Abstract
Information received from different sources can be inconsistent. Even when the sources of information can be ordered on the basis of their trustworthiness, it turns out that extracting an acceptable notion of support for information is a non-trivial matter, as is the question what information a rational agent should accept. Here it is shown how a support ordering on the information can be generated and how it can be used to decide what information to accept and what not to accept. This ordering, it turns out, is closely related to notions such as Epistemic Entrenchment and Grove spheres studied in belief revision.
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Cantwell, J. Resolving Conflicting Information. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7, 191–220 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008296216319
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008296216319