- From: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
- Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 11:33:35 -0800
- To: Jason Striegel <jstriegel@google.com>
- Cc: security-dev <security-dev@chromium.org>, "public-webappsec@w3.org" <public-webappsec@w3.org>, blink-dev <blink-dev@chromium.org>, "dev-security@lists.mozilla.org" <dev-security@lists.mozilla.org>
On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 9:52 AM, jstriegel via blink-dev <blink-dev@chromium.org> wrote: > I'd like to propose consideration of a fourth category: > Personal Devices (home routers, printers, IoT, raspberry pis in classrooms, refrigerators): > - cannot, by nature, participate in DNS and CA systems > - likely on private network block > - user is the owner of the service, hence can trust self rather than CA > > Suggested use: > - IoT devices generate unique, self-signed cert > - Friendlier interstitial (Ie. "Is this a device you recognize?") for self-signed connections on *.local, 192.168.*, 10.*, or on same local network as browser. > - user approves use on first https connection > - browser remembers (device is promoted to "secure" status) > > A lot of IoT use cases could benefit from direct connection (not requiring a cloud service as secure data proxy), but this currently gives the scariest of Chrome warnings. This is probably why the average home router or firewall is administered over http. Yes, I agree this is a problem. I am hoping to publish a proposal for how UAs can authenticate private devices soon (in January probably). A key goal is not having to ask the user "Is this a device you recognize?" — I think we can get the UX flow even simpler, and still be strong. Watch this space...
Received on Thursday, 18 December 2014 19:34:01 UTC