"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@xxxxxxxxxx> writes:
Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xxxxxxxxxxxx):Well I only posted about one substantive comment on the last round
Stefan Berger <"Stefan Bergerstefanb"@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:This is mostly explained by the fact that there have been a *lot* of
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>It doesn't look like this is coming through Serge so I don't see how
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@xxxxxxxxxx>
the Signed-off-by tag is legtimate.
changes, many of them discussed in private emails.
>From the replies to this it doesn't look like Serge has reviewed thisCan you re-state those, or give a link to them?
version either.
I am disappointed that all of my concerns about technical feasibility
remain unaddressed.
so it should be easy to find that said.
The big question is how does this intereact with filesystems
xattr implementations?
There is the potential that we create many more security xattrs this
way. How does that scale? With more names etc.
What happens if we have one xattr per uid for 1000+ uids?
How does this interact with filesystems optimization of xattr names?
For some filesystems they optmize the xattr names, and don't store the
entire thing.
I'd really like to get to a point where unprivileged containers can startThis whole new version has set my review back to square one
using filecaps - at this point if that means having an extra temporary
file format based on my earlier patchset while we hash this out, that
actually seems worthwhile. But it would of course be ideal if we could
do the name based caps right in the first place.
unfortunately.
Eric