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Lowest revenue limit-based truthful auction mechanism for cloud resource allocation

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Abstract

An auction mechanism is an effective way to allocate resources through market behavior. However, in existing studies, most auction mechanisms are designed based on the maximization of social welfare, and there are few studies on potential revenue. Based on cloud computing resource allocation, this paper studies an auction mechanism with revenue limits under single-dimensional and multidimensional resource allocation. That is, the resource provider proposes the lowest revenue limit B. The mechanism aims to maximize the total social welfare while conforming to the lowest revenue limit of the provider. Specifically, we design a new price-raising auction mechanism based on resource similarity and the user cost-effectiveness value, which unifies the two stages of resource allocation and payment pricing, overcoming the problem of low revenue caused by overallocated resources and the lowest winning price. This mechanism can also achieve truthfulness, individual rationality and computational efficiency. In the experimental section, the proposed mechanism is compared with the optimal VCG mechanism and the monotonic mechanism with critical values in terms of revenue, social welfare, resource utilization, etc., and the results demonstrate the good effects of the mechanism designed in this article.

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For experimental data and codes, please contact the corresponding author.

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Acknowledgements

This work is supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 62062065, 12071417 and 61962061), the Program for Excellent Young Talents, Yunnan, China.

Funding

This work is supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 62062065, 12071417 and 61962061), the Program for Excellent Young Talents, Yunnan, China.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Information Science and Engineering, Yunnan University, Kunming, 650504, Yunnan, People’s Republic of China

    Jixian Zhang & Hao Sun

  2. School of Mathematics and Statistics, Yunnan University, Kunming, 650504, Yunnan, People’s Republic of China

    Weidong Li

Authors
  1. Jixian Zhang
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  2. Hao Sun
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  3. Weidong Li
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Contributions

1. JZ and WL contributed to the conception of the study; 2. JZ and WL contributed significantly to the analysis and manuscript preparation; 3. JZ and HS performed the experiment; 4. JZ and HS performed the data analyses and wrote the manuscript.

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Correspondence to Jixian Zhang.

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Zhang, J., Sun, H. & Li, W. Lowest revenue limit-based truthful auction mechanism for cloud resource allocation. J Supercomput 80, 10637–10666 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11227-023-05839-3

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