Paper 2023/1273
Fait Accompli Committee Selection: Improving the Size-Security Tradeoff of Stake-Based Committees
Abstract
We study the problem of committee selection in the context of proof-of-stake consensus mechanisms or distributed ledgers. These settings determine a family of participating parties---each of which has been assigned a non-negative "stake"---and are subject to an adversary that may corrupt a subset of the parties. The challenge is to select a committee of participants that accurately reflects the proportion of corrupt and honest parties, as measured by stake, in the full population. The trade-off between committee size and the probability of selecting a committee that over-represents the corrupt parties is a fundamental factor in both security and efficiency of proof-of-stake consensus, as well as committee-run layer-two protocols. We propose and analyze several new committee selection schemes that improve upon existing techniques by adopting low-variance assignment of certain committee members that hold significant stake. These schemes provide notable improvements to the size--security trade-off arising from the stake distributions of many deployed ledgers.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ACM CCS 2023
- Keywords
- committee selectionproof of stake
- Contact author(s)
-
peter gazi @ iohk io
aggelos kiayias @ ed ac uk
acr @ uconn edu - History
- 2023-11-24: revised
- 2023-08-24: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1273
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1273, author = {Peter Gaži and Aggelos Kiayias and Alexander Russell}, title = {Fait Accompli Committee Selection: Improving the Size-Security Tradeoff of Stake-Based Committees}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1273}, year = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1273} }