



DEVELOPERWEEK™

cloud-native software
supply chain security:
the hard truth





Software Supply Chain




The software supply chain involves a multitude of tools and processes that enable software developers to write, build, and ship applications.

Melara & Bowman, 2022, Intel Labs




CNCF - SSC in a 🥥



https://github.com/cncf/tag-security/blob/main/supply-chain-security/supply-chain-security-paper/CNCF_SSCP_v1.pdf

CIS - SSC ⚡ in a 🥥



<https://www.cisecurity.org/insights/white-papers/cis-software-supply-chain-security-guide>



Confidentiality



affect..

Integrity

Availability





Stages of the SSC



Stages/Elements of the SSC

- Code
- Dependencies
- Build
- Artifacts & Distribution/Deployment
- (Runtime)



Stage: Code



code content

**code
management**





Stage: Code - code content



threats



- bugs



- malicious code



- license



solutions



- scanning



- testing



- policies



Stage: Code - code management

threats



- manipulation



- theft



- deletion



solutions



- access

RBAC

Codeowners

signatures

MFA



- repo config

push policies



Stage: Dependencies

packages, libraries, ...

**Please use a
Package Manager**



Stage: Dependencies

threats



- bugs



- malicious code



- license




- integrity



solutions



- scanning



- testing



- policies



- inventory



- signature




- SBOM



- airgapping

Stage: Build









Stage: Build


⚡ threats

-  - build bugs
-  - malicious env

💡 solutions

-  - dedicated env
-  - zero trust
-  - single use env
- | - pipelines
- { } - as code
-  - reproducible

Stage: Artifacts & Distribution/Deployment



CD¹ ... Continuous Delivery
CD² ... Continuous Deployment

Stage: Artifacts & Distribution/Deployment



⚡ threats



- theft /

deletion



- replacement



- no transparency



- updates



solutions



- repo security



- signatures



- attestation



- SBOM



- TUF



Bottom Line Message

Software Supply Chain has multiple levels → very different threats ⚡

Solutions / Mitigations on different levels of effort and complexity 🙌





in the real world



Context

consulting experience + master thesis input:
“somewhat complete” set of SSCS controls

literature input from..

- CIS Software Supply Chain Security Guide
- CNCF Software Supply Chain Best Practices
- OWASP SCVS Software Component Verification Standard
- SLSA Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts
- Microsoft Secure Supply Chain Consumption Framework
- DoD Enterprise DevSecOps Reference Design



Context – research output


3 Implementation
Groups

167 controls
6 categories


83 questions
4 possible answers

30 companies
(DACH)


Findings - Companies per IP




Findings - Using VCS



Findings - Implementing all IG1 controls




Findings - Implementing IG3 controls





Findings - Controls vs Effort





Lessons Learned

 IG / company size
 Transparency


~25-50% of controls per group not implemented

scans, tests & checks  policies

Low hanging 
not reaped



build, SBOM, attestation

automation is 
(IaC, pipelines, testing, PaC, ..)



The Hard Truth

👍 lots of information available

👎 many simple controls not implemented

👎 most complex controls not implemented

bigger company = less transparency/adaptation



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CNCG Graz + KCD Austria

- BSc MA MBA
- CK{A/AD}, TFA, VA, GitLab, PSM I, Snyk

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Further Reading

Code:

- [SAST](#)
- [\(GitLab\) Push Rules](#)
- [Codeowners](#)
- [IaC Scanning Tools](#)
- [The Test Pyramid](#)

Dependencies:

- [SCA Tools](#)
- [SBOM Introduction](#)
- [Dependency Track](#)

Build:

- [Reproducible Builds](#)
- [Zero Trust Paradigm](#)
- [container based build](#)

Artifacts, Distribution & Deployment:

- [The Update Framework](#)
- [In-Toto Attestation](#)
- [Sigstore](#)

used Literature (selection):

- [CNCF Supply Chain Best Practices](#)
- [CIS Supply Chain Security Guide](#)
- [NIST SSDF](#)
- [SLSA](#)
- [OSSF S2C2F](#)
- [OWASP ASVS](#)
- [SSA Secure Software Controls](#)