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Efficient Traceable Oblivious Transfer and Its Applications

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Information Security Practice and Experience (ISPEC 2018)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 11125))

Abstract

Oblivious transfer (OT) has been applied widely in privacy-sensitive systems such as on-line transactions and electronic commerce to protect users’ private information. Traceability is an interesting feature of such systems that the privacy of the dishonest users could be traced by the service provider or a trusted third party (TTP). However, previous research on OT mainly focused on designing protocols with unconditional receiver’s privacy. Thus, traditional OT schemes cannot fulfill the traceability requirements in the aforementioned applications. In this paper, we address this problem by presenting a novel traceable oblivious transfer (TOT) without involvement of any TTP. In the new system, an honest receiver is able to make a fixed number of choices with perfect receiver privacy. If the receiver misbehaves and tries to request more than a pre-fixed number of choices, then all his previous choices could be traced by the sender. We first give the formal definition and security model of TOT, then propose an efficient TOT scheme, which is proven secure under the proposed security model.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Note that the traceability means that the previously choices of the cheating receiver are revealed, which is the major distinction between our proposed TOT and the construction in [13]. In the table, we use the symbol traceability\(^*\) to distinguish our work with that one in [13].

  2. 2.

    We assume there exists a public key infrastructure (PKI) issuing certificates on the users’ public keys in our system.

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Acknowledgements

This work is supported by the National Key R&D Program of China (2017YFB0802000), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61772418, 61402366). Yinghui Zhang is supported by New Star Team of Xi’an University of Posts & Telecommunications (2016-02).

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Liu, W., Zhang, Y., Mu, Y., Yang, G., Tian, Y. (2018). Efficient Traceable Oblivious Transfer and Its Applications. In: Su, C., Kikuchi, H. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 11125. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99807-7_39

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99807-7_39

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