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Marked Mix-Nets

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Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2017)

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Abstract

We propose a variant mix-net method, which we call a “marked mix-net”. Marked mix-nets avoid the extra cost associated with verifiability (producing a proof of correct mixing operation), while offering additional assurances about the privacy of the messages, compared to a non-verifiable mix-net.

With a marked mix-net, each mix-server adds an extra secret mark in each ciphertext, and the input ciphertexts are made non-malleable but still re-randomizable (RCCA).

Marked mix-nets appear to be a good fit for the mix-net requirements of voting systems that need a mix-net for anonymity but where correctness is guaranteed through independent mechanisms. Our work investigates applications to STAR-Vote, but other applications could be explored, e.g., in Prêt-à-Voter, Selene or Wombat.

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Acknowledgement

We thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions.

The first author is grateful to the Belgian Fund for Scientific Research (F.R.S.-FNRS) for its financial support provided through the the SeVoTe project. The second author gratefully acknowledges support for his work on this project received from the Center for Science of Information (CSoI), an NSF Science and Technology Center, under grant agreement CCF-0939370, and from the Department of Statistics, University of California, Berkeley, which hosted his sabbatical visit during this work.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. UCLouvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

    Olivier Pereira

  2. MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA

    Ronald L. Rivest

Authors
  1. Olivier Pereira
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Correspondence to Olivier Pereira .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Leibniz Universität Hannover, Hannover, Germany

    Michael Brenner

  2. New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, New Jersey, USA

    Kurt Rohloff

  3. New York University, New York, New York, USA

    Joseph Bonneau

  4. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois, USA

    Andrew Miller

  5. University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Luxembourg

    Peter Y.A. Ryan

  6. University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, Australia

    Vanessa Teague

  7. University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom

    Andrea Bracciali

  8. University of Trento, Trento, Italy

    Massimiliano Sala

  9. University of Trento, Trento, Italy

    Federico Pintore

  10. Agari Inc., San Mateo, California, USA

    Markus Jakobsson

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Pereira, O., Rivest, R.L. (2017). Marked Mix-Nets. In: Brenner, M., et al. Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10323. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70278-0_22

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-70278-0_22

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