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9 Hazards in Detecting Deceit

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It would be ideal to have a fail-safe set of behavioral clues to use in detecting deceit; however, there are no such absolute clues. Rather, some behaviors that some people exhibit sometimes are related to some kinds of deception. These behavioral clues, moreover, must be interpreted in the social and psychological context of a specific situation. Other chapters in this book deal with verbal and physiological approaches to the detection of deception. This chapter provides a brief review of some of the nonverbal cues to deception and discusses some of the hazards that bedevil the professional lie-catcher. We distinguish between lying about feelings and feelings about lying, the differential consequences of believing a lie and disbelieving the truth, and two common kinds of errors made by lie-catchers. Finally, we provide a checklist that may help lie-catchers to organize and review their thinking before deciding that a lie has occurred.

NONVERBAL CUES TO DECEPTION

One of the more frequent findings in psychological studies of deception is a tendency for vocal pitch to increase when lying

(Ekman, Friesen, & Scherer, 1976). However, not all individuals show such a pitch increase, and some people may exhibit a decrease in vocal pitch when they lie. Recent reviews of the deception literature (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981; Zuckerman & Driver, 1985) suggest that other vocal characteristics related to deception include slower latency in responding, shorter speech duration, and slower rate of speech. Many of these findings, however, are based on laboratory analogues of deception in which college students lie or tell the truth about liking or disliking friends. In many of these experiments, the incentives for successful deception are trivial. Even the experiments that employ higher incentives use relatively trivial rewards and punishments (e.g., earning $25 or fooling a group of peers). Generalizing from such experiments to law enforcement situations should be done with care.

Other nonverbal behaviors that have been found to be associated with deception are increased occurrence of manipulators (hand movements in which the deceiver touches or strokes herself; Ekman & Friesen, 1972, 1974) and increased occurrence of shrugs. Some investigators have also reported an increase in the rate of eye blinking and in the size of pupillary dilation during stressful or arousing encounters (Nunnally, Knott, Duchnowski, & Parker, 1967; Simpson & Hale, 1969). Insofar as a person is stressed or aroused while lying, these eye behaviors may be signs of deception. However, people may be emotionally aroused or fearful even when they are being truthful. In such cases, more eye blinks or dilated pupils would be misleading clues to deception.

Smiling is one of the more commonly studied facial clues to deceit. Although some investigators have reported decreased smiling during deception (DePaulo et al.,1985), others have reported just the opposite (Ekman et al., 1976). Recent research addresses this contradiction and also illustrates the complexity of research in this area. Ekman, Friesen, and O'Sullivan (1988) found that different kinds of smiles occurred during honest as compared with deceptive interviews. Smiles that are characteristic of felt or experienced positive emotion were more common during honest interviews, but smiles that "leaked" negative emotion (Ekman & Friesen, 1969) were more frequent in deceptive interviews. Unless researchers specify the kinds of smiles they are measuring, they may find different answers to the question of whether the smile is a behavioral clue to deceit. True emotional smiles are less frequent during deception, but leakage smiles are more frequent, at least when the deception involves denying negative affect.

Miscellaneous hand gestures, leg and foot movements, head movements, and postural shifts may decrease slightly during deception (DePaulo et al., 1985), but the amount of decrease is small. In any event, since the methods for defining and measuring these behaviors vary markedly from study to study, drawing overall conclusions is difficult.

Direction of gaze is a clue to deception that college students often report using; they presume that liars avoid eye contact when they are lying. In 18 studies reviewed by DePaulo and her colleagues (DePaulo et al., 1985), however, the overall tendency is for eye contact to *increase* slightly during deception. It would appear that since everyone, including liars, believes that liars avert their gaze, most liars correct for this by increasing eye contact with the target person. If this is the case, gaze direction may be misinterpreted in attempting to detect deception.

LYING ABOUT FEELINGS

Many lies fail because the deceiver does not think ahead by planning fully or rehearsing the story enough. But these are not the only mistakes people make when they attempt to deceive. Mistakes are also made because of difficulty in concealing or falsely portraying an emotion. Not every deception involves emotion, but those that do may cause special problems for the liar. When emotions occur, physiological changes happen automatically without choice or deliberation. This is a fundamental characteristic of emotional experience (Fridja, 1986). People do not actively select when they will feel an emotion; instead,

they usually experience emotions as happening to them. Negative emotions, such as fear, anger, or depression, may occur despite efforts to avoid them (Swann, Griffin, Predmore, & Gaines, 1987). Not only is there little choice about when an emotion is felt, but people often do not have much control over whether or not the expressive signs of the emotion are manifested to others. It may not even be possible for most people to control their observable reactions if the felt emotion is very strong. Even Machiavelli, whose name is associated with cold, calculated cunning in achieving one's ends, could not control his expressive behavior very well. Machiavelli "could not easily rid himself of the sarcastic expression continually playing round his mouth and flashing from his eyes. . . . he was frequently ruled by his powerful imagination" (Villari, quoted in Bull, 1961, p. 17).

When an emotion begins gradually rather than suddenly, the changes in behavior may be small and relatively easy to conceal if one is aware of one's feelings. However, most people are not. When an emotion begins gradually and remains slight, it may be more noticeable to others than to the self, not registering in awareness unless it becomes more intense. Once an emotion is strong, it is much more difficult to control. Concealing the changes in face, body, and voice requires a struggle. Even when the concealment is successful and there is no leakage of the feelings, sometimes the struggle itself will be noticeable and provide a clue to deception (Ekman & Friesen, 1969).

Concealing an emotion is not easy, and creating the appearance of an unfelt emotion is also a difficult task. It requires more than merely saying, "I am angry" or "I am afraid." The deceiver must appear and sound as if he is angry or afraid, if his claim is to be believed. It is difficult to coordinate the changes in face, body, and voice that are required for successful falsification of an emotion. For example, there are muscular movements in the eye area that most people make when actually experiencing fear but that very few people can perform voluntarily. Such difficult-to-perform movements are vital to successful falsification of the appearance of distress, fear, or anger.

Falsifying an experienced emotion is more difficult when one is also attempting to conceal another emotion. Trying to look angry is not easy, but if fear is felt when the person tries to look angry, conflicting forces occur. One set of impulses, arising from fear, pulls in one direction, while the deliberate attempt to appear angry pulls in the other direction. For example, the brows are involuntarily pulled upwards and together in fear, but to falsify anger the person must pull them down (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). Often the signs of this internal struggle between the felt and the false emotion betray the deceit (Ekman et al., 1988).

FEELINGS ABOUT LYING

Although there are thousands of publications dealing with the detection of deception, there has been little theory development about lying and lie detection. Bok (1978) offered the viewpoint of a moral philosopher. Ekman (1985) provided an analysis of the feelings involved in lying based on his laboratory research and clinical observations. The discussion that follows is based largely on Ekman's earlier theorizing.

Not all deceits involve concealing or falsifying emotions. The embezzler conceals that she is stealing money. The vain middle-aged man dyes his grey hair and claims that he is 7 years younger than he is. Yet even when the deception concerns something other than emotion, emotions may become involved. The man might be embarrassed about his vanity, and so he must conceal not only his age but also his embarrassment. The embezzler might feel surprise when someone else is accused of her crime. She must conceal her surprise, or at least conceal the reason why she is surprised.

Thus, emotions often become involved in deceptions that were not undertaken for the purpose of concealing emotions. Once involved, the emotions must be concealed if the deception is to succeed. Any emotion may become a problem, but three emotions are so often intertwined with deceit that they merit

separate explanation. These are fear of being caught, guilt about lying, and delight in having duped someone.

Detection Apprehension

In its milder forms, fear of being caught is not disruptive and may even help the deceiver to avoid mistakes by maintaining alertness. Moderate levels of fear can produce behavioral signs that are noticeable by the skilled lie-catcher, and high levels of detection apprehension produce just what the deceiver fears, namely, evidence of fear or apprehension. The research literature on deception detection (DePaulo, Lanier, & Davis, 1983; DePaulo et al., 1985) suggests that the behavior of highly motivated deceivers is different from that of less motivated ones. In our terminology, the behavior of deceivers with more detection apprehension is different from that of deceivers with less detection apprehension. If a deceiver could estimate beforehand the level of detection apprehension that is likely to occur, this information could inform the deceiver as to whether the attempt to deceive is worth the risk—whether it is likely to succeed. Similarly, the lie-catcher can also use this information by searching for signs of fear in a suspect likely to fear being caught.

Many factors influence the level of detection apprehension that will occur. The first determinant to consider is the deceiver's belief about the skill of the target as a lie-catcher. If the target is known to be gullible, the deceiver would not ordinarily experience much detection apprehension. On the other hand, someone known to be difficult to deceive should increase detection apprehension.

In using detection apprehension as a clue to deception, the lie-catcher must distinguish between the innocent person's fear of being disbelieved and the guilty person's fear of being caught. The difficulty in making this distinction is magnified when the lie-catcher has a reputation for being suspicious and skeptical. The reputation of the skeptical lie-catcher may be the cause of the fear that the innocent person exhibits, since the innocent person may particularly fear being disbelieved,

The second determinant of detection apprehension is the

amount of practice and previous success in deceiving. A job applicant who has lied about qualifications successfully in the past should not be overly concerned about an additional deception. Practice in deceit enables the deceiver to anticipate problems. Success in deceit gives confidence and thus reduces detection apprehension.

A third determinant of detection apprehension is fear of punishment. Criminal interrogators often seek to reduce this factor by suggesting that the punishment may be less if the suspect confesses. Although they usually cannot offer total amnesty, interrogators may offer a psychological amnesty, hoping to induce a confession by implying the suspect need not feel ashamed nor even responsible for committing the crime. An interrogator may sympathetically suggest that the acts are understandable and might have been committed by anyone in the same situation. Another variation might be to offer the suspect a face-saving explanation of the motive for the crime.

A fourth factor influencing detection apprehension is the personality of the liar. Some people find it difficult to lie, whereas others can do so with ease. More is known about people who lie with ease than those who cannot (Hood, 1982). In our research, natural liars did not differ from others in terms of their scores on an objective personality test (Ekman et al., 1976). We found nothing antisocial in their makeup. Unlike psychopaths, they did not use their ability to lie well in order to harm others. Natural liars, highly skilled in deceit but not without conscience, are natural performers who should be able to succeed as actors, salesmen, trial lawyers, negotiators, spies, diplomats, or interrogators.

Superior liars may require two very different sets of skills: those needed to plan a deceptive strategy, and those needed to mislead a target in a face-to-face situation. A liar might have both skills, but presumably one could excel at one skill and not the other. Regrettably, there has been little study of the characteristics of successful deceivers. Nor has any research asked whether the personality characteristics of successful deceivers differ as a function of the setting in which the deceit is practiced.

So far we have described several aspects of detection apprehension relating to the personality of the liar and the reputation

and character of the lie-catcher. Equally important are the stakes—the perceived consequences for successful and unsuccessful attempts at deception. Although there is no empirical evidence supporting our view that relates directly to deception, research on the role of appraisal in the experience of emotion is consistent with our thinking (Lazarus, 1984). We believe there is a simple rule: The greater the stakes, the more the detection apprehension. Applying this simple rule can be complicated because it may not be easy for the lie-catcher to determine what is at stake for the deceiver. For some people, winning is everything. It does not matter whether it is pennies or dollars or simply misleading someone. For such people, the stakes are high in any competition. Alternately, what is at stake may be so idiosyncratic that no outside observer would readily know.

Detection apprehension should be greater when the perceived consequences involve avoiding punishment, not just earning a reward. When the decision to deceive is first made, the stakes usually involve obtaining rewards. The deceiver thinks primarily about what might be gained. An embezzler may think only about the monetary gain when the deceit begins. After the deceit has been under way for some time, such rewards may no longer be as important. The company may become aware of its losses and suspicious enough that the embezzler is prevented from taking more. At this point, the deceit might be maintained in order to avoid being caught, and avoiding punishment is now the only stake. On the other hand, avoiding punishment may be the motive from the outset, if the target is suspicious or the deceiver has little confidence.

Two kinds of punishment are involved in deceit: the punishment if the lie fails and the punishment for the very act of engaging in deception. We believe detection apprehension will be greater if both kinds of punishment are at stake. This hypothesis is consistent with emotion theory relating increasing stimulation with increasing emotional intensity (Young, 1961).

Even if the transgressor knows that the consequences of being caught in a lie will be greater than the consequences if the transgression is admitted, the lie may still be very tempting. Telling the truth brings immediate and certain losses, whereas deceit offers the possibility of avoiding all losses. The prospect of being spared immediate punishment may be so attractive that the deceiver may underestimate the likelihood of being caught. Realization that confession would have been a better policy may come too late, if the deceit has been maintained so long and with such elaboration that confession no longer leads to a lesser punishment.

Sometimes there is little ambiguity about the relative costs of confession or continued concealment. Some actions are so unacceptable that confessing fails to yield approval for having come forward and concealment adds little to the punishment. Such is the case if the lie conceals murder, treason, terrorism, or child abuse. Unlike the rewards possible for some repentant philanderers, forgiveness should not be expected by those who confess more serious transgressions against society. Confession accompanied by contrition and cooperation may lessen the punishment in other cases, however.

Another factor that may affect how the stakes influence detection apprehension is what is gained or lost by the target, not just by the deceiver. Usually the deceiver's gains are at the expense of the target. The embezzler gains what the employer loses. Stakes are not always equal, however. The stakes for the liar and the target may differ in kind as well as in amount. The heirloom watch stolen by a co-worker may gain little for the thief, but its loss may exact a significant emotional price from the victim. When the stakes differ for the deceiver and the target, the stakes for either may determine the deceiver's detection apprehension. It depends on whether the liar recognizes the difference and how it is evaluated.

To summarize, we hypothesize that detection apprehension will be increased when

1. the target has a reputation for being difficult to deceive;
2. the target is initially suspicious;
3. the deceiver has little practice or no prior success;
4. the deceiver is particularly vulnerable to the fear of being caught;
5. the deceiver has no special skill or talent for lying;
6. the perceived stakes or consequences are high;

7. rewards and punishments are both at stake, or at least punishment is at stake;
8. the punishment is great for being caught in a lie, or the punishment for the concealed act is so great that there is no incentive to confess;
9. the target gains no benefit from the deceiver's lie.

Deception Guilt

The second type of feeling aroused by deception is guilt *about* lying, which can be distinguished from guilt feelings about the *content* of a lie. People who do not feel guilty about stealing may experience deception guilt when lying to conceal it. A child might steal candy with little feeling other than excitement or pleasure, yet experience guilt about lying to a parent in order to conceal the theft. Of course, it could be the reverse—no deception guilt, but guilt about stealing. Some people experience guilt about both the content of the lie and the act of lying itself. However, it is not necessary to feel guilty about the content of a lie in order to feel guilty about lying.

Deception guilt can vary in strength. It may be very mild or so strong that the lie will fail because the deception guilt produces leakage or clues to deception (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). When it becomes extreme, deception guilt is a torturing experience, undermining the person's most fundamental feelings of self-worth. To obtain relief from such severe deception guilt, the deceiver may confess despite the likelihood of punishment. In fact, the punishment may be sought by the person who confesses in order to alleviate intense feelings of guilt.

When the decision to deceive is first made, deceivers do not always anticipate how much they may suffer from deception guilt. Deceivers may not realize the impact of being thanked by their victims for their apparent helpfulness, or how they will feel when they see someone else blamed for their misdeeds. Another reason why deceivers may underestimate how much deception guilt they will feel is that it is only with the passage of time that they learn that one lie rarely suffices, that the lie must

be repeated again and again, often with expanding fabrications in order to conceal the original deceit (Mullaney, 1979).

Shame is closely related to guilt (Tomkins,1963), but there is a difference. No audience is needed to experience feelings of guilt; the guilty person is his own judge. Shame is different from guilt because the experience of shame requires disapproval or ridicule by others (Campos & Barrett, 1984). If the misdeed is not discovered, there will be no shame, but there still might be feelings of guilt. Of course, both may occur. The distinction between shame and guilt is important since these two emotions may pull a person in opposite directions. The desire to relieve guilt may motivate a confession, but the need to avoid the humiliation of shame may prevent it.

Some people are especially vulnerable to shame and guilt about lying, for example, those who have been very strictly brought up to believe that lying is a sin. The socialization of others may not have particularly condemned lying but may have instilled more generalized and pervasive guilt feelings. Among psychiatric patients suffering from generalized anxiety disorders or depression, such guilt feelings are common. Guilt-prone people sometimes appear to seek experiences in which they can intensify their guilt. Unfortunately, there has been little research about guilt-prone individuals. More is known about their opposite.

A failure to feel guilt or shame about one's misdeeds is a salient characteristic of psychopaths (Hare, 1970). Experts disagree about whether the lack of guilt and shame is due to environmental or biological determinants (MacMillan & Kofoed, 1984; Schmauk, 1970; Vaillant, 1975). It is clear, however, that since psychopaths rarely experience guilt about lying or fear of being caught in a lie, these emotions will not contribute clues when psychopaths deceive.

If the deceiver does not share social values with the victim, it is unlikely that deception guilt will occur. People usually experience less guilt about lying to those whom they think are wrongdoers. A disgruntled employee may feel entitled to steal company goods. A spy or assassin will not feel guilty about

misleading the victim. Assassins may be afraid of being caught, but they are unlikely to feel guilty about what they have planned. A professional criminal would not feel guilt about deceiving a law enforcement officer. The same principle may explain why diplomats or spies do not feel guilty about misleading their adversaries. In all of these situations, the deceiver and the target do not share common goals or values.

Deception is authorized in most of the foregoing examples by a social norm that legitimates deceiving an opponent. There is little experience of guilt about such authorized deceits when the targets are from opposing sides and hold different values. There also may be authorization to deceive targets who are not opponents and who share values with the deceiver. The priest who conceals a criminal's confession should not feel deception guilt when the police ask him about it. His vows authorize his deceit. He does not benefit from the deceit; the benefit is to the criminal whose identity remains unknown.

Even selfish deceits may not produce deception guilt when the lie is authorized. Poker players don't feel deception guilt about bluffing. The same is true about bargaining, whether in a Middle Eastern bazaar, Wall Street, or the local lawyer's office. Because the participants expect misinformation, not the truth, bargaining and poker are not technically lies (Ekman, 1985). These situations proceed on the assumption that no one will be truthful.

Deception guilt is most likely to occur when lying is not authorized. Deception guilt should be most severe when the target does not expect to be misled, when honesty is expected between deceiver and target. In such opportunistic deceits, we hypothesize that guilt about lying will be greater if the target suffers at least as much as the liar gains. Even under these conditions, there may not be much deception guilt unless some values are shared by the target and the deceiver. The adolescent who lies about drug use to a police officer or social worker may not feel any deception guilt if adults are perceived as naïve people who are incorrect or misinformed about drugs. If, in addition, the adolescent views adults as hypocrites who drink alcohol but who do not permit the use of other drugs, there is even less chance that the deceiver will feel deception guilt. However, the deceiver

who respects the target may feel shame if the lie is discovered. The experience of shame requires some respect for those who disapprove; otherwise, disapproval is likely to bring forth anger or contempt, not shame.

Deceivers experience less guilt when their targets are impersonal or anonymous. It should be easier for a criminal to lie to an arresting officer who is a stranger than to a probation officer who is liked or respected. If the target is anonymous, it is easier to indulge in the guilt-reducing fantasy that the target is not really hurt, doesn't really care, will not notice the lie, or even deserves or wants to be misled (Wolk & Henley, 1970).

Often there is an inverse relationship between deception guilt and detection apprehension. Factors that decrease guilt about deception may increase fear of being caught. When deceits are authorized and there is less deception guilt, the authorization usually raises the stakes, thereby increasing detection apprehension. The employer who deceives the employee suspected of embezzling and conceals his suspicions in order to catch the thief may experience high detection apprehension but is unlikely to experience deception guilt.

Although there are exceptions, most people find the experience of guilt so toxic that they seek ways to diminish it. Deception guilt can be diminished if the deceiver can justify the deception. There are many ways to justify deceit. It can be considered retaliation for injustice. A nasty or mean target can be said not to deserve honesty, for example, "The boss was so stingy, he didn't reward me for all the work I did, so I rewarded myself." Victims may be seen as so gullible that being misled is their fault, not the fault of the liar.

Two other justifications for lying that reduce deception guilt were mentioned earlier. A noble purpose or job requirement is one, and protection of the target is the other. If the target of the deception is a willing party to it, then the deceiver may use this willingness to justify the lie. If the target cooperated in the deceit and knew the truth all along but pretended not to, then the deceiver may rationalize that there was no lie. If there was no lie, then there need not be any deception guilt. A willing target who profits from being deceived makes it easy for the deceiver

to succeed. People often cooperate in being misled, as in polite social encounters (Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979). For example, a hostess may accept without scrutiny an excuse for a guest's early departure.

An unwilling target may become a willing one in order to avoid the costs of discovering deceit. Imagine the plight of a government official who begins to suspect that a lover who has been entrusted with sensitive information might be a spy. A job recruiter may similarly become the willing victim of a fraudulent job applicant, once the applicant is hired, rather than acknowledge a mistaken judgment.

To summarize, we hypothesize that deception guilt will be greatest when

1. the target is unwilling;
2. the deceit is totally selfish, and the target derives no benefit from being misled and loses as much or more than the liar gains;
3. the deceit is unauthorized, and the situation is one in which honesty is authorized;
4. the deceiver has not been practicing the deceit for a long time;
5. the deceiver and the target share social values;
6. the liar is personally acquainted with the target;
7. the deceiver cannot construe the target as mean or gullible;
8. there is no reason for the target to expect to be misled, and the deceiver has encouraged the target to be trusting.

Duping Delight

Detection apprehension and deception guilt are negative feelings that can be aroused by lying. Lying and deception can also produce positive feelings. The lie may be viewed as an accomplishment. The deceiver may feel excitement, either when anticipating the challenge or during the very moment of lying, when success is not yet certain. Afterward, there may be the pleasure that comes with relief, pride in the achievement, or feelings of smug contempt towards the target. Duping delight refers to all or any of these feelings, which can, if not concealed, betray the deceit. Although there is no empirical research on duping

delight, John Irving (1985) described something similar in his novel *The Cider House Rules*: "A lie is . . . a vigorous enterprise, it keeps you on your toes by making you suddenly responsible for what happens because of it. You must be alert to lie, and stay alert to keep your lie a secret. When you lie, it makes you feel in charge of your life. Telling lies is very seductive. . . . I love to lie. When you lie, you feel as if you have cheated fate—your own, and everybody else's" (p. 325).

Duping delight is also exemplified by the behavior of John Walker, the Navy spy. In many aspects of his life, not only his spying for the Russians, Walker delighted in assuming roles, in duping those he interacted with. As one writer noted (Blum, 1987), "On April 28, John Walker took the stand. He declared to the world that he had recruited his friend, his son, and his brother as spies. He was smiling as he spoke, as though repressing a secret hilarity. It was as if he were trying to convey one last lesson . . . across the courtroom: Betrayal is easy, a fact of life" (p. 408).

An innocent example of duping delight occurs when kidding takes the form of misleading a gullible friend. The kidder must conceal the duping delight even though the performance may be directed to an audience of friends or bystanders who are appreciating how well the gullible person is being duped.

We believe that duping delight, like all emotions, can vary in intensity. It may be totally absent, almost insignificant compared to the amount of detection apprehension that is felt, or it may be so great that some behavioral sign of it leaks, as in the case of John Walker. People may confess their deception in order to share their delight in having put one over. Criminals have been known to reveal their crime to friends, strangers, even to the police in order to be acknowledged and appreciated as having been clever enough to pull off a particular deceit.

We speculate that there are several factors that may increase duping delight. If the person being deceived has the reputation of being difficult to fool, successfully misleading such a target should increase duping delight. The presence of others who know what is going on can also increase the likelihood of duping delight. When an audience is present and enjoying the deceiver's

performance, the deceiver may have the most duping delight and the hardest time suppressing any sign of it.

Some people may be more prone to duping delight than others. No scientist has yet studied such people or even verified that they do exist. Yet, it seems obvious that some people boast more than others and that braggarts might be more likely to experience duping delight.

While lying, a person may experience duping delight, deception guilt, and detection apprehension, simultaneously or in succession. An embezzler, for example, might feel all three emotions: delight in fooling fellow employees and the employer, apprehension at moments when the deceiver thinks that there might be some suspicion, and guilt about having broken the law and violated the trust shown by the employer.

To summarize, we hypothesize that duping delight will be greatest when

1. the target poses a challenge, having a reputation for being difficult to deceive;
2. the deception is a challenge, either because of what must be concealed or what must be fabricated;
3. others are watching or know about the deception and appreciate the deceiver's skillful performance.

Guilt, fear, and delight all can be shown in the face, the voice, or the body, even when the liar is trying to conceal them. Even if there is no nonverbal leakage of emotion, the struggle to prevent such leakage may produce behavior that can serve as clues to deception (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). Next we consider some of the hazards involved in detecting deception from such behavioral clues.

COMMON MISTAKES IN DETECTING DECEPTION

Most liars can fool most people most of the time. The published evidence about professional and nonprofessional lie-catchers

supports this view. Zuckerman and his colleagues (1981), in reviewing the accuracy rates for detecting deception in 21 studies, found that average accuracy was only slightly better than chance. Most of the lie-catchers in these studies were college students, so this result may not be too surprising. However, similar results have been found in studies of the lie detection ability of law enforcement personnel. Kraut and Poe (1980) found no difference between college students and customs inspectors in their ability to identify guilty travelers from videotapes. DePaulo and Pfeifer (1986) found no difference between college students and federal law enforcement officers in their accuracy in identifying deception from an audiotape test using stimulus materials from a laboratory experiment on deception. The ability to detect deception in these two studies was assessed using materials that may have been inappropriate. The videotape used in the Kraut and Poe study may not have had the technical sophistication to allow inspection of facial expressions or vocal nuances. The "lies" used in the DePaulo and Pfeifer study were statements made by college students in a laboratory concerning their liking for roommates or opinions about campus issues. Since it is unlikely that this kind of lie would stimulate either detection apprehension or deception guilt, the appropriateness of this measure as an analogue for deception in the area of law enforcement is unclear.

On the other hand, in recent research, Ekman and O'Sullivan (1988) found that some groups of law professionals can do very much better than chance. Ekman and O'Sullivan used videotapes of young women who lied or told the truth about the emotions they were feeling. The women were highly emotionally aroused and were motivated to succeed in the deception. The presence of both felt emotion and detection apprehension suggest that these materials may be more ecologically valid, more like the high-stakes lies that law enforcement professionals deal with, than other laboratory analogues. Our research involved showing 10 interviews in which young women either lied or told the truth about their feelings as they watched various films. Hundreds of law enforcement personnel, such as polygraphers, Secret Service agents, robbery investigators, lawyers, and judges, as well as hundreds of college students, middle-aged people in continuing

education classes, and mental health personnel, were administered this lie-detection ability measure. Although our analyses are incomplete, at this point it appears that Secret Service agents and experienced psychiatrists do significantly better than chance in detecting deception, but that the other groups do not.

Although it is not possible to avoid all mistakes in detecting deceit, precautions can be taken to reduce them. The first precaution involves making the process of interpreting behavioral signs of deceit more explicit. Information about how the face, body, voice, and speech may betray deceit will not prevent all mistaken judgments about whether someone is lying, but it may make those mistakes more obvious and avoidable.

Another precaution is to understand better the nature of the mistakes that occur in detecting deceit (Ekman, 1981). There are two general types of mistakes that are exactly opposite in cause and consequence: In disbelieving the truth, the lie-catcher can mistakenly judge a truthful person to be lying (false positive error); or in believing a lie, the lie-catcher can mistakenly judge a liar to be truthful (false negative error). It does not matter whether lie-catchers depend on a polygraph test or the interpretation of behavior, they are vulnerable to these same two mistakes. This distinction between believing a lie and disbelieving the truth is important because it forces attention to the twin hazards for the lie-catcher. There is no way to completely avoid both mistakes; the choice is between the relative risks. The lie-catcher must evaluate when it is preferable to risk being misled and when it would be better to risk making a false accusation. What can be lost or gained by suspecting the innocent or believing the liar depends upon the nature of the lie, the liar, and the lie-catcher.

Idiosyncracy Error

Both types of mistakes in detecting deceit can occur due to the *idiosyncracy error,* the failure to take account of individual differences—how people vary in expressive behavior regardless of whether they are lying or telling the truth. This error is illustrated by a comment made by Tom Brokaw, the television reporter, who said, "I don't look at a person's face for signs that he

is lying. What I'm after are convoluted answers or sophisticated evasions" (Weisman, 1977, p. 13). Although these clues might indicate that some people are deceiving, for others just the opposite may be true. Furthermore, depending on one or more behaviors as absolute clues to deception will mislead the lie-catcher. Research comparing perceived behavioral clues to deception with actual behavioral manifestations during deception illustrates this. Although people believe that liars avoid eye contact and increase postural shifts while lying, these behaviors do not change significantly in deception (DePaulo et al., 1985). Most deceivers actually increase eye contact with the target and move their bodies less. Deceivers have the same misinformation as other people. In attempting to deceive, most liars try to control those behaviors that are widely regarded as clues to deception (DePaulo et al., 1985).

No clue to deceit is foolproof, not even the autonomic nervous system activity measured by the polygraph (see Chapter 8). The mistake of believing a lie occurs because some people don't commit easily detected errors when they lie. These are not just psychopaths, but also natural performers, people who are using the Stanislavski technique, and those who by other means succeed in believing their own lies, for example, individuals who use defense mechanisms to ward off intolerable information, or public figures who may come to believe their own deceptions because they repeat them so often or so heatedly. The lie-catcher must remember that the *absence* of a sign of deceit is not evidence of truth.

The presence of a sign of deceit can also be misleading, causing the opposite mistake of disbelieving the truth. A clue to deceit may be shown deliberately by a con artist to exploit the victim's mistaken belief that she has caught the con artist in a lie. Poker players reportedly use this trick, establishing what in poker lingo is called a "false tell." "For example, a player might for many hours deliberately cough when bluffing. The opponent . . . soon recognizes this pattern of coughing and bluffing. In a crucial hand of the game when the stakes are raised, the deceiver coughs again, but this time he is not bluffing and so wins a wallet-breaking pot from his confused opponent" (Hayano, 1980, p. 117).

The poker player in this example set up and exploited the mistake of disbelieving the truth, profiting from being judged to be lying. More often when a lie-catcher makes this mistake, the person who is mistakenly identified as lying suffers. It is not only deviousness that causes some people to be judged as lying when they are truthful, but an idiosyncracy in their expressive style. What might be a clue to deceit for many people is not a clue for all people. Some people characteristically show one or more of the following behaviors, whether they are lying or telling the truth:

- indirect and circumlocutious speech
- short or long pauses between words
- many speech errors
- few hand gestures or facial expressions when speaking
- many restless hand movements
- signs of fear, distress, or anger in their facial expressions regardless of how they actually feel
- asymmetric facial expressions

There are substantial differences among individuals in all of these behaviors, and these differences may produce not only mistakes of disbelieving the truth but also mistakes of believing a lie. Disbelieving the truthful person who characteristically speaks indirectly is as much an error in lie detection as believing the smooth-talking liar.

Mistakes due to the idiosyncracy error may be reduced by basing judgments on observed *changes* in the suspect's behavior. The lie-catcher must compare the suspect's usual behavior and the behavior exhibited when the suspect is under suspicion. People are most likely to be misled during the first meeting with a deceiver because there is no basis for comparison and, therefore, no opportunity to observe changes in behavior. Absolute judgments, such as "She is making so many restless hand movements that she must be very uncomfortable," are likely to be wrong. Relative judgments, such as "She is making so many more restless hand movements than is usual for her that she must be very uncomfortable," are the best way to decrease mistakes due to

individual differences in expressive style. Skilled poker players follow this practice by memorizing the idiosyncratic "tells" (clues to deceit) of their regular opponents.

If a lie-catcher must make a judgment after a first meeting, the meeting should be long enough to allow the suspect's usual behavior to be observed. For example, the lie-catcher might try to focus on topics that are less stressful. However, sometimes that won't be possible. The entire meeting might be stressful for a suspect who is resentful or fearful of being under suspicion. Under these circumstances, the lie-catcher should realize the risk of mistaken judgments due to the lack of knowledge of the characteristic behavioral peculiarities of the suspect. A number of studies indicate that in some circumstances lie-catchers perform better after increased exposure to the potential liar (Brandt, Miller, & Hocking, 1980; O'Sullivan, Ekman, & Friesen, 1988).

First meetings are especially likely to lead to errors in judgment, not only because of the lack of an appropriate baseline or anchor against which to make judgments (Zuckerman, Koestner, & Colella, 1985) but also because of individual differences in people's reactions to initial encounters. In first encounters, some people carefully control their behavior and follow well learned rules about how to act. For this reason, they provide an unrepresentative sample of their usual behavior. Others find first meetings anxiety provoking, and, for the opposite reason, their behavior also provides a poor basis for comparison. If possible, the lie-catcher should base judgments on a series of meetings, hoping to establish a better baseline as acquaintance grows. While it might seem that detecting deception is easier when people know each other intimately, that is not always the case. Lovers, family members, friends, or close colleagues may develop blind spots or preconceptions that interfere with accurate judgments of behavioral clues to deceit.

Othello Error

So far we have considered only one source of errors in detecting deceit, the failure to take account of individual differences.

Another equally important factor in disbelieving the truth is the *Othello error*. This error occurs when the lie-catcher fails to consider that a truthful person under stress may appear to be lying. As discussed above, each of the feelings about lying that can produce behavioral clues to deceit may be experienced for other reasons when truthful people know that they are suspected of lying. Truthful people may be afraid of being disbelieved, and their fear might be confused with the deceiver's detection apprehension. Some people have such strong unresolved guilt about other matters that these feelings may be aroused whenever they are suspected of any wrongdoing. Signs of those guilt feelings might be confused with a liar's deception guilt.

Truthful people also may feel scorn toward those they know are falsely accusing them, or excitement about the challenge of proving their accusers wrong, or pleasure in anticipating their vindication. The signs of these feelings may resemble a deceiver's duping delight. Other emotions also may be felt either by deceivers or by truthful people who know that they are under suspicion. Although the reasons would differ, either the liar or the truthful person might feel surprised, angry, disappointed, distressed, or disgusted by the lie-catcher's suspicions or questions.

The Othello error is named for the death scene in Shakespeare's play, since it provides such an excellent example. Othello accuses Desdemona of loving Cassio and tells her to confess, since he plans to kill her for her infidelity. Desdemona asks that Cassio be called to testify to her innocence, but Othello tells her that he has already had Cassio murdered. Desdemona realizes that she will not be able to prove her innocence and that Othello will kill her.

Othello interprets Desdemona's fear and distress as a reaction to the news of her alleged lover's death, confirming his belief in her infidelity. Othello fails to realize that if Desdemona is innocent, she might also feel and show the same emotions. Distress and despair might follow Othello's disbelieving her and her recognition that her last hope to prove her innocence is gone now that Cassio is dead. Desdemona wept for her life, for her predicament, for Othello's lack of trust, and not for the death of a lover.

Othello's error is also an example of how preconceptions can bias a lie-catcher's judgments. Othello is convinced that Desdemona is unfaithful, and he ignores the alternative explanation of Desdemona's behavior by failing to consider that her emotions are not proof one way or the other. Othello seeks to confirm rather than to test his belief that Desdemona is unfaithful. Othello is an extreme example, but preconceptions often distort judgment, causing a lie-catcher to disregard ideas, possibilities, or facts that do not fit the preconceived idea.

When the stakes are high and the costs to the lie-catcher are great if the suspect is lying, even judicious people may reach the wrong conclusion. It is easy to disbelieve the truth, because deceit is a powerful and useful explanation in a complex and baffling world. A former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency wrote,

> As a causal explanation, deception is intrinsically satisfying precisely because it is so orderly and rational. When other persuasive explanations are not available (perhaps because the phenomena we are seeking to explain were actually caused by mistakes, failures to follow orders, or other factors unknown to us), deception offers a convenient and easy explanation. It is convenient because intelligence officers are generally sensitive to the possibility of deception, and its detection is often taken as indicative of sophisticated, penetrating analysis. . . . It is easy because almost any evidence can be rationalized to fit the deception hypothesis; in fact, one might argue that once deception has been raised as a serious possibility, this hypothesis is almost immune to disconfirmation. (Heuer, 1982, p. 59)

Lie-catchers should strive to become aware of their own preconceptions about the suspect. The preconceptions may be influenced by the lie-catcher's personality, strong emotion, input from others, past experience, job pressures, or the need to reduce uncertainty. Whatever their cause, explicit recognition of preconceptions about the suspect increases the chance of discovering the truth, not merely supporting the preconceptions. The lie-catcher should at least realize when preconceptions may interfere with judgments about whether or not a suspect is lying.

The lie-catcher must consider the possibility that a sign of emotion may not be a clue to deceit but a sign of how a truthful person feels about being disbelieved. The lie-catcher should estimate which emotions a particular suspect is likely to feel not only when engaging in deception but also, just as important, when being truthful. Not all liars will have every possible feeling about lying, and not all truthful people will experience every possible feeling about being under suspicion. Let us consider how the lie-catcher can estimate which emotions a truthful person might feel about being suspected of lying.

The lie-catcher may be able to base that estimate on knowledge of the suspect's personality. Earlier, we described the need for the lie-catcher to be acquainted with the suspect in order to reduce errors based on first impressions. In dealing with a truthful person, a different type of knowledge about the suspect is needed. The lie-catcher needs to know the emotional characteristics of the suspect in order to discount the signs of certain emotions that are usually considered clues to deceit. Not everybody is likely to feel afraid, guilty, angry, and so on, when suspected of wrong-doing or lying. It depends in part upon the personality of the suspect.

A self-righteous person might feel angry when suspected of lying but have little fear of being disbelieved or no free-floating guilt. A timorous individual, who lacks confidence and often expects failure, might fear being disbelieved but is not likely to feel anger or guilt. We have already mentioned individuals who are so guilt-ridden that they feel guilty even when they are wrongly suspected of a wrongdoing. Such guilt-ridden people might not, however, be particularly fearful, angry, surprised, distressed, or excited. The lie-catcher must discount the sign of an emotion as a clue to deceit if the suspect's personality would make the suspect likely to have such a feeling even when the suspect is being truthful. The emotions to be discounted depend upon the suspect, since not every emotion will be aroused in every truthful person who is under suspicion.

The specific emotion, if any, that an innocent person may exhibit when suspected depends also upon the relationship between the suspect and the lie-catcher. People who frequently

make false accusations or who repeatedly disbelieve the truth may establish a relationship that makes signs of fear ambiguous as clues to deception. A wife who has repeatedly been accused of having affairs, and subjected to verbal or physical abuse despite her innocence, has reason to be afraid regardless of whether she lies or tells the truth. Among other things, her husband has destroyed the basis for utilizing signs of fear as evidence of lying.

Not every suspect has well formed expectations about every lie-catcher, and not all that do will share the same expectations. Suppose a suspect has been observed associating with people whom the Secret Service believes to be counterfeiters. The suspect needs no actual contact with Secret Service agents to have expectations about them that should be taken into account. If the suspect believes that the Secret Service never makes mistakes and is completely trustworthy, then signs of fear need not be discounted by the interrogator but may be interpreted as detection apprehension. However, if the suspect believes that the Secret Service is either inept or prone to frame people, signs of fear must be discounted. It could be fear of being disbelieved rather than detection apprehension. The lie-catcher must discount the sign of an emotion as a clue to deceit if the suspect's expectations would make the suspect likely to have such a feeling even if the suspect were being truthful.

Although the truthful person's feelings about being suspected of lying can be confusing, such emotional reactions can also help to distinguish truthtellers from deceivers. Confusion arises when the truthful person and the deceiver have the same emotional reactions to suspicion. Clarification is possible when their reactions are likely to differ. Some people have entirely different feelings about being under suspicion when telling the truth as opposed to deceiving.

It is complicated to determine which emotions a suspect is likely to experience when telling the truth and whether these differ from emotions the suspect might feel when lying. It requires considerably more knowledge about the suspect than is usually available. Even when such knowledge exists, it may not help the lie-catcher. The knowledge may suggest that the same

emotion is likely to be felt regardless of whether the suspect lies or is truthful, as was the case for Desdemona. Even when the knowledge suggests that different emotions are likely to occur if the suspect is truthful or deceiving, the behavioral clues may be ambiguous, because some behaviors are signs of more than one emotion. In each of these three instances (inadequate knowledge of the emotions felt by the suspect, knowledge that the same emotions will be felt regardless of whether the suspect is lying or truthful, and knowledge that different emotions are likely to be felt by the liar or the honest person but that the behavioral clues associated with these different emotions may be ambiguous), the lie-catcher cannot utilize the clues to deceit which involve emotion.

Only by realizing this predicament can the lie-catcher avoid disbelieving the truth and be properly wary of believing a lie. Analyzing which emotions a particular deceiver is likely to feel and which emotions a truthful person might feel about being suspected or disbelieved can help to identify a deceiver. Such an analysis may isolate unambiguous signs of honesty or deceit and may alert the lie-catcher to the behaviors that must be discovered.

Liars usually succeed because no one expends the often arduous effort necessary to catch them. Since most lies are relatively trivial, the detailed emotional analysis we have described is not usually called for. When the stakes are high, however, such as when the victim would be severely harmed if misled or when the liar would be either severely harmed if caught or greatly benefited if wrongly judged to be truthful, such efforts are necessary. Lie-checking is not a simple task that can be done quickly. Many questions must be considered in order to estimate the likelihood of mistakes, what kinds of mistakes to expect, and how to spot those mistakes. Questions must be asked about the nature of the lie itself and the characteristics of the specific liar and the specific lie-catcher. No one can be absolutely certain if a liar will fail or a truthful person will be exonerated. Lie-checking provides only an informed guess, but making such estimates should reduce mistakes in both believing lies and disbelieving the truth.

A LYING CHECKLIST

Table 9.1 contains 38 questions which should be considered in evaluating or checking a lie. Most of the questions concern issues that have been mentioned in this chapter. Others are discussed in more detail in *Telling Lies* (Ekman, 1985). There has been no research on the utility of this checklist. We provide it as a convenient reminder of factors that our research and theorizing, as well as the research of others, suggest are important in detecting deception.

To illustrate how to use the lying checklist, let us consider a case in which a truthful person was judged to be lying. Gerald Anderson (Phelan, 1982) was accused of raping and murdering Nancy Johnson, the wife of his next door neighbor. Nancy's husband had returned home from work in the middle of the night, found her body, ran over to the Andersons' house, told them that his wife was dead and that he couldn't find his son, and asked Mr. Anderson to summon the police.

A number of incidents made the police suspect Anderson. The day after the murder he had stayed home from work, drank too much at a local bar, and talked about the murder. When he was brought home, he had been overheard sobbing while saying to his wife, "I didn't want to do it, but I had to." His later claim that he was talking about getting drunk, not murder, was not believed. When the police asked him about a spot on the upholstery of his car, Anderson claimed that it had been there before he bought it. Later, he admitted that the spot came from a nosebleed that happened when he slapped his wife during an argument. He lied because he was ashamed to admit that he had slapped his wife. His interrogators repeatedly told Anderson that this incident proved that he was a violent person who could kill and that he was a liar who would deny it. During the interrogation, Anderson admitted that when he was twelve he had been involved in a minor sex offense that had not harmed the girl and that had never been repeated. Later, it came out that he was not twelve but fifteen at the time. His interrogators insisted that this was further proof that he was a liar, as well as evidence that he

Table 9.1. Lying Checklist

Questions	Hard to detect	Easy to detect
About the lie		
1. Can the liar anticipate exactly when he or she has to lie?	**Yes:** line prepared and rehearsed	**No:** line not prepared
2. Does the lie involve concealment only, without any need to falsify?	**Yes**	**No**
3. Does the lie involve emotions felt at the moment?	**No**	**Yes:** especially difficult if (a) negative emotions such as anger, fear, or distress must be concealed or falsified, or (b) liar must appear emotionless and cannot use another emotion to mask felt emotions that have to be concealed
4. Would there be amnesty if liar confessed to lying?	**No:** enhances liar's motive to succeed	**Yes:** chance to induce confession
5. Are the stakes in terms of either rewards or punishments very high?	**Difficult to predict:** while high stakes may increase detection apprehension, it should also motivate the liar to try hard.	
6. Are there severe punishments for being caught lying?	**No:** low detection apprehension, but may produce carelessness	**Yes:** enhances detection apprehension, but also fear of being disbelieved, producing false positive errors
7. Are there severe punishments for the very act of having lied, apart from the losses incurred from the deceit failing?	**No**	**Yes:** enhances detection apprehension; person may be dissuaded from embarking on lie if she or he knows that punishment for attempting to lie will be worse than the loss incurred by not lying
8. Does the target suffer no loss, or even benefit, from the lie? Is the lie altruistic, not benefiting the liar?	**Yes:** less deception guilt if liar believes this to be so	**No:** increases deception guilt

Table 9.1. *(Continued)*

Questions	Hard to detect	Easy to detect
9. Is it a situation in which the target is likely to trust the liar, not suspecting that he or she may be misled?	**Yes**	**No**
10. Has liar successfully deceived the target before?	**Yes:** decreases detection apprehension; if target would be ashamed or otherwise suffer by having to acknowledge having been fooled, she or he may become a willing victim.	**No**
11. Do liar and target share values?	**No:** decreases deception guilt	**Yes:** increases deception guilt
12. Is the lie authorized?	**Yes:** decreases deception guilt	**No:** increases deception guilt
13. Is the target anonymous?	**Yes:** decreases deception guilt	**No**
14. Are target and liar personally acquainted?	**No**	**Yes:** lie-catcher will be more able to avoid errors due to individual differences
15. Must lie-catcher conceal his or her suspicions from the liar?	**Yes:** lie-catcher may become enmeshed in his or her own need to conceal and fail to be as alert to liar's behavior.	**No**
16. Does lie-catcher have information that only a guilty, not an innocent person, would also have?	**No**	**Yes:** can try to use the guilty knowledge test if the suspect can be interrogated
17. Is there an audience who knows or suspects that the target is being deceived?	**No**	**Yes:** may enhance duping delight, detection apprehension, or deception guilt
18. Do liar and lie-catcher come from similar language, national or cultural backgrounds?	**No:** more errors in judging clues to deceit	**Yes:** better able to interpret clues to deceit

Table 9.1. *(Continued)*

Questions	Hard to detect	Easy to detect
About the liar		
19. Is the liar practiced in lying?	**Yes:** especially if practiced in this type of lie	**No**
20. Is the liar inventive and clever in fabricating?	**Yes**	**No**
21. Does the liar have a good memory?	**Yes**	**No**
22. Is the liar a smooth talker, with a convincing manner?	**Yes**	**No**
23. Does the liar use the reliable facial muscles as conversational emphasizers?	**Yes:** better able to conceal or falsify facial expressions	**No**
24. Is the liar skilled as an actor, able to use the Stanislavski method?	**Yes**	**No**
25. Is the liar likely to convince herself or himself of her or his lie, believing that what she or he says is true?	**Yes**	**No**
26. Is he or she a "natural liar" or psychopath?	**Yes**	**No**
27. Does liar's personality make liar vulnerable either to fear, guilt, or duping delight?	**No**	**Yes**
28. Is liar ashamed of what he or she is concealing?	**Difficult to predict:** while shame works to prevent confession, leakage of that shame may betray the lie.	
29. Might suspected liar feel fear, guilt, shame, or duping delight, even if suspect is innocent and not lying, or lying about something else?	**Yes:** can't interpret emotion clues	**No:** signs of these emotions are clues to deceit

Table 9.1. *(Continued)*

Questions	Hard to detect	Easy to detect
About the lie-catcher		
30. Does the lie-catcher have a reputation of being tough to mislead?	**No:** especially if liar has in the past been successful in fooling the lie-catcher	**Yes:** increases detection apprehension; may also increase duping delight
31. Does the lie-catcher have a reputation of being distrustful?	**Difficult to predict:** Such a reputation may decrease deception guilt; it may also increase detection apprehension.	
32. Does the lie-catcher have a reputation of being fair-minded?	**No:** liar less likely to feel guilty about deceiving the lie-catcher	**Yes:** increases deception guilt
33. Is the lie-catcher a denier who avoids problems and tends to always think the best of people?	**Yes:** probably will overlook clues to deceit, vulnerable to false negative errors	**No**
34. Is lie-catcher unusually able to accurately interpret expressive behaviors?	**No**	**Yes**
35. Does the lie-catcher have preconceptions that bias him or her against the liar?	**No**	**Yes:** although lie-catcher will be alert to clues to deceit, he or she will be liable to false positive errors.
36. Does the lie-catcher obtain any benefits from not detecting the lie?	**Yes:** lie-catcher will ignore, deliberately or unwittingly, clues to deceit	**No**
37. Is lie-catcher unable to tolerate uncertainty about whether she or he is being deceived?	**Difficult to predict:** may cause either false positive or false negative errors	
38. Is lie-catcher seized by an uncontrollable emotion?	**No**	**Yes:** liars will be caught, but innocents will be judged to be lying (false positive error).

had a sex problem, and that he could be the person who raped and then murdered his neighbor.

The police investigators believed that they had their man. They interrogated Anderson for 6 days. Anderson was worn down and finally confessed to a crime that he had not committed. Anderson proclaimed his innocence almost until the end, protesting that he could not have done it since he had no memory of killing or raping Nancy. The interrogators countered by telling him that a killer might have a blackout. They said that failure to remember the act did not prove that he had not done it. Anderson signed a confession after the interrogators told him that his wife said she knew that he had killed Nancy. His wife later denied making this statement. A few days later, Anderson repudiated his confession, and 7 months later the true killer, who was charged with another rape-murder, confessed to killing Nancy Johnson.

The Anderson case illustrates several of the points we made earlier in this chapter about emotions arising from causes other than guilt about a crime. Anderson's emotional reactions could have been generated by his fear of being disbelieved and also by feelings of shame and guilt. Even though innocent of the murder, Anderson was ashamed of two other misdeeds. His interrogators knew that he was ashamed about hitting his wife and about having committed a sex offense as an adolescent. He also felt deception guilt about his attempts to conceal or misrepresent these incidents. The interrogators used these incidents to persuade Anderson that he was the type of person who could kill and rape, but this could also have magnified his feelings of shame and guilt and could have linked those feelings with the crime he was accused of committing.

Lie-checking could have provided a reminder that any signs of fear, shame, or guilt, whether they in Anderson's facial expressions, gestures, voice, speech, or autonomic nervous system activity measured by a polygraph, would be ambiguous clues to deceit. These emotions could occur whether Anderson was innocent or guilty.

Examining this case underscores the sophistication necessary to use expressive clues to deceit effectively. Impressions of

others is based, in part, upon the person's expressive behavior. Usually such impressions are formed unwittingly, and the person who makes them is often unaware of the particular behavioral clues that were used. Errors are less likely if such judgments are more explicit. To our knowledge, most police training does not emphasize behavioral clues to deceit. Since behavioral training is not emphasized, many investigators may not know the bases for their hunches about the guilt or innocence of suspects. Even when training does emphasize the importance of nonverbal clues to deceit, too little attention is given to those situation in which such clues will be useless or misleading.

It is not possible to abolish the use of behavioral clues to deceit in criminal interrogations, and justice might not be served if it were. In deadly deceits, when a truthful person could be falsely imprisoned or executed for a crime or a lying murderer could escape conviction, every legal attempt should be made to discover the truth. But the process of interpreting clues to deceit or truthfulness should be more explicit, more deliberate, and more careful.

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