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    Harvard Law Review: Volume 128, Number 6 - April 2015
    Harvard Law Review: Volume 128, Number 6 - April 2015
    Harvard Law Review: Volume 128, Number 6 - April 2015
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    Harvard Law Review: Volume 128, Number 6 - April 2015

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    The Harvard Law Review, April 2015, is offered in a digital edition. Contents include the annual Developments in the Law survey of a particular area of legal concern; this year's topic is Policing. Other contents include:

    * Article, "Consent Procedures and American Federalism," by Bridget Fahey
    * Essay, "Anticipatory Remedies for Takings," by Thomas W. Merrill
    * Book Review, "How a 'Lawless' China Made Modern America: An Epic Told in Orientalism," by Carol G.S. Tan

    Specific subjects studied in 'Developments in the Law - Policing' are: Policing and Profit, Policing Students, Policing Immigrant Communities, and Considering Police Body Cameras.
    In addition, the issue features student commentary on Recent Cases, including such subjects as: business judgment rule and mergers; whistleblowing under Dodd-Frank and extraterritoriality; senate redistricting in New York; postmortem rights of publicity; standing and overlap of various tests used; informing one who pleads No Contest of collateral consequences; exceptions to marriage license requirement for out-of-state marriages; exclusionary rule for violations of Posse Comitatus restrictions; and extending federal forced labor statute to conduct criminalized under state law. Finally, the issue features several summaries of Recent Publications.

    The Harvard Law Review is a student-run organization whose primary purpose is to publish a journal of legal scholarship. The Review comes out monthly from November through June and has roughly 2500 pages per volume. The organization is formally independent of the Harvard Law School. Student editors make all editorial and organizational decisions. This issue of the Review is Apr. 2015, the sixth issue of academic year 2014-2015 (Volume 128). The digital edition features active Contents, linked notes, and proper ebook and Bluebook formatting.

    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherQuid Pro, LLC
    Release dateApr 9, 2015
    ISBN9781610278317
    Harvard Law Review: Volume 128, Number 6 - April 2015
    Author

    Harvard Law Review

    The Harvard Law Review is a student-run organization whose primary purpose is to publish a journal of legal scholarship. The Review comes out monthly from November through June and has roughly 2500 pages per volume. The organization is formally independent of Harvard Law School. Primary articles are written by leading legal scholars, with contributions in the form of case summaries and Notes by student members.

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      Harvard Law Review - Harvard Law Review

      Volume 128

      Number 6

      April 2015

      Harvard Law Review

      Copyright © 2015 by The Harvard Law Review Association. All rights reserved. This work or parts of it may not be reproduced, copied or transmitted (except as permitted by sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), by any means including voice recordings and the copying of its digital form, without the written permission of the print publisher.

      Published by the Harvard Law Review. Digitally published in ebook editions, for the Harvard Law Review, by Quid Pro Books. Available in major digital formats and at leading ebook retailers and booksellers.

      Quid Pro Books

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      Cataloging (Volume 128, Number 6):

      ISBN 978-1-61027-831-7 (ebook)

      CONTENTS

      ARTICLE

      Consent Procedures and American Federalism

      Bridget A. Fahey     (128 HARV. L. REV. 1561)

      ESSAY

      Anticipatory Remedies for Takings

      Thomas W. Merrill     (128 HARV. L. REV. 1630)

      BOOK REVIEW

      How a Lawless China Made Modern America: An Epic Told in Orientalism

      Carol G.S. Tan     (128 HARV. L. REV. 1677)

      DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW — POLICING     (128 HARV. L. REV. 1706)

      Introduction     (128 HARV. L. REV. 1707)

      I. Policing and Profit     (128 HARV. L. REV. 1723)

      II. Policing Students     (128 HARV. L. REV. 1747)

      III. Policing Immigrant Communities     (128 HARV. L. REV. 1771)

      IV. Considering Police Body Cameras     (128 HARV. L. REV. 1794)

      RECENT CASES

      Corporate Law — Mergers and Acquisitions — Delaware Supreme Court Endorses Business Judgment Review for Going-Private Mergers with Dual Procedural Protections. — Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014)

      (128 HARV. L. REV. 1818)

      Securities Regulation — Whistleblower Protection — Second Circuit Holds that Antiretaliation Provision of Dodd-Frank Act Does Not Apply Extraterritorially. — Liu Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2014)

      (128 HARV. L. REV. 1826)

      Redistricting — Population Deviation — Eastern District of New York Rejects Equal Protection Challenge to New York State Senate Redistricting Plan. — Favors v. Cuomo, No. 11-cv-5632, 2014 WL 2154871 (E.D.N.Y. May 22, 2014), modified, 2014 WL 3734378 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2014)

      (128 HARV. L. REV. 1834)

      Property Law — Right of Publicity — Ninth Circuit Upholds Washington Statute Recognizing Postmortem Rights of Individuals Domiciled Out of State. — Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd, 762 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2014)

      (128 HARV. L. REV. 1842)

      Standing — Federal Courts — D.C. Circuit Demonstrates Redundancy Between the Competitor Standing Test and the Zone of Interests Test. — Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g denied, No. 13-5118 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 11, 2014)

      (128 HARV. L. REV. 1850)

      Criminal Law — Plea Deals and Collateral Consequences — Tenth Circuit Holds that Defendant Need Not Be Informed of Collateral Consequences Before Pleading No Contest. — United States v. Muhammad, 747 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2741 (2014)

      (128 HARV. L. REV. 1860)

      Family Law — Marriage Requirements — New York Supreme Court Holds Statutory Exception to Marriage License Requirement Generally Inapplicable to Out-of-State Marriages. — Ponorovskaya v. Stecklow, 987 N.Y.S.2d 543 (Sup. Ct. 2014)

      (128 HARV. L. REV. 1868)

      Fourth Amendment — Exclusionary Rule — Ninth Circuit Suppresses Evidence Based on Violation of Regulations and Policies Implementing Posse Comitatus Act–Like Restrictions. — United States v. Dreyer, 767 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2014)

      (128 HARV. L. REV. 1876)

      Statutory Interpretation — Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 — Sixth Circuit Declines to Extend Federal Forced Labor Statute to Conduct Criminalized Under State Law, Based in Part on Federalism Concerns. — United States v. Toviave, 761 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2014)

      (128 HARV. L. REV. 1884)

      RECENT PUBLICATIONS

      (128 HARV. L. REV. 1894)

      About the Harvard Law Review

      The Harvard Law Review (ISSN 0017-811X) is published monthly eight times a year, November through June, by The Harvard Law Review Association at Gannett House, 1511 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138. Periodicals postage paid at Boston, Mass., and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to the Harvard Law Review, Gannett House, 1511 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138.

      Current subscription: $60.00 individual / $200.00 institution, payable in advance. Remittance must be made by U.S. Dollar Draft payable at a United States bank. Subscription requests that are received midvolume may be subject to an additional postage and handling charge. Domestic claims of nonreceipt of issues should be made within 90 days of the month of publication, overseas claims within 180 days; thereafter, the regular back issue rate will be charged for replacement. All notifications of changes of address should include old and new addresses, with ZIP codes. Please inform us one month in advance to ensure prompt delivery.

      Single issues of Volume 128 are available from The Harvard Law Review Association at the following prices: $15.00 individual / $55.00 institution. Back issues and volumes prior to Volume 128 are available from William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 1285 Main St., Buffalo, NY 14209-1987. For the prices of issues, volumes, and sets prior to Volume 128, please inquire of William S. Hein & Co., Inc. (http://www.wshein.com).

      INFORMATION FOR CONTRIBUTORS

      The Review invites the submission of unsolicited manuscripts. The Review strongly prefers articles under 25,000 words in length — the equivalent of about 50 law review pages — including text and footnotes. Length in excess of 30,000 words — the equivalent of about 60 law review pages — will weigh significantly against selection. Please confine author’s name and biographical information to a removable title page. Footnotes should conform to the 19th edition of The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation.

      Review of manuscripts may take from four to six weeks. Authors who are considering concurrent submissions to other journals should be aware that the Review cannot guarantee timely responses to requests for expedited review.

      Send all correspondence to The Harvard Law Review Association, Gannett House, 1511 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138.

      For additional information about the Harvard Law Review, or to submit a manuscript, please visit our website at http://www.harvardlawreview.org.

      ARTICLE

      CONSENT PROCEDURES AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM

      Bridget A. Fahey

      [128 HARV. L. REV. 1561 (2015)]

      CONTENTS

      CONSENT PROCEDURES AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM

      Bridget A. Fahey

      *

      Cooperative federalism programs and spending grants are like contracts. There is a federal offer and a state acceptance; there are terms and conditions, obligations and penalties. And there is a meeting of the minds — a moment when the states consent to a federal offer and the deal is done. But because the states are not monolithic actors — and many officials, acting through many different political processes, could conceivably speak for the state — the federal government establishes procedures that dictate which state actors may consent on the state’s behalf and how.

      I call these consent procedures. These procedures are ubiquitous: they appear in every program and facilitate every grant that requires voluntary state participation. But they are not innocuous. Some require a particular state officer to serve as the state’s spokesperson. Others require the states to express their consent by proceeding through certain state-level processes. Still others automatically enroll the states and infer their ongoing consent from their failure to opt out. In Professors Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s popular framing, Congress controls the choice architecture within which states make the decision to join or reject voluntary cooperative programs. Like choice architecture, consent procedures do more than operate as processes for registering state consent. Many also shape how states internally discuss, deliberate, and decide whether to join federal programs. They affect the formation as much as the expression of state consent.

      This Article is the first to identify and critically analyze these procedures. It canvasses their many forms and features. It contextualizes them in the Court’s federalism jurisprudence and identifies potential constitutional concerns. It asks whether and under what conditions they are consistent with the core values of American federalism. And it describes ways that different stakeholders — Congress, federal agencies, and the states — can navigate them going forward. The federal government’s largely unnoticed ability to set consent procedures is a consequential feature of twenty-first-century federalism. Federal-state collaboration is increasingly Congress’s regulatory model of choice, and the terms of these collaborations will be the federalism fight of this new century. Consent procedures force to the forefront fundamental questions about the degree of autonomy, self-determination, and respect the states deserve when they are negotiating, defining, and agreeing upon the terms of their cooperative ventures — questions that become more pressing with each legislative session.

      INTRODUCTION

      Cooperative federalism programs and conditional spending grants are like contracts between the states and federal government.¹ There is a federal offer and a state acceptance; there are terms and conditions, obligations and penalties. And there is a meeting of the minds, a moment when the states consent to a federal offer and the deal is done. But because the states are not monolithic actors — and many officials, acting through many different political processes, could conceivably speak for the state — the federal government embeds what I call consent procedures in cooperative federalism statutes and regulations that dictate which state actor gets to accept the federal offer and how.

      Take, for instance, the exchange provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act² (ACA). The offer: state control over the health exchange the Act creates for each state. The conditions: compliance with federal quality, access, and governance rules. But how does a state accept? According to the statute, states can agree to establish exchanges only at such time and in such manner as the Secretary [of Health and Human Services (HHS)] may prescribe.³ HHS, in turn, requires states to consent by submitting a technical document called a Blueprint Application along with a Declaration Letter signed by the state’s governor.⁴ It is the state’s governor, in other words, who gets to accept the federal offer.

      Requirements like this are not merely academic. In late 2012, Mike Chaney, Mississippi’s elected insurance commissioner, sent a letter and Blueprint Application to HHS declaring Mississippi’s intent to implement and operate a State-based Exchange.⁵ Three months later, HHS rejected the application because it did not follow HHS’s prescribed consent procedures.⁶ HHS noted that the agency had issued detail[ed] requirements for approval to run a state-based exchange, including the requirement that a State’s Declaration Letter must be signed by the State’s Governor.⁷ Although Chaney was a statewide elected official, with broad jurisdiction over insurance-related issues in Mississippi, the federally dictated consent procedure deemed only the governor authorized to speak for the state.

      This is not a unique situation. In every program and for every grant that relies on the states’ voluntary participation, the federal government decides how the states volunteer: which official or institution gets to speak for the state, how the decision is presented to that speaker, what process the speaker must use to communicate the state’s decision, and the timeline on which the decision must be made. In Professors Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s popular framing, Congress and federal agencies control the choice architecture within which states make the decision to join or reject cooperative programs.⁸

      Some consent procedures are deferential: they require, for instance, that a state’s indication of consent be submitted by the State agency that is eligible to submit the plan.⁹ Others are highly intrusive — such as, for instance, procedures that require federally designated state officials to follow federally designated state-level processes as a predicate to expressing the state’s consent.

      Medicaid’s original consent procedure, which is also used for the frequent amendments to state programs, is one example. It requires a state’s Medicaid agency to prepare an application or an amendment to its original application, invite comments on that application from the state’s governor, then finally send it to the federal agency.¹⁰ It mandates a chain of communication and consultation between the state’s Medicaid agency and the state’s governor that state law and practice may or may not support.

      The Clean Water Act’s¹¹ section-404 permit program is another. The program allows the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to transfer federal permitting authority over certain water areas to the states. The program’s consent procedure requires not only a letter from the state’s governor expressing the state’s interest in the 404 program but also a statement from the state’s attorney general contain[ing] a legal analysis¹² of the effect of state eminent domain law on the successful implementation of the program, which cite[s] specific statutes and administrative regulations.¹³ The federally dictated consent procedure not only directs the state’s attorney general to perform an action in his official state-authorized capacity that he might not otherwise perform, but it also specifies the precise form that action must take.

      As these examples suggest, consent procedures do more than operate as processes for registering state consent; many also shape how states internally discuss, deliberate, and decide whether to join federal programs. Whether by accident or by design, these procedures affect the formation as much as the expression of state consent.

      This is the first sustained treatment of consent procedures. Although issues related to them have been litigated in a handful of state cases,¹⁴ and academics have noted elements of this consent dynamic,¹⁵ consent procedures have not been identified by the courts or academy as a distinctive feature of federal-state interactions. Yet the federal government’s ability to set consent procedures is a consequential aspect of twenty-first-century federalism, and it is becoming more so with each legislative session. As federal-state collaboration increasingly becomes the regulatory model of choice for policy initiatives big and small, these procedures will play an outsized role in mediating the power and influence of state and federal political actors. They let the federal government intervene in state politics and decisionmaking in novel and unexpected ways. They allow the federal government to enhance its bargaining power when dealing with the states in situations that are commonly considered by courts and scholars to be negotiations between equal actors. And they present new opportunities to test the rules established by the Supreme Court that mediate the relationship between the states and the federal government.

      Identifying which consent procedures are consistent with American federalism and which are not requires rules of engagement that dictate how the states and federal government are obliged to treat one another when they join together their respective power, resources, and democratic legitimacy to achieve a common goal.¹⁶ What type and degree of autonomy, self-determination, respect, and deference are the states entitled to when the states and federal government are negotiating, defining, and agreeing to the terms of their collective ventures?

      These questions are not unfamiliar in the world of bargaining. Contract law has spawned rules of engagement for nearly every facet of contract formation.¹⁷ But analogous rules have not been recreated in the intergovernmental sphere. Federalism doctrine and scholarship have precious few principles for theorizing and managing how the states and federal government can arrive at a democratically and constitutionally legitimate meeting of the minds.

      Our federalism’s unique history has made this so. American federalism is still coming to terms with the magnificent growth in federal-state collaborations over the last forty years — a trend that has only accelerated in the twenty-first century, which has borne forms and magnitudes of intergovernmental partnership never before seen.¹⁸ While much ink has been spilled deliberating how to distribute jurisdiction between the states and federal government in the traditional dual sovereignty model, that model becomes more detached from our on-the-ground legal reality with each passing year.¹⁹ Scholars have dissected how power is distributed in some of the major cooperative statutes that turn the dual sovereignty system on its head,²⁰ but theorizing the stunningly complex and varied ways that ‘federalism’ manifests from the inside of federal statutes²¹ remains an emerging project.²²

      Specifically, the rights and entitlements of the states when they act as partners, administrators, implementers, and collaborators alongside the federal government — rather than as largely isolated miniature governments — remain ill-defined in the Court and academy.²³ This is true among both the old-guard sovereigntists and a new group of scholars who support federalism models that leave sovereignty by the wayside. Yet both schools would be strengthened by more robust answers to these questions.

      Scholars and jurists who oppose integration and advocate for a return to the traditional dual sovereignty model have focused much of their effort on resisting policies that limit or displace state jurisdiction.²⁴ Questions about how to protect state sovereignty when the states act within federal programs — where state participation comes by the grace of Congress,²⁵ but the states are nonetheless entitled to be treated as independent and autonomous political entities²⁶ — have gone under-addressed.²⁷ The anti-commandeering and anti-coercion rules set an important foundation, but as Part II will demonstrate, our twenty-first-century cooperative federalism has created far more opportunities for the federal government to interfere with state independence than the conventional reading of these rules can encompass. Consent procedures are just one example.

      And even among a new group of federalism scholars who extol the benefits of our increasingly integrated system by imagining American federalism as a distinctive species of nationalism,²⁸ rules of engagement have been the neglected stepchild. The new nationalists have revived interest in the value of state contributions to traditionally federal domains. They argue that the states provide the democratic churn necessary for an ossified national system to move forward²⁹ by acting, resisting, speaking, and maneuvering within federal programs, even if these acts do not sound in the traditional language of tax-raising, law-making, peace-keeping sovereignty. Indeed, one goal of the new nationalist project is to argue that the decline of these traditional trappings of sovereignty should not be lamented. As participants in national projects, states enable racial minorities and dissenters to rule,³⁰ serve as staging grounds for national debates,³¹ spur the develop[ment of] national consensus,³² safeguard the separation of powers,³³ negotiate interjurisdictional gray area[s],³⁴ and administer a far-reaching array of federal programs.³⁵ Integration, in other words, is a federalism friend — not a federalism foe.

      But although the new nationalists have provided a rich descriptive account of the many ways the states make our national politics more vibrant, they have yet to tell us how much integration is too much integration, or on what terms it should proceed. Professor Heather Gerken — who was a new nationalist before that title existed — has suggested that identifying ‘rules of engagement’ may be the most pronounced weakness of th[e] [new nationalist] school.³⁶ For even if you accept the central premise of the school — that the states are valuable because they make our national democracy more vibrant, more legitimate, and more effective, not because of some illusory store of sovereignty — the federal government can’t have carte blanche to dictate how they operate, the choices they make, and the terms of their participation in national programs. Such control would turn state-federal collaboration into state-federal assimilation, and state obsolescence would necessarily follow. Certain attributes of state governance must be protected in order for the states to continue serving the nationalist functions that the new nationalists embrace.³⁷ There must be rules of engagement that protect state-federal collaborations against total assimilation.

      This Article begins to identify and define those rules. It examines a new and consequential site of federal-state interaction: the consent process. For dual sovereigntists and new nationalists, judges and academics alike, the rules that tell governing bodies how they are obliged to treat one another when they negotiate and collaborate are both vital and sustaining.

      * * *

      The high-level goals of this Article are twofold. The first is to describe how states express consent today by reviewing on a statutory and programmatic level the federal rules that dictate the consent process. In what follows, I describe the ubiquitous presence of these consent procedures in federal programs big and small, as well as their common forms and structures and their many customizable features and applications. The second goal is to situate consent procedures in the Court’s federalism jurisprudence and in contemporary federalism scholarship. Two relevant doctrines are immediately apparent: the anti-coercion rule, which prohibits the federal government from coercing the states during federal-state negotiations, and the anti-commandeering rule, which prohibits the federal government from directing state institutions to make policy choices or implement federal programs. I argue that while neither doctrine directly addresses the distinctive issues raised by federally dictated consent procedures, their intersection reveals a variety of ways in which intrusive consent procedures could raise constitutional concerns. I then look beyond doctrine to the main values and goods that scholars and courts believe federalism advances and argue that consent procedures have the potential to interfere with each of them.

      The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I sketches the range of consent procedures the federal government uses to enroll states in cooperative programs. These processes are rarely discussed during the give and take of federal lawmaking and are often hidden in a morass of statutory and regulatory language. By consolidating them in one place, I identify three elements of consent that the federal government often controls: (1) consent agents, (2) consent actions, and (3) baseline assumptions. Part II undertakes a doctrinal analysis of consent procedures and concludes that when consent procedures interfere with a state’s standard governmental processes, they sit at a forbidden intersection between the Court’s anti-coercion and anti-commandeering rules. Part III elaborates the potential for consent procedures to interfere with the goods or values our system of federalism produces. And Part IV considers how different stakeholders — Congress, the Executive, the courts, and the states — can and should think about consent procedures going forward.

      I. OVERVIEW OF CONSENT PROCEDURES

      The means that the federal government uses to ascertain state consent to cooperative programs are as variegated and textured as the programs themselves. Indeed, I use the language of process — calling them consent procedures — because they fuse and layer different elements of consent together. They specify the agent who must express the consent and the actions she must take. They also specify a baseline assumption about the state’s starting point vis-à-vis the program. Most consent procedures begin with the baseline assumption that states have not consented to the program until they perform the consent procedure; but a few assume that the states have tacitly consented until they use the designated process to opt out of the program. Some consent procedures, in other words, use a "consent when model and others use a consent until" model.

      Every act of consent will have an agent, an action, and a baseline assumption. Some consent procedures specify all three elements, while others specify only one or two, implicitly deferring determinations about the other elements of the consent act to the state. For instance, a consent procedure that specifies the actions that a state must take in order to consent, but not the agent who must perform those actions, allows the state to select its own agent. In this Part, I step through each of these elements in turn, providing examples of the different variations the federal government incorporates into consent procedures.³⁸

      A. Consent Agents

      The agent-based elements of consent procedures dictate the state actor or institution that must be the state’s representative for the purpose of committing to the federal program.

      1. Chief Executive Officers. — The federal government often designates the state’s governor or chief executive officer as this actor.³⁹ As noted above, for instance, guidance implementing the ACA requires that the state’s application to establish a state-based insurance exchange be signed by the State’s Governor.⁴⁰ But there are several variations on this theme. A governor may express her state’s intention to participate in the program by taking a specified action (discussed in greater detail below in section I.B) instead of sending a communication. In the 1990 amendments to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,⁴¹ for instance, Congress permitted the governor of a state to express her intent to expand the scope of her state’s reclamation projects by certifying that previous projects had been successfully completed.⁴²

      2. Agencies and Administrative Officials. — Agencies can also be designated consenters. But it is typical for the federal government to require the governor to first name the appropriate agency to manage the program. The Occupational Safety and Health Act⁴³ is a standard example. The Act makes grants available to fund experimental projects related to occupational safety. The consent procedure first asks the governor to designate the appropriate State agency for receipt of any grant,⁴⁴ then requires the designated agency to submit an application requesting funds on behalf of the state.⁴⁵

      In some cases, the federal government limits the agencies or administrative officials the governor may designate to those with appropriate state-law jurisdiction. Department of Commerce regulations related to the distribution of fishery assistance funds, for instance, limit eligible agencies to those authorized under [state] laws to regulate commercial fisheries.⁴⁶

      And in some instances — particularly when there is an obvious state counterpart agency for a federal program — Congress bypasses the governor designation process altogether and commits the consent rights to the agency in the first instance. This is common in education programs. Several grants connected to the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001⁴⁷ make the State educational agency the state’s consent agent.⁴⁸

      3. Joint Agents. — Finally, some agent-based consent elements require two actors to express the state’s interest in concert. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973⁴⁹ allowed the states to receive federal highway funds to build alternatives to highway transportation. The Act required the joint request of a State Governor and the local governments concerned before the Secretary would approve such a use.⁵⁰ As should be clear, agent-based consent elements can reflect judgments about which actor or set of actors ought to be the state’s representative in a given area.⁵¹

      B. Consent Actions

      As part of its consent procedures, the federal government may also require the state or a specified state official to take a set of actions in order to express its consent. Some consent procedures are purely action-based, specifying only that the state generally must perform a set of actions, but not dictating who within the state must complete them.⁵²

      Action-based consent elements can also be used in conjunction with agent-based elements. This kind of procedure designates a state official, then requires that official to perform certain actions in order to register his consent.

      The required actions contemplated by federal procedures can range from the simple to the complex. The simplest action-based consent element is the state’s submission of an application.⁵³ More complex procedures require the state to take federally specified political or administrative actions as part of the consent act. There are several common procedural requirements.

      1. Legislative Enactments. — Some consent procedures require the state to enact a law in order to indicate its consent. Unemployment insurance — the federal-state collaboration operative across the country — requires consent to be expressed through the state legislature unless otherwise noted in particular provisions. The original law — the Wagner-Peyser Act of 1933⁵⁴ — specified that [i]n order to obtain the benefits of appropriations [under the law], a State shall, through its legislature, accept the provisions of this Act.⁵⁵ Amendments to the law in 1998, which are still in effect today, retained this requirement, but changed the phrase through its legislature to pursuant to State statute.⁵⁶

      2. Official Acts. — As I previewed earlier, some consent procedures require state officials to perform federally specified official acts in their state-level capacity prior to consenting to the federal program. I have already mentioned the Clean Water Act’s section-404 permitting program, which requires the state’s attorney general to prepare a legal analysis of certain legal implications of the program.⁵⁷

      3. Designation. — Many consent procedures require a state or specific state official to designate an individual or agency that will be the ongoing contact for the program. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act⁵⁸ requires an application that must include, among other things, the designation of the lead agency in the State that will be responsible for the administration of funds.⁵⁹ Similarly, states requesting federal grants for the management of hazardous material must initially submit an application and letter from the state’s governor designating the State agency that is authorized to apply for a grant.⁶⁰ Thereafter, that agency may request funds directly in a primarily agent-based consent model. The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund similarly makes funds available only if the Governor of a State . . . advise[s] the [National Pollution Funds Center] in writing of the specific individual who is designated to make [such] requests.⁶¹

      4. Consultation. — Some consent procedures, in effect, require state officials to consult with one another prior to expressing the state’s consent. As mentioned above, Medicaid’s consent procedure first requires the state’s designated Medicaid agency to prepare an application and any subsequent application amendments.⁶² It then requires that agency to submit that application or proposed amendment to the state’s governor (or the governor’s designee) for comments before finally sending the application to the federal government.⁶³ This procedure is interesting not just because it forges a process of political communication between state officials within the state, but also because it asks the governor to send his comments to the federal government alongside the application so that the federal government can take them into consideration when it evaluates the application. Other federal laws include similar action-based consent elements, requiring state agencies to consult first with state governors before requesting a federal grant.⁶⁴ Reaching even more broadly, while the consent procedure for grants under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act⁶⁵ does not specify a consent agent, it does require an assurance that the application was developed in consultation and coordination with appropriate State officials, including:

      the chief executive officer, the chief State school officer, the head of the State alcohol and drug abuse agency, the heads of the State health and mental health agencies, the head of the State criminal justice planning agency, the head of the State child welfare agency, the head of the State board of education, or their designees, and representatives of parents, students, and community-based organizations.⁶⁶

      5. Certification. — The federal government often requires states to certify that they are able to fulfill their obligations under the program before they can consent. The federal government’s primary cash welfare program, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families⁶⁷ (TANF), requires the chief executive officer of the State to make half a dozen certifications in the state’s application for federal funds,⁶⁸ ranging from which State agency or agencies will administer and supervise the program⁶⁹ to its commitment to preventing fraud in the use of federal funds.⁷⁰

      6. Disclosure and Publicity. — Some consent procedures require the states to comply with certain transparency requirements in the preparation of their applications or letters of intent. For instance, the Early Intervention Program for Infants and Toddlers with Disabilities⁷¹ requires the states to publish their applications in a manner that will ensure circulation throughout the State for at least a 60-day period, with an opportunity for public comment on the application for at least 30 days during that period, prior to submitting them.⁷² Other consent procedures have similar requirements.⁷³

      7. Transferals. — Finally, to manage cases in which the designated consent actor does not agree to the federal program, some statutes create alternative consent procedures that are triggered when that actor declines or simply fails to move forward. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009⁷⁴ specified that [i]f funds provided to any State in any division of this Act are not accepted for use by the Governor, then acceptance by the State legislature, by means of the adoption of a concurrent resolution, shall be sufficient to provide funding to such State.⁷⁵

      Likewise, a core provision of the Clean Water Act required states to collaborate with the federal government on areawide waste treatment management plans.⁷⁶ At the center of the program was the designation of areas with substantial water quality control problems.⁷⁷ The consent procedure gave the governor the first bite at that apple. If the governor did not act . . . within the time required, the program allowed the chief elected officials of local governments in the state to step forward and make their own designations.⁷⁸

      C. Baseline Assumptions

      Most cooperative programs adopt the initial premise that the state is not part of the program until it affirmatively consents. But a few programs invert this premise and automatically enroll the states, while allowing them to opt out through a prescribed procedure. These programs infer the state’s consent to participate by its failure to opt out. For ease, I call consent procedures that assume states have consented until they opt out tacit consent procedures.

      President Clinton’s welfare overhaul — the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996⁷⁹ (PRWORA) — contains a lively example of tacit consent. In addition to many other welfare reforms, the statute enacted a comprehensive ban on the provision of federal public benefits to undocumented immigrants, a ban that resulted in their removal from the rolls of nearly every federal benefit program.⁸⁰ The law sought the same result in the states.⁸¹ PRWORA included a mirror provision that barred undocumented immigrants from accessing any purely state or local public benefit that was funded from a state treasury or administered through a state agency.⁸² It overrode hundreds of state laws, including nearly every statute and regulation that made a state grant, contract, loan, professional license, . . . commercial license[,] . . . retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar benefit available to undocumented immigrants.⁸³ This unprecedented interference with state spending and lawmaking prerogatives would seem to exceed Congress’s constitutional powers.⁸⁴ So the Act squared itself with Article I’s limitations on congressional power by allowing states to opt out of the ban through a formal legislative act.⁸⁵ This unusual optout provision seems to have transformed an unconstitutional federal directive into a constitutional cooperative program. Congress automatically enrolled states in a joint policy program, but cast their continued involvement as voluntary because they were able to override the default at any time. A state’s inaction, in other words, constituted tacit consent to its continued participation in the program.

      A similar consent procedure operates as the foundation of the Clean Air Act’s⁸⁶ (CAA) State Implementation Plan (SIP) process. When the EPA promulgates new ambient air quality standards pursuant to the CAA, states are given a period of time in which to create a SIP articulating their approach to meeting those standards.⁸⁷ If that period elapses without action, states are understood to have waived the statutory right to meet the standards on their own and to have consented to the federal government’s management of the state’s air quality.⁸⁸

      The National Housing Act⁸⁹ (NHA), too, uses a similar device. That Act subjects states to federal mortgage rate regulations, but permits them to opt out of federal rates by enacting a provision of law explicitly regulating rates at the state level.⁹⁰ Like the PRWORA default discussed above, rate regulations in place before the NHA needed to be reenacted in order for the state to opt out of the federal rate regulation.⁹¹

      * * *

      This typology is intended to demonstrate the range of ways the federal government can manage the expression of state consent. It should also begin to reveal how consent procedures operate to influence, intervene in, and even reshape state political processes. Below, I describe in detail how these procedures may trespass on the constitutional strictures established to protect the states as well as the goods and values traditionally associated with American federalism. But it should be immediately apparent that consent procedures can intrude upon state political processes, whether designed to do so or not.

      As I show below, agent-based elements at their most invasive may designate as the state’s consent agent an officer or entity that lacks the state-level legal authority or political support necessary to serve as the state’s decisionmaker for the program or policy on offer.⁹² States faced with such a provision must choose between acquiescing in the official’s service as the state’s consent agent, developing a workaround to have the federally designated agent guided by the state’s preferred actor, or declining the offer outright.⁹³ Each of these paths could have a meaningful impact on how state political processes function.

      Action-based consent elements can be even more intrusive. Procedures that combine action- and agent-based elements not only tell a state official that he must be the state’s spokesperson, but also tell him how to perform his duties — instructing him, for instance, to provide official commentary on a proposal, write an opinion with certain specifications, or consult with certain officials. Other action-based procedures require the states to subject the consent decision to processes that may not be required by, or even permitted under, state law.

      Finally, by requiring the states to take affirmative steps to express their nonconsent to cooperative initiatives, tacit consent procedures necessarily mold state political processes to federal specifications. In order for a state to remain in the position it was in prior to the enactment of the purportedly collaborative program — to simply maintain the status quo — it has to perform a political act required by the federal government, a command that may be difficult, if not impossible, to heed.

      This is not to suggest that all consent procedures intrude upon the states in unjustifiable ways. Some consent procedures provide the states with the latitude to decide how to consent. One way to do this is to avoid federal pronouncements about who should speak for the state, and simply require the State to consent — thereby making valid an expression of consent from any authorized state official. If the governor has the power to act for the state in the performance of the consent act, she can. If a different official has the necessary power, the task falls to that official instead. Importantly, under such a regime, the federal government will receive consent from different state actors in different states. Unlike other consent procedures, these simple action-based processes allow each state to act through a different consent process. Likewise, action-based consent elements that require states to designate an agency or official to manage the program going forward seem necessary, even if they do subtly instruct the designator to act.

      My goal in this Article is not to enumerate and analyze the constitutional and theoretical advantages and disadvantages of each type of consent procedure. That detailed project must await future work. My aim is to interrogate whether the federal government has the basic power to create consent procedures that influence state governments in the ways that many already do today. Do our constitutional federalism doctrines and widely accepted federalism values embrace or forbid the intrusions effectuated by consent procedures?

      II. CONSENT PROCEDURES AND THE COURT

      A. Overview

      Because consent procedures influence how the states make consequential governing decisions, they seem intuitively discordant with the constitutional mandate that the federal government engage the states as independent and autonomous political entities.⁹⁴ Two maxims form the core of the Court’s existing rules of engagement for facilitating federal-state interactions.⁹⁵ The first rule, which applies to the implementation of federal programs, holds that the federal government cannot commandeer the states into implementing a federal initiative. Commandeering occurs when the federal government instructs or requires the states to regulate. The second rule, which applies to negotiations⁹⁶ over cooperative programs, holds that the states may not be coerced into working with the federal government. When Congress offers states a choice to accept or reject federal funding or joint programming, the Court requires that state assent be voluntar[il]y⁹⁷ given and an expression of the state’s own will.⁹⁸ When negotiating with the federal government, the states must always have the option not merely in theory but in fact⁹⁹ to reject the federal government’s offer.¹⁰⁰

      Even without careful doctrinal analysis, many consent procedures seem to violate these rules of engagement. How can a state act according to its own will if that will is subject to the command of another? How can we call the decision of a state voluntary when that state didn’t control the decisionmaking procedures that produced it?

      Strong as these intuitions are, their source is difficult to locate in a conventional reading of either the commandeering or coercion cases. The commandeering cases focus on federal directives requiring the states to help implement federal programs; they have never been extended to situations in which the states are negotiating the terms of their participation in cooperative programs. The coercion cases, by contrast, do speak to what the states are owed when they are negotiating the terms of cooperative programs, but to date they have only invalidated federal offers for imposing harms distinct from those present in the commandeering cases. Consent procedures, in other words, sit at an untheorized intersection between the two sets of doctrines. In this Part, I examine what each set of cases has to offer the other and our consent procedure inquiry more generally.

      B. The Commandeering Cases

      Congress cannot require States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.¹⁰¹ This is the principle at the heart of the Court’s seminal commandeering cases, New York v. United States and Printz v. United States. Yet that principle describes almost exactly what consent procedures do — they instruct the states to make consequential policy choices that have legal, financial, and political implications using the federal government’s preferred process or agent.

      New York addressed the constitutionality of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act,¹⁰² which used a complex web of incentives to encourage states to safely dispose of their own radioactive waste.¹⁰³ The Act was a response to a daunting shortage of waste disposal sites that left the producers of low-level waste without avenues for the waste’s safe removal. The Act required states to remedy this shortage either by creating internal disposal sites or by forming interstate compacts to use disposal sites in neighboring states.¹⁰⁴ To encourage states that were hesitant to act, it offered financial inducements and threatened legal penalties.¹⁰⁵ The most draconian provision commanded states to take title and legal possession of any waste generated within the state’s borders, whether by the government or private parties, unless and until the state enacted regulations providing for an in-state or regional disposal site.

      In New York, the Court found the take title provision to be an unconstitutional act of federal commandeering because it required states to choose between two federally prescribed alternatives. Both purported options, the Court said, compel[led]¹⁰⁶ the states to legislate according to the federal government’s instructions.¹⁰⁷ When states are commandeered in this manner, the Court reasoned, they cease to operate as distinct sovereignties because they act in obedience to another government rather than to their own constituents.¹⁰⁸

      Several years later, in Printz, the Court extended the New York principle to the commandeering of state officials, in addition to legislative processes. The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act¹⁰⁹ required state officials to run instant background checks on most in-store handgun purchases.¹¹⁰ While the Act ultimately envisioned the federal government conducting these checks, it instructed each state’s chief law enforcement officer (CLEO) to perform the checking function while the federal government got its own process up and running. The Court struck down this command to state CLEOs on the grounds that [t]he Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.¹¹¹

      New York and Printz together reveal three distinct ways in which the federal government might instruct[] the states to govern.¹¹² There are: (1) instructions to set in motion a state regulatory process that may otherwise have remained motionless; (2) instructions to enact regulations that conform to federally dictated specifications; and (3) instructions to specific state officials to perform specific official tasks.

      The federal government has used consent procedures to instruct the states in each of these ways. Consent procedures require the states to hold public hearings and circulate applications and proposals.¹¹³ They require state officials to prepare official documents and analyses,¹¹⁴ to make certifications,¹¹⁵ and to engage in processes of intragovernmental consultation.¹¹⁶ And they require federally chosen state officials — most often governors — to designate others as authorities in a particular area.¹¹⁷

      Although there are clear parallels between consent procedures and the type of instructions given in the commandeering cases, the contexts surrounding the instructions differ in meaningful ways, making the application of the cases to consent procedures a complicated task. This is because consent procedures, to the extent that they commandeer the states, do so as a condition on receiving a federal grant, not as a direct command. In New York, the federal government instructed states to either enact a regulatory scheme or take title to their state’s low-level waste. A third option — the option of declining both options — was not available to them. Similarly, in Printz, the CLEO mandate was just that — a requirement, not a request. Consent procedures, on the other hand, can be avoided, at least in theory, if the state opts not to participate in the federal program.¹¹⁸ Some might say that because consent procedures do not bind states unless (and until) they voluntarily decide to accept the federal government’s offer, consent procedures are not commandeering in the technical sense.

      But this simple lawyer’s rejoinder — the distinction between a command and a condition — does not tell the whole story, for several reasons. The first is the simplest: in New York, Justice O’Connor rejected the idea that state officials are allowed to consent to their state being commandeered. New York state officials had testified in favor of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act in Congress, and one of the state’s senators had endorsed the Act on the Senate floor.¹¹⁹ Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, Justice O’Connor wrote, the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.¹²⁰

      Second, and more importantly, the proposition that any state that follows a federally mandated consent procedure does so voluntarily seems to beg the question. Take the ACA’s health-exchange consent procedure discussed in Part I. The consent procedure vests the decision to establish a health care exchange with the state’s governor.¹²¹ Imagine that a state’s governor wants to build an exchange, but the state’s legislature or insurance commissioner opposes it. Should a court conclude that the state voluntarily chose to accept the federal government’s offer simply because the governor followed the appropriate consent procedure? Assume further that the legislature and insurance commissioner not only oppose the exchange but also contest the governor’s authority, under state law, to decide whether to create an exchange. Is the state’s choice voluntary then? How should a court determine whether the state — as distinct from any individual official — voluntarily chose to submit itself to the consent procedure in the first instance?

      The problem, in other words, is that the consent procedure is meant to establish that the state is acting voluntarily. What we lack is an account of the predicate conditions that make a state’s decision to follow a consent procedure itself a voluntary act.¹²² To interrogate this domino effect, we need a better understanding of the nature

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