

VirusTotal

Threat landscape module

Rich and **actionable** adversary intelligence


www.virustotal.com/contact

Fighting global adversaries constrained by the narrow visibility of a handful of researchers?

There is a better way.

In a nutshell

Adversary intelligence layer providing superior context across the VT ENTERPRISE threat intelligence suite



Climb the pyramid of pain with crowdsourced adversary intelligence

Instantly learn who/what is behind an incident

The threat landscape module adds links and online deep dive research articles to threat {campaign, toolkit, actor} cards in {file, domain, IP, URL} reports.

Understand who is behind a given IoC and how their campaign operates. Linked cards include one-click access to related IoCs, TTPs, hunting artefact, rules, etc. to proactively protect your organization or unearth missed threats.

Extend your knowledge via Finished intelligence reports crowdsourced from online articles. [\[+\]](#)

The screenshot displays a security analysis interface for a file with the hash 1f17ae5fcf0ab03bcd92a16c93a7b18049ebd3f554c53c0b47a3a40494a34f4. The file is identified as 'WdExt.exe' (1.70 MB, 2023-03-16 08:53:37 UTC). A prominent red circle indicates a 'Community Score' of 56 out of 67. A warning message states: '56 security vendors and no sandboxes flagged this file as malicious'. The interface includes tabs for DETECTION, DETAILS, BEHAVIOR, CONTENT, TELEMETRY, and COMMUNITY. The COMMUNITY tab is active, showing a table of references:

References (4)	Date	Author
The Sample: Beating the Malware Piñata	2022-05-05	Christopher Gardner
Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code	2018-06-17	IBM Support
Analysis of a Botnet Campaign	2016-01-01	Andy Settle
Who's Really Spreading through the Bright Star?	2015-03-04	Kurt Baumgartner

Below the references, there are sections for 'Contained In Collections (1)' and 'Related Threat Actors (1)'. The 'Jaku Collection' by Malpedia (2023-03-16 08:53:38 UTC) is listed with 59,405 files, 9 references, 1 Yara rule, and 1 threat actor. The 'DarkHotel' actor is also shown, with 59.74 K IoCs, a suspected sponsor in South Korea, and a first seen date of 2010-04-15. A snippet of a report snippet is visible: 'Kaspersky described DarkHotel in a 2014 report as: "... DarkHotel drives its camp...'

Outsmart your adversaries via threat actor cards

Essential and actionable information related to a threat actor group, updated real-time.

Summaries include a description, aliases, suspected nation state sponsor, targeted industries, targeted regions, motivations, etc.

Actionable insights in the form of campaigns/toolkit tied to the actor, IoCs, geo+time activity breakdowns, common technical properties for their toolkit, {YARA, Sigma, IDS} detection rules, MITRE ATT&CK TTPs, finished intelligence articles. [+]

The screenshot shows a detailed threat actor card for the Lazarus Group. At the top, it identifies the group as 'Lazarus Group' with a profile picture and a flag for North Korea. It lists the 'Suspected sponsor' as 'North Korea' and 'Target categories' as 'Government, Administration' and 'Private sector'. It also shows 'First seen' as '2007-01-03 13:21:59 UTC' and 'Last seen' as '2023-03-15 00:22:42 UTC'.

The 'Description' section states: 'Since 2009, HIDDEN COBRA actors have leveraged their capabilities to target and compromise a range of victims; some intrusions have resulted in the exfiltration of data. Commercial reporting has referred to this activity as Lazarus Group and Guardians of Peace. Tools and capabilities used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include DDoS botnets, wiper malware. Variants of malware and tools used by HIDDEN COBRA actors include Destover, Duuzer, and Hangman.'

The 'Aliases' section lists numerous aliases such as 'Operation DarkSeoul', 'Dark Seoul', 'Hidden Cobra', 'Hastati Group', 'Andariel', 'Unit 121', 'Bureau 121', 'NewRomanic Cyber Army Team', 'Bluenoroff', 'Subgroup: Bluenoroff', 'Operation Troy', 'Operation GhostSecret', 'Operation AppleJeus', 'APT38', 'APT 38', 'Stardust Chollima', 'Whois Hacking Team', 'Zinc', 'Appleworm', 'Nickel Academy', 'ATK3', 'GO032', 'ATK117', 'GO082', 'HIDDEN COBRA', 'Guardians of Peace', 'ZINC', 'NICKEL ACADEMY', and 'BeagleBoyz'.

The 'Suspected victims' section lists various countries: 'South Korea', 'United States', 'Thailand', 'France', 'China', 'Hong Kong', 'United Kingdom', 'Guatemala', 'Canada', 'Bangladesh', 'Japan', 'India', 'Germany', and 'Brazil'.

Below the main card, there are tabs for 'COLLECTIONS', 'IOCS', 'TELEMETRY', 'COMMONALITIES', 'RULES', 'TTPs', and 'COMMUNITY'. The 'COLLECTIONS' tab is active, showing a list of collections:

- Rifdoor Collection** by Malpedia (2023-03-16 09:41:47 UTC): Files: 4257 | References: 4 | Yara rules: 1 | Threat actors: 1. Description: software-toolkit: Rifdooris a remote access trojan (RAT) that shares numerous code similarities withHotCroissant.
- PhanDoor Collection** by Malpedia (2023-03-15 19:41:08 UTC): Files: 1527 | References: 1 | Yara rules: 1 | Threat actors: 1
- Ratankba Collection** by Malpedia (2023-03-15 15:18:10 UTC): Files: 444 | References: 278 | Yara rules: 1 | Threat actors: 1. Description: This is a backdoor that establishes persistence using the Startup folder. It communicates to its C&C server using HT...
- AlphaNC Collection** by Malpedia (2023-03-15 14:44:54 UTC): Files: 103 | References: 3 | Yara rules: 1 | Threat actors: 1
- AppleJeus Collection** by CarlosCabal (2023-03-15 12:05:14 UTC): Files: 1 | Threat actors: 1. Description: According to PcRisk, AppleJeus is the name of backdoor malware that was distributed by the Lazarus group. They s...
- Ghost RAT Collection** by Malpedia: Files: 1051 | References: 77 | Yara rules: 1 | Threat actors: 6

Find breaches with threat campaign/toolkit cards

In-depth analysis of collections of IoCs generating insights to detect missed threats, all the way from hashes to TTPs.

Actionable intelligence for all maturity levels: hashes, IPs, domains, URLs, detection rules, malware toolkit technical commonalities, TTPs, etc.

Search and API lookup activity aggregations to understand targeted countries and operational timeframe.

Finished intelligence in the form of crowdsourced online articles about the campaign/toolkit. [\[+\]](#)

Emotet

Created 2 years ago | Updated 15 hours ago | First submission 16 years ago | Last submission 1 day ago | Last two weeks active

Owner: Malpedia (source) | Alias: Geodo | Header: | Actors: GOLD CABIN | MUMMY SPIDER | Targeted industries: All | Targeted regions: All

software-toolkit cve-2017-11882 cve-2020-18999 bobsoft cve-2009-3128 pecompact cve-2007-5659 pccrypt32 aspack cve-2012-0507 nspack cve-2014-0904 cve-2016-2569 cve-2013-6449 cve-2016-4982 upack cve-2011-0559 cve-2006-1206 pearmor cve-2008-1447 cve-2007-0943 cve-2015-2808 cve-2008-3016 cve-2008-0455 cve-2009-4873 yoda cve-2011-3430 cve-2005-3142 cve-2016-7202

Write Preview

While Emotet historically was a banking malware organized in a botnet, nowadays Emotet is mostly seen as infrastructure as a service for content delivery. For example, since mid 2018 by Trickbot for installs, which may also lead to ransomware attacks using Ryuk, a combination observed several times against high-profile targets. It is always stealing information from victims but what the criminal gang behind it did, was to open up another business channel by selling their infrastructure delivering additional malware. From malware analysts it has been classified into epochs depending on command and control, payloads, and delivery solutions which change over time. Emotet had been taken down by authorities in January 2021, though it appears to have sprung back to life in November 2021.

Save

IOCS COMMONALITIES TELEMETRY RULES TTPS GRAPH COMMUNITY 30+

Related file hashes 10 / 57.51 K


	Detections	Size	First seen	Last seen	Submitter
000829f87f31a32151837399843a0dfaf92c44f1eae76741883f9872c79c97 d4df7a877a88f741a7c4cb7e524bbe8_virus peexe spreader overlay	41 / 68	208.60 KB	2023-01-31 15:54:31	2023-01-31 15:54:31	1
0001c1480b369f38e1b4933029c78f4a2e1f5078c1593a967a96939c8653488 VEXTRACT_EXE .MUI peexe assembly detect-debug-environment checks-network-adapters checks-bios calls-wmi ...	50 / 69	12.61 MB	2021-08-25 04:47:27	2021-08-25 04:47:27	1
000399178018ef4c285985885ef90615ab11318e30d6fecf4cfbe444de7f76 Obfuscated Name.exe peexe obfuscated assembly runtime-modules detect-debug-environment checks-network-adapters ...	50 / 68	2.84 MB	2021-05-03 18:16:23	2021-05-03 18:16:23	1
0003186048331426de49e904e505e8d716566eA90f25e28A380f5d2380205838 FolderChangesView.exe peexe overlay runtime-modules checks-network-adapters spreader direct-cpu-clock-access	54 / 68	449.09 KB	2021-06-19 02:00:30	2021-06-19 02:00:30	1

Trends to achieve faster mean time to detect

Leverage the extended visibility and collective speed of the community, accelerate defensive operations.

The threat landscape module gives you access to all community + partner collections, threat actors and references, in a fully indexed and searchable manner. Focus on what matters to your organization, when it matters, via targeted industry, targeted region, source region, threat category and date filters.

Accelerate beyond the investigations of a handful of researchers staring at a piece of the puzzle. [+]



Stay abreast of emerging threats with online reports

Crowdsourced research articles about the latest threats consolidated into a single interface and digested via NLP.

Planet-wide Internet crawls focusing on malware and threat actor articles, acting as a live daily stream of finished intelligence reports.

Automatic extraction and tagging of CVEs, targeted industries, motivations, malware toolkit, affected regions, etc.

Search across the knowledge base and answer your executives' questions. [+]

The screenshot displays a web application interface with a dark theme. At the top, there are navigation tabs: 'COLLECTIONS', 'THREAT ACTORS', and 'REFERENCES', with 'REFERENCES' being the active tab. Below the tabs is a search bar with the placeholder text 'Search by title, description or tags'. A dropdown menu for 'Creation date' is visible. The main content area is a list of items, each with a link icon on the left, a title and description in the middle, a date on the right, and a source on the far right. The items include:

- InfoSec Handlers Diary Blog - SANS Internet Storm Center**: Incoming Silicon Valley Bank Related Scams, Author: Johannes Ullrich. Date: 2023-03-16. Source: @sans_isc.
- SecuritySnacks/SVB-Related-Domains.csv at main · DomainTools/SecuritySnacks**: SecuritySnacks data that doesn't fit into a single tweet. - SecuritySnacks/SVB-Related-Domains.csv at main · DomainTools/SecuritySnacks. Date: 2023-03-16. Source: GitHub.
- IOCs/2023/03 at main · Cisco-Talos/IOCs**: Indicators of Compromise. Contribute to Cisco-Talos/IOCs development by creating an account on GitHub. Collections: 1. Date: 2023-03-15.
- Flash Notice: HermeticWizard, HermeticRansom, and IsaacWiper Target Ukraine**: This week, ESET researchers discovered three new cyber attacks against Ukraine: HermeticWizard, HermeticRansom, and IsaacWiper. CVE-2022-2856. Date: 2023-03-15. Source: avertium.
- Ransomware gang leaks data stolen from City of Oakland - TT Malware Log**: 【訳】ランサムウェアのギャングがオークランド市から盗んだデータを流出させる 【図表】 データ漏洩サイトに流出したオークランド市の疑念のデータ (BleepingComputer) 出典... CVE-2017-11882 CVE-2019-13456 CVE-2016-9444 CVE-2020-1472 CVE-2018-13379 CVE-2021-31564 CVE-2020-0683 CVE-2020-4756 CVE-2022-0038. Date: 2023-03-15. Source: 谷川哲司.
- 1.1.1.2 Ensure mounting of freevxfs filesystems is disabled - ...**: Audit item details for 1.1.1.2 Ensure mounting of freevxfs filesystems is disabled - Ismod Ip Addresses: 1. Date: 2023-03-15.
- Flash Notice: Critical Fortinet Zero-Day Vulnerability Exploited in the Wild**: A critical zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2022-42475) was found in multiple versions of Fortinet's FortiOS SSL-VPN. CVE-2021-20038. Date: 2023-03-15. Source: avertium.
- DoppelPaymer / Grief (まとめ) - TT Malware Log**: 【目次】 概要 【最新情報】 記事 【ニュース】 【資料】 【図表】 関連情報 【リークサイト】 【関連まとめ記事】 概要 【最新情報】 ◆Core DoppelPaymer ransomware gang members targeted in Europol operation (BleepingComputer,... CVE-2017-11882 CVE-2019-13456 CVE-2016-9444 CVE-2020-1472 CVE-2018-13379 CVE-2021-31564 CVE-2020-0683 CVE-2020-4756 CVE-2022-0038. Date: 2023-03-15. Source: 谷川哲司.
- 2020年第3四半期ネットワーク層DDoS攻撃の傾向 - TT Malware Log**: 【資料】 ◆2020年第3四半期ネットワーク層DDoS攻撃の傾向 (Cloudflare, 2020/11/19) https://blog.cloudflare.com/ja-jp/network-layer-ddos-attack-trends-for-q3-2020-ja-jp/. Date: 2023-03-15. Source: 谷川哲司.

Actionability first

Go beyond IoCs and PDF reports, focus on patterns and modus operandi, corner your adversaries and unearth unknown threats

Detect and proactively block high severity IoCs

{file hashes, domains, IPs URLs} tied to threat campaigns and actors, updated real-time.

Flag missed threats via retroactive IoC matching in SIEM logs or proactively block them in defensive technologies such as NGFW, EDRs, etc.

Boost the severity score of these alerts given their direct association with a threat actor.

One-click exports into the most popular ingestion formats and off-the-shelf integrations in security technologies. [\[+\]](#)

The screenshot shows a security dashboard for the threat actor 'DarkHotel'. The interface includes a header with the actor's name, a profile picture, and metadata such as 'Suspected sponsor: South Korea', 'Target categories: Private sector', and 'First seen: 2010-04-15 04:04:39 UTC'. Below this is a 'Description' section with a quote from Kaspersky. The 'Aliases' section lists various group names like DUBNIUM, Fallout Team, Karba, etc. The 'Suspected victims' section lists Japan, Russia, Taiwan, South Korea, and China. The main content area is titled 'COLLECTIONS' and 'IOCS', showing a list of files with columns for 'Files 10 / 59.63 K', 'Detections', 'Size', 'First seen', and 'Last seen'. The files listed are all 'WdExt.exe' files with various hashes and associated tags like 'peexe', 'spreader', and 'overlay'.


Files 10 / 59.63 K	Detections	Size	First seen	Last seen
A61C093E6C114D8FC11A0186B2930AA3ACEED0A11388E26AE128D7CD40...	58 / 66	1.73 MB	2023-03-16 16:47:59	2023-03-16 16:47:59
8CA3087ADBE57384D9033DCD7AF8727A74FEC3727F574A571704093CEAF...	58 / 69	1.76 MB	2023-03-16 16:37:12	2023-03-16 16:37:12
6A4C76423533251FCCAF989F099B6BAD2033DB5DB6F988247C0D6089936...	59 / 69	1.73 MB	2023-03-16 16:36:53	2023-03-16 16:36:53
5904D32185C72C9C5787258E45358E27BA06FD2E0BC48ECCDF3377A92FBC...	62 / 69	1.73 MB	2023-03-16 15:22:08	2023-03-16 15:22:08

Answer where, when and what with global telemetry

Web and API lookups by 3.6M+ free users in 230+ countries digested into geographical+time+IoC activity lines.

Focus on specific time ranges and understand targeted regions and IoCs leveraged. Breakdowns and filters across all three dimensions: time, region and IoC.

When was a given actor/campaign active in France? What malware did they use then? During May 2022, which regions did a given actor target? Answer all these questions and more. [\[+\]](#)




Go beyond IoCs, look for toolkit commonalities

Automatic extraction and ranking of malware toolkit technical properties that can be used for hunting purposes.

Aggregations and ranks across AV/EDR detections, distribution vectors, network infrastructure (CnCs, download URLs...), persistence registry keys, mutexes, dropped files, PDB paths, imphash, etc.

Climb the pyramid of pain and focus on leftovers and repeatable patterns for malware toolkit used by your adversaries.

Includes one-click action to calculate commonalities for custom search / hunt results. [\[+\]](#)



The screenshot displays a web interface for threat intelligence analysis. The main content area is titled "Threat network infrastructure" and is organized into three sections: "Contacted Domains", "Parent contacted Domains", and "Contacted IP Addresses". Each section lists various domains or IP addresses along with the number of items associated with them. A "Table of contents" sidebar on the right lists several categories: "Detections", "Distribution Vectors", "Threat network infrastructure", "Similarity hashes", "MITRE ATT&CK", "Execution tracing", and "Static analysis".


Section	Item	Count
Contacted Domains	browzar.com	186 items
	connectini.net	177 items
	214.250.2.23.in-addr.arpa	96 items
	profitabletrustednetwork.com	87 items
	ezsearch.ru	86 items
	ffdownload.online	71 items
	g-partners.live	68 items
	www.carifred.com	51 items
	b.goatbgame.com	50 items
	www.w7dskipoja.com	45 items
Parent contacted Domains	cloudflare.net	12566 items
	globalsign.com	6495 items
	microsoft.com	712 items
	msfnksi.com	228 items
	browzar.com	186 items
	connectini.net	177 items
	23.in-addr.arpa	135 items
	20.in-addr.arpa	102 items
Contacted IP Addresses	104.21.59.252	873 items
	50.23.197.95	160 items
	136.144.41.133	157 items
	40.126.31.3	98 items
	157.240.14.35	80 items

Deploy multi-layered detections

Threat {campaign, toolkit, actor} cards rank crowdsourced {YARA, Sigma, IDS} rules matching against their artifacts.

YARA rules provide an additional static detection layer beyond your AV/EDR. Sigma rules tackle the detonation behaviour angle. IDS rules introduce flags at the network level. Implement a true defense-in-depth security program.

All the rules include detailed descriptions providing further context and pivots to uncover other matching IoCs in the VirusTotal global corpus. [+]



Flag modus operandi with MITRE ATT&CK TTPs

Files processed by VT are detonated in multiple sandboxes and their behavior is mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK matrix.

TTPs do not only characterize single files, they are also aggregated and ranked into commonalities in threat {campaign, toolkit, actor} cards, shedding light into adversary modus operandi. TTP commonalities also for custom groupings of IoCs.

All this data is indexed and searchable in conjunction with other static, dynamic, code and in-the-wild properties. [\[+\]](#)

The screenshot displays the MITRE ATT&CK TTPs interface. The top navigation bar includes: IOCS, COMMONALITIES, TELEMETRY, RULES, TTPs (selected), GRAPH, and COMMUNITY (30+). The main content area is titled "Mitre ATT&CK Tactics and Techniques".

The interface is organized into sections based on MITRE ATT&CK tactics:

- Initial Access (TA0001)**:
 - 35 matches: Replication Through Removable Media (TI091)
 - 1 matches: Exploit Public-Facing Application (TI190)
- Execution (TA0002)**:
 - 1059 matches: Shared Modules (TI129)
 - 883 matches: Command and Scripting Interactions (TI106)
 - 92 matches: Service Execution (TI549.002)
 - 45 matches: Native API (TI106)
 - 45 matches: Scheduled Task/Job (TI053)
 - 36 matches: Scripting (TI064)
 - 31 matches: Exploitation for Client Execution (TI106)
 - 22 matches: Component Object Model (TI106)
 - 15 matches: Windows Management Instrumentation (TI106)
 - 8 matches: PowerShell (TI1059.001)
 - 7 matches: Malicious File (TI204.002)
 - 4 matches: Windows Command Shell (TI1059.003)
 - 1 matches: Scheduled Task (TI053.005)
- Persistence (TA0003)**:
 - 338 matches: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (TI547.001)
 - 252 matches: DLL Side-Loading (TI574.002)
 - 96 matches: Windows Service (TI543.003)
 - 74 matches: DLL Search Order Hijacking (TI574.001)
 - 65 matches: LSASS Driver (TI547.008)
 - 45 matches: Scheduled Task/Job (TI053)
 - 9 matches: Bootkit (TI542.003)
 - 7 matches: Shortcut Modification (TI547.009)
 - 5 matches: Systemd Service (TI543.002)
 - 5 matches: Change Default File Association (TI546.001)
 - 4 matches: Image File Execution Options Injection (TI546.012)
 - 1 matches: Scheduled Task (TI053.005)
- Privilege Escalation (TA0004)**:
 - 663 matches: Process Injection (TI056)
 - 374 matches: Access Token Manipulation (TI134)
 - 338 matches: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder (TI547.001)


A detailed view for the "Scheduled Task/Job" technique (TI053) is shown, containing the following text: "Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met (ex: RPC and file and printer sharing in Windows environments). Scheduling a task on a remote system typically may require being a member of an admin or otherwise privileged group on the remote system. Adversaries may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence. These mechanisms can also be abused to run a process under the context of a specified account (such as one with elevated permissions/privileges). Similar to System Binary Proxy Execution, adversaries have also abused task scheduling to potentially mask one-time execution under a trusted system process." A "View on mitre" button is also visible.

Collaborate & easily communicate to leadership

Pre-computed VT Graphs for threat campaigns and actors, plus relationships and pivots based on these new notions.

Extend crowdsourced investigations, efficiently collaborate with your team and export visuals for executive presentations.

Leverage VT Graph's one-click filters to further dissect threats that matter to you. Store subgraphs to focus on activity that is particularly interesting. Create a historical investigative knowledge base for your team. [+]




Fill in the gaps with finished industry articles

All cards include online references speaking about the campaign, actor or IoCs tied to these.

Immediately access conclusions by hundreds of security teams across the industry. Complement automatic static, dynamic, code analysis with human research.

Articles are linked via Internet-wide crawls, learn about a threat as soon as someone speaks about it. Faster and more complete visibility via crowdsourcing. [\[+\]](#)




References (463)	Date	Author
Emotet Returns, Now Adopts Binary Padding for Evasion	2023-03-13	Ian Keneffick
Emotet malware attacks return after three-month break	2023-03-07	Lawrence Abrams
Emotet Campaign	2023-02-26	Ilan Duhin and Yossi Poberezsky
Following the Scent of TrickGate: 6-Year-Old Packer Used to Deploy the Most Wanted Malware	2023-01-30	Arie Olshstein
Unpacking Emotet Malware	2023-01-26	Ilan Duhin
Emotet returns and deploys loaders	2023-01-09	Intrinsec and CTI Intrinsec
[Z2A]Bimonthly malware challenge – Emotet (Back From the Dead)	2022-12-19	m4n0w4r and Tran Trung Kien
X-Ray of Malware Evasion Techniques – Analysis, Dissection, Cure?	2022-11-21	Thomas Roccia
How LNK Files Are Abused by Threat Actors	2022-11-10	Nicole Fishbein
EMOTET dynamic config extraction	2022-10-28	@rsprooten and Elastic Security Intelligence
Cisco Talos Intelligence Group - Comprehensive Threat Intelligence: Threat Roundup for July 16 to July 23 - SecuritNEWS	2021-07-24	SecuritNEWS
Threat Roundup for July 16 to July 23	2021-07-23	
The chronicles of Emotet	2020-12-04	Oleg Kupreev
COVID-19 – Malware Makes Hay During a Pandemic McAfee Blogs	2020-05-07	@https://twitter.com/star_sriram

Generate relevant intel tailored for your org

Subscribe to threat {campaigns, toolkits, actors}, all new IoCs tied to them will flow into your IoC Stream.

Subscriptions are an effortless vehicle to generate custom threat feeds that can be ingested across your security stack via off-the-shelf integrations or common feed formats (e.g. STIX).

Go beyond pre-packaged and often noisy/irrelevant threat feeds, customize your threat landscape and focus on the threats that truly matter to you. [\[+\]](#)



Faster insights & superior visibility

Go beyond the conclusions of a handful of researchers, plug your operations into the collective community's brain

Crowdsourced threat landscape visibility



2K+ campaign
cards / month



1K+ active
researchers



500+ de-duped
threat actors



Telemetry from 3.6M+
users in 230+ countries



40K+ daily
reference sites




7M+ classified
IoCs / month


Make your stack smarter, be safer

Effortlessly automate and enrich everything, everywhere


Exportable and user-friendly



One-click exports to common formats for ingestion in your security stack (SIEM, TIP, NGFW...)



Automate detection and custom workflows via **API**, focus on higher severity (threat actors) first.



Ubiquitously enrich any interface with adversary intelligence via the VirusTotal **browser extension**.

Technology Integrations

Unearth threats dwelling undetected in your environment

VT's technology integrations correlate your telemetry with threat actor context to automate triage, expedite investigations and enhance detection.

E.g. [VT4Splunk](#) automatically enrich file hashes, domains, IPs and URLs in events with VT reputation and context. Conduct hunt missions on the correlated data. Prioritize indicators based on severity. Dashboards summarizing exploited vulnerabilities and **suspected actors in your environment**, plus their TTPs (MITRE ATT&CK). **Similar integrations for other TOP SIEMs.** [+]

Adversary Intelligence
Correlation of VirusTotal's community threat [campaign, toolkit, actor] cards with IoCs seen in your environment.

Select a time window: [Hide Filters](#)

Campaigns and malware toolkits found	Threat actors found
83	

[Campaigns and malware toolkits](#) [Threat actors](#)

Click on any Campaign to expand the list of hashes and events

Name	First seen in events	Last seen in events	Description
Agent Tesla	2023-02-27 12:34:06	2023-02-27 12:34:06	A .NET based keylogger and RAT readily available to actors. Logs keystrokes
Rencos	2023-02-27 12:33:23	2023-02-27 12:33:23	Rencos (acronym of Remote Control & Surveillance Software) is a Remote Access
STRRAT	2023-02-27 12:32:55	2023-02-27 12:32:55	STRRAT is a Java-based RAT, which makes extensive use of plugins to provide
Upscayl	2023-02-27 12:34:10	2023-02-27 12:34:10	Upscayl
CO_20230203	2023-02-27 12:34:12	2023-02-27 12:34:12	This list of hashes comes from a medical facility from the application white
CobaltStrike	2023-02-27 12:33:04	2023-02-27 12:33:04	Cobalt Strike is a paid penetration testing product that allows an attacker
malware 01052022	2023-02-27 12:32:58	2023-02-27 12:32:58	Malware Domains
Banking threat check by Vy Binh	2023-02-27 12:33:14	2023-02-27 12:33:14	Vietcombank threat checking by Vy Binh 2023 (follow Loki botnet)
Vidar	2023-02-27 12:33:26	2023-02-27 12:33:26	Vidar is a forked malware based on Arkei. It seems this stealer is one of th
ASEC 주간 악성코드 통계 (20221121 - 20221127)	2023-02-27 12:32:56	2023-02-27 12:32:56	(2022-11-29) https://asec.ahnlab.com/ko/43051/

[Files](#) [Domains](#) [UrIs](#) [IPs](#)

Hashes found in your events related to the Campaign Agent Tesla

Click on any row to expand the list of related events

Last seen in events	SHA256	# Detections	File type
2023-02-27 12:33:59	6eadf3822fae52f6ebfc31b7f6ce117e39c49766088466c123026c947a1d08b	34	xlsx

Events related to the Campaign Agent Tesla

i	Time	Event
>	19/09/2022 12:56:37000	sha256=6eadf3822fae52f6ebfc31b7f6ce117e39c49766088466c123026c347a1d08b host a.persoonen.k1... source a.hashbase.with.mt... source a.Malware with CVEs

Outcomes & value proposition

Mature your security program and radically improve your security posture

Mature your security program

Security org challenges

Alert fatigue and false positives

SOCs only able to handle 14% of alerts



Quality & speed of incident response handling

Analyst-intensive and often inaccurate



Missed threats due to lack of context

Generic/anomaly/ML detections discarded as low severity



Evolving threat landscape

Difficult to keep up with new attack vectors & techniques



Many threat intel feeds, few relevant ones

Further exacerbate the problem of alert fatigue



Security program is too reactive

Growing attacker dwell time and no prevention



Cybersecurity skills gap

CTI analysts and advanced threat hunters are scarce



Budget constraints & suboptimal spending

Expensive generic tools that are threat landscape agnostic



Solving with VT Threat Landscape

Prioritize alerts based on severity

Address incidents tied to motivated threat actors first

IoCs, commonalities and TTPs for 360 response

Supercharge blast radius id, containment and remediation

Attribution to minimize false negatives

Associated threat actors/campaigns on IoC reports

Emerging threat articles and trending campaigns

Filters and rankings to explore latest developments

Tailored feeds via {campaign, actor} subscriptions

Focus on specific threats, industries and regions

Go beyond IoCs, conduct proactive hunt missions

Leverage commonalities, TTPs, rules for hunting

Digested intelligence & one-click filters for juniors

Easily filter VT's corpus to depict your threat landscape


Situational awareness to invest wisely

Prioritize your \$\$ to address threats that matter to you


What makes us different?

Timely, more interactive, more actionable

Traditional response to attacks



The power of crowdsourcing



What Makes VT Threat Landscape Different

Unlike traditional threat intelligence vendors, VirusTotal's adversary intelligence is not the product of a handful of researchers/analysts and a limited set of investigations.

Instead, VirusTotal ensures timeliness and comprehensiveness by leveraging the collective knowledge of the community and Google's planet-scale infrastructure digesting technical toolkit properties into proactive hunting artifacts.



Collective knowledge

1K+ community researchers contributing 2K+ campaign/toolkit collections per month, real-time as emerging threats are spotted.



Community telemetry

Geo+IoC+time web and API lookup activity in campaign / actor cards coming from 3.6M+ users from 230+ countries. Breakdowns and focus filters.



Tailored threat feeds

Generate IoC streams based on subscriptions to relevant threat {actors, campaigns}. Automatic matching in your environment via API and integrations.



Proactive hunting artifacts

Automatic extraction of malware toolkit commonalities for hunting purposes, TTP identification and {YARA, Sigma, IDS} rules.



Filters ensuring relevance

Filter intelligence cards by industry, targeted regions, sponsor, motivations, activity time spans, etc. to focus on threats that matter to your organization.



Interactive TI one-stop-shop

Single provider for technical, tactical, operational and strategic intelligence - peak cost-efficiency. Unrivaled investigative interactivity.

Rich >> Timely >> Relevant >> Actionable >> Proactive

[Contact us](#)