Abstract
Elaborate security policies often require organizations to restrict user data access in a fine-grained manner, instead of traditional table- or column-level access control. Not surprisingly, managing fine-grained access control in software is rather challenging. In particular, if access is not configured carefully, information leakage may happen: Users may infer sensitive information through the data explicitly accessible to them in centralized systems or in the cloud.
In this paper we formalize this information-leakage problem, by modeling sensitive information as answers to “secret queries,” and by modeling access-control rules as views. We focus on the scenario where sensitive information can be deterministically derived by adversaries. We review a natural data-exchange based inference model for detecting information leakage, and show its capabilities and limitation. We then introduce and formally study a new inference model, view-verified data exchange, that overcomes the limitation for the query language under consideration.
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Notes
- 1.
The intuition is that tuple patterns occuring over S constrain tuple patterns over T.
- 2.
Weakly acyclic dependencies [6] are types of tuple- and equality-generating integrity constraints that commonly occur in practice and have nice formal properties.
- 3.
A ground data set is a data set without null values.
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Alborzi, F., Chirkova, R., Yu, T. (2015). Exact Detection of Information Leakage in Database Access Control. In: Madria, S., Hara, T. (eds) Big Data Analytics and Knowledge Discovery. DaWaK 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9263. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-22729-0_31
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