Before Trump Returns, Congress Should Buy Weapons for Ukraine

A month after Franklin D. Roosevelt won the 1940 presidential election, he called for legislation to ramp up military aid to countries fighting Nazi Germany. Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941. Within months, Britain and the Soviet Union were pounding Adolf Hitler’s forces with U.S. weapons and other equipment.

Now that Americans have voted to return Donald Trump to the White House, the situation risks flipping into reverse: After Jan. 20, 2025, the United States may abandon its European allies to Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s fascist war machine.

During his campaign, Trump said he will “not give a penny to Ukraine.” Part of his plan to end the war “in one day” is that he would “tell [Ukrainian President Volodymyr] Zelensky, no more. You got to make a deal.” But if Russia is allowed to conquer and subjugate Ukraine, it would only be a matter of which democracy gets colonized next by a neighboring dictatorship: Poland, the Baltic States, Moldova, or Taiwan.

Thus, over the next 75 days, Congress and the Biden administration face an urgent historic mission to help Ukraine get as many weapons as possible before a possible withdrawal of U.S. support.

U.S. President Joe Biden has directed the Defense Department to draw down all remaining Ukrainian security aid that Congress has appropriated by the end of his term. It’s not clear if the Pentagon could supply much more weaponry than that by Inauguration Day, even if it received additional funding from Congress.

Instead, the way to promptly fund more arms is to bankroll Ukrainian procurement of U.S. weapons. Specifically, Biden should request, and Congress should pass, another supplemental funding bill on a similar scale as the one in April, which included $60.8 billion for Ukraine. The new supplemental should authorize the administration to spend any amount of the aid—up to the full amount—to cut a massive check to the Ukrainian government with the stipulation that Ukraine use the funds to purchase U.S.-made weapons.

Sending Ukraine $60 billion to spend on weapons would be entirely consistent with the strategy that the Biden administration had been preparing in case of a Trump win. One of Biden’s main initiatives has been to push the G-7 to give $50 billion in frozen Russian assets to Ukraine, deliberately structuring the transfer to get out the door before Jan. 20 so that Trump cannot stop it. Biden originally wanted to seize and give to Kyiv all $300 billion of Russia’s frozen money, but the Europeans could not be convinced. The administration has also shown its willingness to throw U.S. budgetary resources into the mix: When the $50 billion was blocked by the Hungarian government, the White House engineered a clever way of guaranteeing the money through the Treasury Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development.

The key political challenge, however, could be getting House Speaker Mike Johnson to support this legislation during the lame duck period, when he will probably be preparing to run for another term as speaker. This may require some hardball maneuvering by some of the many pro-Ukraine Republicans in the House. It would be much easier, of course, if Trump quietly goes along with it, like he did with the last supplemental.

The United States would not be the first government to fund Ukrainian arms procurement. Denmark paved the way this year with a grant that finances contracts between Ukraine and defense manufacturers. Denmark and Ukraine developed a transparent set of financial controls that include factory site visits, validation of delivery, and auditing processes. All sides regard this pilot program as so successful that other allies are pulling out their checkbooks to join in on the action.

Americans’ tax dollars would be safely held by the most credibly reformed and reputably led wing of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry: the defense procurement agency. In the early weeks of the full-scale invasion, when Russian forces were bearing down on Kyiv and heavy Western weapons hadn’t yet arrived, Ukraine’s desperate Defense Ministry called up illicit intermediaries, begging them to help buy up old stocks of Soviet-type munitions on the notoriously opaque and fragmented international arms market. But over the following months, as Western aid started flowing, Ukraine’s strategy shifted to building a clean, transparent pipeline for buying weapons straight from producers.

Established in August 2022, the defense procurement agency is now run by Maryna Bezrukova, a seasoned reformer who previously cleaned up procurement at Ukraine’s national electricity company. To be her deputy, Bezrukova hired Ukraine’s most reputably independent corruption investigator: Artem Sytnyk, the former head of the state National Anti-Corruption Bureau. With these sheriffs in town, the surest way for even the most powerful Ukrainians to go to jail is to try to corruptly make money off weapons acquisitions.

Under this reformist leadership, the defense procurement agency is aggressively cutting out intermediaries by contracting directly with arms manufacturers. The clearest sign of success is that excluded arms dealers and their cronies are attacking Bezrukova with threatening messages, smear campaigns, and doxing on Telegram. Most recently, these intermediaries tried to sideline Bezrukova by getting Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov to merge her agency into another one—and fire her in the process. That announcement triggered such strong pushback by NATO and Ukrainian civil society that the minister canceled the planned reorganization. Instead, with support from Ukraine’s allies, the ministry formed a new supervisory board of reputable experts to oversee the procurement agency.

Any U.S. legislation that funds weapons contracts arranged by Ukraine’s defense procurement agency should come with one additional condition: Before Kyiv receives any money, it must enact legislation mandating the existence of the agency, safeguarding the independence of its supervisory board, and most importantly, prohibiting the defense minister from firing the agency head without a concurring decision by the supervisory board.

Beyond the strategic benefits, this approach could create jobs for Americans during Trump’s second term, largely in states that voted for him. Unlike military aid provided by Europe or allocated by NATO, U.S. funding would come right back home: to Northrop Grumman’s gun truck production line in Arizona, General Dynamics’ artillery shell facility in Texas, Raytheon’s missile factory in Alabama, and Lockheed Martin’s F-16 plant in South Carolina.

To prevent the Trump administration from using executive authority to block the export of weapons procured by Ukraine under the program, Congress should insert one exemption to the Buy American requirement: If the U.S. government ends up blocking exports, Ukraine would be free to redirect the funds to non-U.S. arms manufacturers.

Just as vital as the original Lend-Lease Act, this legislation could be called the Buy American Weapons Act. And it would keep the United States on the right side of history against the imperial armies that are once again on the march.