KAISER: unmap most of the kernel from userspace page tables
From: | Dave Hansen <dave.hansen-AT-linux.intel.com> | |
To: | linux-kernel-AT-vger.kernel.org | |
Subject: | [PATCH 00/23] KAISER: unmap most of the kernel from userspace page tables | |
Date: | Tue, 31 Oct 2017 15:31:46 -0700 | |
Message-ID: | <[email protected]> | |
Cc: | linux-mm-AT-kvack.org, dave.hansen-AT-linux.intel.com |
tl;dr: KAISER makes it harder to defeat KASLR, but makes syscalls and interrupts slower. These patches are based on work from a team at Graz University of Technology posted here[1]. The major addition is support for Intel PCIDs which builds on top of Andy Lutomorski's PCID work merged for 4.14. PCIDs make KAISER's overhead very reasonable for a wide variety of use cases. Full Description: KAISER is a countermeasure against attacks on kernel address information. There are at least three existing, published, approaches using the shared user/kernel mapping and hardware features to defeat KASLR. One approach referenced in the paper locates the kernel by observing differences in page fault timing between present-but-inaccessable kernel pages and non-present pages. KAISER addresses this by unmapping (most of) the kernel when userspace runs. It leaves the existing page tables largely alone and refers to them as "kernel page tables". For running userspace, a new "shadow" copy of the page tables is allocated for each process. The shadow page tables map all the same user memory as the "kernel" copy, but only maps a minimal set of kernel memory. When we enter the kernel via syscalls, interrupts or exceptions, page tables are switched to the full "kernel" copy. When the system switches back to user mode, the "shadow" copy is used. Process Context IDentifiers (PCIDs) are used to to ensure that the TLB is not flushed when switching between page tables, which makes syscalls roughly 2x faster than without it. PCIDs are usable on Haswell and newer CPUs (the ones with "v4", or called fourth-generation Core). The minimal kernel page tables try to map only what is needed to enter/exit the kernel such as the entry/exit functions, interrupt descriptors (IDT) and the kernel stacks. This minimal set of data can still reveal the kernel's ASLR base address. But, this minimal kernel data is all trusted, which makes it harder to exploit than data in the kernel direct map which contains loads of user-controlled data. KAISER will affect performance for anything that does system calls or interrupts: everything. Just the new instructions (CR3 manipulation) add a few hundred cycles to a syscall or interrupt. Most workloads that we have run show single-digit regressions. 5% is a good round number for what is typical. The worst we have seen is a roughly 30% regression on a loopback networking test that did a ton of syscalls and context switches. More details about possible performance impacts are in the new Documentation/ file. This code is based on a version I downloaded from (https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER). It has been heavily modified. The approach is described in detail in a paper[2]. However, there is some incorrect and information in the paper, both on how Linux and the hardware works. For instance, I do not share the opinion that KAISER has "runtime overhead of only 0.28%". Please rely on this patch series as the canonical source of information about this submission. Here is one example of how the kernel image grow with CONFIG_KAISER on and off. Most of the size increase is presumably from additional alignment requirements for mapping entry/exit code and structures. text data bss dec filename 11786064 7356724 2928640 22071428 vmlinux-nokaiser 11798203 7371704 2928640 22098547 vmlinux-kaiser +12139 +14980 0 +27119 To give folks an idea what the performance impact is like, I took the following test and ran it single-threaded: https://github.com/antonblanchard/will-it-scale/blob/mast... It's a pretty quick syscall so this shows how much KAISER slows down syscalls (and how much PCIDs help). The units here are lseeks/second: no kaiser: 5.2M kaiser+ pcid: 3.0M kaiser+nopcid: 2.2M "nopcid" is literally with the "nopcid" command-line option which turns PCIDs off entirely. Thanks to: The original KAISER team at Graz University of Technology. Andy Lutomirski for all the help with the entry code. Kirill Shutemov for a helpful review of the code. 1. https://github.com/IAIK/KAISER 2. https://gruss.cc/files/kaiser.pdf -- The code is available here: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/daveh/x86... Documentation/x86/kaiser.txt | 128 ++++++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 + arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 77 ++++ arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 34 +- arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S | 13 + arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 57 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/hw_irq.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/kaiser.h | 59 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 29 +- arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h | 32 +- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 20 +- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h | 121 ++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 16 + arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 230 +++++++++-- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/processor-flags.h | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 21 +- arch/x86/kernel/espfix_64.c | 22 +- arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 30 +- arch/x86/kernel/irqinit.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c | 25 +- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 +- arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 1 + arch/x86/mm/init.c | 75 ++-- arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c | 416 ++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 63 ++- arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 16 +- arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 105 ++++- include/asm-generic/vmlinux.lds.h | 17 + include/linux/kaiser.h | 34 ++ include/linux/percpu-defs.h | 32 +- init/main.c | 2 + kernel/fork.c | 6 + security/Kconfig | 10 + 38 files changed, 1565 insertions(+), 149 deletions(-)