Distance‐bounding protocol is a useful primitive in resisting distance‐based attacks. Currently, most of the existing distance‐bounding protocols usually do not take the reuse of nonces in designing the protocols into consideration. However, there have been some literature studies showing that nonce repetition may lead to the leakage of the shared key between protocol participants. Aikaterini et al. introduced a countermeasure that could serve as a supplementary in most distance‐bounding systems allowing nonce repetition. However, their proposal only holds against passive attackers. In this paper, we introduce an active attack model and show that their countermeasure is insecure under the proposed active attack model. We also discover that all existing distance‐bounding protocols with mutual authentication are vulnerable to distance‐based attacks if a short nonce is applied under the proposed active model. To address this security concern, we propose a new distance‐bounding protocol with mutual authentication to prevent distance‐based attacks under the active adversary model. A detailed security analysis is presented for the proposed distance‐bounding protocol with mutual authentication.