

# Cross-Enterprise Security and Privacy Authorization (XSPA) Profile of WS-Trust for Healthcare Version 1.0

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#### Abstract:

This profile describes a framework in which WS-Trust is leveraged by cross-enterprise security and privacy authorization (XSPA) to satisfy requirements pertaining to information-centric security within the healthcare community.

#### Status:

This document was last approved by the OASIS membership as an OASIS Standard on the above date.

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## 1 Introduction

- 2 This document describes a framework that provides access control interoperability useful in the
- 3 healthcare environment. Interoperability is achieved using WS-Trust secure token request/response
- 4 elements to carry common semantics and vocabularies in exchanges specified below.

## 1.1 Terminology

- 6 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD
- 7 NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described
- 8 in [RFC2119].

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- 9 The following definitions establish additional terminology and usage in this profile:
- 10 Access Control Service (ACS) The Access Control Service is the enterprise security service that
- supports and implements user-side and service-side access control capabilities. The service would be
- 12 utilized by the Service and/or Service User.
- 13 Attributes Attributes are information related to user location, role, purpose of use, and requested
- 14 resource requirements and actions necessary to make an access control decision. This terminology is
- 15 used by the SAML and XACML specifications and is equivalent in concept to claims.
- 16 Claim A claim is a statement made about a client, service or other resource (e.g. name, identity, key,
- 17 group, privilege, capability, etc.). This terminology is used by the WS-Trust specification and is equivalent
- in concept to an attribute.
- 19 Entity An entity may also be known as a principal and/or subject, which represents an application, a
- 20 machine, or any other type of entity that may act as a requester in a transaction.
- 21 **Object** An *object* is an entity that contains or receives information. The *objects* can represent
- 22 information containers (e.g., files or directories in an operating system, and/or columns, rows, tables, and
- views within a database management system) or objects can represent exhaustible system resources,
- 24 such as printers, disk space, and **central processing unit** (CPU) cycles. ANSI RBAC (American
- 25 National Standards Institute Role Based Access Control)
- 26 **Operation** An operation is an executable image of a program, which upon invocation executes some
- function for the user. Within a file system, operations might include read, write, and execute. Within a
- 28 database management system, operations might include insert, delete, append, and update. An
- 29 operation is also known as an action or privilege. ANSI RBAC
- 30 **Permission** An approval to perform an operation on one or more RBAC protected objects. ANSI RBAC
- 31 Security Token Service STS A security token service (STS) is a Web service that issues security
- 32 tokens. That is, it makes assertions based on evidence that it trusts, to whoever trusts it (or to specific
- 33 recipients). To communicate trust, a service requires proof, such as a signature, to prove knowledge of a
- 34 security token or set of security token. A service itself can generate tokens or it can rely on a separate
- 35 STS to issue a security token with its own trust statement (note that for some security token formats this
- 36 can just be a re-issuance or co-signature). This forms the basis of trust brokering.
- 37 **Structural Role** A job function within the context of an organization whose permissions are defined by
- 38 operations on workflow objects. ASTM (American Society for Testing and Materials) E2595-2007
- 39 Service Provider (SP) The service provider represents the system providing a protected resource and
- 40 relies on the provided security service.
- 41 Service User The service user represents any individual entity [such as on an Electronic Health
- 42 Record (EHR)/Personal Health Record (PHR) system] that needs to make a service request of a
- 43 Service Provider.
- Web Service A Web Service is a software component that is described via WSDL and is capable of
- 45 being accessed via standard network protocols such as but not limited to SOAP over HTTP.

47	1.2 Normative R	References
48 49	[RFC2119]	S. Bradner, Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt, IETF RFC 2119, March 1997.
50 51 52	[SAMLPROF]	OASIS Standard, "Profiles for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language, v2.0," March 2005. http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-profiles-2.0-os.pdf
53	[ASTM E1986-09 (	2009)] Standard Guide for Information Access Privileges to Health Information.
54	[ASTM E2595 (200	7)] Standard Guide for Privilege Management Infrastructure
55 56	[SAML]	OASIS Standard, "Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) v2.0", March 2005. http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf
57 58 59 60	[HL7-PERM]	HL7 Security Technical Committee, HL7 Version 3 Standard: Role-based Access Control Healthcare Permission Catalog, (Available through <a href="http://www.hl7.org/library/standards.cfm">http://www.hl7.org/library/standards.cfm</a> ), Release 1, Designation: ANSI/HL7 V3 RBAC, R1-2008, Approval Date 2/20/2008.
61 62 63 64 65	[HL7-CONSENT]	HL7 Consent Related Vocabulary Confidentiality Codes Recommendation, http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/30930/hl7confidentialitycodes.doc, from project submission: http://lists.oasis-open.org/archives/xacml-demotech/200712/msg00015.html
66 67	[WS-TRUST]	OASIS Standard, "WS-Trust, Version 1.3", March 2007. http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-trust/200512/ws-trust-1.3-os.pdf.
68	1.3 Non-Normat	tive References
69	[XSPA-SAML-INTF	RO]
70 71 72	·	OASIS Committee Working Draft, "XSPA Introduction to Profile of SAML for Healthcare", December 2008. http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/30407/xspa-saml-introduction-01.doc
73	[XSPA-SAML-EXA	•
74 75 76		OASIS Committee Working Draft, "XSPA Profile of SAML for Health Implementation Examples", December 2008. http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/30408/xspa-saml-examples-01.doc

## 2 XSPA profile of WS-Trust Implementation

78 The XSPA profile of WS-Trust provides cross-enterprise authorization of entities within and between 79

healthcare information technology (IT) systems by providing common semantics and vocabularies for

interoperable coarse and fine-grained access control.

## 2.1 Interactions between Parties

Figure 1 displays an overview of interactions between parties in the exchange of healthcare information. Elements described in the figure are explained in the subsections below.


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Figure 1: Interaction between Parties

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In the figure above, extracted from the [WS-TRUST] standard, the arrows represent possible communication paths; the requestor MAY obtain a token from the security token service, or it MAY have been obtained indirectly. The requestor then demonstrates authorized use of the token to the Web service. The Web service either trusts the issuing security token service or MAY request a token service to validate the token (or the Web service MAY validate the token itself).

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The following figure (2) provides additional detail during a healthcare information exchange between two organizations. This figure is representative of architecture demonstrated at the RSA 2010 Oasis XSPA Interopability Demonstration (Interop) in March of 2010.

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


Figure 2 Interactions as demonstrated RSA 2010 Oasis XSPA Interop

#### 2.1.1 Access Control Service at Service User

- 101 The XSPA profile of WS-Trust supports sending all requests through an Access Control Service (ACS).
- 102 The ACS receives the Request Security Token (RST) from the Service User and responds with a Request
- 103 Security Token Response (RSTR) containing SAML assertions regarding user authorizations and
- 104 attributes.

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- To perform its function, the ACS may acquire additional attribute information related to user location, role,
- 106 purpose of use, and requested resource requirement and actions. The requesting ACS is responsible for
- 107 enforcement of the access control decision.
- 108 It should be noted that the ACS may make an access control decision to deny access to remote
- 109 resources based on local internal policies.

#### 2.1.2 Access Control Service at Service Provider

- 111 The Service Provider ACS is responsible for the parsing of assertions, evaluating the assertions against
- the security and privacy policy, and making and enforcing a decision on behalf of the Service Provider.

## 2.1.3 Security Policy

- 114 The security policy includes the rules regarding authorizations required to access a protected resource
- and additional security conditions (location, time of day, cardinality, separation of duty, purpose, etc.) that
- 116 constrain enforcement.

## 2.1.4 Privacy Policy

- The privacy policy includes the set of consent directives and other privacy conditions (object masking,
- object filtering, user, role, purpose, etc.) that constrain enforcement.

## 120 **2.2 Transmission Integrity**

- 121 The XSPA profile of WS-Trust recommends the use of reliable transmission protocols. Where
- 122 transmission integrity is required, this profile makes no specific recommendations regarding mechanism
- 123 or assurance level.

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## 124 **2.3 Transmission Confidentiality**

- 125 The XSPA profile of WS-Trust recommends the use of secure transmission protocols. Where
- 126 transmission confidentiality is required, this profile makes no specific recommendations regarding
- 127 mechanisms.

## 128 2.4 Error States

129 This profile adheres to error states described in WS-Trust v1.3.

## 2.5 Security Considerations

- 131 The following security considerations are established for the XSPA profile of WS-Trust:
- Participating information domains have agreed to use XSPA profile and that a trust relationship exists,
  - Entities are members of defined information domains under the authorization control of a defined set of policies,
    - Entities have been identified and provisioned (credentials issued, privileges granted, etc.) in accordance with policy,
    - Privacy policies have been identified and provisioned (consents, user preferences, etc.) in accordance with policy.
  - Pre-existing security and privacy policies have been provisioned to Access Control Services,
  - The capabilities and location of requested information/document repository services are known,
- Secure channels are established as required by policy,
  - Audit services are operational and initialized, and
- Entities have asserted membership in an information domain by successful and unique authentication.

#### 2.6 Confirmation Identifiers

- 147 The manner used by the relying party to confirm that the requester message came from a system entity
- that is associated with the subject of the assertion will depend upon the context and sensitivity of the
- data. For confirmations requiring a specific level of assurance, this profile specifies the use of National
- 150 Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-63 Electronic Authentication
- 151 Guideline. In addition, this profile specifies the Liberty Identity Access Framework (LIAF) criteria for
- evaluating and approving credential service providers.

#### 2.7 Metadata Definitions

This profile will utilize the WS-Trust <a href="AttributeStatement">AttributeStatement</a> to inject a SAML assertion into request.

## 2.8 Naming Syntax, Restrictions and Acceptable Values

This profile conforms to WS-Trust v1.3 specification. 156

#### 2.9 Namespace Requirements 157

158 This profile will support the namespace requirements described in WS-Trust v1.3.

#### 2.10 Attribute Rules of Equality 159

- 160 All asserted attributes child to <a href="AttributeStatement">AttributeStatement</a> element will be typed as strings. Two <a href="Attributes">AttributeS</a>
- elements refer to the same SAML attribute if and only if their Name XML attribute values are equal in a 161
- 162 binary comparison.

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## 2.11 WS-Trust Claims

- The optional wst:Claims parameter defined in [WS-Trust] can be used by the service provider to specify 164
- its claims requirements, as well as by the client to pass claims at run time. 165

#### 2.11.1 **XSPA Dialect (normative)** 166

- This profile defines a dialect for using wst:Claims with XSPA. The dialect is identified by the following 167 168 URI:
  - urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:claims

#### 2.11.2 XSPA ClaimType (normative)

- The XSPA dialect also defines the xspa:ClaimType element. The xspa:ClaimType is a child element of wst:Claims. One or many xspa:ClaimType(s) may be included in a wst:Claims.
- 173 Example of use:

```
<xspa:ClaimType uri="xs:anyURI" optional="xs:boolean">
    <xspa:ClaimValue>xs:string</xspa:ClaimValue>
</xspa:ClaimType>
```

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Table 1: XSPA ClaimType (Normative)

Тад	Description
/xspa:ClaimType	Represents claim
/xspa:ClaimType/@Uri	The unique identifier specifying the claim type.
/xspa:ClaimType/@Optional	Defaults to true.
/xspa:ClaimValue	The specific value specified in the claim, optional.

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#### Example of use:

```
<wst:Claims Dialect="urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:claims">
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              <xspa:ClaimType Uri="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id"/>
183
              <xspa:ClaimType Uri="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:subject:role"/>
              <xspa:ClaimType Uri="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:resource:resource-id"/>
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185
              <xspa:ClaimType Uri="urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:subject:purposeofuse"/>
              <xspa:ClaimType Uri="urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:subject:npi"</pre>
          optional="true"/>
          </wst:Claims>
```

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#### 190 Example of use:

#### 2.11.3 XSPA Claims – Static vs. Runtime

Many of the attributes described in this profile may be delivered to an STS from an Identity Management Provider. These attributes describe the requesting individual, his or her unique identifier and permissions. And organization information, all of which are static in nature.

Other attributes must be determined at runtime, are usually based on work flow, state, or application knowledge. It is RECOMMENDED at minimum implementers should support dynamic assertion of following XSPA claims.

Table 2: XSPA Claims Determined at Runtime

ClaimType	Description
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:subject:purposeofuse	The standards based healthcare reason why user is requesting resource.
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id	The resource being requested.
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:resource:hI7:type	The type of resource being requested.
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:subject:functional-role	The role internal to the requesting organization that may be based on current workflow.
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id	Create, read, update, delete, execute, etc.

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## 2.12 Attribute Naming Syntax, Restrictions and Acceptable Values

This profile leverages the attribute naming syntax, restrictions and acceptable values defined in **[XSPA-SAML]** and **[XSPA-XACML]**, both utilize the namespace of urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0.

The following table lists attribute naming syntax, restrictions, and acceptable values that are discussed in greater detail in the subsections below.

Notes on Table 3:

- The OID for the HL7 Permission Catalog [HL7-PERM] is 2.16.840.1.113883.13.27.
- The OID for structural roles referenced in **[ASTM E1986-09 (2009)]** is 1.2.840.10065.1986.7.
- The mechanism used to identify the patent in a standardized way, e.g. resource:resource-id, is outside the scope of the profile.
- HL7 RBAC Permission Catalog [HL7-PERM] represents a conformant minimum interoperability set for object/action pairings.

Table 3: XSPA Standard Attributes (Normative)

Identifier	Туре	Valid Values
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id	String	Name of the user as required by Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Disclosure Accounting. The name will be typed as a string and in plain text.

urn:oasis:names:tc:xpsa:1.0:subject:organization	String	Organization the requestor belongs to as required by Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Disclosure Accounting.
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:subject:organization-id	anyURI	Unique identifier of the consuming organization and/or facility
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:subject:hl7:permission	String	Refer to [HL7-PERM] and its OID representation.
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:subject:role	String	Structural Role refer to [ASTM E1986-09 (2009)] and its OID representation.
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:subject:purposeofuse	String	TREATMENT, PAYMENT, OPERATIONS, EMERGENCY, SYSADMIN, MARKETING, RESEARCH, REQUEST, PUBLICHEALTH
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id	String	Unique identifier of the resource defined by and controlled by the servicing organization. In healthcare this is the patient unique identifier.
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:resource:hl7:type	String	For minimum interoperability set of objects and supporting actions refer to [HL7-PERM] and their OID representations.
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:environment:locality	String	Unique identifier of the servicing organization.
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:2.0:subject:npi	String	National Provider ID provided by U.S. Government for all active providers.

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#### 2.12.1 Name

Name is the name of the user as required by Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
Privacy Disclosure Accounting.

## 222 2.12.2 National Provider Identifier (NPI) – (optional)

NPI is a US Government issued unique provider identifier required for all Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Disclosure Accounting transactions.

## 2.12.3 Organization

Organization is the organization that the user belongs to as required by HIPAA Privacy Disclosure Accounting.

## 2.12.4 Organization-ID

229 Organization-ID is the unique identifier of the consuming organization and/or facility.

## 230 2.12.5 Structural Role

- 231 Structural Role is the value of the principal's structural role. Structural roles that are used in this profile
- are defined in Table 2 "Healthcare Personnel that Warrant Differing Levels of Access Control" of ASTM
- 233 1986-09 (2009) Standard Guide for Information Access Privileges to Health Information.
- 234 ASTM E1986 Structural roles are described in greater depth in ASTM E2595-07, Standard Guide for
- 235 Privilege Management Infrastructure.
- 236 Structural roles provide authorizations on objects at a global level without regard to internal details.
- Examples include authorization to participate in a session, authorization to connect to a database,
- authorization to participate in an order workflow, or connection to a protected uniform resource locator
- 239 (URL). The structural role is the role name referenced by the patient's consent directive.

#### 240 2.12.6 Functional Role

- 241 Functional role can include custom attributes related to application functionality agreed upon by the
- 242 parties in an exchange.

## 243 2.12.7 Permission (optional)

- 244 Permission is not required by this profile. Permission is determined by the action on the target. See
- 245 "Action" below. The permission is the ANSI INCITS (International Committee for Information Technology
- 246 Standards) RBAC compliant action-object pair representing the authorization required for access by the
- 247 protected resource.

#### 248 **2.12.8 Action**

- The HL7 (Health Level Seven) RBAC Permission catalog is an ANSI INCITS 359-2004 RBAC compliant
- vocabulary that provides a minimal permission subset for interoperability. This profile specifies the use of
- the following HL7 RBAC Permission Catalog Actions:
- 252 Append
- 253 Create
- 254 Delete
- 255 Read
- Update
- Execute

## 258 2.12.9 Execute (optional)

- 259 Execute refers to complex functions and stored procedures that provide for extended actions within the
- healthcare environment. Examples include "print", "suspend", and "sign". Execute can include custom
- attributes related to functionality agreed upon by the parties in an exchange.

## 262 **2.12.10 Object**

- Objects are any system resource subject to access control. This profile specifies the use of HL7 RBAC
- Permission Catalog as the object vocabulary in an action-object permission pair. HL7 RBAC Permission
- 265 Catalog provides the minimum set of interoperable objects suitable for the support of security and privacy
- 266 access control decisions in this profile.

## 267 **2.12.11 Purpose of Use (POU)**

- 268 Purpose of use provides context to requests for information resources. Each purpose of use will be
- unique to a specific assertion, and will establish the context for other security and privacy attributes. For
- a given claim, all assertions must be bound to the same purpose of use. Purpose of use allows the

service to consult its policies to determine if the user's authorizations meet or exceed those needed for access control.

The following list of healthcare related purposes of use is specified by this profile:

Table 4: Values for Purpose of Use

Description	Allowed Value
Healthcare Treatment	TREATMENT
Payment	PAYMENT
Operations	OPERATIONS
Emergency Treatment	EMERGENCY
System Administration	SYSADMIN
Research	RESEARCH
Marketing	MARKETING
Request of the Individual	REQUEST
Public Health	PUBLICHEALTH

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
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The figure below illustrates the general relationship between subject (user) and granted permissions to specific objects as a relationship to their POU. Roles in this relationship are placeholders for permissions. Permission defines the object-action relationship.

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Figure 3: Determining Subject Permissions

## **2.12.12 Resource**

The object(s) for which access is requested must be identical to the object(s) for which the authorization assertions of this profile apply. A requested resource is not required to be a simple object but may

instead be a process or workflow. This profile specifies the use of HL7 RBAC Permission Catalog as the resource vocabulary.

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# 3 Examples of Use

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The following examples of WS-Trust request and response messages are intended to provide additional guidance to implementers of this profile.

## 3.1 WS-Trust Event Flow

The following figure represents an example flow of messages and attributes and is non-normative.




Figure 4: Cross-Enterprise Example Interaction

## 4 Conformance

## 4.1 Introduction

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- The XSPA profile of WS-Trust addresses the following aspects of conformance:
  - This profile describes a minimum vocabulary set that must be supported in order to claim conformance.
  - An implementation must conform at minimum to the WS-Trust v1.3 specification and implement support for xspa:Dialect, and xspa:ClaimType described in section 2.11 of this profile.

## 4.2 Conformance Tables

- The table below identifies portions of the profile that MUST be adhered to in order to claim conformance.
- Note: "M" is mandatory and MUST be used, "O" is optional, "P" is preferred, and "n/a" is not applicable.

## 4.3 Attributes

The implementation MUST use the attributes associated with the identifiers in the table below consistent with descriptions in this profile.

Table 5: Attribute	Mamina	Tunina	and Assentable	1/0/110	0-4
Table 5 Allifollie	MARTINO	I VDIIIO	ano accepiable	value	יאכי.

Identifier	Required Attribute	Runtime Claim Assertion	Claim Asserted Externally
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:subject:subject-id	М	0	Р
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:subject:organization-id	М	0	Р
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:organization	М	0	Р
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:subject:hl7:permission	0	0	Р
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:2.0:subject:role (ASTM E1986-09 (2009) Structured Role Value)	М	0	Р
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:subject:functional-role	0	Р	n/a
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:subject:purposeofuse	М	Р	n/a
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:resource:resource-id	М	Р	n/a
urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id (HL7 Permission Catalog Resource Action Value)	0	Р	n/a
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:resource:hl7:type (HL7 Permission Catalog Object Value)	0	Р	n/a

Identifier	Required Attribute	Runtime Claim Assertion	Claim Asserted Externally
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:1.0:environment:locality	М	0	n/a
urn:oasis:names:tc:xspa:2.0:subject:npi	0	0	Р

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