



# Web Services Security SOAP Message with Attachments (SwA) Profile Version 1.1.1

## OASIS Standard

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#### Additional artifacts:

This prose specification is one component of a multi-part Work Product which includes:

- *Web Services Security Kerberos Token Profile Version 1.1.1.* <http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-KerberosTokenProfile-v1.1.1-os.html>.
- *Web Services Security Rights Expression Language (REL) Token Profile Version 1.1.1.* <http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-rel-token-profile-v1.1.1-os.html>.
- *Web Services Security SAML Token Profile Version 1.1.1.* <http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-SAMLTOKENProfile-v1.1.1-os.html>.
- *Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security Version 1.1.1.* <http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-SOAPMessageSecurity-v1.1.1-os.html>.
- *Web Services Security SOAP Message with Attachments (SwA) Profile Version 1.1.1.* <http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-SwAProfile-v1.1.1-os.html>. (this document)
- *Web Services Security Username Token Profile Version 1.1.1.* <http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-UsernameTokenProfile-v1.1.1-os.html>.
- *Web Services Security X.509 Certificate Token Profile Version 1.1.1.* <http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-x509TokenProfile-v1.1.1-os.html>.
- XML schemas: <http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/xsd/>

### Related work:

This specification supersedes:

- *Web Services Security SOAP Messages with Attachments (SwA) Profile 1.1*. 01 November 2006. OASIS Standard incorporating Approved Errata.  
<http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/v1.1/wss-v1.1-spec-errata-os-SwAProfile.html>
- *Web Services Security SOAP Messages with Attachments (SwA) Profile 1.1*. 01 November 2006. OASIS Approved Errata.  
<http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/v1.1/wss-v1.1-errata-os-SwAProfile.html>

### Abstract:

This specification defines how to use the OASIS Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security standard [WSS-Sec] with SOAP Messages with Attachments [SwA].

This document integrates specific error corrections or editorial changes to the preceding specification, within the scope of the Web Services Security and this TC.

This document introduces a third digit in the numbering convention where the third digit represents a consolidation of error corrections, bug fixes or editorial formatting changes (e.g., 1.1.1); it does not add any new features beyond those of the base specifications (e.g., 1.1).

### Status:

This document was last revised or approved by the membership of OASIS on the above date. The level of approval is also listed above. Check the “Latest version” location noted above for possible later revisions of this document.

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# 1 Introduction

This section is non-normative. Note that sections 2.1, 2.2 and 5 are normative. All other sections are non-normative.

This document describes how to use the OASIS Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security standard [WSS-Sec] with SOAP Messages with Attachments [SwA]. More specifically, it describes how a web service consumer can secure SOAP attachments using SOAP Message Security for attachment integrity, confidentiality and origin authentication, and how a receiver may process such a message.

A broad range of industries - automotive, insurance, financial, pharmaceutical, medical, retail, etc - require that their application data be secured from its originator to its ultimate consumer. While some of this data will be XML, quite a lot of it will not be. In order for these industries to deploy web service solutions, they need an interoperable standard for end-to-end security for both their XML data and their non-XML data.

Profiling SwA security may help interoperability between the firms and trading partners using attachments to convey non-XML data that is not necessarily linked to the XML payload. Many industries, such as the insurance industry require free-format document exchange in conjunction with web services messages. This profile of SwA should be of value in these cases.

In addition, some content that could be conveyed as part of the SOAP body may be conveyed as an attachment due to its large size to reduce the impact on message and XML processing, and may be secured as described in this profile.

This profile is applicable to using SOAP Message Security in conjunction with SOAP Messages with Attachments (SwA). This means the scope is limited to SOAP 1.1, the scope of SwA.

Goals of this profile include the following:

- Enable those who choose to use SwA to secure these messages, including chosen attachments, using SOAP Message Security
- Allow the choice of securing MIME header information exposed to the SOAP layer, if desired.
- Do not interfere with MIME transfer mechanisms, in particular, allow MIME transfer encodings to change to support MIME transfer, despite support for integrity protection.
- Do not interfere with the SOAP processing model – in particular allow SwA messages to transit SOAP intermediaries.

Non-goals include:

- Provide guidance on which of a variety of security mechanisms are appropriate to a given application. The choice of transport layer security (e.g. SSL/TLS), S/MIME, application use of XML Signature and XML Encryption, and other SOAP attachment mechanisms (MTOM) is explicitly out of scope. This profile assumes a need and desire to secure SwA using SOAP Message security.
- Outline how different security mechanisms may be used in combination.
- Enable persisting signatures. It may be possible depending on the situation and measures taken, but is not discussed in this profile.
- Support signing and/or encryption of portions of attachments. This is not supported by this profile, but is not necessarily precluded. Application use of XML Signature and XML Encryption may be used to accomplish this. SOAP Message security may also support this in some circumstances, but this profile does not address or define such usage.

The existence of this profile does not preclude using other mechanisms to secure attachments conveyed in conjunction with SOAP messages, including the use of XML security technologies at the application layer or the use of security for the XML Infoset before a serialization that uses attachment technology [MTOM]. The requirements in this profile only apply when securing SwA attachments explicitly according to this profile.

---

## 47 2 Notations and Terminology

### 48 2.1 Notational Conventions

49 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD  
50 NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this specification are to be interpreted as  
51 described in IETF RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

52 Listings of productions or other normative code appear like this.

53  
54 Example code listings appear like this.

55 **Note:** Non-normative notes and explanations appear like this.

56 When describing abstract data models, this specification uses the notational convention used by the XML  
57 Infoset. Specifically, abstract property names always appear in square brackets (e.g., [some property]).

58 When describing concrete XML schemas [XML-Schema], this specification uses the notational convention  
59 of OASIS Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security. Specifically, each member of an element's  
60 [children] or [attributes] property is described using an XPath-like [XPath] notation (e.g.,  
61 /x:MyHeader/x:SomeProperty/@value1). The use of {any} indicates the presence of an element wildcard  
62 (<xs:any/>). The use of @{any} indicates the presence of an attribute wildcard (<xs:anyAttribute/>).

63 Commonly used security terms are defined in the Internet Security Glossary [SECGLO]. Readers are  
64 presumed to be familiar with the terms in this glossary as well as the definitions in the SOAP Message  
65 Security specification [WSS-Sec].

### 66 2.1.1 Namespaces

67 Namespace URIs (of the general form "some-URI") represent application-dependent or context-  
68 dependent URIs as defined in RFC 2396 [RFC2396]. This specification is designed to work with the  
69 SOAP 1.1 [SOAP11] message structure and message processing model, the version of SOAP supported  
70 by SOAP Messages with Attachments. The current SOAP 1.1 namespace URI is used herein to provide  
71 detailed examples.

72 The namespaces used in this document are shown in the following table (note that for brevity, the  
73 examples use the prefixes listed below but do *not* include the URIs – those listed below are assumed).

Prefix	Namespace
ds	<a href="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#</a>
S11	<a href="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/</a>
wsse	<a href="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd">http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd</a>
wsu	<a href="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd">http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd</a>
wsswa	<a href="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-SwAProfile-1.1.xsd">http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-SwAProfile-1.1.xsd</a>
xenc	<a href="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#</a>

74  
75 The URLs provided for the wsse and wsu namespaces can be used to obtain the schema files.



## 76 2.1.2 Acronyms and Abbreviations

77 The following (non-normative) table defines acronyms and abbreviations for this document, beyond those  
78 defined in the SOAP Message Security standard.

Term	Definition
CID	Content ID scheme for URLs. Refers to Multipart MIME body part, that includes both MIME headers and content for that part. [RFC2392]
SwA	SOAP Messages with Attachments [SwA]

## 79 2.2 Normative References

80	[RFC 2119]	S. Bradner. <i>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</i> . IETF RFC 2119, March 1997. <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt</a> .
81		
82	[CHARSETS]	Character sets assigned by IANA. See
83		<a href="http://www.iana.org/assignments/character-sets">http://www.iana.org/assignments/character-sets</a> .
84	[Excl-Canon]	"Exclusive XML Canonicalization, Version 1.0", W3C Recommendation, 18 July
85		2002. <a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/xml-exc-c14n/">http://www.w3.org/TR/xml-exc-c14n/</a> .
86	[RFC2045]	"Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet
87		Message Bodies", IETF RFC 2045, November 1996,
88		<a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2045.txt">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2045.txt</a> .
89	[RFC2046]	"Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", IETF
90		RFC 2046, November 1996, <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2046.txt">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2046.txt</a> .
91	[RFC2047]	"Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Three: Message Header
92		Extensions for Non-ASCII Text", IETF RFC 2047, November 1996,
93		<a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2047.txt">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2047.txt</a> .
94	[RFC2048]	"Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Four: Registration
95		Procedures", <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2048.txt">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2048.txt</a> .
96	[RFC2049]	"Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Five: Conformance Criteria
97		and Examples", <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2049.txt">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2049.txt</a> .
98	[RFC2119]	S. Bradner, "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", IETF
99		RFC 2119, March 1997, <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt</a> .
100	[RFC2184]	P. Resnick, "MIME Parameter Value and Encoded Word Extensions: Character
101		Sets, Languages, and Continuations", IETF RFC 2184, August 1997,
102		<a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2184.txt">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2184.txt</a> .
103	[RFC2392]	E. Levinson, "Content-ID and Message-ID Uniform Resource Locators", IETF
104		RFC 2392, <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2392.txt">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2392.txt</a> .
105	[RFC2396]	T. Berners-Lee, R. Fielding, L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI):
106		Generic Syntax," RFC 2396, MIT/LCS, U.C. Irvine, Xerox Corporation, August
107		1998, <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2396.txt">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2396.txt</a> .
108	[RFC2557]	"MIME Encapsulation of Aggregate Documents, such as HTML (MHTML)", IETF
109		RFC 2557, March 1999, <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2557.txt">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2557.txt</a> .
110	[RFC2633]	Ramsdell B., "S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification", Standards Track RFC
111		2633, June 1999. <a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2633.txt">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2633.txt</a> .
112	[RFC2822]	"Internet Message Format", IETF RFC 2822, April 2001,
113		<a href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2822.txt">http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2822.txt</a> .
114	[SECGLO]	"Internet Security Glossary," Informational RFC 2828, May 2000.
115	[SOAP11]	"SOAP: Simple Object Access Protocol 1.1", W3C Note, 08 May 2000.
116	[SwA]	"SOAP Messages with Attachments", W3C Note, 11 December 2000,
117		<a href="http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/NOTE-SOAP-attachments-20001211">http://www.w3.org/TR/2000/NOTE-SOAP-attachments-20001211</a> .
118	[WS-I-AP]	"Attachments Profile Version 1.0", <i>Final Material</i> , 2004-08-24, <a href="http://www.ws-i.org/Profiles/AttachmentsProfile-1.0.html">http://www.ws-</a>
119		<a href="http://www.ws-i.org/Profiles/AttachmentsProfile-1.0.html">i.org/Profiles/AttachmentsProfile-1.0.html</a> .

120 **[WSS-Sec]** *Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security Version 1.1.1*. 18 May 2012.  
121 OASIS Standard. <http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss->  
122 [SOAPMessageSecurity-v1.1.1-os.html](http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss-m/wss/v1.1.1/os/wss-SOAPMessageSecurity-v1.1.1-os.html).

123 **[XML-Schema]** W3C Recommendation, "XML Schema Part 1: Structures", 2 May 2001,  
124 <http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xmlschema-1-20010502/>.

125 W3C Recommendation, "XML Schema Part 2: Datatypes", 2 May 2001,  
126 <http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xmlschema-2-20010502/>.

127 **[XML-Sig]** W3C Recommendation, "XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", 12 February  
128 2002, <http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlsig-core/>.

129 **[XPath]** W3C Recommendation, "XML Path Language", 16 November  
130 1999, <http://www.w3.org/TR/xpath>.

## 131 2.3 Non-normative References

132 **[DecryptT]** M. Hughes et al, "Decryption Transform for XML Signature",  
133 W3C Recommendation, 10 December 2002. [http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-](http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-decrypt)  
134 [decrypt](http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-decrypt)

135 **[MTOM]** "SOAP Message Transmission Optimization Mechanism", W3C  
136 Recommendation, 25 January 2005, <http://www.w3.org/TR/soap12-mtom/>.



137

## 3 MIME Processing

138 This profile is concerned with the securing of SOAP messages with attachments, attachments that are  
139 conveyed as MIME parts in a multi-part MIME message as outlined in SOAP Messages with  
140 Attachments[SwA]. This involves two processing layers, SOAP messaging and MIME transfer. This  
141 specification defines processing of a merged SOAP and MIME layer, in order to meet SwA security  
142 requirements. It relies on an underlying MIME transfer layer that allows changes to MIME transfer  
143 encoding as a message transits MIME nodes. This profile does not impose restrictions on that MIME  
144 transfer layer apart from aspects that are exposed to the SOAP processing layer. Likewise, this profile  
145 does not restrict the SOAP processing model, including use of SOAP intermediaries, allowing SOAP  
146 Messages with Attachments to transit SOAP nodes.

147 To accommodate the ability to secure attachment headers that are exposed to the SOAP message layer  
148 and application, this profile does not assume a strict protocol layering of MIME, SOAP and application.  
149 Rather, this profile allows a SOAP sender to create a primary SOAP envelope as well as attachments to  
150 be sent with the message. It is up to the application which, if any, of the attachments are referenced from  
151 SOAP header and/or body blocks. The application may be aware of, and concerned with, certain aspects  
152 of the attachment MIME representation, including Content-Type and Content-Length headers, to give two  
153 examples. Due to this concern, the application may choose to secure these exposed headers. This does  
154 not mean, however, that the application and SOAP layer are aware or concerned with all MIME headers  
155 used for MIME transit, in particular issues related to transfer encoding. The expectation is that the MIME  
156 processing layer of the sender and receiver will handle transfer encoding issues, hiding this detail from  
157 the processing layer associated with this profile. As a result, this specification focuses on those aspects of  
158 MIME processing that are exposed and of concern to higher protocol layers, while ignoring MIME transit  
159 specific details.

160 This model has two implications. First, it means that certain aspects of MIME processing, such as transfer  
161 encoding processing, are out of scope of the profile and do not need to be addressed. Secondly, it means  
162 that many of the MIME headers are also out of scope of the profile and the profile does not support  
163 integrity protection of these headers, since they are expected to change. If more security protection is  
164 required then it must occur by other means, such as with a protocol layer below the MIME layer, for  
165 example transport security (with the understanding that such security may not always apply end-end).

166 Use of this profile is intended to be independent of MIME-specific security processing, although care must  
167 be taken when using both SOAP Message Security and S/MIME. When conveyed end-to-end, S/MIME  
168 content may be conveyed opaquely as one or more attachments, as a MIME content type. If S/MIME  
169 security is to be used between nodes that convey the SOAP message, then this may also be opaque to  
170 SOAP Message Security, as long as the attachment that was sent by the initial SOAP sender is the same  
171 as that which is received by the receiving SOAP intermediary or ultimate SOAP receiver. Care must be  
172 taken to ensure this will be the case. Clearly SOAP Message Security encryption could prevent S/MIME  
173 processing of an attachment, and likewise S/MIME encryption could prevent SOAP Message Security  
174 signature verification if these techniques are interleaved. This potential concern is out of scope of this  
175 profile.

---

## 176 4 XML Attachments

177 A SOAP Messages with Attachments multi-part MIME structure contains a primary SOAP envelope in the  
178 root part and one or more attachments in additional MIME parts. Some of these attachments may have a  
179 content type corresponding to XML, but do not contain the primary SOAP envelope to be processed.

180 Some attachments associated with the SOAP body may be targeted at the SOAP Ultimate Receiver  
181 along with the SOAP body and may be processed at the application layer along with the body. Others  
182 may be targeted at intermediaries. How attachments are to be processed and how these attachments are  
183 referenced from SOAP header and body blocks, if at all, is dependent on the application. In many cases  
184 the attachment content may not need to be processed as XML as the message traverses intermediaries.

185 Generally requiring canonicalization of XML attachments whenever transmitting them is undesirable, both  
186 due to the potential ambiguities related to the canonicalization context of the attachment (e.g. Is it an  
187 independent XML document, a portion of the primary SOAP envelope, etc) as well as the universal  
188 performance impact of such a canonicalization requirement. When XML attachment content is signed,  
189 then XML canonicalization is required, as is generally the case when signing XML.

190 MIME part canonicalization (as described below) is required for non-XML attachments to enable SOAP  
191 Message Security signatures that are stable despite MIME transfer processing.

---

## 192 5 Securing SOAP With Attachments

193 Attachments may be associated with SOAP messages, as outlined in SOAP Messages with Attachments  
194 [SwA]. This profile defines how such attachments may be secured for integrity and confidentiality using  
195 the OASIS Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security standard. This does not preclude using  
196 other techniques. The requirements in this profile only apply when securing SwA attachments explicitly  
197 according to this profile.

198 This profile considers all attachments as opaque whether they are XML or some other content type. It is  
199 the sole responsibility of the application to perform further interpretation of attachments, including the  
200 ability to sign or encrypt portions of those attachments.

### 201 5.1 Primary SOAP Envelope

202 When SOAP attachments are used as specified in [SwA] each SOAP message is accompanied by a  
203 MIME header and possibly multiple boundary parts. This is known as a SOAP message package. This  
204 document assumes that a proper SOAP message package is constructed using the HTTP and MIME  
205 headers appropriate to [SwA].

206 The primary SOAP envelope SHOULD be conveyed in the first MIME part, but MAY be conveyed in  
207 another MIME part when the start attribute is specified in the HTTP Multipart/Related header.

208 In particular, implementations should take care in distinguishing between the HTTP headers in the SOAP  
209 message package and the start of the SOAP payload. For example, the following Multipart/Related  
210 header belongs to the HTTP layer and not the main SOAP payload:

```
211 Content-Type: Multipart/Related; boundary=xyz; type="text/xml"; start="<foo>"
```

212 The main SOAP payload begins with the appropriate boundary. For example:

```
213 --xyz  
214 Content-Type: text/xml; charset=utf-8  
215 Content-ID: <foo>  
216  
217 <?xml version='1.0' ?>  
218 <s11:Envelope xmlns:s11="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" />
```

### 219 5.2 Referencing Attachments

220 SOAP Messages with Attachments defines two MIME mechanisms for referencing attachments. The first  
221 mechanism uses a CID scheme URL to refer to the attachment that has a Content-ID MIME header with a  
222 value corresponding to the URL, as defined in [RFC 2392]. For example, a content id of "foo" may be  
223 specified in the MIME part with the MIME header "Content-ID: <foo>" and be referenced using the CID  
224 Schema URL "cid:foo".

225 The second mechanism is to use a URL to refer to an attachment containing a Content-Location MIME  
226 header. In this case the URL may require resolution to determine the referenced attachment [RFC2557].

227 For simplicity and interoperability this profile limits WS-Security references to attachments to CID scheme  
228 URLs. Attachments referenced from WS-Security signature references or cipher references MUST be  
229 referenced using CID scheme URLs.

230 This profile assumes, since it is not defined in RFC 2396 Section 4.2, that all cid: references are not  
231 same-document references and that therefore, under XMLDSIG, dereferencing a cid: URI always yields  
232 an octet stream as input to the transform chain [RFC2396], [XMLDSIG].

### 233 5.3 MIME Part Reference Transforms

234 By definition of RFC 2392, a URI reference to a MIME attachment includes the MIME headers associated  
235 with that attachment as well as the MIME part content [RFC2392]. Since there may be some confusion as

236 to what is referenced, it is useful to clearly indicate what is included in the referenced attachment. In  
237 addition, some applications may wish to only encrypt or include the attachment content in a signature  
238 reference hash, and others may wish to include MIME headers and content.  
239 For these reasons, this profile defines reference transforms, allowing a clear and explicit statement of  
240 what is included in a MIME reference. These transforms are called “MIME Part Reference Transforms”.  
241 The input of each of these transforms is an octet stream, as defined in XML Security [XML-Sig].

### 242 **5.3.1 Attachment-Content-Signature-Transform**

243 The Attachment-Content-Signature-Transform indicates that only the content of a MIME part is  
244 referenced for signing. This transform MUST be identified using the URI value:

```
245 http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-SwAProfile-1.1#Attachment-Content-  
246 Signature-Transform
```

247  
248 When this transform is used the content of the MIME part should be canonicalized as defined in section  
249 5.4.2.

250 The octet stream input to this transform is the entire content of the MIME attachment associated with the  
251 CID, including all the MIME headers and attachment content, as represented in the MIME part containing  
252 the attachment.

253 The output of the transform is an octet stream consisting of the canonicalized serialization of the  
254 attachment content. All of the MIME headers associated with the MIME part are ignored and not included  
255 in the output octet stream. The canonicalization of the content is described in section 5.4.2 of this  
256 specification.

### 257 **5.3.2 Attachment-Complete-Signature-Transform**

258 The Attachment-Complete-Signature-Transform indicates that both the content and selected headers of  
259 the MIME part are referenced for signing. This transform MUST be identified using the URI value:

```
260 http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-SwAProfile-1.1#Attachment-Complete-  
261 Signature-Transform
```

262 This transform specifies that in addition to the content the following MIME headers are to be included  
263 (when present):

- 264 • Content-Description
- 265 • Content-Disposition
- 266 • Content-ID
- 267 • Content-Location
- 268 • Content-Type

269 These headers are included because of their common use and the risks associated with inappropriate  
270 modification. If other headers are to be protected, other mechanisms at the application level should be  
271 used (such as copying values into a SOAP header) and this is out of scope of this profile.

272 Other MIME headers associated with the MIME part serialization are not referenced by the transform and  
273 are not to be included in signature calculations.

274 When this transform is used the MIME headers should be canonicalized as defined in section 5.4.1 and  
275 the MIME content should be canonicalized as defined in section 5.4.2.

276 The octet stream input to this transform is the entire content of the MIME attachment associated with the  
277 CID, including all the MIME headers and attachment content, as represented in the MIME part containing  
278 the attachment.

279 The output of the transform is an octet stream consisting of concatenation of the MIME canonicalized  
280 MIME headers selected by the transform followed by the canonicalized attachment content. The  
281 canonicalization of headers and content are described in sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 of this specification.

### 282 **5.3.3 Attachment-Ciphertext-Transform**

283 The Attachment-Ciphertext-Transform indicates that only the content of a MIME part is referenced, and  
284 contains the ciphertext related to an XML EncryptedData element. This transform MUST be identified  
285 using the URI value:

```
286 http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-SwAProfile-1.1#Attachment-Ciphertext-  
287 Transform
```

288  
289 The octet stream input to this transform is the entire content of the MIME attachment associated with the  
290 CID, including all the MIME headers and attachment content, as represented in the MIME part containing  
291 the attachment.

292 The output of the transform is an octet stream consisting of the ciphertext as conveyed in the MIME part  
293 content. All of the MIME headers associated with the MIME part are ignored and not included in the  
294 output octet stream. The MIME text canonicalization of the content is described in section 5.4.2 of this  
295 specification.

## 296 **5.4 Integrity and Data Origin Authentication**

297 Integrity and data origin authentication may be provided for SwA attachments using XML Signatures, as  
298 outlined in the SOAP Message Security standard as profiled in this document. This is useful independent  
299 of the content of the MIME part – for example, it is possible to sign a MIME part that already contains a  
300 signed object created by an application. It may be sensible to sign such an attachment as part of SOAP  
301 Message security so that the receiving SOAP node may verify that all attachments are intact before  
302 delivering them to an application. A SOAP intermediary may also choose to perform this verification,  
303 even if the attachments are not otherwise processed by the intermediary.

### 304 **5.4.1 MIME header canonicalization**

305 The result of MIME header canonicalization is a UTF-8 encoded octet stream.

306 Each of the MIME headers listed for the Attachment-Complete transform MUST be canonicalized as part  
307 of that transform processing, as outlined in this section. This means the transform MUST perform the  
308 following actions in interpreting the MIME headers for signature creation or verification (this order is not  
309 prescriptive as long as the same result is obtained)

- 310 1. The transform MUST process MIME headers before the MIME content.
- 311 2. The transform MUST only process MIME headers that are explicitly present in the attachment part and  
312 are listed in the Attachment-Complete transform section of this specification, except that a MIME part  
313 without a Content-Type header MUST be treated as having a Content-Type header with the value  
314 "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii". MIME headers not listed in the Attachment-Complete  
315 transform section of this specification are to be ignored by the transform.
- 316 3. The MIME headers MUST be processed by the Attachment-Complete transform in lexicographic order  
317 (ascending).
- 318 4. The MIME header names MUST be processed by the transform as having the case according to the  
319 MIME specifications (as shown in the Attachment-Complete section).
- 320 5. The MIME header values MUST be unfolded [[RFC2822](#)].
- 321 6. Any Content-Description MIME header containing RFC2047 encoding MUST be decoded [[RFC2047](#)].
- 322 7. When a Content-ID header is processed, the "<>" characters associated with the msg-id MUST be  
323 included in the transform input. The reason is that although semantically these angle bracket  
324 characters are not part of the msg-id (RFC 2822) they are a standard part of the header lexicographic

- 325 representation. If these characters are not integrity protected then an attacker could remove them  
326 causing the CID transformation specified in RFC2392 to fail.
- 327 8. Folding whitespace in structured MIME headers (e.g. Content-Disposition, Content-ID, Content-  
328 Location, Content-Type) that is not within quotes MUST be removed. Folding whitespace in structured  
329 MIME headers that is within quotes MUST be preserved. Folding whitespace in unstructured MIME  
330 headers (e.g. Content-Description) MUST be preserved [RFC2822]. For example, whitespace  
331 immediately following the colon delimiter in the structured Content-Type header MUST be removed,  
332 but whitespace immediately following the colon delimiter in the unstructured Content-Description  
333 header MUST be preserved.
- 334 9. Comments in MIME header values MUST be removed [RFC2822].
- 335 10. Case-insensitive MIME header values (e.g. media type/subtype values and disposition-type values)  
336 MUST be converted to lowercase. Case-sensitive MIME header values MUST be left as is with  
337 respect to case [RFC2045].
- 338 11. Quoted characters other than double-quote and backslash ("\") in quoted strings in structured MIME  
339 headers (e.g. Content-ID) MUST be unquoted. Double-quote and backslash ("\") characters in quoted  
340 strings in structured MIME headers MUST be character encoded [RFC2822].
- 341 12. Canonicalization of a MIME header MUST generate a UTF-8 encoded octet stream containing the  
342 following: the MIME header name, a colon (":"), the MIME header value, and the result of  
343 canonicalizing the MIME header parameters in lexicographic order (ascending) as described below.
- 344 13. MIME header parameter names MUST be converted to lowercase [RFC2045].
- 345 14. MIME parameter values containing RFC2184 character set, language, and continuations MUST be  
346 decoded. The resulting canonical output MUST not contain the RFC2184 encoding [RFC2184].
- 347 15. Case-insensitive MIME header parameter values MUST be converted to lowercase. Case-sensitive  
348 MIME header parameter values MUST be left as is with respect to case [RFC2045].
- 349 16. Enclosing double-quotes MUST be added to MIME header parameter values that do not already  
350 contain enclosing quotes. Quoted characters other than double-quote and backslash ("\") in MIME  
351 header parameter values MUST be unquoted. Double-quote and backslash characters in MIME  
352 parameter values MUST be character encoded.
- 353 17. Canonicalization of a MIME header parameter MUST generate a UTF-8 encoded octet stream  
354 containing the following: a semi-colon (";"), the parameter name (lowercase), an equals sign ("="), and  
355 the double-quoted parameter value.
- 356 18. Each header MUST be terminated by a single CRLF pair, without any trailing whitespace.
- 357 19. The last header MUST be followed by a single CRLF and then the MIME content.

## 358 5.4.2 MIME Content Canonicalization

359 Before including attachment content in a signature reference hash calculation, that MIME attachment  
360 SHOULD be canonicalized. The reason is that signature verification requires an identical hash of content  
361 as when signing occurred.

362 Content of an XML Content-Type MUST be XML canonicalized using Exclusive XML Canonicalization  
363 without comments, as specified by the URI <http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#> [Excl-Canon]. The  
364 reason for requiring Exclusive Canonicalization is that many implementations will support Exclusive  
365 Canonicalization for other XML Signature purposes, since this form of canonicalization supports context  
366 changes. The InclusiveNamespace PrefixList attribute SHOULD be empty or not present.

367 Other types of MIME content SHOULD be canonicalized according to the MIME part canonicalization  
368 mechanism appropriate to the Content-Type of the MIME part.

369 To quote the S/MIME specification (section 3.1.1 "Canonicalization") which deals with this issue  
370 [RFC2633]:

371 The exact details of canonicalization depend on the actual MIME type and subtype of an  
372 entity, and are not described here. Instead, the standard for the particular MIME type should  
373 be consulted. For example, canonicalization of type text/plain is different from  
374 canonicalization of audio/basic. Other than text types, most types have only one



375 representation regardless of computing platform or environment which can be considered  
376 their canonical representation.

377 MIME types are registered. This registration includes a section on "Canonicalization and Format  
378 Requirements" [RFC2048] and requires each MIME type to have a canonical representation.

379  
380 The MIME "text" type canonical form is defined in the MIME conformance specification (See "Canonical  
381 Encoding Model") [RFC2049]. Important aspects of "text" media type canonicalization include line ending  
382 normalization to <CR><LF> and ensuring that the charset is a registered charset (see RFC 2633 section  
383 "Canonicalization"). [RFC2633, CHARSETS, RFC2045].

### 384 **5.4.3 Protecting against attachment insertion threat**

385 Including an attachment in a signature calculation enables a receiver to detect modification of that  
386 attachment. Including all attachments in a signature calculation, by providing a <ds:Reference> for each,  
387 protects against the threat of attachment removal. This does not protect against insertion of a new  
388 attachment.

389 The simplest protection against attachment insertion is for the receiver to know that all attachments  
390 should be included in a signature calculation – unreferenced attachments are then an indication of an  
391 attachment insertion attack.

392 Such information may be communicated in or out of band. Definition of these approaches is out of the  
393 scope of this profile.

### 394 **5.4.4 Processing Rules for Attachment Signing**

395 The processing rule for signing is modified based on the SOAP Message Security rules.

396 After determining which attachments are to be included as references in a signature, create a  
397 <ds:Signature> element in a <wsse:Security> header block targeted at the recipient, including a  
398 <ds:Reference> for each attachment to be protected by the signature. Additional <ds:Reference>  
399 elements may refer to content in the SOAP envelope to be included in the signature.

400 For each attachment Reference, perform the following steps:

- 401 1. MIME Part Canonicalize the content of the attachment, as appropriate to the MIME type of the part, as  
402 outlined in section 5.4.2. Attachments of an XML content type require Exclusive XML Canonicalization  
403 without comments[Excl-Canon].
- 404 2. If MIME headers are to be included in the signature, perform MIME header canonicalization as  
405 outlined in section 5.4.1.
- 406 3. Determine the CID scheme URL to be used to reference the part and set the <ds:Reference> URL  
407 attribute value to this URL.
- 408 4. Include a <ds:Transforms> element in the <ds:Reference>. This <ds:Transforms> element MUST  
409 include a <ds:Transform> element with the Algorithm attribute having the full URL value specified  
410 earlier in this profile – corresponding to either the Attachment-Complete-Signature-Transform or  
411 Attachment-Content-Signature-Transform, depending on what is to be included in the hash calculation.  
412 This MUST be the first transform listed. The <ds:Transform> element MUST NOT contain any  
413 transform for a MIME transfer encoding purpose (e.g. base64 encoding) since transfer encoding is left  
414 to the MIME layer as noted in section 2. This does not preclude the use of XML Transforms, including  
415 a base64 transform, for other purposes.
- 416 5. Extract the appropriate portion of the MIME part consistent with the selected transform.
- 417 6. Create the <ds:Reference> hash value as outlined in the W3C XML Digital Signature  
418 Recommendation.



## 419 5.4.5 Processing Rules for Attachment Signature Verification

420 Signature verification is performed as outlined in SOAP Message Security and the XML Digital Signature  
421 Recommendation, with the following considerations for SwA attachments.

422 To verify <ds:Reference> hashes for SwA attachments, the following steps must be performed for each  
423 reference to an attachment:

- 424 1. Find the attachment corresponding to the <ds:Reference> URL attribute value. This value MUST  
425 correspond to the Content-ID for the attachment[SwA].
- 426 2. MIME Part Canonicalize the content of the attachment, as appropriate to the MIME type of the part, as  
427 outlined in section 5.4.2. Attachments of an XML content type require Exclusive XML Canonicalization  
428 without comments[Excl-Canon]. The MIME content to be MIME canonicalized MUST have had any  
429 transfer-encoding processed at the MIME layer before this step is performed.
- 430 3. If MIME headers were included in the signature, perform MIME header canonicalization as outlined in  
431 section 5.4.1.
- 432 4. Extract the appropriate portion of the MIME part according to the MIME Part Signature Transform  
433 value.
- 434 5. Calculate the reference hash and verify the reference.

## 435 5.4.6 Example Signed Message

```
436 Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary="BoundaryStr" type="text/xml"
437 --BoundaryStr
438 Content-Type: text/xml
439
440 <S11:Envelope xmlns:S11="..." xmlns:wsse="..." xmlns:wsu="..." xmlns:ds="..."
441 xmlns:xenc="...">
442   <S11:Header>
443     <wsse:Security>
444
445       <wsse:BinarySecurityToken wsu:Id="CertAssociatedWithSigningKey"
446         EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-
447 wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary"
448         ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-
449 x509-token-profile-1.0#x509v3">
450         ...
451       </wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
452
453       <ds:Signature>
454         <ds:SignedInfo>
455           <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm=
456 'http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#' />
457           <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm=
458 'http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1' />
459           <ds:Reference URI="cid:bar">
460             <ds:Transforms>
461               <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-
462 wss-SwAProfile-1.1#Attachment-Content-Signature-Transform"/>
463             </ds:Transforms>
464             <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm=
465 'http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1' />
466             <ds:DigestValue>j6lwx3rvEPO0vKtMup4NbeVu8nk=</ds:DigestValue>
467           </ds:Reference>
468         </ds:SignedInfo>
469         <ds:SignatureValue>DeadBeef</ds:SignatureValue>
470
471       <ds:KeyInfo>
472         <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
473           <wsse:Reference URI="#CertAssociatedWithSigningKey"/>
474         </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

```

```
475         </ds:KeyInfo>
476
477         </ds:Signature>
478     </wsse:Security>
479 </S11:Header>
480 <S11:Body>
481     some items
482 </S11:Body>
483 </S11:Envelope>
484 --BoundaryStr
485 Content-Type: image/png
486 Content-ID: <bar>
487 Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
488
489 the image
```

## 490 5.5 Encryption

491 A SwA attachment may be encrypted for confidentiality protection, protecting either the MIME part content  
492 including selected MIME headers, or only the MIME part content.

493 This is done using XML Encryption to encrypt the attachment, placing the resulting cipher text in the  
494 updated attachment body replacing the original content, and placing a new <xenc:EncryptedData>  
495 element in the <wsse:Security> header. An <xenc:CipherReference> MUST link the  
496 <xenc:EncryptedData> element with the cipher data.

497 The key used for encryption MAY be conveyed using an <xenc:EncryptedKey> element in the  
498 <wsse:Security> header. In this case the <xenc:ReferenceList> element in the <xenc:EncryptedKey>  
499 element MUST contain an <xenc:DataReference> with a URI attribute specifying the  
500 <xenc:EncryptedData> element in the <wsse:Security> header corresponding to the attachment.

501 When the same <xenc:EncryptedKey> corresponds to multiple <xenc:EncryptedData> elements, the  
502 <xenc:ReferenceList> in the <xenc:EncryptedKey> element SHOULD contain an <xenc:DataReference>  
503 for each <xenc:EncryptedData> element, both for attachments and encrypted items in the primary SOAP  
504 envelope. References should be ordered to correspond to ordering of the security header elements.

505 When an <xenc:EncryptedKey> element is not used when encrypting an attachment, then the  
506 <xenc:EncryptedData> element MAY contain a <ds:KeyInfo> element to specify a key as outlined in the  
507 SOAP Message Security standard. Different deployments may have different requirements on how keys  
508 are referenced. When an <xenc:EncryptedKey> element is used the <xenc:EncryptedData> element  
509 MUST NOT contain a <ds:KeyInfo> element.

510 When an attachment is encrypted, an <xenc:EncryptedData> element will be placed in the  
511 <wsse:Security> header. An <xenc:ReferenceList> element associated with this <xenc:EncryptedData>  
512 element may also be added, as recommended by WSS: SOAP Message Security.

513 Note: The same CID is used to refer to the attachment before encryption and after. This  
514 avoids the need to rewrite references to the attachment, avoiding issues related to  
515 generating unique CIDs and relating to preserving the correspondence to the original  
516 WSDL definition.

### 517 5.5.1 MIME Part CipherReference

518 This profile requires that <xenc:EncryptedData> elements corresponding to encrypted SwA attachments  
519 use a <xenc:CipherReference> to refer to the cipher text, to be conveyed in the attachment. Upon  
520 encryption the MIME part attachment content is replaced with the encoded cipher text.

521 The <xenc:CipherReference> MUST have a <xenc:Transforms> child element. This element MUST have  
522 a <ds:Transform> child having an Algorithm attribute with a URI value specifying the Attachment-  
523 Ciphertext-Transform. This transform explicitly indicates that when dereferencing the MIME part  
524 reference that only the MIME part content is to be used as the cipher value.

525 The <xenc:CipherReference> MUST NOT contain a transform used for a transfer encoding purpose (e.g.  
526 the base64 transform). Transfer encoding is left to the MIME layer, as noted in section 2.

## 527 5.5.2 Encryption Processing Rules

528 The order of the following steps is not normative, although the result should be the same as if this order  
529 were followed.

530 1. When encrypting both attachments and primary SOAP envelope content using the same key, perform  
531 the attachment processing first.

532 Note: The SOAP Message Security standard states that elements should be prepended  
533 to the security header. This processing rule supports putting the <xenc:EncryptedData>  
534 element first in the header with <xenc:EncryptedKey> and tokens following. Thus, a  
535 receiver should be able to process the <xenc:EncryptedKey> before the  
536 <xenc:EncryptedData> element for the attachment.

537 2. Encrypt the attachment part using XML Encryption, according to the rules of XML Encryption. Encrypt  
538 either the attachment including content and selected MIME headers or only the attachment content.

539 When encryption includes MIME headers, only the headers listed in this specification for the Attachment-  
540 Complete-Signature-Transform (Section 5.3.2) are to be included in the encryption. If a header listed in  
541 the profile is present it MUST be included in the encryption. If a header is not listed in this profile, then it  
542 MUST NOT be included in the encryption.

543 3. Set the <xenc:EncryptedData> Type attribute value to a URI that specifies adherence to this profile  
544 and that specifies what was encrypted (MIME content or entire MIME part including headers). The  
545 following URIs MUST be used for this purpose:

546 • Content Only:

547 `http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-SwAProfile-1.1#Attachment-Content-`  
548 `Only`

549 • Content and headers:

550 `http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-SwAProfile-1.1#Attachment-Complete`

551  
552 4. Set the <xenc:EncryptedData> MimeType attribute to match the attachment MIME part Content-Type  
553 header before encryption when the Content-Only URI is specified for the Type attribute value. The  
554 MimeType attribute value MAY be set when the AttachmentComplete Type attribute value is specified.

555 5. Optionally set the <xenc:EncryptedData> Encoding attribute to reflect the attachment content  
556 encoding, as visible to the security layer at the time of encryption. This is advisory information to the  
557 decryption security layer. It should be understood that this has no relation with the actual encoding that  
558 could be performed independently by the MIME layer later for transfer purposes.

559 6. Set the <xenc:EncryptedData> <xenc:CipherReference> to the same reference URL for the  
560 attachment that was used before encryption . This MUST be a CID scheme URL referring to the  
561 attachment part Content-ID. Ensure this MIME header is in the part conveying the cipher data after  
562 encryption.

563 7. Include the Attachment-Ciphertext-Transform in the <xenc:CipherReference> <xenc:Transforms> list.

564 8. Prepend the <xenc:EncryptedData> element to the <wsse:Security> SOAP header block and then  
565 prepend the associated optional <xenc:ReferenceList> element.

566 9. Update the attachment MIME part, replacing the original content with the cipher text generated by the  
567 XML Encryption step.

568 10. Update the attachment MIME part header MIME Content-Type and Content-Length appropriate to the  
569 cipher data.

### 570 5.5.3 Decryption Processing Rules

571 The <xenc:CipherReference> URL MUST be a URL that refers to the MIME part containing the cipher  
572 text, and must also correspond to the reference value of the original attachment that was encrypted. This  
573 MUST be a CID scheme URL.

574 Decryption may be initiated upon locating the <xenc:EncryptedData> element in the <wsse:Security>  
575 header.

576 The following decryption steps must be performed so that the result is as if they were performed in this  
577 order:

- 578 1. Extract the cipher text from the attachment referenced by the <xenc:CipherReference> URL attribute.  
579 The Attachment-Ciphertext-Transform defined in this profile indicates that the MIME part content is  
580 extracted.
- 581 2. Decrypt the cipher text using the information present in the appropriate <xenc:EncryptedData>  
582 element and possibly other out of band information, according to the XML Encryption Standard.
- 583 3. If the <xenc:EncryptedData>Type attribute indicates that selected MIME headers were encrypted, then  
584 those MIME headers MUST be replaced by the result of decryption, as well as the MIME part content.
- 585 4. If the <xenc:EncryptedData>Type attribute indicates that only the content of the MIME part was  
586 encrypted, then the cipher text content of the attachment part MUST be replaced by the result of  
587 decryption. In this case the MIME part Content-Type header value MUST be replaced by the  
588 <xenc:EncryptedData> MimeType attribute value.
- 589 5. If the <xenc:EncryptedData> Encoding attribute is present then the decryption security layer may pass  
590 this advisory information to the application.

### 591 5.5.4 Example

592 This example shows encryption of the primary SOAP envelope body as well as an attachment using a  
593 single symmetric key conveyed using an EncryptedKey element.

```
594 Content-Type: multipart/related; boundary="BoundaryStr" type="text/xml"  
595 --BoundaryStr  
596 Content-Type: text/xml  
597  
598 <S11:Envelope  
599   xmlns:S11="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"  
600   xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-  
601   wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"  
602   xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"  
603   xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">  
604  
605   <S11:Header>  
606     <wsse:Security>  
607  
608       <wsse:BinarySecurityToken wsu:Id="Acert"  
609         EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-  
610 wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary"  
611         ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-  
612 x509-token-profile-1.0#x509v3">  
613         ...  
614       </wsse:BinarySecurityToken>  
615  
616       <xenc:EncryptedKey Id='EK'  
617         <EncryptionMethod  
618           Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5"/>  
619         <ds:KeyInfo Id="keyinfo">  
620           <wsse:SecurityTokenReference>  
621             <ds:X509Data>  
622               <ds:X509IssuerSerial>  
623                 <ds:X509IssuerName>  
624                   DC=ACMECorp, DC=com
```

```

625         </ds:X509IssuerName>
626         <ds:X509SerialNumber>12345678</X509SerialNumber>
627         </ds:X509IssuerSerial>
628     </ds:X509Data>
629     </wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
630 </ds:KeyInfo>
631 <CipherData><CipherValue>xyzabc</CipherValue></CipherData>
632 <ReferenceList>
633     <DataReference URI='#EA' />
634     <DataReference URI='#ED' />
635 </ReferenceList>
636 </EncryptedKey>
637
638 <xenc:EncryptedData
639     Id='EA'
640     Type="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-SwAProfile-
641 1.1#Attachment-Content-Only"
642     MimeTypes="image/png">
643     <xenc:EncryptionMethod
644         Algorithm='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc' />
645     <xenc:CipherData>
646         <xenc:CipherReference URI=cid:bar">
647             <xenc:Transforms>
648                 <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-
649 wss-SwAProfile-1.1#Attachment-Ciphertext-Transform"/>
650             </xenc:Transforms>
651         </xenc:CipherReference>
652     </xenc:CipherData>
653 </xenc:EncryptedData>
654
655 </wsse:Security>
656 </S11:Header>
657 <S11:Body>
658     <xenc:EncryptedData Id='ED'
659     <xenc:EncryptionMethod
660         Algorithm='http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc' />
661     <xenc:CipherData>
662         <xenc:CipherValue>DEADBEEF</xenc:CipherValue>
663     </xenc:CipherData>
664 </xenc:EncryptedData>
665 </S11:Body>
666 </S11:Envelope>
667 --BoundaryStr
668 Content-Type: application/octet-stream
669 Content-ID: <bar>
670 Content-Transfer-Encoding: binary
671
672 BinaryCipherData

```

## 673 5.6 Signing and Encryption

674 When portions of content are both signed and encrypted, there is possible confusion as to whether  
675 encrypted content need first be decrypted before signature verification. This confusion can occur when  
676 the order of operations is not clear [[DecryptT](#)]. This problem may be avoided with SOAP Message  
677 Security for SwA attachments when attachments and corresponding signatures and encryptions are  
678 targeted for a single SOAP recipient (actor). The SOAP Message Security standard explicitly states that  
679 there may not be two <wsse:Security> headers targeted at the same actor, nor may there be two headers  
680 without a designated actor. In this case the SOAP Message Security and SwA profile processing rules  
681 may eliminate ambiguity since each signing or encryption produces an element in the <wsse:Security>  
682 header, and these elements are ordered. (Signing produces <ds:Signature> elements and encryption  
683 produces <xenc:EncryptedData> elements).

684 If an application produces different <wsse:Security> headers targeted at different recipients, these are  
685 processed independently by the recipients. Thus there is no need to correlate activities between distinct  
686 headers – the order is inherent in the SOAP node model represented by the distinct actors.  
687

---

688 **6 Conformance**

689 An implementation conforms to this specification if it meets the requirements in Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 5.



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697

## B. Revision History

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Revision	Date	Editor	Changes Made
WD01	17-January-2011	Carlo Milono	Corrected/added hyperlinks where missing; added Status section
WD02	8-February-2011	Carlo Milono	Added Related Work to reflect v1.1.1 of the specs; changed References for SOAP Message Security to reflect v1.1.1; Changed WD# to 2; Added Date; Moved Current Members to Previous and added new Current Members; saved document under wd02; entered the Revision History  Merged Old Current Contributors with Old Previous, created a New Current Contributors.
WD03	16-March-2011	David Turner	Corrected and updated links
WD04	23-March-2011	David Turner	Fixed namespace in example at Lines 645-646 and removed a few errant spaces.
CSD01	2-May-2011	TC Admin	Generated from WD04
CSD02-draft	16-May-11	David Turner	Added conformance statement and corrected a few formatting issues.

699