Bugtraq mailing list archives
IRIX routed(1M) Vulnerability
From: agent99 () BOYTOY CSD SGI COM (SGI Security Coordinator)
Date: Wed, 21 Oct 1998 21:38:28 GMT
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
Title: IRIX routed(1M) Vulnerability
Number: 19981004-01-PX
Date: October 21, 1998
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________
- ------------------------
- ---- Issue Specifics ---
- ------------------------
The routed(1M) daemon is used to manage network routing tables.
A vulnerability has been discovered in routed(1M) which allows a malicious
user to append debug and tracing information to arbitrary files on the system.
Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. This
issue has been corrected in future releases of IRIX.
- ---------------
- ---- Impact ---
- ---------------
The routed(1M) daemon is installed by default on IRIX.
A local account is not needed in order to exploit this vulnerability.
The vulnerability can be exploited remotely by using carefully crafted network
packets.
The vulnerability allows a malicious user to append routed(1M) debug tracing
information to arbitrary files on the system.
This vulnerability has been publicly discussed in Usenet newsgroups
and mailing lists.
- ---------------------------
- ---- Temporary Solution ---
- ---------------------------
Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.
There are no workarounds for this routed(1M) vulnerability. The routed(1M)
daemon must be disabled or patches installed.
The steps below can be used to disable the routed(1M) daemon to prevent
exploitation of this vulnerability until patches can be installed.
=================
**** WARNING ****
=================
Disabling routed(1M) daemon will prevent dynamic updates of the
network routing tables. Static routes must be configured, see the
route(1M) man page for more information.
1) Become the root user on the system.
% /bin/su -
Password:
#
2) Verify routed(1M) daemon is enabled.
# chkconfig
Flag State
==== =====
routed on
3) Disable routed(1M) daemon.
# chkconfig routed off
4) Verify routed(1M) daemon has been disabled.
# chkconfig
Flag State
==== =====
routed off
5) Stop and restart all system networking daemons.
# /etc/init.d/network stop;/etc/init.d/network start
6) Return to previous user level.
# exit
%
- -----------------
- ---- Solution ---
- -----------------
OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- --------- -------------
IRIX 3.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 4.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.3 yes 2770
IRIX 6.0.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 6.1 yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 6.2 yes 1638 Note 2
IRIX 6.3 yes 2413 Note 2
IRIX 6.4 yes 2413 Note 2
IRIX 6.5 no
IRIX 6.5 no
IRIX 6.5.1 no
NOTES
1) Upgrade to currently supported IRIX operating system.
2) These are the base patches where the security issue was first fixed.
There may be newer rollup patches that contain the security fix and
are currently available from http://support.sgi.com/ or you SGI
support provider.
Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches can be
found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectively.
For security and patch management reasons, ftp.sgi.com (mirror of sgigate) lags
behind and does not do a real-time update of ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches
directories.
##### Patch File Checksums ####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.1638
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 25810 10 README.patch.1638
Algorithm #2 (sum): 45994 10 README.patch.1638
MD5 checksum: 5CFFC234C3FD6A55AAF1724A23856464
Filename: patchSG0001638
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 54461 3 patchSG0001638
Algorithm #2 (sum): 10118 3 patchSG0001638
MD5 checksum: 1A4F38FCB51AEA8444236CD0B78EE8BB
Filename: patchSG0001638.eoe_hdr
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 10008 8 patchSG0001638.eoe_hdr
Algorithm #2 (sum): 23343 8 patchSG0001638.eoe_hdr
MD5 checksum: 960162CA99A3F2B00C1F2728F1FD82A8
Filename: patchSG0001638.eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 25386 52 patchSG0001638.eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 5077 52 patchSG0001638.eoe_man
MD5 checksum: ECA70503EEB12265CB56CC1CBA0AAB74
Filename: patchSG0001638.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 04406 241 patchSG0001638.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 3325 241 patchSG0001638.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 123CA06F9A5B91D1D56458FF455538C4
Filename: patchSG0001638.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 18065 4 patchSG0001638.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 22105 4 patchSG0001638.idb
MD5 checksum: E8333BC62A89A6C4A2326F9C9089565A
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 59269 9 README.patch.2413
Algorithm #2 (sum): 61782 9 README.patch.2413
MD5 checksum: 81A1CC8326C35FC9D8A36E6E4C2ECE7E
Filename: patchSG0002413
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 35882 3 patchSG0002413
Algorithm #2 (sum): 14583 3 patchSG0002413
MD5 checksum: ADD49D668CDF3644CB80AEE1B5EC530F
Filename: patchSG0002413.eoe_hdr
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 43690 8 patchSG0002413.eoe_hdr
Algorithm #2 (sum): 23342 8 patchSG0002413.eoe_hdr
MD5 checksum: B88588DEC32FB32AEB2F8420BC7E172E
Filename: patchSG0002413.eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 34349 39 patchSG0002413.eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 52356 39 patchSG0002413.eoe_man
MD5 checksum: 4CA92E9BDF2FD32354CE3F640B69BA75
Filename: patchSG0002413.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 44812 216 patchSG0002413.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 33076 216 patchSG0002413.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 6CC82F0698061F49686FADCB7C27D97F
Filename: patchSG0002413.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 19469 3 patchSG0002413.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 44128 3 patchSG0002413.idb
MD5 checksum: F8B97D25D2C386CB3DF9C67940B39D7E
Filename: README.patch.2770
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 50674 54 README.patch.2770
Algorithm #2 (sum): 55165 54 README.patch.2770
MD5 checksum: AF52BE0D11D1ABA533F750808B7C6976
Filename: patchSG0002770
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 45021 29 patchSG0002770
Algorithm #2 (sum): 38712 29 patchSG0002770
MD5 checksum: 8E458BF95BB806D5082D36F5C323C3AD
Filename: patchSG0002770.dev_hdr
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 55046 18 patchSG0002770.dev_hdr
Algorithm #2 (sum): 21666 18 patchSG0002770.dev_hdr
MD5 checksum: 12D756C9AAADDA464F628FB08B8012C2
Filename: patchSG0002770.eoe1_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 58486 19 patchSG0002770.eoe1_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 19828 19 patchSG0002770.eoe1_man
MD5 checksum: 971A700918352743FDFAD9DC7AAC7F08
Filename: patchSG0002770.eoe1_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 19070 3874 patchSG0002770.eoe1_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 2196 3874 patchSG0002770.eoe1_sw
MD5 checksum: BAC859508D8025C05CF7EF8732E8C340
Filename: patchSG0002770.eoe2_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 20509 16 patchSG0002770.eoe2_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 64242 16 patchSG0002770.eoe2_man
MD5 checksum: B0491FEFB0CE1C0BC03F7A1345BDE250
Filename: patchSG0002770.eoe2_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 35898 1681 patchSG0002770.eoe2_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 50094 1681 patchSG0002770.eoe2_sw
MD5 checksum: 009D8A477E83CE4646F004FB3F48953E
Filename: patchSG0002770.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 46255 53 patchSG0002770.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 6566 53 patchSG0002770.idb
MD5 checksum: 8A53DCAFC6BF0E8A4682D74733834C18
Filename: patchSG0002770.nfs_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 22345 17 patchSG0002770.nfs_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 21111 17 patchSG0002770.nfs_man
MD5 checksum: 8782FA52CAB650472352DABC1C38B823
Filename: patchSG0002770.nfs_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 22859 162 patchSG0002770.nfs_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 7001 162 patchSG0002770.nfs_sw
MD5 checksum: BA848F9526D84CF205C7DD080CF7D46E
- -------------------------
- ---- Acknowledgments ---
- -------------------------
Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the Internet community at large for their
assistance in this matter.
- ------------------------------------------------------------
- ---- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- ------------------------------------------------------------
If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert () sgi com.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
cse-security-alert () sgi com.
For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service
called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe
to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are
released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email
to SGI as outlined below.
% mail wiretap-request () sgi com
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d
In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
------oOo------
For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alert () sgi com or contact your SGI support provider. A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.
______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon
Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: 2.6.2
iQCVAwUBNi5POLQ4cFApAP75AQGxbQP/bVtoSGTqTZN/XWdQIYWdUmCRrNTmdlRH
ItpQUHxYL1nyREWFqiiptzw/wUrkNB863g7a81bnho3mItk2MX6b0cuVhmSC9ZQL
i8hYhgCR7ZF+Kd8ddC2zwYo4FFdPFqSujl8eO2L+mTys5zbD/hKlqvZvVQF82XdS
mEDtp2QjYLA=
=/0X1
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
Current thread:
- IRIX routed(1M) Vulnerability SGI Security Coordinator (Oct 21)
- <Possible follow-ups>
- Re: IRIX routed(1M) Vulnerability Huger, Alfred (Oct 21)