manner can create disruptive ripples. Third, the limited, short-term nature of much private contractor involvement may not match long-term mission needs. Fourth, the net result of heavy Department of Defense reliance on contractors whose mission fit is questionable can be devastating, as it "is developing a growing dependency on contracted services and the PMO [private