On the Quantum Security of HAWK

Serge Fehr; Yu-Hsuan Huang

Paper 2023/711

On the Quantum Security of HAWK

Serge Fehr, Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica

Yu-Hsuan Huang, Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica

Abstract

In this paper, we prove the quantum security of the signature scheme HAWK, proposed by Ducas, Postlethwaite, Pulles and van Woerden (ASIACRYPT 2022). More precisely, we reduce its strong unforgeability in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) to the hardness of the one-more SVP problem, which is the computational problem on which also the classical security analysis of HAWK relies. Our security proof deals with the quantum aspects in a rather black-box way, making it accessible also to non-quantum-experts.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: quantum security HAWK digital signature random oracle model
Contact author(s): serge fehr @ cwi nl
yhh @ cwi nl
History: 2023-05-22: approved; 2023-05-17: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2023/711
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/711,
      author = {Serge Fehr and Yu-Hsuan Huang},
      title = {On the Quantum Security of {HAWK}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/711},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/711}
}