OpenMinds

OpenMinds

Software Development

Shielding Nations from Cognitive Threats and Disinformation

About us

OpenMinds is a cognitive defence agency that provides threat intelligence and response services to over 30 governments and organisations worldwide, including Ukrainian and NATO-member governments, the European Commission, USAID, leading StratCom agencies, and research institutions.

Industry
Software Development
Company size
11-50 employees
Headquarters
London
Type
Privately Held
Founded
2022

Locations

Employees at OpenMinds

Updates

  • At OpenMinds, we are committed to combating propaganda and disinformation, with a particular focus on the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war. Our mission is to support governments, research institutions, and organizations globally by providing full-cycle information threat intelligence and response capabilities. Through our AI-powered platform, Pythia, and collaboration with world-class teams, we track and respond to disinformation, helping to strengthen communities' informational resilience. Our 2024 reports provide insights into the evolving information warfare landscape, showcasing the impact of Russian disinformation tactics, military threats, and public opinion shifts. Here are the key highlights from our 2024 reports.

    Key highlights from our reports

    Key highlights from our reports

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    Since the start of the full-scale invasion, Russian authorities have repeatedly issued threats towards Ukraine and the West, ranging from ambiguous warnings about the “consequences” to the testing of new nuclear weapons. OpenMinds has calculated the Russian Threats Index (RTI) to assess the frequency and nature of these threats. The data spans from 1 Jan 2021 to 30 Nov 2024, with Jan 2022 – prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine – serving as the baseline index value of 100. Using morphological analysis, we filtered posts mentioning Russian officials, narrowing it down to 940 threats. Our model assessed and verified the accuracy of each threat using a confidence score. The RTI has reached its highest level since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, soaring to 120 points in September 2024 — 40% increase compared to October 2022, with threats moving from “red lines” to more direct military and nuclear warnings. In 2024, military and nuclear threats accounted for 54% of all threats, nearly twice as much as in 2022. Russian Ministry of Defence mentioned Western arms suppliers in 89% of its press briefings in 2024 — 1.8 times more often than in 2023. Frequent mention of the NATO has become a part of a broader narrative aimed at the construction of an “external enemy” image. Only in November we found nearly 100 000 posts on Russian social networks about the confrontation between Russia and NATO. Explore the full report for a deeper analysis: https://lnkd.in/euN3c5Vj

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  • One of Russia's most deceptive tactics has been the manipulation and distortion of historical facts. This rewriting of history – such as Putin’s claim that Ukraine never existed as a nation – is not merely about controlling the narrative, it serves as a tool to justify aggression and undermine a nation’s identity. In his new book "Forged in War", Mark Galeotti explores how Russia has long used these historical narratives to justify its actions, from its centuries-long campaign to humble or destroy Ukraine to the present-day rhetoric that denies Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign nation. Galeotti's perspective, shared in an interview with Aspects of History, emphasises that viewing the enemy through the lens of history helps us understand not only the origins of these tactics but also how they shape the conflict today – a crucial step in strengthening cognitive defence.

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  • Russia has allocated 137.2 billion rubles (approximately $1.42 billion) for state propaganda in 2025, setting a record high. However, this number only demonstrates funding for state-run TV and other domestic media. The overall scope of Russia’s disinformation efforts extends much further, with significant resources dedicated to global media influence. This highlights Russia's ongoing investment in its hybrid warfare strategy, which has long extended beyond military actions and into the realm of information warfare. While many fear Russia’s military presence on their borders, its influence in the information space is already widespread, affecting the political landscape of multiple countries. The resources Russia is directing towards its disinformation campaigns are vast, involving not only state-run TV but also social media, cinema, bot farms, and educational initiatives. These efforts demonstrate the broad nature of Russia’s approach to shaping global narratives.

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  • What lessons can be learned from Ukraine’s approach that could apply to other nations facing hybrid warfare challenges? Here’s a snippet from the Silicon Curtain podcast, where OpenMinds CEO Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi shared his insights on this topic. Traditional defence mechanisms are no longer sufficient. We must adapt to the new reality of hybrid threats, particularly in the realms of cognitive and informational warfare – domains that are becoming increasingly important. It’s not just about military strength but about countering disinformation and safeguarding public perception. Ukraine has shown the power of integrating military, cyber, and informational strategies, where controlling narrative is as vital as deploying traditional weapons. The future lies in creating international alliances focused on informational resilience, ensuring that democracies are prepared for the evolving nature of warfare.

  • Ahead of the elections in Moldova and Georgia, Russia employed disinformation tactics that exploit on local vulnerabilities, manipulate public narratives, and undermine trust in democratic processes. In our recent report, we analysed 133 political Telegram channels in Moldova, and 96 in Georgia, to investigate Russian interference in the elections processes. Here are our key findings, follow the link to learn more: https://lnkd.in/eP9NSEhd

  • Right before the elections in Georgia pro-Russian actors were actively exploiting "Ukrainian scenario". This narrative warns that deeper integration with the European Union might provoke a military confrontation with Russia, and portrays the pro-Russian party as the only favourable and proper choice. Georgia’s October parliamentary elections underscored the country's balance between European aspirations and Russian influence. Pro-Russian entities, aligned with the ruling Georgian Dream party, intensified their campaign to frame opposition movements and EU integration as threats to the nation's stability. Georgian Telegram channels linked to pro-Russian outlets like Alt-Info and a network of bots active on Russian social media platforms. Key messages spread on Telegram suggest that opposition victories could "open a second front" against Russia, placing Georgia in the center of a geopolitical confrontation. At the same time, these channels avoid direct endorsement of Russia, opting instead to promote "neutrality" and the economic benefits of maintaining cordial relations with Moscow. This approach mirrors similar efforts in Moldova, where Russian narratives emphasise the dangers of unionism with Romania and EU integration. What they want to state is that any deviation from the status quo risks destabilisation and war. The "Ukrainian scenario" narrative is a strategic scare tactic designed to keep voters from supporting pro-European reforms. It capitalises on genuine fears of war. Notably, it shifts the blame for potential aggression from the Kremlin to pro-European politicians, painting them as "agents of Western powers". Learn more in our latest report and beware of Russia's disinformation tactics: https://lnkd.in/eP9NSEhd

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  • The power of resilience in Ukraine’s response to Russian aggression What drives Ukrainian resilience in the face of invasion? Here are some insights from the conversation between Sviatoslav Hnizdovskyi and Jonathan Fink on the Silicon Curtain podcast. 1. A strong unified network. In the face of Russia’s invasion, joint work of civil society and private sector have been key in pushing back against disinformation and propaganda. This collaboration, which grew from the ashes of Soviet control, has allowed Ukraine to mobilise quickly and adapt to new challenges. From grassroots movements to high-level strategies, the response has been rapid and effective, and it’s also quite unique. 2. Cognitive defence. Informational warfare isn't just about debunking false narratives — it’s about countering an entire system designed to weaken society from within. By empowering citizens with tools to recognise and resist manipulation, Ukraine has built a defence against Russia's attempt to control narratives and media. 3. Resilience is shaping change. It’s not just about the battles won on the front lines, but also about how Ukrainians fight to preserve their agency, identity, and truth in an information-saturated world. Resilience is about creating systems that protect the truth, keep communities united, and ensure that manipulation has no place in shaping our realities. Ukraine's ability to resist is rooted in the strength of its people — our drive to protect our freedom, our culture, and our future.

  • The riots are happening in Tbilisi as protesters fight for their right to be in the EU. And as Georgia approached its 2024 parliamentary elections, a familiar topic resurfaced in our research: Russian disinformation before the elections. Our latest report, "Russian Electoral Interference In Moldova And Georgia 2024: Mapping Disinformation Networks", uncovers how pro-Russian narratives spread through social media, shaping public opinion and undermining trust in democratic processes in Georgia in particular. From claims that sanctions against Russia harm Georgia’s economy to messaging that paints European integration as a path to decline, the narratives reveal a calculated effort to sway Georgian voters. With bot activity on VK spiking post-election and opposition forces being delegitimised, the parallels to Russia’s tactics in Ukraine are hard not to recognise. Explore the key findings and implications in our full investigation. The report is now available on our website: https://lnkd.in/eP9NSEhd

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  • We're hiring a Financial Manager As we expand, we seek a proactive and detail-oriented Financial Manager to support our financial operations. This role will manage day-to-day accounting, ensure compliance with financial regulations, and collaborate with various teams to maintain accurate financial records. We’re a great match if you have: • 2+ years of experience in finance or accounting • A degree in Accounting, Finance, or a related field • Familiarity with UK corporate law and accounting - you will manage our local accounting team • Proficiency in English (B2 or higher) • Strong organisational and time-management skills • Excellent communication skills, both written and verbal • Ability to work independently and as part of a team Apply now and share the opportunity with anyone who might be a good match for the role: https://lnkd.in/eknVuWDR

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