Paper 2018/357
Statistical Ineffective Fault Attacks on Masked AES with Fault Countermeasures
Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Hannes Gross, Stefan Mangard, Florian Mendel, and Robert Primas
Abstract
Implementation attacks like side-channel and fault attacks are a threat to deployed devices especially if an attacker has physical access. As a consequence, devices like smart cards and IoT devices usually provide countermeasures against implementation attacks, such as masking against side-channel attacks and detection-based countermeasures like temporal or spacial redundancy against fault attacks. In this paper, we show how to attack implementations protected with both masking and detection-based fault countermeasures by using statistical ineffective fault attacks using a single fault induction per execution. Our attacks are largely unaffected by the deployed protection order of masking and the level of redundancy of the detection-based countermeasure. These observations show that the combination of masking plus error detection alone may not provide sufficient protection against implementation attacks.
Note: Camera ready version for asiacrypt
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2018
- Keywords
- Implementation attackFault attackSFASIFA
- Contact author(s)
- robert primas @ iaik tugraz at
- History
- 2018-09-08: revised
- 2018-04-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/357
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/357,
author = {Christoph Dobraunig and Maria Eichlseder and Hannes Gross and Stefan Mangard and Florian Mendel and Robert Primas},
title = {Statistical Ineffective Fault Attacks on Masked {AES} with Fault Countermeasures},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/357},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/357}
}
